国内移动支付产业的协作模式
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摘要
本文重点讨论移动支付产业的协作模式,分析协作模式选择的影响因素。由于移动支付在监管政策、技术模式、业务模式和商业模式方面都存在很多的不确定性,任何一个因素的变化都有可能导致协作模式的改变,因此,本文的研究都是建立在移动运营商市场准入的成本很高以及移动支付商业模式与银行卡支付产业相同的假设基础。
论文共分七章。第一章为绪论,简单阐述为什么需要关注移动支付产业协作模式这一问题,并概述了相关的理论研究进展。
第二章分析了海外移动支付业务的发展经验。在对移动支付产业链结构和主要环节的职能与定位的分析基础上,提出了移动支付产业存在两个双边平台,即支付转接平台和支付应用平台。这是移动支付产业各方关注和争夺的焦点。同时,总结并简单对比了目前存在的三种协作模式:移动运营商为主导、银行卡公司为主导以及第三方支付服务提供商为主导。
第三章研究了移动支付产业的经济性质。系统复杂性这一经济特性是该产业具有高度复杂性的基本原因,支付业的双边市场特性与手机、互联网的结合使得移动支付商业模式的创新成为可能并将由此带来支付业的变革,同时,移动支付产业价值网络的形成对原先的产业主导者提出了新挑战。
第四章和第五章主要采用双边市场理论和博弈论这两个分析工具,建立了移动支付转接平台市场均衡的定量模型和移动支付应用平台所有权设计的定量模型。第四章的研究结果表明:移动运营商和银行卡公司的博弈是个长期且随产业环境变化而变化的过程,双方采用竞争策略还是合作策略与系统的初始状态有很大关系。在移动支付盈利模式沿袭传统银行卡支付以及移动运营商独自运营移动支付转接平台的成本很高的假定条件下,移动运营商与银行卡公司的合作将会成为主流方式。
第五章的研究结果表明:在只考虑平台初期投入的固定成本的情况下,主要的移动支付服务提供商之间(移动运营商、银行、行业卡运营商等)应该进行合作,共同拥有并运营该平台。当且仅当第三方市场呈现完全竞争的状况,平台所有者才会将经营权外包。尽管存在经营可变成本的移动支付平台是更加符合现实状况的一种假设,但由于计算结果十分复杂,只能推断出大致的结论。在所有权和经营权分离的情况下,最终达到哪种均衡将取决于分红比例的大小,分红比例改变将可能使得第三方经营时带来的社会总福利较之所有权经营权统一时有所改进。
第六章提出了国内的移动支付产业协作模式。在对国内移动支付产业环境和主要参与主体(移动运营商、银行、银联)的SWOT和发展策略对比的基础上,结合第四章和第五章的定量研究结果,提出:目前最适合我国移动支付业务发展的协作模式是主要的移动运营商与银行之间建立股权式战略联盟——成立合资公司——共同负责移动支付应用平台的运营,同时,与以中国银联为主的第三方支付服务提供商建立契约式战略联盟,由其提供跨行转接服务。
这种模式的特点是:移动运营商与银行关注各自的核心产品,在信息安全、产品开发和资源共享方面达成更加紧密的合作,并共同控制整条产业链;中国银联的跨行转接作用得到保证,但市场不再呈现独家垄断的局面,竞争者数量的增加有利于激活企业的活力,提高国内该行业的整体效率和竞争力。
第七章是结论,对本文的主要思想进行归纳总结,并提出了本文需要进一步展开深入研究的一些问题。
This article focuses on the co-operation model of mobile payment industry and analyzes the potentially relevant influencing factors. As there are lots of uncertainty of technology trend and business model,any will lead to the change of co-opertion model,the research is based on the assumption that the mobile operater faces high cost for market entry and the business model of the mobile payment is the same as the bankcard payment.
The structure of the article includes seven chapters. Chapter 1 simply gives the reasons why we pay attention to mobile payment co-operation model.
Chapter 2 points out the experiences of overseas mobile payment industry. On the basis of the study about the structure of this industry chain and the functions and positions of key links, we find out that there are two two-sided platforms in the mobile payment industry, that is, the payment swith platform and the payment application platform which are focus of the mobile payment industry. Then we conclude and contrast three current co-operation models: the mobile operator as the dominant player, the bankcard association as the dominant player and the third-party payment service provider as the dominant player.
Chapter 3 researches the economic properties of the mobile payment industry, including the system complexity, the two-sided market and the value network formation. The system complexity leads to the industry complicacy. The property of the two-sided market makes it possible the creation of business model and will causes the revolution of the payment industry. The transition from the value chain to the value network challenges the traditional industry leader.
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 build the quantity models about the market equilibrium of the payment swith platform and the ownership design of the payment application platform. Chapter 4 finds out the gaming between the mobile operator and the bankcard association varies with the industry environment from a long-term point of view. Two sides choose competition or collaboration depending on the initial situation of the whole system. If the business model of the mobile payment fixes with the bankcard industry and the mobile operator independently runs the swith platform with high cost, the co-operation between the mobile operator and the bankcard association will become the main way.
Chapter 5 shows the main mobile payment service providers should work together including mobile operators, banks and industry-card operators, if we only count the prime fix cost about the platform build. Only if the third-party market owns the perfect competition structure, the platform owner just outsources the managerial authority. Although the platform cost involves variable cost in reality, we only draw the rough conclusion for the complex result. Under the separation from propriety to managerial authority, the market equilibrium depends on the proportion of share in profits which possibly changes the social welfare.
Chapter 6 proposes the domestic co-operation model. After the comparison of the SWOT and developing strategy among main players, combining with the first two chapters' research, we indicate that the most suitable co-operation model is to buildthe shares of strategic alliance among main mobile operators and banks------establishthe joint venture which runs the mobile application platform. At the same time, they should build the contractual strategic alliance with the third-party payment service providers involving Chinaunionpay who can provide payment swith service.
The characteristics are that mobile operators and banks focus on their respective key products, come to the close agreement on the information safety, the product development and the resource share, then control the whole industry chain together. Under this framework, Chinaunionpay still keeps its payment swith position but faces more violent competition. The number of competitors increasing is helpful to activate the vigour of enterprises, to enhance the industry efficiency and the competitive power.
The last chapter draws the conclusion of main findings in this article, and brings forward some aspects which need to study more deeply.
论文共分七章。第一章为绪论,简单阐述为什么需要关注移动支付产业协作模式这一问题,并概述了相关的理论研究进展。
第二章分析了海外移动支付业务的发展经验。在对移动支付产业链结构和主要环节的职能与定位的分析基础上,提出了移动支付产业存在两个双边平台,即支付转接平台和支付应用平台。这是移动支付产业各方关注和争夺的焦点。同时,总结并简单对比了目前存在的三种协作模式:移动运营商为主导、银行卡公司为主导以及第三方支付服务提供商为主导。
第三章研究了移动支付产业的经济性质。系统复杂性这一经济特性是该产业具有高度复杂性的基本原因,支付业的双边市场特性与手机、互联网的结合使得移动支付商业模式的创新成为可能并将由此带来支付业的变革,同时,移动支付产业价值网络的形成对原先的产业主导者提出了新挑战。
第四章和第五章主要采用双边市场理论和博弈论这两个分析工具,建立了移动支付转接平台市场均衡的定量模型和移动支付应用平台所有权设计的定量模型。第四章的研究结果表明:移动运营商和银行卡公司的博弈是个长期且随产业环境变化而变化的过程,双方采用竞争策略还是合作策略与系统的初始状态有很大关系。在移动支付盈利模式沿袭传统银行卡支付以及移动运营商独自运营移动支付转接平台的成本很高的假定条件下,移动运营商与银行卡公司的合作将会成为主流方式。
第五章的研究结果表明:在只考虑平台初期投入的固定成本的情况下,主要的移动支付服务提供商之间(移动运营商、银行、行业卡运营商等)应该进行合作,共同拥有并运营该平台。当且仅当第三方市场呈现完全竞争的状况,平台所有者才会将经营权外包。尽管存在经营可变成本的移动支付平台是更加符合现实状况的一种假设,但由于计算结果十分复杂,只能推断出大致的结论。在所有权和经营权分离的情况下,最终达到哪种均衡将取决于分红比例的大小,分红比例改变将可能使得第三方经营时带来的社会总福利较之所有权经营权统一时有所改进。
第六章提出了国内的移动支付产业协作模式。在对国内移动支付产业环境和主要参与主体(移动运营商、银行、银联)的SWOT和发展策略对比的基础上,结合第四章和第五章的定量研究结果,提出:目前最适合我国移动支付业务发展的协作模式是主要的移动运营商与银行之间建立股权式战略联盟——成立合资公司——共同负责移动支付应用平台的运营,同时,与以中国银联为主的第三方支付服务提供商建立契约式战略联盟,由其提供跨行转接服务。
这种模式的特点是:移动运营商与银行关注各自的核心产品,在信息安全、产品开发和资源共享方面达成更加紧密的合作,并共同控制整条产业链;中国银联的跨行转接作用得到保证,但市场不再呈现独家垄断的局面,竞争者数量的增加有利于激活企业的活力,提高国内该行业的整体效率和竞争力。
第七章是结论,对本文的主要思想进行归纳总结,并提出了本文需要进一步展开深入研究的一些问题。
This article focuses on the co-operation model of mobile payment industry and analyzes the potentially relevant influencing factors. As there are lots of uncertainty of technology trend and business model,any will lead to the change of co-opertion model,the research is based on the assumption that the mobile operater faces high cost for market entry and the business model of the mobile payment is the same as the bankcard payment.
The structure of the article includes seven chapters. Chapter 1 simply gives the reasons why we pay attention to mobile payment co-operation model.
Chapter 2 points out the experiences of overseas mobile payment industry. On the basis of the study about the structure of this industry chain and the functions and positions of key links, we find out that there are two two-sided platforms in the mobile payment industry, that is, the payment swith platform and the payment application platform which are focus of the mobile payment industry. Then we conclude and contrast three current co-operation models: the mobile operator as the dominant player, the bankcard association as the dominant player and the third-party payment service provider as the dominant player.
Chapter 3 researches the economic properties of the mobile payment industry, including the system complexity, the two-sided market and the value network formation. The system complexity leads to the industry complicacy. The property of the two-sided market makes it possible the creation of business model and will causes the revolution of the payment industry. The transition from the value chain to the value network challenges the traditional industry leader.
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 build the quantity models about the market equilibrium of the payment swith platform and the ownership design of the payment application platform. Chapter 4 finds out the gaming between the mobile operator and the bankcard association varies with the industry environment from a long-term point of view. Two sides choose competition or collaboration depending on the initial situation of the whole system. If the business model of the mobile payment fixes with the bankcard industry and the mobile operator independently runs the swith platform with high cost, the co-operation between the mobile operator and the bankcard association will become the main way.
Chapter 5 shows the main mobile payment service providers should work together including mobile operators, banks and industry-card operators, if we only count the prime fix cost about the platform build. Only if the third-party market owns the perfect competition structure, the platform owner just outsources the managerial authority. Although the platform cost involves variable cost in reality, we only draw the rough conclusion for the complex result. Under the separation from propriety to managerial authority, the market equilibrium depends on the proportion of share in profits which possibly changes the social welfare.
Chapter 6 proposes the domestic co-operation model. After the comparison of the SWOT and developing strategy among main players, combining with the first two chapters' research, we indicate that the most suitable co-operation model is to buildthe shares of strategic alliance among main mobile operators and banks------establishthe joint venture which runs the mobile application platform. At the same time, they should build the contractual strategic alliance with the third-party payment service providers involving Chinaunionpay who can provide payment swith service.
The characteristics are that mobile operators and banks focus on their respective key products, come to the close agreement on the information safety, the product development and the resource share, then control the whole industry chain together. Under this framework, Chinaunionpay still keeps its payment swith position but faces more violent competition. The number of competitors increasing is helpful to activate the vigour of enterprises, to enhance the industry efficiency and the competitive power.
The last chapter draws the conclusion of main findings in this article, and brings forward some aspects which need to study more deeply.
引文
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