存款保险制度与中国选择
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摘要
存款保险制度作为金融安全网的重要组成部分,自1934年在美国首创以来,目前在全球多数国家已被引入以保障存款人利益和维护金融稳定,并取得了积极成效,我国也正积极筹划建立这项制度。本文从存款保险的基本概念出发,回顾了存款保险制度的相关理论和争论,整理了我国的相关研究文献；并建立模型分析了存款保险对银行风险的影响。然后,根据我国处理问题金融机构的实践,本文发现我国长期以来存在着隐性存款保险,并从制度经济学视角阐述这是国家以短期财政成本最小化的方式控制金融资源、支持经济发展的选择;进一步通过实证检验发现我国隐性存款保险覆盖了整个银行业,并较显著的从数量渠道激励了银行风险。但是,随着金融稳定日益重要,隐性存款保险改革的迫切性逐渐显现。
伴随着我国宏观经济和银行业的成长发展,金融监管体制以及法律制度的不断完善,我国引入存款保险制度的环境日渐成熟。我国应当积极适时做出建立存款保险制度的制度创新,完善金融安全网：改变以国家信用支撑银行体系的状况,转向依托市场化机制来保护存款人利益。通过比较和借鉴世界各国实施存款保险制度的成功经验,本文对我国存款保险制度的目标、保险范围、保险限额、保险费率进行了探索,并从微观和宏观角度对引入该项制度后的可能影响进行了分析。
Deposit insurance system is an important component of financial safety net. Now, Deposit insurance system has been established to protect the benefit of depositors and financial system stability, and achieved positive results in most countries around world since FDIC has implemented it successfully in 1934. China is also actively planning to introduce this system. This paper reviews the literatures on deposit insurance domestic and abroad, and then establishes a model to analyze how the deposit insurance system impacts bank risk. According to disposals of the failed financial institutions, this paper shows that there has existed implicit deposit insurance in China for a long time from the perspective of institutional economics, because Chinese government tried to control financial resources to support economic development at the minimize cost of fiscal expenses. Also, the empirical results show that implicit deposit insurance covers the entire banking industry in China, and incentives bank risk by the means of deposit volume more significantly. As importance of financial stability enhances gradually, implicit deposit insurance has to be reformed.
With the development of economic and banking industry, and the improvement of the financial regulatory system and legal system in China, the institutional environment is maturing for introducing explicit deposit insurance system. China should make a timely decision to establish deposit insurance system to consummate the financial safety net to protect the benefit of depositor, based on market mechanism instead of the national credit. By comparing the successful experience of the deposit insurance system in six countries, this paper has discussed some key factors such as the goal, coverage and premium of deposit insurance system in China by drawing on the successful experience of deposit insurance system around world, and analyzes the potential impact from micro and macro perspective when deposit insurance system would be introduced in China.
伴随着我国宏观经济和银行业的成长发展,金融监管体制以及法律制度的不断完善,我国引入存款保险制度的环境日渐成熟。我国应当积极适时做出建立存款保险制度的制度创新,完善金融安全网：改变以国家信用支撑银行体系的状况,转向依托市场化机制来保护存款人利益。通过比较和借鉴世界各国实施存款保险制度的成功经验,本文对我国存款保险制度的目标、保险范围、保险限额、保险费率进行了探索,并从微观和宏观角度对引入该项制度后的可能影响进行了分析。
Deposit insurance system is an important component of financial safety net. Now, Deposit insurance system has been established to protect the benefit of depositors and financial system stability, and achieved positive results in most countries around world since FDIC has implemented it successfully in 1934. China is also actively planning to introduce this system. This paper reviews the literatures on deposit insurance domestic and abroad, and then establishes a model to analyze how the deposit insurance system impacts bank risk. According to disposals of the failed financial institutions, this paper shows that there has existed implicit deposit insurance in China for a long time from the perspective of institutional economics, because Chinese government tried to control financial resources to support economic development at the minimize cost of fiscal expenses. Also, the empirical results show that implicit deposit insurance covers the entire banking industry in China, and incentives bank risk by the means of deposit volume more significantly. As importance of financial stability enhances gradually, implicit deposit insurance has to be reformed.
With the development of economic and banking industry, and the improvement of the financial regulatory system and legal system in China, the institutional environment is maturing for introducing explicit deposit insurance system. China should make a timely decision to establish deposit insurance system to consummate the financial safety net to protect the benefit of depositor, based on market mechanism instead of the national credit. By comparing the successful experience of the deposit insurance system in six countries, this paper has discussed some key factors such as the goal, coverage and premium of deposit insurance system in China by drawing on the successful experience of deposit insurance system around world, and analyzes the potential impact from micro and macro perspective when deposit insurance system would be introduced in China.
引文
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