互联网产业竞争与规制
摘要
信息社会正在以人们无法想象的速度发展,其日新月异的商业模式不断改变着人们的生活。人类每天的生活已经无法离开网络提供的新闻网页、邮件、搜索、微博、阅读、音乐等等,互联网已经成为如同公路、供电、供水、供气系统等一样的重要基础设施。互联网产业链可以分为三个部分：互联网骨干网运营商(IBP),互联网服务提供商(ISP)和互联网内容提供商(ICP),其中ICP是一个完全竞争的创新市场,也是一般理解的互联网的各种应用和服务,而前两者作为基础设施在产业竞争中具有重要意义。
国际学术界对互联网竞争的研究主要集中在网间的互联、接入定价和双边市场等方面,主要观点为：互联网的骨干网竞争主要表现为对互联的动机和结算的定价。从规制的角度而言国际普遍的观点认为互联网是一个创新的市场,不需要规制,或者应该实施“轻手规制”。但规制体系和市场结构的不同是国内外互联网产业现状的最大差异,寡头垄断、纵向一体化的市场结构、三网融合的困境是国内互联网产业不能回避的关键问题。
基于此,本文以互联网产业的竞争格局为核心,沿着网络互联、市场进入和产业变革的方向展开研究。本文基于对互联网的经济特性和技术特性比较研究,对骨干网的互联动机进行模型研究和经验分析,揭示骨干网垄断结构条件下互联激励和互联质量的困境,并根据双边市场特性下的出网定价模型揭示定价的原则；本文从纵向一体化和市场关闭的视角,揭开互联网骨干网瓶颈设施的垄断力量延伸特征,以经验数据和案例阐述在纵向一体化的成本优势支持下ISP接入定价的原理,也以数字融合理论为基础对三网融合的进程进行了比较研究；同时本文对于产业进一步发展趋势进行分析,即互联网永不停息的创新浪潮下OTT业务对互联网网络运营企业的冲击,通过网络中立立法和智能管道的抗争两方面研究提出对网络中立规制前沿的政策取向；本文还综合提出了互联网规制框架,从一体化的规制部门设计、互联互通的规制、结算价格管理等多方面对规制的设想和建议。本文的主要内容如下：
(一)互联网的经济特性
本文深入比较研究互联网的经济技术特性,认为尽力而为的技术特性和双边市场的经济特性是互联网和电信网的重要特性区别。互联网既被看作传统电信网的一部分,但又存在和电信网明显不同之处。互联网和电信网相同之处在于具有沉淀成本属性、自然垄断属性、范围经济属性和网络外部性,但其外部性强于电信网。互联网和电信特性存在差异之处在于：互联网的技术特性与其他电信网存在较大的区别,传统电信网强调业务的Qos,互联网表现为尽力而为,即由于互联网网络的组织形式和技术标准特点,业务的质量取决于相互竞争的业务对带宽的争夺,网络提供商无法保障严格的服务质量；同时互联网具有很强的双边市场特性,即互联网的用户群体可以分为用户和网站两个部分组成,互联网提供商作为平台运营商,用户群双方总价格不变时价格结构变化会影响到交易量。双边市场特性还表现在“鸡和蛋”的困境,如何启动一个双边市场平台,进入者可以通过提高优惠市场的用户受益程度,吸引该边市场用户加入平台,从而获得更多另一边市场用户(平台利润的主要来源方)的加入,但如果市场中存在一个强势的垄断者则“鸡和蛋”的困境将更加突出。
同时互联网的双线接入特性也使得对其竞争的研究视角发生变化,双线接入特性表现为一边用户能加入多个平台,为了能享受更大的另一边用户规模的网络效应。
(二)骨干网的互联和竞争(产业链上游)
本文通过建立以互联质量和市场份额为研究对象的竞争模型,认为在单线接入条件下,大的骨干网倾向于选择比小的骨干网更低的互联质量,并且大的骨干网随着用户基数份额越大,其选择的互联质量将下降。在中国市场数据的经验分析中得出只有在互联质量0=1时,新增用户的市场份额差保持为0,否则随着0的下降,新增用户市场份额差将逐步扩大到20%,大的骨干网通过控制互联互通提高网络差异化,提高了市场份额。并且互联质量降低了小骨干网的均衡价格,降低了消费者剩余和社会总福利。在多线接入的模型中多线接入并未改变大的骨干网倾向选择比较小骨干网更低的互联质量的情况,但在不增加用户成本的假设下,多线接入将扩展用户需求。
本文通过对互联网互联结算的出网定价(OFFNET)模型研究,提出在平衡流量模型、不存在网络差异性的骨干网之间的完美的竞争下,企业利润为零,企业不关心接入费水平,在实际中,骨干网通常选择Bill and Keep的方式来降低交易成本正是反映了这一结论。
骨干网的竞争策略研究认为主导运营商将采取阻碍互联、降低互联质量和提高互联价格等多方面的策略,并且从经验数据研究了中国互联网实际互联带宽严重不足的现状。
(三)ISP的接入和三网融合(产业链中游)
本文针对互联网产业链的IBP和ISP的上下游产业结构,参考Rey和Tirole(1997)及姜春海(2006)的一般性模型,开展对纵向一体化的古诺竞争模型研究,提出纵向一体化的IBP是否对寻求接入的ISP采取垂直排斥取决于纵向一体化的IBP在ISP产业环节是否有成本竞争优势。如果IBP在ISP产业环节成本处于优势,则IBP向ISP收取的接入费高于非纵向一体化的情况。从接入费的经验分析结果看,IBP实施了垂直排斥,并且垂直排斥的程度和成本优势的程度正相关。因此国内纵向一体化的市场结构延伸了主导企业在IBP环节的垄断优势,使得ISP环节的竞争趋于寡头垄断结构。
本文比较了三网融合的进程,开展基于产品组合需求模型的产业融合规制研究,认为部分放松形成的不对称进入规制不能形成有效的市场结构,可能会导致获得市场进入权的企业对在位企业的市场排斥,市场进入并不有效；完全放松的对称进入的数字融合规制能形成有效的全业务竞争格局,消费者的选择和企业的利润均能得到保证。并由此对国内三网融合和互联网进行经验分析。
(四)网络中立和智能管道(产业链下游)
在互联网的快速发展过程中,大量内容企业OTT业务快速渗透,在大量使用网络流量的情况下对基础运营商的网络形成巨大压力,且客户的价值也转向了应用和内容。站在产业发展的前沿,本文分别从互联网产业链发展趋势,网络中立的研究现状、网络中立和智能管道等方面对网络中立和互联网规制进行初步研究,并成为本文关于互联网网络竞争和规制的重要组成部分
(五)互联网的规制体系
本文通过对国内互联网规制现状和国际互联网规制借鉴的梳理,阐述了国内互联网规制存在的主要问题,提出了产业发展政策先导、以三网融合为契机对骨干网引入竞争、加大对骨干网互联的管理、对ISP接入价格纳入规制范围、开放驻地网接入市场和逐步引入网络中立思想等方面的规制设想。
The development of the information society in the express way is changing our life beyond our expectation. We can't live without the news webpage, mail, search, micro-blog (twitter), reading, music etc that provided on the internet. The Internet industry has become important infrastructure as highroad, electric power and water delivery system. The Internet industry can be divided into three segments:internet backbone network operators (IBP), internet service providers (ISP) and Internet content providers (ICP). The ICPs segment is a completely competitive innovative market just as the concept we usually understand. But the status and competition of the former two segments are in the core position of the internet industry.
International academic research on internet competition mainly focused on the network interconnection, access pricing, two-sided market. It is considered that the backbone network competitive mainly included the motivation and settlement of interconnection pricing, and the internet is a innovation market that need not to be regulated or the internet should be regulated bu the "light-hand". But the regulation system and the market structures of internet are so different between china and foreign country, the oligopoly structure, vertical integration, digital convergence are the unavoidable key problems of domestic Internet industry.
Therefore, the paper centers on the internet industry competition structure, discusses the network interconnection, market entry and industrial change. Comparative study the economic characteristics and technological characteristics of the internet industry, the paper analyses the interconnect motivation of backbone network on a model and empirical research, and reveal the predicament of interconnect motivation and interconnection quality in the monopoly structure, and give the access pricing principles according the off-net stream model. From the perspective of vertical integration and foreclosure it reveals that the bottleneck facilities of Internet backbone will extend its market power, and it gives the ISP access pricing principles when the vertical integrated backbone has the cost advantage with empirical data and cases. The paper gives a comparative study on digital convergence with theory procedures. Then the paper analyses the trend of the internet industry, focuses on the impact that the creative OTT services conducted on the network operations, gives the policy guideline to network neutrality considered the network neutrality legislation and intelligent pipeline resistance of the carries. Based on the studies the paper gives a internet regulation framework, from the design of an integrated regulation department, internet interconnection regulation, access pricing regulation and other ideas and suggestions. The main contents are as follows:
(1) The economic characteristics of the Internet
The paper comparative studies the economic and technical characteristics of the Internet, it consider that the technical characteristic of "Do my best" and two-sided market economic characteristic are the most important differences between internet and telecom network. The Internet can be regarded as a part of traditional telecommunication network, but also be obvious different. The Internet and telecom network have the same characters of sunk cost, natural monopoly, economies of scope, network externalities which is stronger than telecommunication network. The characteristic difference between internet and telecommunications lies in:there is a great technical character difference is quality, which the traditional telecommunications services perform Qos and the internet perform "do my best". Because of the structure and the technique standard of internet network, quality of service depends on the competing for bandwidth, which is unpredictable. The internet industry has strong two-sided market character. As The customer groups can be divided into two sides: users and website, the internet provider plays the role as platform operators of the two-sided market. When the total price of two sides keep unchanged the price structure of two sides changes will affect the demand. The two-sided market characteristics is shown as the "chicken and egg " dilemma:how to start a two-sided market platform; entrants can improve the preferential market one side users benefit, attract another side users to join the platform; If there is a strong monopoly platform in the market,the " chicken and egg " dilemma will be more serious.
Multi-homing characteristics of Internet changes the perspective of our studies, in which case customers can join two platform in order to enjoy greater network effect.
(2) Interconnection and competition of backbone network (the upstream of the internet industry)
Through the establishment of competition model of interconnection quality and market share, we argue that large backbone networks tend to choose lower quality with the small internet backbone, and the higher share advantage the dominant backbone has, the low quality will be. The empirical study of Chinese market show that only when the interconnection quality is best (θ=1), the new user market share difference will be0. Otherwise with quality decrease, add user market share difference will gradually expand to20%and the dominant backbone keep quality advantage and get more share of the new users market through give a bad interconnection quality. And also the interconnection quality reduced the equilibrium price of the small backbone and reduced the consumer surplus and social welfare. Multi-homing access does not change the backbone quality choice of interconnection, but Multi-homing access increase the whole demand.
By studying the OFF-NET model of Internet interconnection settlement between backbone networks, when the competition is perfect and the stream is balanced, the profit will be zero, and the firms do not care about the price of access. In fact, backbones usually take Bill and Keep to reduce the transaction cost, in which the backbone of bills the access traffic without actual settlement.
Study on backbones'competitive strategy indicate that the dominant backbone will blocking the interconnection, reducing interconnection quality and increasing the interconnection price and etc. the empirical data of China prove that Internet Interconnection bandwidth is of serious shortage.
(3) The access between IBP and ISP, digital convergence,(the middlestream of the internet industry)
The IBP and ISP are the upstream and downstream segment of the internet industry. The paper studies vertical integration and market foreclosure based on the model of Rey and Tirole (1997) and Jiang (2006), Put forward that whether the vertical integrated IBP foreclosure in the ISP segment depends on the IBP's cost advantage. If the IBP has cost advantage in the ISP segment, IBP intend to charge the ISP higher access price than the price without vertical integration. As the result of empirical analysis, we prove that IBP implement access price for vertical foreclosure and the intensity of vertical foreclosure is positively related to the degree of IBP's cost advantage in ISP segment of. Therefore, the vertical structure of market extends the monopoly power to ISP segment, and the ISP segment seems to be more oligopoly structure.
After discussed on the comparison of digital convergence, the paper studies product mix model of industry convergence and regulation policy. It proves that partial relaxation regulation of entry cannot form workable market structure, and the convergence firm will exclude the in cabinet firm without convergence. The entry is not efficient. Completely relax of entry regulation can form a competition pattern effectively, in which the consumer choice and the profit of the firms can be guaranteed. A empirical study on the convergence of domestic market is carried out at the last.
(4) Network neutrality and smart pipe convergence (the downstream of the internet industry)
As the rapid development of Internet, lots of OTT services are booming, the network traffic compact to frustrations network, and the customer value transfer to the application and content. The paper studies the forefront of industry trend, network neutrality, smart pipe, and give some viewpoint on regulation of network neutrality. This part on net neutrality is also an important part of the Internet network competition and regulation policy.
(5) Regulation framework in Internet industry
The paper points out main problems of domestic Internet regulation based on the regulation theory studying and the domestic Internet regulation analysising. It gives some suggestions on Internet regulation:industry development policy guidance; introduce competition to the backbone segment as the digital convergence being implemented; regulate the interconnection of backbone; regulate the access price of ISP; open loop access market; and gradually introduce network neutrality thoughts.
国际学术界对互联网竞争的研究主要集中在网间的互联、接入定价和双边市场等方面,主要观点为：互联网的骨干网竞争主要表现为对互联的动机和结算的定价。从规制的角度而言国际普遍的观点认为互联网是一个创新的市场,不需要规制,或者应该实施“轻手规制”。但规制体系和市场结构的不同是国内外互联网产业现状的最大差异,寡头垄断、纵向一体化的市场结构、三网融合的困境是国内互联网产业不能回避的关键问题。
基于此,本文以互联网产业的竞争格局为核心,沿着网络互联、市场进入和产业变革的方向展开研究。本文基于对互联网的经济特性和技术特性比较研究,对骨干网的互联动机进行模型研究和经验分析,揭示骨干网垄断结构条件下互联激励和互联质量的困境,并根据双边市场特性下的出网定价模型揭示定价的原则；本文从纵向一体化和市场关闭的视角,揭开互联网骨干网瓶颈设施的垄断力量延伸特征,以经验数据和案例阐述在纵向一体化的成本优势支持下ISP接入定价的原理,也以数字融合理论为基础对三网融合的进程进行了比较研究；同时本文对于产业进一步发展趋势进行分析,即互联网永不停息的创新浪潮下OTT业务对互联网网络运营企业的冲击,通过网络中立立法和智能管道的抗争两方面研究提出对网络中立规制前沿的政策取向；本文还综合提出了互联网规制框架,从一体化的规制部门设计、互联互通的规制、结算价格管理等多方面对规制的设想和建议。本文的主要内容如下：
(一)互联网的经济特性
本文深入比较研究互联网的经济技术特性,认为尽力而为的技术特性和双边市场的经济特性是互联网和电信网的重要特性区别。互联网既被看作传统电信网的一部分,但又存在和电信网明显不同之处。互联网和电信网相同之处在于具有沉淀成本属性、自然垄断属性、范围经济属性和网络外部性,但其外部性强于电信网。互联网和电信特性存在差异之处在于：互联网的技术特性与其他电信网存在较大的区别,传统电信网强调业务的Qos,互联网表现为尽力而为,即由于互联网网络的组织形式和技术标准特点,业务的质量取决于相互竞争的业务对带宽的争夺,网络提供商无法保障严格的服务质量；同时互联网具有很强的双边市场特性,即互联网的用户群体可以分为用户和网站两个部分组成,互联网提供商作为平台运营商,用户群双方总价格不变时价格结构变化会影响到交易量。双边市场特性还表现在“鸡和蛋”的困境,如何启动一个双边市场平台,进入者可以通过提高优惠市场的用户受益程度,吸引该边市场用户加入平台,从而获得更多另一边市场用户(平台利润的主要来源方)的加入,但如果市场中存在一个强势的垄断者则“鸡和蛋”的困境将更加突出。
同时互联网的双线接入特性也使得对其竞争的研究视角发生变化,双线接入特性表现为一边用户能加入多个平台,为了能享受更大的另一边用户规模的网络效应。
(二)骨干网的互联和竞争(产业链上游)
本文通过建立以互联质量和市场份额为研究对象的竞争模型,认为在单线接入条件下,大的骨干网倾向于选择比小的骨干网更低的互联质量,并且大的骨干网随着用户基数份额越大,其选择的互联质量将下降。在中国市场数据的经验分析中得出只有在互联质量0=1时,新增用户的市场份额差保持为0,否则随着0的下降,新增用户市场份额差将逐步扩大到20%,大的骨干网通过控制互联互通提高网络差异化,提高了市场份额。并且互联质量降低了小骨干网的均衡价格,降低了消费者剩余和社会总福利。在多线接入的模型中多线接入并未改变大的骨干网倾向选择比较小骨干网更低的互联质量的情况,但在不增加用户成本的假设下,多线接入将扩展用户需求。
本文通过对互联网互联结算的出网定价(OFFNET)模型研究,提出在平衡流量模型、不存在网络差异性的骨干网之间的完美的竞争下,企业利润为零,企业不关心接入费水平,在实际中,骨干网通常选择Bill and Keep的方式来降低交易成本正是反映了这一结论。
骨干网的竞争策略研究认为主导运营商将采取阻碍互联、降低互联质量和提高互联价格等多方面的策略,并且从经验数据研究了中国互联网实际互联带宽严重不足的现状。
(三)ISP的接入和三网融合(产业链中游)
本文针对互联网产业链的IBP和ISP的上下游产业结构,参考Rey和Tirole(1997)及姜春海(2006)的一般性模型,开展对纵向一体化的古诺竞争模型研究,提出纵向一体化的IBP是否对寻求接入的ISP采取垂直排斥取决于纵向一体化的IBP在ISP产业环节是否有成本竞争优势。如果IBP在ISP产业环节成本处于优势,则IBP向ISP收取的接入费高于非纵向一体化的情况。从接入费的经验分析结果看,IBP实施了垂直排斥,并且垂直排斥的程度和成本优势的程度正相关。因此国内纵向一体化的市场结构延伸了主导企业在IBP环节的垄断优势,使得ISP环节的竞争趋于寡头垄断结构。
本文比较了三网融合的进程,开展基于产品组合需求模型的产业融合规制研究,认为部分放松形成的不对称进入规制不能形成有效的市场结构,可能会导致获得市场进入权的企业对在位企业的市场排斥,市场进入并不有效；完全放松的对称进入的数字融合规制能形成有效的全业务竞争格局,消费者的选择和企业的利润均能得到保证。并由此对国内三网融合和互联网进行经验分析。
(四)网络中立和智能管道(产业链下游)
在互联网的快速发展过程中,大量内容企业OTT业务快速渗透,在大量使用网络流量的情况下对基础运营商的网络形成巨大压力,且客户的价值也转向了应用和内容。站在产业发展的前沿,本文分别从互联网产业链发展趋势,网络中立的研究现状、网络中立和智能管道等方面对网络中立和互联网规制进行初步研究,并成为本文关于互联网网络竞争和规制的重要组成部分
(五)互联网的规制体系
本文通过对国内互联网规制现状和国际互联网规制借鉴的梳理,阐述了国内互联网规制存在的主要问题,提出了产业发展政策先导、以三网融合为契机对骨干网引入竞争、加大对骨干网互联的管理、对ISP接入价格纳入规制范围、开放驻地网接入市场和逐步引入网络中立思想等方面的规制设想。
The development of the information society in the express way is changing our life beyond our expectation. We can't live without the news webpage, mail, search, micro-blog (twitter), reading, music etc that provided on the internet. The Internet industry has become important infrastructure as highroad, electric power and water delivery system. The Internet industry can be divided into three segments:internet backbone network operators (IBP), internet service providers (ISP) and Internet content providers (ICP). The ICPs segment is a completely competitive innovative market just as the concept we usually understand. But the status and competition of the former two segments are in the core position of the internet industry.
International academic research on internet competition mainly focused on the network interconnection, access pricing, two-sided market. It is considered that the backbone network competitive mainly included the motivation and settlement of interconnection pricing, and the internet is a innovation market that need not to be regulated or the internet should be regulated bu the "light-hand". But the regulation system and the market structures of internet are so different between china and foreign country, the oligopoly structure, vertical integration, digital convergence are the unavoidable key problems of domestic Internet industry.
Therefore, the paper centers on the internet industry competition structure, discusses the network interconnection, market entry and industrial change. Comparative study the economic characteristics and technological characteristics of the internet industry, the paper analyses the interconnect motivation of backbone network on a model and empirical research, and reveal the predicament of interconnect motivation and interconnection quality in the monopoly structure, and give the access pricing principles according the off-net stream model. From the perspective of vertical integration and foreclosure it reveals that the bottleneck facilities of Internet backbone will extend its market power, and it gives the ISP access pricing principles when the vertical integrated backbone has the cost advantage with empirical data and cases. The paper gives a comparative study on digital convergence with theory procedures. Then the paper analyses the trend of the internet industry, focuses on the impact that the creative OTT services conducted on the network operations, gives the policy guideline to network neutrality considered the network neutrality legislation and intelligent pipeline resistance of the carries. Based on the studies the paper gives a internet regulation framework, from the design of an integrated regulation department, internet interconnection regulation, access pricing regulation and other ideas and suggestions. The main contents are as follows:
(1) The economic characteristics of the Internet
The paper comparative studies the economic and technical characteristics of the Internet, it consider that the technical characteristic of "Do my best" and two-sided market economic characteristic are the most important differences between internet and telecom network. The Internet can be regarded as a part of traditional telecommunication network, but also be obvious different. The Internet and telecom network have the same characters of sunk cost, natural monopoly, economies of scope, network externalities which is stronger than telecommunication network. The characteristic difference between internet and telecommunications lies in:there is a great technical character difference is quality, which the traditional telecommunications services perform Qos and the internet perform "do my best". Because of the structure and the technique standard of internet network, quality of service depends on the competing for bandwidth, which is unpredictable. The internet industry has strong two-sided market character. As The customer groups can be divided into two sides: users and website, the internet provider plays the role as platform operators of the two-sided market. When the total price of two sides keep unchanged the price structure of two sides changes will affect the demand. The two-sided market characteristics is shown as the "chicken and egg " dilemma:how to start a two-sided market platform; entrants can improve the preferential market one side users benefit, attract another side users to join the platform; If there is a strong monopoly platform in the market,the " chicken and egg " dilemma will be more serious.
Multi-homing characteristics of Internet changes the perspective of our studies, in which case customers can join two platform in order to enjoy greater network effect.
(2) Interconnection and competition of backbone network (the upstream of the internet industry)
Through the establishment of competition model of interconnection quality and market share, we argue that large backbone networks tend to choose lower quality with the small internet backbone, and the higher share advantage the dominant backbone has, the low quality will be. The empirical study of Chinese market show that only when the interconnection quality is best (θ=1), the new user market share difference will be0. Otherwise with quality decrease, add user market share difference will gradually expand to20%and the dominant backbone keep quality advantage and get more share of the new users market through give a bad interconnection quality. And also the interconnection quality reduced the equilibrium price of the small backbone and reduced the consumer surplus and social welfare. Multi-homing access does not change the backbone quality choice of interconnection, but Multi-homing access increase the whole demand.
By studying the OFF-NET model of Internet interconnection settlement between backbone networks, when the competition is perfect and the stream is balanced, the profit will be zero, and the firms do not care about the price of access. In fact, backbones usually take Bill and Keep to reduce the transaction cost, in which the backbone of bills the access traffic without actual settlement.
Study on backbones'competitive strategy indicate that the dominant backbone will blocking the interconnection, reducing interconnection quality and increasing the interconnection price and etc. the empirical data of China prove that Internet Interconnection bandwidth is of serious shortage.
(3) The access between IBP and ISP, digital convergence,(the middlestream of the internet industry)
The IBP and ISP are the upstream and downstream segment of the internet industry. The paper studies vertical integration and market foreclosure based on the model of Rey and Tirole (1997) and Jiang (2006), Put forward that whether the vertical integrated IBP foreclosure in the ISP segment depends on the IBP's cost advantage. If the IBP has cost advantage in the ISP segment, IBP intend to charge the ISP higher access price than the price without vertical integration. As the result of empirical analysis, we prove that IBP implement access price for vertical foreclosure and the intensity of vertical foreclosure is positively related to the degree of IBP's cost advantage in ISP segment of. Therefore, the vertical structure of market extends the monopoly power to ISP segment, and the ISP segment seems to be more oligopoly structure.
After discussed on the comparison of digital convergence, the paper studies product mix model of industry convergence and regulation policy. It proves that partial relaxation regulation of entry cannot form workable market structure, and the convergence firm will exclude the in cabinet firm without convergence. The entry is not efficient. Completely relax of entry regulation can form a competition pattern effectively, in which the consumer choice and the profit of the firms can be guaranteed. A empirical study on the convergence of domestic market is carried out at the last.
(4) Network neutrality and smart pipe convergence (the downstream of the internet industry)
As the rapid development of Internet, lots of OTT services are booming, the network traffic compact to frustrations network, and the customer value transfer to the application and content. The paper studies the forefront of industry trend, network neutrality, smart pipe, and give some viewpoint on regulation of network neutrality. This part on net neutrality is also an important part of the Internet network competition and regulation policy.
(5) Regulation framework in Internet industry
The paper points out main problems of domestic Internet regulation based on the regulation theory studying and the domestic Internet regulation analysising. It gives some suggestions on Internet regulation:industry development policy guidance; introduce competition to the backbone segment as the digital convergence being implemented; regulate the interconnection of backbone; regulate the access price of ISP; open loop access market; and gradually introduce network neutrality thoughts.
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