生物技术企业专利诉讼策略研究
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摘要
专利与生物技术产业的发展密不可分,专利更兼有战略性资产与战略性武器的功能。生物技术重视研究与开发,而专利就是保护其研发成果的利器。专利诉讼已经由单纯的法律议题转化为企业竞争的手段,成为生物技术企业经营上不可或缺的战略工具。对于一个生物技术企业来说,发展一个有效的专利诉讼战略相当重要,生物技术专利诉讼的高期望值及高额的诉讼成本引起了各方的关注。美国和英国生物技术世界领先,加上其成熟的法律体系和优越的诉讼环境等特点,已成为世界生物技术专利诉讼的大战场,因此本文以美国和英国生物技术企业为例,探讨了几个和专利诉讼相关的问题:诉讼成本不对称条件下的企业市场进入行为;专利的隔离收益对专利权人选择和解的影响分析;专利诉讼与研发联盟的建立以及专利布局在专利诉讼中的作用和功能。
在诉讼成本不对称条件下,分析了市场上潜在侵权者的进入障碍和退出竞争的行为机制。由于拥有专利权的企业通常在他们的市场中都有不同程度的垄断地位,当存在专利侵权时,他们可能失去的垄断租要比潜在侵权者成功进入后所能得到的经济租大,此时专利权人可以将诉讼成本优势作为一个阻碍潜在侵权者进入的战略工具。论文建立了一个市场进入模型,研究了博弈双方的进入行为以及专利权人阻止潜在侵权者参与竞争的行为模式。
研究了诉讼专利的隔离收益对于专利权人和解行为的影响。这种研究是基于专利的隔离机制理论的:该机制可以阻碍竞争对手轻易地模仿公司的战略性资产,从而产生一种“隔离利益”。不对称收益是专利诉讼不能达成和解的解释之一。本文中不对称收益表现为基于诉讼专利价值的一种隔离收益。假设当诉讼专利具有较高的隔离收益时,双方并不倾向于达成和解。论文考察了1990年以来,经美国地方法院和联邦巡回上诉法院审理的289个生物技术领域的专利诉讼案例,选取评估专利的隔离收益的一系列指标包括自我引证率、专利布局规模、同族专利、科学关联性、专利生命周期、技术独立性以及专利指向的技术生命周期,主要运用概率单位模型来验证假设。通过对模型的检验结果分析,发现论文的假设在回归模型中都得到了验证,相关关系与预期基本相符。
研究了由专利诉讼导致的企业建立研发联盟的行为。首先对诉讼企业组建生物技术研发联盟的现状进行了归纳,接着利用生命科学领域的竞争进化和协同进化原理分析了企业从专利诉讼走向研发联盟的行为,认为专利诉讼是企业的竞争进化行为,而由其产生的研发联盟则是企业的协同进化行为,同时分析了研发联盟内企业的协同进化效应。认为联盟中协同进化机制产生的主要原因是:资源的相似或互补,战略目标的趋同和对长期效益的追求。生物技术研发联盟既是一种组织结构形式,也是一种十分重要的企业竞争策略,其特点是联盟具有战略性,以专利交叉许可的方式最为普遍,但是并没有出现盈利性的专利联盟。最后研究了生物技术研发联盟的发展趋势,以及联盟内的专利共享博弈。
研究了专利布局战略对专利诉讼行为的影响。论文对专利布局的要素进行了界定,并探讨了生物技术企业如何利用布局的优势在诉讼中获得竞争优势。在归纳西方学者和我国学者对企业专利布局所进行的多种探索后,论文提出了专利价值链和专利布局的概念。认为相互关联的专利可以构成一条专利价值链,专利布局是基于专利价值链上密切协作的一组专利的战略性布署,它是在某一特定技术中(通常以一个或多个基础专利为核心),大量联系密切的专利在时间、空间上集聚,形成强劲、持续的专利竞争优势的现象。
论文认为企业专利布局对专利诉讼的影响主要在两个方面:为诉讼提供决策支持信息,以及通过规模特征和多样化特征降低诉讼风险。在此基础上研究了生物技术企业的专利布局战略,这些战略可以分为:专利网战略,专利共享战略,共同开发战略,冷门战略以及技术追随型战略。最后分析了美国著名生物技术公司Amgen和Affymetrix影响较大的专利诉讼案例,结果表明拥有完善的专利布局是专利权人在诉讼中获取利益的重要因素。
Patent is inseparable from the development of biotechnology industry, moreover, patent also has these functions of the strategic assets and the strategic weapons. Biotechnology attaches importance to the research and development, and patent is the weapon for protecting their outcomes of research and development. Patent litigation has been translated into the competitiveness means of enterprises from the pure law topic; also, it is looked as an essential strategic tool for the operation of biotechnology companies. For a biotechnology company, it is very important to develop some valid patent litigation strategies, and the people at large concern the high expectations and the high litigation costs about the biotechnology patent litigation. With the mature legal system and the predominant litigation environment, and other characteristics, America and Britain, which are as the world leaders in biotechnology, has become the battlefield of world biotechnology patent litigation. So, using some biotechnology companies in the United States and British as examples, the dissertation discusses some patent litigations and related theories: The enterprise patent litigation behaviors under the conditions of the asymmetric litigation costs; The factor analysis about a patentee choosing a settlement under the conditions of the asymmetric stakes; the significance of the establishment of the patent litigation and the R & D alliance, and the patent portfolio in patent litigation.
Under the conditions of the asymmetric litigation costs, the entry barriers and the behavior mechanism of exiting the competition are discussed for the potential infringers in the market. These companies, which possess of patent(s), usually are on the monopoly position in some degrees in their market. For the existence of patent infringement, the monopoly rent they may lose is much more than the economic rent which the potential infringer(s) may get after successfully entering the market. Under such circumstances, the litigation cost advantage can be looked as a strategic instrument counteracting the entering of potential infringer(s). And then the entry behaviors are studied about the two sides. In additional, the deterrence mechanism constructed by the patentee using the litigation cost advantage, and the ways of profit, are analyzed.
Influence factors of isolating income associated with the litigation patent of settlement were consideration. In this dissertation, asymmetric stakes manifested called Isolating income of patent, based on the common understanding that competitive advantage is generally built on firm-specific assets that cannot be easily contracted for in the market。The dissertation studies the 289 patent cases of the biotechnology companies which have been appealed to the U. S. District Court the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since 1990. To survey the isolationg income of patent, the following indicators are chosen:self-cited rate, number of family patents, science linkage,technology cycletime, patent lifetime, patent portfolio' size and independency of technology. Parameter estimates from a sample selection Probit model provide support for the hypotheses, and the intergrated influence were discussed too, the result is consistent with our statistical hypothesis.
The underlying reasons that biotechnology companies change from the patent litigation to the R & D alliance are provided. Using the theories of the competition evolution and the synergia evolution, the dissertation gives a conclusion: the patent litigation among the biotechnology companies is a competition evolution behavior of company, and the R & D alliance produced by it is a synergia evolution behavior of company. In the biotechnology R & D alliance, the effect of the synergia evolution is: similitude or suplement each other, consistent strategy aim and the pursuit of long benefits. For the development of the bio R & D alliance, the characteristic is the strategy, the prevalent patent cross license, and no patent pool. The object of the alliance is changed from sharing the risk and lowering the cost to the organizing the learning. And three-dimensional network of alliance is formed from the linear alliance chain. Bio R & D alliance is not only a form of organizational structure, but also a very important enterprise competitive strategy.
The concept and the assessment methods of the patent portfolio are provided. And the dissertation reveals the main approaches of the biotechnology patent portfolio and its operation mechanism. Based on various definition of stakeholder given by western scholars and Chinese scholars, the dissertation proposes that a“patent value chain”could be structured by a series associated patents. The patent portfolio of a company can be comprehensively assessed. For the overall trend and the internal technical strength in the technology environment, the existing patents are classified and the company patent strategies are studied out according the relative position by BCGM (Boston Consulting Group Matrix). On the basis of above studies, the biotechnology patents portfolio strategies are studied. These strategies can be classified into: The patent net strategy, the patent sharing strategy, the joint development, dark-horse expectancy strategy and deployment strategy, the black horse strategy, and technology following strategy. By analyzing the litigation cases for the well-known American biotechnology company: Amgen and Affymetrix, the dissertation proves that the perfect possession of the patent portfolio is a significant factor for a patentee to obtain the benefits during the patent litigation.
在诉讼成本不对称条件下,分析了市场上潜在侵权者的进入障碍和退出竞争的行为机制。由于拥有专利权的企业通常在他们的市场中都有不同程度的垄断地位,当存在专利侵权时,他们可能失去的垄断租要比潜在侵权者成功进入后所能得到的经济租大,此时专利权人可以将诉讼成本优势作为一个阻碍潜在侵权者进入的战略工具。论文建立了一个市场进入模型,研究了博弈双方的进入行为以及专利权人阻止潜在侵权者参与竞争的行为模式。
研究了诉讼专利的隔离收益对于专利权人和解行为的影响。这种研究是基于专利的隔离机制理论的:该机制可以阻碍竞争对手轻易地模仿公司的战略性资产,从而产生一种“隔离利益”。不对称收益是专利诉讼不能达成和解的解释之一。本文中不对称收益表现为基于诉讼专利价值的一种隔离收益。假设当诉讼专利具有较高的隔离收益时,双方并不倾向于达成和解。论文考察了1990年以来,经美国地方法院和联邦巡回上诉法院审理的289个生物技术领域的专利诉讼案例,选取评估专利的隔离收益的一系列指标包括自我引证率、专利布局规模、同族专利、科学关联性、专利生命周期、技术独立性以及专利指向的技术生命周期,主要运用概率单位模型来验证假设。通过对模型的检验结果分析,发现论文的假设在回归模型中都得到了验证,相关关系与预期基本相符。
研究了由专利诉讼导致的企业建立研发联盟的行为。首先对诉讼企业组建生物技术研发联盟的现状进行了归纳,接着利用生命科学领域的竞争进化和协同进化原理分析了企业从专利诉讼走向研发联盟的行为,认为专利诉讼是企业的竞争进化行为,而由其产生的研发联盟则是企业的协同进化行为,同时分析了研发联盟内企业的协同进化效应。认为联盟中协同进化机制产生的主要原因是:资源的相似或互补,战略目标的趋同和对长期效益的追求。生物技术研发联盟既是一种组织结构形式,也是一种十分重要的企业竞争策略,其特点是联盟具有战略性,以专利交叉许可的方式最为普遍,但是并没有出现盈利性的专利联盟。最后研究了生物技术研发联盟的发展趋势,以及联盟内的专利共享博弈。
研究了专利布局战略对专利诉讼行为的影响。论文对专利布局的要素进行了界定,并探讨了生物技术企业如何利用布局的优势在诉讼中获得竞争优势。在归纳西方学者和我国学者对企业专利布局所进行的多种探索后,论文提出了专利价值链和专利布局的概念。认为相互关联的专利可以构成一条专利价值链,专利布局是基于专利价值链上密切协作的一组专利的战略性布署,它是在某一特定技术中(通常以一个或多个基础专利为核心),大量联系密切的专利在时间、空间上集聚,形成强劲、持续的专利竞争优势的现象。
论文认为企业专利布局对专利诉讼的影响主要在两个方面:为诉讼提供决策支持信息,以及通过规模特征和多样化特征降低诉讼风险。在此基础上研究了生物技术企业的专利布局战略,这些战略可以分为:专利网战略,专利共享战略,共同开发战略,冷门战略以及技术追随型战略。最后分析了美国著名生物技术公司Amgen和Affymetrix影响较大的专利诉讼案例,结果表明拥有完善的专利布局是专利权人在诉讼中获取利益的重要因素。
Patent is inseparable from the development of biotechnology industry, moreover, patent also has these functions of the strategic assets and the strategic weapons. Biotechnology attaches importance to the research and development, and patent is the weapon for protecting their outcomes of research and development. Patent litigation has been translated into the competitiveness means of enterprises from the pure law topic; also, it is looked as an essential strategic tool for the operation of biotechnology companies. For a biotechnology company, it is very important to develop some valid patent litigation strategies, and the people at large concern the high expectations and the high litigation costs about the biotechnology patent litigation. With the mature legal system and the predominant litigation environment, and other characteristics, America and Britain, which are as the world leaders in biotechnology, has become the battlefield of world biotechnology patent litigation. So, using some biotechnology companies in the United States and British as examples, the dissertation discusses some patent litigations and related theories: The enterprise patent litigation behaviors under the conditions of the asymmetric litigation costs; The factor analysis about a patentee choosing a settlement under the conditions of the asymmetric stakes; the significance of the establishment of the patent litigation and the R & D alliance, and the patent portfolio in patent litigation.
Under the conditions of the asymmetric litigation costs, the entry barriers and the behavior mechanism of exiting the competition are discussed for the potential infringers in the market. These companies, which possess of patent(s), usually are on the monopoly position in some degrees in their market. For the existence of patent infringement, the monopoly rent they may lose is much more than the economic rent which the potential infringer(s) may get after successfully entering the market. Under such circumstances, the litigation cost advantage can be looked as a strategic instrument counteracting the entering of potential infringer(s). And then the entry behaviors are studied about the two sides. In additional, the deterrence mechanism constructed by the patentee using the litigation cost advantage, and the ways of profit, are analyzed.
Influence factors of isolating income associated with the litigation patent of settlement were consideration. In this dissertation, asymmetric stakes manifested called Isolating income of patent, based on the common understanding that competitive advantage is generally built on firm-specific assets that cannot be easily contracted for in the market。The dissertation studies the 289 patent cases of the biotechnology companies which have been appealed to the U. S. District Court the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since 1990. To survey the isolationg income of patent, the following indicators are chosen:self-cited rate, number of family patents, science linkage,technology cycletime, patent lifetime, patent portfolio' size and independency of technology. Parameter estimates from a sample selection Probit model provide support for the hypotheses, and the intergrated influence were discussed too, the result is consistent with our statistical hypothesis.
The underlying reasons that biotechnology companies change from the patent litigation to the R & D alliance are provided. Using the theories of the competition evolution and the synergia evolution, the dissertation gives a conclusion: the patent litigation among the biotechnology companies is a competition evolution behavior of company, and the R & D alliance produced by it is a synergia evolution behavior of company. In the biotechnology R & D alliance, the effect of the synergia evolution is: similitude or suplement each other, consistent strategy aim and the pursuit of long benefits. For the development of the bio R & D alliance, the characteristic is the strategy, the prevalent patent cross license, and no patent pool. The object of the alliance is changed from sharing the risk and lowering the cost to the organizing the learning. And three-dimensional network of alliance is formed from the linear alliance chain. Bio R & D alliance is not only a form of organizational structure, but also a very important enterprise competitive strategy.
The concept and the assessment methods of the patent portfolio are provided. And the dissertation reveals the main approaches of the biotechnology patent portfolio and its operation mechanism. Based on various definition of stakeholder given by western scholars and Chinese scholars, the dissertation proposes that a“patent value chain”could be structured by a series associated patents. The patent portfolio of a company can be comprehensively assessed. For the overall trend and the internal technical strength in the technology environment, the existing patents are classified and the company patent strategies are studied out according the relative position by BCGM (Boston Consulting Group Matrix). On the basis of above studies, the biotechnology patents portfolio strategies are studied. These strategies can be classified into: The patent net strategy, the patent sharing strategy, the joint development, dark-horse expectancy strategy and deployment strategy, the black horse strategy, and technology following strategy. By analyzing the litigation cases for the well-known American biotechnology company: Amgen and Affymetrix, the dissertation proves that the perfect possession of the patent portfolio is a significant factor for a patentee to obtain the benefits during the patent litigation.
引文
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