网络博弈视角下的中国汽车企业对抗互动研究
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摘要
多市场接触和策略互动是现代企业竞争的两大突出特点。在多市场接触明显的产业里,企业之间的竞争可以被视为是嵌入在以市场接触为纽带的企业网络上的对抗互动过程。因此,很有必要从企业网络和策略互动的角度来研究企业之间的竞争。本文运用网络博弈理论,结合复杂网络分析方法,对中国汽车企业的对抗互动做了细致而深入的理论研究。
首先,建立了企业对抗互动的网络博弈分析框架和模型:(1)构建了一般性的企业对抗互动无限重复博弈网络模型。(2)从多个视角定义了博弈中的企业策略,包括触发策略如针锋相对策略和冷酷策略等,非一致性和一致性策略,以及察觉-动机-能力视角下的随机惩罚触发策略。(3)以产品差异化的古诺模型为基础,建立了三个具有明确产业含义的企业对抗互动无限重复网络博弈模型,它们分别是价格战网络博弈模型、品牌竞争网络博弈模型和产能扩张竞争网络博弈模型。
接下来,利用价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的网络博弈模型对中国汽车企业的对抗互动展开理论分析。先是利用2000年到2006年的产品产量数据,每年建立一个企业-产品加权二分网络,并依据这7个二分网络设计了上述三类企业对抗互动的仿真模型,具体工作包括:估计产品市场规模和企业生产成本,设定仿真参数、控制变量、初始状态、仿真过程和输出变量。然后进行仿真并对仿真结果进行分析,总结中国汽车企业对抗互动的特点,得到以下主要发现:(1)企业采取一致性策略能够有效抑制品牌竞争的发生,同时会促进价格战和品牌竞争的扩散,但对价格战的发生以及产能扩张竞争的发生和扩散没有明显的影响。(2)企业对反击的预期的提高,能够显著地抑制价格战和产能扩张竞争的发生,但对品牌竞争的发生和三种对抗互动的扩散没有明显的影响。(3)不同年份的企业-产品二分网络对品牌竞争的影响非常大,对价格战也有一定的影响,对产能扩张竞争的影响却很小。
最后,研究了企业-产品二分网络的拓扑结构对中国汽车企业价格战和品牌竞争的影响,得到如下发现:(1)一个企业在价格战中发动对抗行动的倾向,与它的平均最短路和聚集系数呈负相关关系,但与它的节点权没有明显的相关关系;不同地,一个企业在品牌竞争中发动对抗行动的倾向,与它的节点权和聚集系数呈正相关关系,但与它的平均最短路呈负相关关系。(2)从2000年到2006年,企业-产品二分网络的平均最短路越来越小,聚集系数越来越大,节点权分布的幂指数越来越小。上述的拓扑指标变化规律,很好地解释了中国汽车企业对抗互动的演变特点。(3)汽车企业-产品二分网络具有明显的社团结构,并且企业对抗互动主要发生在网络社团的内部,有时也会在联系比较密切的社团之间互相扩散。
本文的创新主要体现四个方面。第一,运用网络博弈理论研究企业对抗互动,提出了基于企业-市场二分网络的无限重复网络博弈一般性模型和分析框架,为企业对抗互动提供了新视角和新思路。第二,引入产品差异化的古诺竞争模型建立价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的网络博弈模型,为这三类企业对抗互动提供了很好的理论分析工具。第三,将复杂网络分析和网络博弈仿真结合起来探讨网络拓扑结构对企业对抗互动的影响,是一个较成功的尝试,为同类研究提供了较好的方法论借鉴和参考。第四,揭示了中国汽车企业价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的对抗互动特点及其演变规律,有助于增进人们对中国汽车企业对抗互动的理解。
Multi-market contact and strategy interaction are two prominent characteristics of competition between modern firms. In an industry with obvious multi-market contact, the competition between firms can be viewed as a process of inter-firm rivalry on the firm network linked by market contact. Hence it is of necessity to study the competition between firms from the perspective of firm network and of strategy interaction. The present paper tries to offer a meticulous and profound theoretical analysis on the inter-firm rivalry in China automobile industry by applying the network game theory and incorporating complex network analysis method.
The paper begins with the construction of a grneral network game analysis framework and some specific models of inter-firm rivalry: (1) constructing a general infinite repeated network game model for inter-firm rivalry; (2) defining from multiple perspectives the strategies of firms in the game, including trigger strategy (such as tit-for-tat and grim strategy), inconsistent and consistent strategy, and random punishment trigger strategy from the perspective of Awareness-Motivation-Capability; (3) constructing three infinite repeated network game model with specifically-defined rivalry action for the inter-firm rivalry based on differentiated product Cournot model, namely: price war network game model, brand competition network game model and capacity expansion competition network game model.
Then, the paper carry out a theoretical analysis of inter-firm rivalry between China automobile firms based on the price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition network game model. Initially, 7 firm-product weighted bipartite networks are constructed, in which the edge weight are the corresponding annual output from 2000 to 2006, respectively. Thereafter, simulation models of inter-firm rivalry according to the bipartite networks above are designed, including estimatation of product market size, production cost of firms and setting of simulation parameter, control variables, initial state, simulation proccess and output variables. The analysis of simulation results show that: (1) the consistent strategies can effectively inhibit the occurrence of brand competition but will enhance the diffusion of price war and of brand competition; whereas they have no significant impact on the occurrence of price war or on the occurrence and diffusion of capacity expansion competition; (2) the enhancement of enterprises’expectation for counterattack can effectively inhibit the occurrence of price war and capacity expansion competition, but has no significant impact on the occurrence of brand competition or the diffusion of all categories of inter-firm rivalry; (3) firm-product bipartite network exerts a tremendous impact on brand competition, whereas the impact is moderate on price war and insignificant on capacity expansion competition.
Finally, The paper anylyzes the relationship between the topology structure of firm-product bipartite networks and the price war and brand competition of China automobile firms, while reveals the following discoveries: (1) the tendency of firms in launching rivalry action in price wars is in negative correlation with its average shortest path and clustering coefficient but not significantly related to its node weight. In contrast, the tendency of firms to initiate rivalry action in brand competition is in positive correlation with its node weight and clustering coefficient but in negative correlation with its average shortest path. (2) From 2000 to 2006, the average shortest path of firm-product bipartite network is increasingly smaller and the clustering coefficient is getting larger whereas the power exponent of node weight distribution is getting smaller. Such variation of the typology indexes offers a reasonable explanation for the evolutionary features of China automobile firms in real-life inter-firm rivalry. (3) Firm-product bipartite networks in the Chinese automobile industry has distinct community structure whereas the inter-firm rivalry of enterprises mainly takes place inside network community, but also spreads among closely interconnected communities.
The innovation of the present paper is chiefly embodied in the following aspects: (1) it applies the network game theory to study the inter-firm rivalry to put forward a general model and analysis framework of infinite repeated network game based on firm-product bipartite network, which offers a new perspective and new idea for the research of inter-firm rivalry. (2) It introduces Cournot competition model of production differentiation to construct a network game model of price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition, thus offering an effective tool of theoretical analysis on inter-firm rivalry. (3) it discusses the impact of network typology on inter-firm rivalry by combining complex network analysis and network game simulation; this has been a successful attempt which will in turn provides methodological reference for similar research. (4) it reveals the features and evolutionary features of inter-firm rivalry of China automobile firms in price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition, hence facilitating our understanding of the inter-firm rivalry between China automobile firms.
首先,建立了企业对抗互动的网络博弈分析框架和模型:(1)构建了一般性的企业对抗互动无限重复博弈网络模型。(2)从多个视角定义了博弈中的企业策略,包括触发策略如针锋相对策略和冷酷策略等,非一致性和一致性策略,以及察觉-动机-能力视角下的随机惩罚触发策略。(3)以产品差异化的古诺模型为基础,建立了三个具有明确产业含义的企业对抗互动无限重复网络博弈模型,它们分别是价格战网络博弈模型、品牌竞争网络博弈模型和产能扩张竞争网络博弈模型。
接下来,利用价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的网络博弈模型对中国汽车企业的对抗互动展开理论分析。先是利用2000年到2006年的产品产量数据,每年建立一个企业-产品加权二分网络,并依据这7个二分网络设计了上述三类企业对抗互动的仿真模型,具体工作包括:估计产品市场规模和企业生产成本,设定仿真参数、控制变量、初始状态、仿真过程和输出变量。然后进行仿真并对仿真结果进行分析,总结中国汽车企业对抗互动的特点,得到以下主要发现:(1)企业采取一致性策略能够有效抑制品牌竞争的发生,同时会促进价格战和品牌竞争的扩散,但对价格战的发生以及产能扩张竞争的发生和扩散没有明显的影响。(2)企业对反击的预期的提高,能够显著地抑制价格战和产能扩张竞争的发生,但对品牌竞争的发生和三种对抗互动的扩散没有明显的影响。(3)不同年份的企业-产品二分网络对品牌竞争的影响非常大,对价格战也有一定的影响,对产能扩张竞争的影响却很小。
最后,研究了企业-产品二分网络的拓扑结构对中国汽车企业价格战和品牌竞争的影响,得到如下发现:(1)一个企业在价格战中发动对抗行动的倾向,与它的平均最短路和聚集系数呈负相关关系,但与它的节点权没有明显的相关关系;不同地,一个企业在品牌竞争中发动对抗行动的倾向,与它的节点权和聚集系数呈正相关关系,但与它的平均最短路呈负相关关系。(2)从2000年到2006年,企业-产品二分网络的平均最短路越来越小,聚集系数越来越大,节点权分布的幂指数越来越小。上述的拓扑指标变化规律,很好地解释了中国汽车企业对抗互动的演变特点。(3)汽车企业-产品二分网络具有明显的社团结构,并且企业对抗互动主要发生在网络社团的内部,有时也会在联系比较密切的社团之间互相扩散。
本文的创新主要体现四个方面。第一,运用网络博弈理论研究企业对抗互动,提出了基于企业-市场二分网络的无限重复网络博弈一般性模型和分析框架,为企业对抗互动提供了新视角和新思路。第二,引入产品差异化的古诺竞争模型建立价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的网络博弈模型,为这三类企业对抗互动提供了很好的理论分析工具。第三,将复杂网络分析和网络博弈仿真结合起来探讨网络拓扑结构对企业对抗互动的影响,是一个较成功的尝试,为同类研究提供了较好的方法论借鉴和参考。第四,揭示了中国汽车企业价格战、品牌竞争和产能扩张竞争的对抗互动特点及其演变规律,有助于增进人们对中国汽车企业对抗互动的理解。
Multi-market contact and strategy interaction are two prominent characteristics of competition between modern firms. In an industry with obvious multi-market contact, the competition between firms can be viewed as a process of inter-firm rivalry on the firm network linked by market contact. Hence it is of necessity to study the competition between firms from the perspective of firm network and of strategy interaction. The present paper tries to offer a meticulous and profound theoretical analysis on the inter-firm rivalry in China automobile industry by applying the network game theory and incorporating complex network analysis method.
The paper begins with the construction of a grneral network game analysis framework and some specific models of inter-firm rivalry: (1) constructing a general infinite repeated network game model for inter-firm rivalry; (2) defining from multiple perspectives the strategies of firms in the game, including trigger strategy (such as tit-for-tat and grim strategy), inconsistent and consistent strategy, and random punishment trigger strategy from the perspective of Awareness-Motivation-Capability; (3) constructing three infinite repeated network game model with specifically-defined rivalry action for the inter-firm rivalry based on differentiated product Cournot model, namely: price war network game model, brand competition network game model and capacity expansion competition network game model.
Then, the paper carry out a theoretical analysis of inter-firm rivalry between China automobile firms based on the price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition network game model. Initially, 7 firm-product weighted bipartite networks are constructed, in which the edge weight are the corresponding annual output from 2000 to 2006, respectively. Thereafter, simulation models of inter-firm rivalry according to the bipartite networks above are designed, including estimatation of product market size, production cost of firms and setting of simulation parameter, control variables, initial state, simulation proccess and output variables. The analysis of simulation results show that: (1) the consistent strategies can effectively inhibit the occurrence of brand competition but will enhance the diffusion of price war and of brand competition; whereas they have no significant impact on the occurrence of price war or on the occurrence and diffusion of capacity expansion competition; (2) the enhancement of enterprises’expectation for counterattack can effectively inhibit the occurrence of price war and capacity expansion competition, but has no significant impact on the occurrence of brand competition or the diffusion of all categories of inter-firm rivalry; (3) firm-product bipartite network exerts a tremendous impact on brand competition, whereas the impact is moderate on price war and insignificant on capacity expansion competition.
Finally, The paper anylyzes the relationship between the topology structure of firm-product bipartite networks and the price war and brand competition of China automobile firms, while reveals the following discoveries: (1) the tendency of firms in launching rivalry action in price wars is in negative correlation with its average shortest path and clustering coefficient but not significantly related to its node weight. In contrast, the tendency of firms to initiate rivalry action in brand competition is in positive correlation with its node weight and clustering coefficient but in negative correlation with its average shortest path. (2) From 2000 to 2006, the average shortest path of firm-product bipartite network is increasingly smaller and the clustering coefficient is getting larger whereas the power exponent of node weight distribution is getting smaller. Such variation of the typology indexes offers a reasonable explanation for the evolutionary features of China automobile firms in real-life inter-firm rivalry. (3) Firm-product bipartite networks in the Chinese automobile industry has distinct community structure whereas the inter-firm rivalry of enterprises mainly takes place inside network community, but also spreads among closely interconnected communities.
The innovation of the present paper is chiefly embodied in the following aspects: (1) it applies the network game theory to study the inter-firm rivalry to put forward a general model and analysis framework of infinite repeated network game based on firm-product bipartite network, which offers a new perspective and new idea for the research of inter-firm rivalry. (2) It introduces Cournot competition model of production differentiation to construct a network game model of price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition, thus offering an effective tool of theoretical analysis on inter-firm rivalry. (3) it discusses the impact of network typology on inter-firm rivalry by combining complex network analysis and network game simulation; this has been a successful attempt which will in turn provides methodological reference for similar research. (4) it reveals the features and evolutionary features of inter-firm rivalry of China automobile firms in price war, brand competition and capacity expansion competition, hence facilitating our understanding of the inter-firm rivalry between China automobile firms.
引文
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