论专利技术的授权策略
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摘要
对专利持有人而言,为了更好的获得专利带来的利益,授权策略的选择至关重要。本文针对空间差异价格竞争、同质产品和异质产品的产量竞争、上游垄断、不对称信息等不同市场环境,从微观层面分析了专利权人的授权策略,对现有结果进行了更正、扩展和深化,给出了能够最大化专利权人利益的授权合同。主要内容如下:
更正了现有文献空间差异环境的分步最优结果,得出使用提成制合同不仅应该授权非激烈的专利,也应该授权激烈专利的结论。并且把价格机制推广到固定费加提成的形式,给出了专利权人参与竞争或不参与竞争时的最优授权合同。对于厂商位置内生化的情形,借助现有文献成本不对称时厂商位置、价格竞争的结果,分析了厂商间的专利授权策略,认为无论专利大小如何,如果使用两部制合同,专利权厂商出售专利总是有利可图的,并且导致厂商空间差异最大化。另外,还分析了厂商执行另外一种价格竞争策略,即歧视价格时的专利授权问题。
更正了现有文献关于厂商进行产量竞争时的专利授权策略。如果专利权人不参与竞争,则其专利费收益是一个定值,与授权厂商数目、提成基数无关。并分析了专利权人参与竞争时的授权策略,如果专利权厂商有足够的生产能力,就没必要出售专利,如果存在产量限制,出售专利可以增加收益。
作为对标准产量竞争模型的推广,分析了产品差异与上游垄断市场的专利授权策略。若产品存在差异,无论专利权人是否参与竞争,都应该尽可能多的出售专利,这种策略不同于同质产品市场。如果上游市场被垄断,下游厂商是否出售专利决定于行动次序,并且跟随者的专利比领先者的专利更具社会价值,对现有结果作了补充。
外部专利权人可能不如厂商更加了解市场需求。基于这种现象,分析了需求创新专利与工艺创新专利离散分布时的信息甄别机制,并分析了信息租金与效率的权衡。如果专利权人持有需求创新专利,可能不需要兼顾低需求市场,以节省信息租金,如果持有工艺创新专利则相反。两点分布的分析是对现有文献的补充。还分析了市场需求连续分布时的专利价格机制,对现有文献进行了扩展。还给出了专利权人拥有信息时的信号传递机制,并分析了这种有成本的信号传递的必要性。
For a patentee, it is vital to find a good licensing strategy to gain more profits form the patent. This paper aiming at frameworks where firms compete in price, in homogenous or heterogeneous outputs, where downstream firms rely on upstream firm’s output and where asymmetry information exists, analyses the licensing strategy form from the microcosmic lay, and presents the optimal licensing contract, which corrects, extends or deepens some existing results. The main conclusion as following:
This paper corrects the result in literature where the patentee firm chooses its price so as to maximize profit from products, and then chooses license fee to maximize its total profit, and then draw the conclusion that not only non-drastic patent, but also drastic patent should be licensed. It also extending licensing contract to fee plus royalty, presents the optimal contract for an outsider as well as an insider. When locations of the firms are endogenous, it in virtue of some literatures about results where firms compete location then price, analyses the licensing strategy for an insider. It takes for it’s better for the patentee firm to license its patent through a two-part tariff contract in spite of the magnitude of the patent, and maximum differentiation will always appear. Otherwise, it analyses the licensing contract where firms practice price- discrimination.
It corrects the existing result about the licensing strategy for a patentee who owns a demand innovation in a framework where firms compete in output. For an outsider, the profit he can gain form the patent is a fixed value, and doesn’t change according the number of licensing firms and the royalty base. It also analyses the optimal strategy for an insider. If the throughput of the insider is enough, it’s unnecessary to license patent. But if the throughput is poor, licensing the patent brings more profit.
Through extending standard model about firms competes in output, it analyses licensing strategy when firms’products are heterogeneous, or the upstream market is monopolized. When there are differentiated oligopolies, for an insider as well as an outsider, patent should be licensed as much as possible, which is different from homogenous firms. If the upstream market is monopolized, the patentee in downstream licenses patent or not is decided by action sequence, and the follower’s patent gains more social welfare, which recruits the existing results.
An outsider may not know market demand as clearly as a licensee firm do. Based on this, it analyses screening mechanism on demand innovation patent and craftwork innovation patent, then it weighs information rents and efficiency. If an outsider owns a demand innovation patent, maybe it’s better for him to abandon low demand market to save information rents, but if his patent is a craftwork innovation one, opposition appears. The analysis on discrete demand recruits existing literatures. It also bring out the licensing mechanism when market demand is continuous, which extends existing literatures. Finally, it analyses a signaling game in patent licensing. For signaling needs cost, it’s not always superior for a patentee with high quality innovation.
更正了现有文献空间差异环境的分步最优结果,得出使用提成制合同不仅应该授权非激烈的专利,也应该授权激烈专利的结论。并且把价格机制推广到固定费加提成的形式,给出了专利权人参与竞争或不参与竞争时的最优授权合同。对于厂商位置内生化的情形,借助现有文献成本不对称时厂商位置、价格竞争的结果,分析了厂商间的专利授权策略,认为无论专利大小如何,如果使用两部制合同,专利权厂商出售专利总是有利可图的,并且导致厂商空间差异最大化。另外,还分析了厂商执行另外一种价格竞争策略,即歧视价格时的专利授权问题。
更正了现有文献关于厂商进行产量竞争时的专利授权策略。如果专利权人不参与竞争,则其专利费收益是一个定值,与授权厂商数目、提成基数无关。并分析了专利权人参与竞争时的授权策略,如果专利权厂商有足够的生产能力,就没必要出售专利,如果存在产量限制,出售专利可以增加收益。
作为对标准产量竞争模型的推广,分析了产品差异与上游垄断市场的专利授权策略。若产品存在差异,无论专利权人是否参与竞争,都应该尽可能多的出售专利,这种策略不同于同质产品市场。如果上游市场被垄断,下游厂商是否出售专利决定于行动次序,并且跟随者的专利比领先者的专利更具社会价值,对现有结果作了补充。
外部专利权人可能不如厂商更加了解市场需求。基于这种现象,分析了需求创新专利与工艺创新专利离散分布时的信息甄别机制,并分析了信息租金与效率的权衡。如果专利权人持有需求创新专利,可能不需要兼顾低需求市场,以节省信息租金,如果持有工艺创新专利则相反。两点分布的分析是对现有文献的补充。还分析了市场需求连续分布时的专利价格机制,对现有文献进行了扩展。还给出了专利权人拥有信息时的信号传递机制,并分析了这种有成本的信号传递的必要性。
For a patentee, it is vital to find a good licensing strategy to gain more profits form the patent. This paper aiming at frameworks where firms compete in price, in homogenous or heterogeneous outputs, where downstream firms rely on upstream firm’s output and where asymmetry information exists, analyses the licensing strategy form from the microcosmic lay, and presents the optimal licensing contract, which corrects, extends or deepens some existing results. The main conclusion as following:
This paper corrects the result in literature where the patentee firm chooses its price so as to maximize profit from products, and then chooses license fee to maximize its total profit, and then draw the conclusion that not only non-drastic patent, but also drastic patent should be licensed. It also extending licensing contract to fee plus royalty, presents the optimal contract for an outsider as well as an insider. When locations of the firms are endogenous, it in virtue of some literatures about results where firms compete location then price, analyses the licensing strategy for an insider. It takes for it’s better for the patentee firm to license its patent through a two-part tariff contract in spite of the magnitude of the patent, and maximum differentiation will always appear. Otherwise, it analyses the licensing contract where firms practice price- discrimination.
It corrects the existing result about the licensing strategy for a patentee who owns a demand innovation in a framework where firms compete in output. For an outsider, the profit he can gain form the patent is a fixed value, and doesn’t change according the number of licensing firms and the royalty base. It also analyses the optimal strategy for an insider. If the throughput of the insider is enough, it’s unnecessary to license patent. But if the throughput is poor, licensing the patent brings more profit.
Through extending standard model about firms competes in output, it analyses licensing strategy when firms’products are heterogeneous, or the upstream market is monopolized. When there are differentiated oligopolies, for an insider as well as an outsider, patent should be licensed as much as possible, which is different from homogenous firms. If the upstream market is monopolized, the patentee in downstream licenses patent or not is decided by action sequence, and the follower’s patent gains more social welfare, which recruits the existing results.
An outsider may not know market demand as clearly as a licensee firm do. Based on this, it analyses screening mechanism on demand innovation patent and craftwork innovation patent, then it weighs information rents and efficiency. If an outsider owns a demand innovation patent, maybe it’s better for him to abandon low demand market to save information rents, but if his patent is a craftwork innovation one, opposition appears. The analysis on discrete demand recruits existing literatures. It also bring out the licensing mechanism when market demand is continuous, which extends existing literatures. Finally, it analyses a signaling game in patent licensing. For signaling needs cost, it’s not always superior for a patentee with high quality innovation.
引文
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