再论语言、心智和实在三者的关系
|
摘要
本文以三大语言理论:Whorf的语言相对论、Halliday的系统功能语言学和Lakoff&Johnson的认知语义学关于科学实在论的论述中存在的问题和面临的困境为突破口,旨在反思它们的认识论基础并探讨语言、心智(或思维)和实在三者之间的关系(简称三元关系),从而为三大语言理论的适用范围划定界限。本研究主要采用反思和批判的方法,通过溯因推理将研究问题层层引向深入。
一般认为语义学研究语言符号与实在之间的关系,而认识论哲学研究心智与实在的关系,真理的符合论认为,与实在符合的认识或知识就是真理。随着认知语义学的产生,心智成为研究语义问题不可忽视的因素.而心智认识实在的过程也离不开语言的参与.因此,无论是语义理论还是认识论理论都要观照到三元关系,它们都须对三元关系给出其基本假定。
这三大语言理论都有其特定的认识论哲学基础:语言相对论和系统功能语言学的哲学基础都属于建构主义的认识论,而Lakoff&Johnson的认知语义学基于体验主义哲学。因此,它们具有不同的科学实在观和真理观:语言相对论认为,我们的思维或心智往往无意识地受到语言结构的影响或控制,科学知识并不是关于实在的真理,而是西方印欧语言的产物:系统功能语言学的语义观假定实在本身是不可知的,我们所能认识的只是经过语法释解或建构的实在,科学理论并不是与实在符合的真理,而是语言对经验重新建构的结果;Lakoff&Johnson提出了体验的科学实在论认为,心智和理性本质上都是体验的,抽象思维,包括逻辑、数学和科学知识都是体验性和想象性的心智的产物。
然而,这三大语言理论的科学实在观都存在如下不可克服的困难:1)无法划清科学理论与非科学或伪科学学说的界限;2)无法区分科学思维方式与非科学思维方式;3)无法对科学知识的增长以及科学的成功的解释能力和预测能力的事实做出合理的说明。
由于存在这些问题和困境,本文试图探讨与三元关系相关的以下问题:心智能否认识实在并与实在符合?或者说,心智能否获得关于实在的真理?心智通过怎样的认知机制获得科学的知识?科学思维方式与常识理论、神话幻想、形而上学等非科学或伪科学的思维方式有何分别?心智是否如语言相对论所声称的必定受到语言结构的影响或控制而无法认识实在?或者如系统功能语言学的语义理论所认为的,实在是不可知的,我们所能认识的只是经过语法释解或建构的实在?抑或如体验主义哲学所声称的,我们所获得的知识只能在我们的身体所限定的范围之内,即心智所能认识的实在,只是体验性的实在?如果是这样的话,该如何解释科学知识比非科学知识更加可靠、稳定和具有更准确的预测力呢?
随着认知科学对心智的研究,人们对三元关系的认识也发生了新的变化。在基于人工智能理论的认知科学中,心智被看成是信息处理器.由此,认知主义的语义观完全不同于传统的语义理论,主张意义是由解读者心智中的概念框架或内部模型对语言符号信息进行动态地和分层次加工处理的结果,心智对语言信息的处理是一个自下而上和自上而下的互动整合的过程。
认知范式下的真理也不再是如逻辑实证主义的真理观那样把真理看成是在句子层面操作的问题。认知范式下的真理问题在语篇层次上判断.
但由于认知主义的语义观把词、句子乃至语篇的意义看成是相对于特定的知识框架或世界模型而定的,其真理观也会导致相对主义.例如库恩的范式理论就否认符合论的真理观,也否认科学理论是真理,而不过是暂时实用的“概念盒子”。他认为新范式取代旧范式不是理性论证的结果而是非理性的格式塔转换,范式之间的竞争则采取宣传、劝说、多数战胜少数等非逻辑的方式。
Lakoff&Johnson(1999)认为体验的科学实在论为库恩的范式理论提供了支持。他们认为科学革命之后新范式取代旧范式其实是用新隐喻取代旧隐喻,其中新旧隐喻之间不可通约,因此是学科内发生了彻底的重新概念化。然而,他们无法解释,为何科学家愿意接受新隐喻,而放弃旧隐喻?他们选择新隐喻有何理性的动因?
波普尔坚持批判理性主义,否认库恩关于科学革命是非理性的格式塔转换,而认为,正因为科学家的思想或理论可以通过语言表达出来,并以学术专著或期刊论文的形式发表,使他们的思想和理论成为可以公开批判和讨论的对象。因而,科学理论之间是可以理性地评判优劣的,或评判哪一个更接近真理。他称库恩的范式的理论是“框架的神话”。
本文提出,对一个科学理论进行辩护可看作是科学共同体承认表达该理论的语篇的意义是连贯的、可理解的、可接受的。因此,科学理论的真假或可接受性问题可归结为判断表达该科学理论的语篇的意义是否是连贯的问题。
目前的关于语篇连贯的理论经历了四个发展阶段,并体现为四种不同的研究进路:1)基于结构主义的语篇结构或形式分析的篇章语法:2)基于言语行为理论的语用学的语篇分析;3)基于符号学的语篇研究包括基于系统功能语言学对语篇连贯的研究:4)基于认知语言学理论对语篇连贯的研究。前三个研究进路都只限于对语篇本体的结构或意义的研究,而忽视语篇处理者的心智因素或认知结构。基于认知语言学的语篇连贯理论却无法解释带来科学革命的理论的语篇的意义连贯问题,即无法说明构成革命性科学语篇的意义连贯的认知机制是什么.因为,带来科学革命的理论常常具有反常识、反常规、违反既定知识框架的特点。
本文以给物理学带来巨大革命的六个理论:哥白尼的日心说、伽利略的落体定律、牛顿的万有引力定律、法拉第和麦克斯韦的电磁理论、爱因斯坦的相对论以及量子力学为例,说明基于认知语言学的语篇连贯的理论无法解释这类科学语篇的连贯性。其根本原因在于,认知语义学的理论基础来自格式塔心理学和体验主义哲学。这些理论都以人们的日常经验和感知作为研究心智的认知结构的证据来源,认知语义学的证据也大都来自日常语言或自然语言中的表达方式。而这样的理论只能解释心智获得常识等非科学的知识,却不能说明许多科学知识,特别是带来科学革命的理论是怎样产生、接受和理解的。
体验主义的心智观认为,一切知识包括科学知识归根结底都来源于具有体验性和想象性的心智或理性。然而事实上,通过体验的和想象的思维至多只能产生原始水平的,基于经验积累的、非理论化、没有普遍性的知识技能,而无法产生真正意义上的科学理论体系.上述六个革命性科学理论都不可能通过体验性和想象性的思维产生。克莱因认为,是数学使得科学家最终接受了那些违反常规和直观经验的革命性科学理论的,也只有是借助数学,科学家才能构造出那些理论。
体验主义的数学观认为,数学思维本质上也是体验的和想象的。本文对此进行了驳斥并得出如下两个推论:1)大部分数学知识,特别是超出算术水平的、高级的数学知识并不是通过体验的和想象的认知产生的,而是更高层次的、符号化的、理性的心智能力的发明。因而,心智并不完全是体验的,数学思维是非体验的和超越性的;2)大部分数学思想不能用日常语言表达出来,数学语言也不同于日常语言,具有抽象性、符号性、明了性、简洁性、非歧义性和精确性.因此,不能以日常语言为证据证明心智中的数学思维也是体验的和想象的。体验主义哲学只是以少量的算术运算中的语言表述作为证据,声称数学思想和数学知识也是体验性和想象性的人类概念系统的产物,这种论断是错误的。
因此,本文进一步反思和批判了体验主义的心身观,指出其心身观仅仅强调心智的体验性,而忽视了心智对身体经验和感知的超越性。Lakoff&Johnson声称体验主义哲学挑战了两千多年的西方传统哲学的说法也是言过其实。
本文基于对语言、心智和实在三者关系的研究得出如下两个结论:1)应在语篇层次探讨心智与实在的符合关系,即真理问题,而不应在句子层面讨论;2)心智中的理性具有超越性。理性既能超越语言结构的影响和控制,也能突破身体构造和机能的局限。
本研究对三元关系提出了两个假说:1)思维的三层次假说:2)语言思维的有意识性和社会性假说.
本研究的主要贡献有:1)对Whorf的语言相对论的科学实在观提出了质疑和批判:2)对逻辑实证主义关于语言、心智和实在是逻辑同构的论断提出了批评和驳斥,提出判断心智是否与实在符合,不应在句子层次,而应在一个意义完整的、系统的语篇层次上判定;3)批判了基于建构主义认识论的系统功能语言学的语义观关于科学实在性的论述;4)批判了体验主义的心智观、心身观、理性观、数学观和体验的科学实在论,限定了该哲学理论适用的范围;5)论证指出了Lakoff&Johnson所声称的对两千多年的西方传统哲学的挑战和批判事实上无法成立;6)对心智中的理性的超越性的论证支持了波普尔的科学认识论的思想,而驳斥了库恩的范式理论的“框架神话”;7)基于相关研究对语言思维和意象(非语言)思维的区分以及对抽象思维四个层次的划分,更深入地分析和探讨了语言、心智和实在三者的关系,并对三大语言理论的科学实在观的问题根源进行了剖析。
Based on the comparison of their distinct basic assumptions about the relationship among language, mind(or thought) and reality(briefed as LMR-relation) of the three influential linguistic theories, i.e. Whorfian linguistic relativity, Halliday's systemic functional linguistics and Lakoff & Johnson's cognitive semantics, this dissertation makes critical assessments about their respective views on scientific realism. It argues that the three linguistic theories are bound to give rise to the following insurmountable difficulties: first, they cannot demarcate science from non-science or pseudo-science; second, they cannot distinguish scientific ways of thinking from nonscientific ones; finally, they cannot make a plausible account of the very facts of the growth of scientific knowledge and the success or usefulness of science in explanation and prediction. These dilemmas elicit the present quest for a tenable account for the LMR-relation so that it can justify scientific theories and ways of thinking as more reliable, stable and certain knowledge than non-scientific one such as folk theories, mythology and metaphysics. Moreover, those difficulties also induce the reexamination of the epistemological foundations of the three linguistics theories with the hope to give them sound evaluations and define their spheres of application. By means of abduction and criticism, this study attempts to dig into the nature of LMR-relation.
All the three linguistic theories have their own epistemological foundations: both Whorfian linguistic relativity and Halliday's meaning theories are established on constructivism, while Lakoff & Johnson's is philosophically based experientialism. Linguistic relativity maintains that since our thought or mind is unconsciously influenced or constrained by linguistic structures, the reality itself is inaccessible to our mind. Scientific knowledge cannot be truth about reality but the construction of the Western Indo-European languages. Likewise, the meaning theories of systemic functional linguistics assume that the reality is unknowable. What we can know is the reality constructed or construed by grammars. Based on his grammatical metaphor theory, Halliday puts forth the arguments that the frequent use of nominalization in scientific discourses suggests that scientific language thingifies the events and processes into observable, measurable and testable objects or things. Scientific theories are, therefore, by no means the truth in correspondence to reality but the reconstruction or reshaping of experience by languages or grammars. Whereas as a response to the postmodern critique of science, Lakoff & Johnson on the one hand reject the post-modern relativism of truth and the anti-realism of science, on the other, they disapprove of the classical philosophical view of scientific realism, which is dubbed by them as a disembodied objective scientific realism. They advance the embodied scientific realism or experiential realism by claiming that our mind and reason are inherently embodied and even the most abstract knowledge such as logic, mathematics and scientific theories are the results of the embodied and imaginative mind.
With all those controversies and disputes on the view of scientific realism, this study attempts to explore into the following issues: can mind get access to reality or correspond to reality? With what cognitive mechanism can mind acquire scientific knowledge? What distinguishes scientific ways of thinking from non-scientific ones? Is the reality inaccessible to mind as claimed by linguistic relativity because the mind is necessarily affected or constrained by the structures of languages? Or the reality is unknowable to mind because of the assertions given by systemic functional linguistics that the reality is nothing but the construction or construal of grammars? Or is it that the reality is embodied in nature, as advocated by experientialism, because our knowledge is gained through our bodily experience and the interaction of our bodies with environment? If those are the cases, how can we plausibly account for the scientific knowledge as being more reliable, stable and precise in prediction than the non-scientific one?
Seeking for a tenable assumption about LMR-relationship is not only the major concern of meaning theories but also that of epistemological philosophy because the semantics is generally assumed as the study of relation between language and reality, while epistemology takes its primary interest in the relation between mind and reality. The correspondence theory of truth holds the view that truth is the knowledge in congruence with facts. The advent of cognitive science provides fresh insight into the understanding of mind as well as the LMR-relationship, which results in the novel theories on meaning and truth. Within the framework of cognitivism, mind is, therefore, viewed as an information processor, which processes perceptual and linguistic information interactively and integratively with the four complementary stages involved, i.e., the monadic stage, the structural stage, contextual stage and cognitive or epistemic stage.
As a consequence, the cognitive view on meaning diverges from the traditional meaning theories because the meanings of words and sentences are either determined in isolation as assumed by truth value semantics, or are dependent on indefinite, all-inclusive contexts as regarded by pragmatics. From the cognitive point of view, however, meaning is the output of the dynamic and hierarchical processing within the conceptual frames or internal world models stored in the mind of interpreters. Mind processes linguistic information in both top-down and bottom-up fashions.
The cognitivist theory of truth is no longer determined on sentential or propositional level as taken by logical positivism. Based on cognitive information processing approach of the model of mind, the dissertation argues that truth should be interfaced with discourses, that is to say, truth should be judged on discursive or textual level.
Nevertheless, the cognitivist view of truth may fall into the relativism of truth since either the meaning of a word or a sentence is relative to a particular intellectual framework of world model. How to justify a scientific hypothesis or theory?
Kuhn, as an exponent of the pragmaticism of truth, objects the correspondence theory of truth and denies scientific theories as truth. He claims that a scientific theory is only a useful "conceptual box", which can temporarily hold the natural phenomena. And he adheres to the viewpoint that the replacement of a new paradigm with the old one is not the consequence of rational argumentation but an irrational gestalt switch, which occurs all at once or not at all. The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) claim that their embodied scientific realism is compatible with Kuhnian tradition, because after scientific revolutions, the switch of paradigms is actually the replacement of new metaphors with the old ones, and hence an entire discipline is reconceptualized. The new metaphors are incommensurable with the old ones. But they cannot give grounds for why the scientific community is willing to accept the new metaphors and abandon the old ones.
Popper, however, advocates critical rationalism and firmly believes in the progressiveness of science and the correspondence theory of truth. He insists that the scientific enterprise is the pursuit of truth or the process of getting closer to truth. The progress in science is achieved through rational criticism and discussion. He denies Kuhn's view of scientific revolution as an irrational gestalt switch by arguing that since scientific theories can be formulated linguistically, and that they can even be published and become objects open to investigation and criticism, different theories or paradigms can thus be rationally assessed. He criticizes Kuhnian paradigm theory as "the myth of framework".
This dissertation thus contends that the justification of a scientific theory can be viewed as its acceptance by the scientific community as a coherent and understandable discourse or text. That is to say, acceptability of a scientific theory can be reduced to the coherence of its text.
The contemporary textual coherence theories have undergone four stages of evolution with distinct approaches to textual studies: 1) the structuralist approach to textual structures and forms involved in study of textual grammars; 2) the pragmatic approach to textual coherence grounded on speech act theory; 3) semiological approach to textual study including the study of textual coherence based on systemic functional linguistic theory; 4) the cognitive approach to textual coherence. Obviously, the former three approaches are merely focused on the study of text proper in terms of forms or meangings but ignore the textual processors' mental factors or their cognitive structures. The cognitive approach to textual coherence theory is, nonetheless, unable to explain the coherence of revolutionary scientific texts, or it fails to pin down what constitutes the cognitive mechanism of the coherent interpretation or understanding of a text that enunciates a revolutionary scientific theory. Because on the one hand, the theories bringing about scientific revolutions generally run counter to commonsense, conventionality, normal or established epistemic frameworks, for instance, the six revolutionary physical theories: Copernicus's heliocentric theory, Galileo's law of falling body, Newton's law of universal gravitation, Faraday and Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum theory. The cognitive linguistic theories are incompetent to explain the coherence of the above six revolutionary scientific discourses for the very reason that the cognitive semantics is theoretically founded on the Gestalt psychology and experientialist philosophy, which take the everyday experience and perceptions as the objects or sources for studying mental or cognitive structures. And the evidence for cognitive semantics is gathered primarily from ordinary language or natural language. Naturally, such a theory is only applicable to the explanation of the textual coherence of folk theories or other non-scientific knowledge, but is inadequate to elucidate why the revolutionary scientific texts are understandable, acceptable or meaningful.
The experientialist view of mind claims that all knowledge including scientific knowledge stems from the embodied and imaginative mind and reason. As a matter of fact, however, the knowledge derived from embodied and imaginative thinking can only achieve the level of the primitive, empirical, elementary rules and techniques, which fall short of enunciating any systematic scientific theories with general principles. That is to say, the above mentioned six revolutionary scientific theories cannot solely be the results of embodied and imaginative thinking. The famous mathematical philosopher Morris Kline asserts that it is mathematics that guarantees the acceptance of those unconventional and anti-perceptual experience revolutionary scientific theories and it is only by mathematical means that the scientists can formulate or invent those theories.
At odds over the experiential view of mathematics, which claims that mathematical thinking is embodied and imaginative by nature, this study comes to the following two inferences: on the one hand, most mathematical theories, especially those go beyond the arithmetic level, are not the products of embodied and imaginative cognition but the invention of the advanced capacities of rational mind. Mind is, therefore, not inherently embodied as claimed by experientialism, and mathematical thinking is largely disembodied and transcendental. On the other, most mathematical thought cannot be expressed with everyday language and mathematical language diverges from natural language substantively with its symbolic, brief, unambiguous, precise characters. Thus it is inappropriate or ill-advised to jump to the conclusion that the mathematical way of thinking is embodied and imaginative by only deriving its evidence from the ordinary linguistic expressions.
The dissertation proceeds to challenge the experientialist view of mind-body issue with the argument that it overemphasizes the embodiment of mind but neglects the transcending capability of mind over bodily experience and perception. It is also pointed out that Lakoff & Johnson's boast of their challenge to the over two millenium Western classical philosophy is all the way an exaggeration.
The thesis finally arrives at the following two conclusions: first, the corresponding relation between mind and reality, i.e. the truth problem, should be judged on discursive or textual level rather than on sentential one; second, the reason in mind is so transcendentally characterized that it can not only transcend the influence or constraints of linguistic structures but also can surpass the limitations of our bodily make-up and physiological function.
Two new hypotheses pertaining to the LMR-relation are proposed, one is the three level of thought hypothesis, and the other is the hypothesis about the consciousness and societality of linguistic thought.
In general, this dissertation makes the following seven aspects of contributions: firstly, it criticizes and raises objections to Whorfian linguistic relativity. Secondly, this study proposes that truth should be judged on discursive or textual level instead of on sentential one by refuting the logical positivist assertion on the logical isomorphism of language, mind and reality. Thirdly, the constructivist meaning theory of systemic functional linguistics is demonstrated to be fallacious in its view on scientific realism and the grammatical metaphor theory should not be used for justifying the relativism of truth. Fourthly, this dissertation disproves the experientialist views on mind, mind-body issue, reason, mathematics and the embodied scientific realism and defines the applicable scope of this philosophical theory. Fifthly, the statement given by Lakoff & Johnson about their challenge to Western thought is revealed to be hyperbolized. Sixthly, the argument for the transcendence of reason endorses Popper's epistemology of science and refutes Kunian paradigm theory as a "myth of framework". Finally, the dissertation delves deeper into the relation among language, mind and reality on the basis of the relevant research findings on the distinction between the linguistic thinking from imagery (or non-linguistic) thinking and the stratification of the four levels of abstract thinking, and unveils the source of the fallacy lying in views on scientific realism of the three influential linguistic theories.
一般认为语义学研究语言符号与实在之间的关系,而认识论哲学研究心智与实在的关系,真理的符合论认为,与实在符合的认识或知识就是真理。随着认知语义学的产生,心智成为研究语义问题不可忽视的因素.而心智认识实在的过程也离不开语言的参与.因此,无论是语义理论还是认识论理论都要观照到三元关系,它们都须对三元关系给出其基本假定。
这三大语言理论都有其特定的认识论哲学基础:语言相对论和系统功能语言学的哲学基础都属于建构主义的认识论,而Lakoff&Johnson的认知语义学基于体验主义哲学。因此,它们具有不同的科学实在观和真理观:语言相对论认为,我们的思维或心智往往无意识地受到语言结构的影响或控制,科学知识并不是关于实在的真理,而是西方印欧语言的产物:系统功能语言学的语义观假定实在本身是不可知的,我们所能认识的只是经过语法释解或建构的实在,科学理论并不是与实在符合的真理,而是语言对经验重新建构的结果;Lakoff&Johnson提出了体验的科学实在论认为,心智和理性本质上都是体验的,抽象思维,包括逻辑、数学和科学知识都是体验性和想象性的心智的产物。
然而,这三大语言理论的科学实在观都存在如下不可克服的困难:1)无法划清科学理论与非科学或伪科学学说的界限;2)无法区分科学思维方式与非科学思维方式;3)无法对科学知识的增长以及科学的成功的解释能力和预测能力的事实做出合理的说明。
由于存在这些问题和困境,本文试图探讨与三元关系相关的以下问题:心智能否认识实在并与实在符合?或者说,心智能否获得关于实在的真理?心智通过怎样的认知机制获得科学的知识?科学思维方式与常识理论、神话幻想、形而上学等非科学或伪科学的思维方式有何分别?心智是否如语言相对论所声称的必定受到语言结构的影响或控制而无法认识实在?或者如系统功能语言学的语义理论所认为的,实在是不可知的,我们所能认识的只是经过语法释解或建构的实在?抑或如体验主义哲学所声称的,我们所获得的知识只能在我们的身体所限定的范围之内,即心智所能认识的实在,只是体验性的实在?如果是这样的话,该如何解释科学知识比非科学知识更加可靠、稳定和具有更准确的预测力呢?
随着认知科学对心智的研究,人们对三元关系的认识也发生了新的变化。在基于人工智能理论的认知科学中,心智被看成是信息处理器.由此,认知主义的语义观完全不同于传统的语义理论,主张意义是由解读者心智中的概念框架或内部模型对语言符号信息进行动态地和分层次加工处理的结果,心智对语言信息的处理是一个自下而上和自上而下的互动整合的过程。
认知范式下的真理也不再是如逻辑实证主义的真理观那样把真理看成是在句子层面操作的问题。认知范式下的真理问题在语篇层次上判断.
但由于认知主义的语义观把词、句子乃至语篇的意义看成是相对于特定的知识框架或世界模型而定的,其真理观也会导致相对主义.例如库恩的范式理论就否认符合论的真理观,也否认科学理论是真理,而不过是暂时实用的“概念盒子”。他认为新范式取代旧范式不是理性论证的结果而是非理性的格式塔转换,范式之间的竞争则采取宣传、劝说、多数战胜少数等非逻辑的方式。
Lakoff&Johnson(1999)认为体验的科学实在论为库恩的范式理论提供了支持。他们认为科学革命之后新范式取代旧范式其实是用新隐喻取代旧隐喻,其中新旧隐喻之间不可通约,因此是学科内发生了彻底的重新概念化。然而,他们无法解释,为何科学家愿意接受新隐喻,而放弃旧隐喻?他们选择新隐喻有何理性的动因?
波普尔坚持批判理性主义,否认库恩关于科学革命是非理性的格式塔转换,而认为,正因为科学家的思想或理论可以通过语言表达出来,并以学术专著或期刊论文的形式发表,使他们的思想和理论成为可以公开批判和讨论的对象。因而,科学理论之间是可以理性地评判优劣的,或评判哪一个更接近真理。他称库恩的范式的理论是“框架的神话”。
本文提出,对一个科学理论进行辩护可看作是科学共同体承认表达该理论的语篇的意义是连贯的、可理解的、可接受的。因此,科学理论的真假或可接受性问题可归结为判断表达该科学理论的语篇的意义是否是连贯的问题。
目前的关于语篇连贯的理论经历了四个发展阶段,并体现为四种不同的研究进路:1)基于结构主义的语篇结构或形式分析的篇章语法:2)基于言语行为理论的语用学的语篇分析;3)基于符号学的语篇研究包括基于系统功能语言学对语篇连贯的研究:4)基于认知语言学理论对语篇连贯的研究。前三个研究进路都只限于对语篇本体的结构或意义的研究,而忽视语篇处理者的心智因素或认知结构。基于认知语言学的语篇连贯理论却无法解释带来科学革命的理论的语篇的意义连贯问题,即无法说明构成革命性科学语篇的意义连贯的认知机制是什么.因为,带来科学革命的理论常常具有反常识、反常规、违反既定知识框架的特点。
本文以给物理学带来巨大革命的六个理论:哥白尼的日心说、伽利略的落体定律、牛顿的万有引力定律、法拉第和麦克斯韦的电磁理论、爱因斯坦的相对论以及量子力学为例,说明基于认知语言学的语篇连贯的理论无法解释这类科学语篇的连贯性。其根本原因在于,认知语义学的理论基础来自格式塔心理学和体验主义哲学。这些理论都以人们的日常经验和感知作为研究心智的认知结构的证据来源,认知语义学的证据也大都来自日常语言或自然语言中的表达方式。而这样的理论只能解释心智获得常识等非科学的知识,却不能说明许多科学知识,特别是带来科学革命的理论是怎样产生、接受和理解的。
体验主义的心智观认为,一切知识包括科学知识归根结底都来源于具有体验性和想象性的心智或理性。然而事实上,通过体验的和想象的思维至多只能产生原始水平的,基于经验积累的、非理论化、没有普遍性的知识技能,而无法产生真正意义上的科学理论体系.上述六个革命性科学理论都不可能通过体验性和想象性的思维产生。克莱因认为,是数学使得科学家最终接受了那些违反常规和直观经验的革命性科学理论的,也只有是借助数学,科学家才能构造出那些理论。
体验主义的数学观认为,数学思维本质上也是体验的和想象的。本文对此进行了驳斥并得出如下两个推论:1)大部分数学知识,特别是超出算术水平的、高级的数学知识并不是通过体验的和想象的认知产生的,而是更高层次的、符号化的、理性的心智能力的发明。因而,心智并不完全是体验的,数学思维是非体验的和超越性的;2)大部分数学思想不能用日常语言表达出来,数学语言也不同于日常语言,具有抽象性、符号性、明了性、简洁性、非歧义性和精确性.因此,不能以日常语言为证据证明心智中的数学思维也是体验的和想象的。体验主义哲学只是以少量的算术运算中的语言表述作为证据,声称数学思想和数学知识也是体验性和想象性的人类概念系统的产物,这种论断是错误的。
因此,本文进一步反思和批判了体验主义的心身观,指出其心身观仅仅强调心智的体验性,而忽视了心智对身体经验和感知的超越性。Lakoff&Johnson声称体验主义哲学挑战了两千多年的西方传统哲学的说法也是言过其实。
本文基于对语言、心智和实在三者关系的研究得出如下两个结论:1)应在语篇层次探讨心智与实在的符合关系,即真理问题,而不应在句子层面讨论;2)心智中的理性具有超越性。理性既能超越语言结构的影响和控制,也能突破身体构造和机能的局限。
本研究对三元关系提出了两个假说:1)思维的三层次假说:2)语言思维的有意识性和社会性假说.
本研究的主要贡献有:1)对Whorf的语言相对论的科学实在观提出了质疑和批判:2)对逻辑实证主义关于语言、心智和实在是逻辑同构的论断提出了批评和驳斥,提出判断心智是否与实在符合,不应在句子层次,而应在一个意义完整的、系统的语篇层次上判定;3)批判了基于建构主义认识论的系统功能语言学的语义观关于科学实在性的论述;4)批判了体验主义的心智观、心身观、理性观、数学观和体验的科学实在论,限定了该哲学理论适用的范围;5)论证指出了Lakoff&Johnson所声称的对两千多年的西方传统哲学的挑战和批判事实上无法成立;6)对心智中的理性的超越性的论证支持了波普尔的科学认识论的思想,而驳斥了库恩的范式理论的“框架神话”;7)基于相关研究对语言思维和意象(非语言)思维的区分以及对抽象思维四个层次的划分,更深入地分析和探讨了语言、心智和实在三者的关系,并对三大语言理论的科学实在观的问题根源进行了剖析。
Based on the comparison of their distinct basic assumptions about the relationship among language, mind(or thought) and reality(briefed as LMR-relation) of the three influential linguistic theories, i.e. Whorfian linguistic relativity, Halliday's systemic functional linguistics and Lakoff & Johnson's cognitive semantics, this dissertation makes critical assessments about their respective views on scientific realism. It argues that the three linguistic theories are bound to give rise to the following insurmountable difficulties: first, they cannot demarcate science from non-science or pseudo-science; second, they cannot distinguish scientific ways of thinking from nonscientific ones; finally, they cannot make a plausible account of the very facts of the growth of scientific knowledge and the success or usefulness of science in explanation and prediction. These dilemmas elicit the present quest for a tenable account for the LMR-relation so that it can justify scientific theories and ways of thinking as more reliable, stable and certain knowledge than non-scientific one such as folk theories, mythology and metaphysics. Moreover, those difficulties also induce the reexamination of the epistemological foundations of the three linguistics theories with the hope to give them sound evaluations and define their spheres of application. By means of abduction and criticism, this study attempts to dig into the nature of LMR-relation.
All the three linguistic theories have their own epistemological foundations: both Whorfian linguistic relativity and Halliday's meaning theories are established on constructivism, while Lakoff & Johnson's is philosophically based experientialism. Linguistic relativity maintains that since our thought or mind is unconsciously influenced or constrained by linguistic structures, the reality itself is inaccessible to our mind. Scientific knowledge cannot be truth about reality but the construction of the Western Indo-European languages. Likewise, the meaning theories of systemic functional linguistics assume that the reality is unknowable. What we can know is the reality constructed or construed by grammars. Based on his grammatical metaphor theory, Halliday puts forth the arguments that the frequent use of nominalization in scientific discourses suggests that scientific language thingifies the events and processes into observable, measurable and testable objects or things. Scientific theories are, therefore, by no means the truth in correspondence to reality but the reconstruction or reshaping of experience by languages or grammars. Whereas as a response to the postmodern critique of science, Lakoff & Johnson on the one hand reject the post-modern relativism of truth and the anti-realism of science, on the other, they disapprove of the classical philosophical view of scientific realism, which is dubbed by them as a disembodied objective scientific realism. They advance the embodied scientific realism or experiential realism by claiming that our mind and reason are inherently embodied and even the most abstract knowledge such as logic, mathematics and scientific theories are the results of the embodied and imaginative mind.
With all those controversies and disputes on the view of scientific realism, this study attempts to explore into the following issues: can mind get access to reality or correspond to reality? With what cognitive mechanism can mind acquire scientific knowledge? What distinguishes scientific ways of thinking from non-scientific ones? Is the reality inaccessible to mind as claimed by linguistic relativity because the mind is necessarily affected or constrained by the structures of languages? Or the reality is unknowable to mind because of the assertions given by systemic functional linguistics that the reality is nothing but the construction or construal of grammars? Or is it that the reality is embodied in nature, as advocated by experientialism, because our knowledge is gained through our bodily experience and the interaction of our bodies with environment? If those are the cases, how can we plausibly account for the scientific knowledge as being more reliable, stable and precise in prediction than the non-scientific one?
Seeking for a tenable assumption about LMR-relationship is not only the major concern of meaning theories but also that of epistemological philosophy because the semantics is generally assumed as the study of relation between language and reality, while epistemology takes its primary interest in the relation between mind and reality. The correspondence theory of truth holds the view that truth is the knowledge in congruence with facts. The advent of cognitive science provides fresh insight into the understanding of mind as well as the LMR-relationship, which results in the novel theories on meaning and truth. Within the framework of cognitivism, mind is, therefore, viewed as an information processor, which processes perceptual and linguistic information interactively and integratively with the four complementary stages involved, i.e., the monadic stage, the structural stage, contextual stage and cognitive or epistemic stage.
As a consequence, the cognitive view on meaning diverges from the traditional meaning theories because the meanings of words and sentences are either determined in isolation as assumed by truth value semantics, or are dependent on indefinite, all-inclusive contexts as regarded by pragmatics. From the cognitive point of view, however, meaning is the output of the dynamic and hierarchical processing within the conceptual frames or internal world models stored in the mind of interpreters. Mind processes linguistic information in both top-down and bottom-up fashions.
The cognitivist theory of truth is no longer determined on sentential or propositional level as taken by logical positivism. Based on cognitive information processing approach of the model of mind, the dissertation argues that truth should be interfaced with discourses, that is to say, truth should be judged on discursive or textual level.
Nevertheless, the cognitivist view of truth may fall into the relativism of truth since either the meaning of a word or a sentence is relative to a particular intellectual framework of world model. How to justify a scientific hypothesis or theory?
Kuhn, as an exponent of the pragmaticism of truth, objects the correspondence theory of truth and denies scientific theories as truth. He claims that a scientific theory is only a useful "conceptual box", which can temporarily hold the natural phenomena. And he adheres to the viewpoint that the replacement of a new paradigm with the old one is not the consequence of rational argumentation but an irrational gestalt switch, which occurs all at once or not at all. The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) claim that their embodied scientific realism is compatible with Kuhnian tradition, because after scientific revolutions, the switch of paradigms is actually the replacement of new metaphors with the old ones, and hence an entire discipline is reconceptualized. The new metaphors are incommensurable with the old ones. But they cannot give grounds for why the scientific community is willing to accept the new metaphors and abandon the old ones.
Popper, however, advocates critical rationalism and firmly believes in the progressiveness of science and the correspondence theory of truth. He insists that the scientific enterprise is the pursuit of truth or the process of getting closer to truth. The progress in science is achieved through rational criticism and discussion. He denies Kuhn's view of scientific revolution as an irrational gestalt switch by arguing that since scientific theories can be formulated linguistically, and that they can even be published and become objects open to investigation and criticism, different theories or paradigms can thus be rationally assessed. He criticizes Kuhnian paradigm theory as "the myth of framework".
This dissertation thus contends that the justification of a scientific theory can be viewed as its acceptance by the scientific community as a coherent and understandable discourse or text. That is to say, acceptability of a scientific theory can be reduced to the coherence of its text.
The contemporary textual coherence theories have undergone four stages of evolution with distinct approaches to textual studies: 1) the structuralist approach to textual structures and forms involved in study of textual grammars; 2) the pragmatic approach to textual coherence grounded on speech act theory; 3) semiological approach to textual study including the study of textual coherence based on systemic functional linguistic theory; 4) the cognitive approach to textual coherence. Obviously, the former three approaches are merely focused on the study of text proper in terms of forms or meangings but ignore the textual processors' mental factors or their cognitive structures. The cognitive approach to textual coherence theory is, nonetheless, unable to explain the coherence of revolutionary scientific texts, or it fails to pin down what constitutes the cognitive mechanism of the coherent interpretation or understanding of a text that enunciates a revolutionary scientific theory. Because on the one hand, the theories bringing about scientific revolutions generally run counter to commonsense, conventionality, normal or established epistemic frameworks, for instance, the six revolutionary physical theories: Copernicus's heliocentric theory, Galileo's law of falling body, Newton's law of universal gravitation, Faraday and Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum theory. The cognitive linguistic theories are incompetent to explain the coherence of the above six revolutionary scientific discourses for the very reason that the cognitive semantics is theoretically founded on the Gestalt psychology and experientialist philosophy, which take the everyday experience and perceptions as the objects or sources for studying mental or cognitive structures. And the evidence for cognitive semantics is gathered primarily from ordinary language or natural language. Naturally, such a theory is only applicable to the explanation of the textual coherence of folk theories or other non-scientific knowledge, but is inadequate to elucidate why the revolutionary scientific texts are understandable, acceptable or meaningful.
The experientialist view of mind claims that all knowledge including scientific knowledge stems from the embodied and imaginative mind and reason. As a matter of fact, however, the knowledge derived from embodied and imaginative thinking can only achieve the level of the primitive, empirical, elementary rules and techniques, which fall short of enunciating any systematic scientific theories with general principles. That is to say, the above mentioned six revolutionary scientific theories cannot solely be the results of embodied and imaginative thinking. The famous mathematical philosopher Morris Kline asserts that it is mathematics that guarantees the acceptance of those unconventional and anti-perceptual experience revolutionary scientific theories and it is only by mathematical means that the scientists can formulate or invent those theories.
At odds over the experiential view of mathematics, which claims that mathematical thinking is embodied and imaginative by nature, this study comes to the following two inferences: on the one hand, most mathematical theories, especially those go beyond the arithmetic level, are not the products of embodied and imaginative cognition but the invention of the advanced capacities of rational mind. Mind is, therefore, not inherently embodied as claimed by experientialism, and mathematical thinking is largely disembodied and transcendental. On the other, most mathematical thought cannot be expressed with everyday language and mathematical language diverges from natural language substantively with its symbolic, brief, unambiguous, precise characters. Thus it is inappropriate or ill-advised to jump to the conclusion that the mathematical way of thinking is embodied and imaginative by only deriving its evidence from the ordinary linguistic expressions.
The dissertation proceeds to challenge the experientialist view of mind-body issue with the argument that it overemphasizes the embodiment of mind but neglects the transcending capability of mind over bodily experience and perception. It is also pointed out that Lakoff & Johnson's boast of their challenge to the over two millenium Western classical philosophy is all the way an exaggeration.
The thesis finally arrives at the following two conclusions: first, the corresponding relation between mind and reality, i.e. the truth problem, should be judged on discursive or textual level rather than on sentential one; second, the reason in mind is so transcendentally characterized that it can not only transcend the influence or constraints of linguistic structures but also can surpass the limitations of our bodily make-up and physiological function.
Two new hypotheses pertaining to the LMR-relation are proposed, one is the three level of thought hypothesis, and the other is the hypothesis about the consciousness and societality of linguistic thought.
In general, this dissertation makes the following seven aspects of contributions: firstly, it criticizes and raises objections to Whorfian linguistic relativity. Secondly, this study proposes that truth should be judged on discursive or textual level instead of on sentential one by refuting the logical positivist assertion on the logical isomorphism of language, mind and reality. Thirdly, the constructivist meaning theory of systemic functional linguistics is demonstrated to be fallacious in its view on scientific realism and the grammatical metaphor theory should not be used for justifying the relativism of truth. Fourthly, this dissertation disproves the experientialist views on mind, mind-body issue, reason, mathematics and the embodied scientific realism and defines the applicable scope of this philosophical theory. Fifthly, the statement given by Lakoff & Johnson about their challenge to Western thought is revealed to be hyperbolized. Sixthly, the argument for the transcendence of reason endorses Popper's epistemology of science and refutes Kunian paradigm theory as a "myth of framework". Finally, the dissertation delves deeper into the relation among language, mind and reality on the basis of the relevant research findings on the distinction between the linguistic thinking from imagery (or non-linguistic) thinking and the stratification of the four levels of abstract thinking, and unveils the source of the fallacy lying in views on scientific realism of the three influential linguistic theories.
引文
[1]Al-Sharafi,A.G.M.Textual Metonymy:A Semiotic Approach[M].New York:Palgrave Macmillan.2004.
[2]Austin,J.L.How to Do Things with Words[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社,牛津大学出版社.2003.
[3]Ayer,A.J.(Ed.).Logical Positivism[C].Westport:Greenwood Press.1959.
[4]Barcelona,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroad:A Cognitive Perspective[C].Berling and New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2003.
[5]Burtt,E.A.The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science:A ttistorical and Critical Essey[M].Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.2002.
[6]Campbell,K.S.Coherence,Continuity,and Cohesion:Theoretical Foundations for Document Design[M].New Jersey:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,Publishers.1995.
[7]Chapman,S & Routledge,C.Key Thinkers in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language[C].Edinburgh University Press.2005.
[8]Chomsky,N.New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind [M].Beijing:Foreign Language and Research Press.2002.
[9]Cohen,I.B.Revolution in Science[M].Cambridge,Massechusetts,and London,England:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.1985.
[10]Cohen,I.B.The Newtonian Revolution[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1983.
[11]Cohen,R.& Wartofsky,M.(ed).Methodology,Metaphysics and the History of Science:in Memory of Benjamin Nelson[C].D.Reidel Publishing Company.1984.
[12]Davision,D.Truth,Language,and History[M].London:Clarendon Press.2005.
[13]Devitt,M & Sterelny,K.Language and Reality:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language(2~(nd) Edition)[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts:h Bradford Book The MIT Press.1999.
[14]Dirver,R.& P(o|¨)rings,R.(Ed.) Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast[C].Berling and New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2003.
[15]Dressier,W.(ed.).Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].Berlin,New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[16]Fauconnier,G.Mapping in Thought and Language[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1997.
[17]Fauconnier,G.Mental Spaces;Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language[M].世界图书出版公司,剑桥大学出版社.2008.
[18]Gentner,D.& Jeziorski,M.The shift from metaphor to analogy in western science[A].Ortony,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Thought [C].Cambridge University Press.1993.
[19]Gumperz,J.J.& Levinson,S.C.(Ed.).Rethinking Linguistic Relativity[C].Cambridge University Press.1996.
[20]Haack,S.Philosophy of Logics[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978.
[21]Hale,B & Wright,C.A Companion to the Philosophy ofLanguage[C].Massachusetts:Blackwell Publishers.2000.
[22]Halliday,M.A.K.& C.M.I.M.Matthiessen.Construing Experience through Meaning:A Language-based Approachto Cognition[M].London:Cassell,1999.
[23]Halliday,M.A.K.& Hason,R.Cohesion in English[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2001.
[24]Halliday,M.A.K.Explorations in the Functions of Language[M].New York:Elsevier.1973.
[25]Halliday,M.A.K.New ways of meaning--the challenge to applied linguistics.Ed.by Fill,A & Muhlhausler,P.in The Ecolinguistics Reader:Language,Ecology andEnvironment[C].London and New York:Continuum.2001.
[26]Halliday,M.A.K.The Language of Science[M].Ed.by Jonathan J.Webster.London·New York:Continuum.2004.
[27]Hanfling,O.Philosophy and Ordinary Language:the Bent and Genius of our Tongue[M].London and New York:Routledge.2000.
[28]Hanson,N.R.Patterns of Discovery[M].Cambridge University Press.1961.
[29]Harweg,R.Is Coherence a Pragmatic Phenomenon? Comments on Dieter Viehweger' s Paper "Coherence-Interaction of Modules"[A].In Connexity and Coherence[C].(ed.) Heydrich,Neubauer,Pet(o|¨)fi and S(o|¨)zer.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[30]Hasan,R.Text in the Systemic-Functional Model[A].In Current Trends in Yextlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[31]Haser,V.Metaphor,Metonymy,and Experientialist Philosophy:Challenging Cognitive Semantics[M].Berlin·New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2005.
[32]Heydrieh,W.,Fritz,N.,PetSfi,J.& SSzer,E.(Ed.).Connexity and Coherence:Analysis of Text and Discourse[C].Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[33]James,W.The Principles of Psychology(1890)[M].New York:Dover.1950.
[34]Johnson,M.The Body in the Mind[M].Chicago and London:The University of Chicago Press.1987.
[35]Johnson-Laird,P.N.Mental Models:Towards a Cognitive Science of Language,Inference,and Consciousness[M].Cambridge/Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.1983.
[36]Kline,M.Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1972.
[37]Kline,M.Mathematics and the Physical World[M].New York:Thomas Y.Crowell Company.1959.
[38]Kline,M.Mathematics and the Search for Knowledge[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1985.
[39]Kline,M.Mathematics in Western Culture[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1953.
[40]Kline,M.Mathematics,the Loss of Certainty[M].Oxford University Press.1980.
[41]Kuhn,Y.The Essential Tension[M].Chicago:Chicago University Press.1977.
[42]Kuhn,Y.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1970.
[43]Kuhn,T.The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research[A].in Crombie (Ed.),Scientific Change[C].Heinemann,London.1963:347-369
[44]Kuhn,T.The Structure of Scientific Revolution[M].Beijing:China Social Sciences Publishing House Chengcheng Books LTD.1999.
[45]Lakoff,G & Johnson,M.1980.Metaphor we Live by[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.
[46]Lakoff,G & Johnson,M.Philosophy in the Flesh:The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought[M].New York:Basic Books.1999.
[47]Lakoff,G & N(?)(?)ez,R.Conceptual Metaphor in Mathematics[A].In Discourse and Cognition:Bridging the Gap[C].Koenig,J.P.(Ed.)Stanford,Calif.:CSLI Publications.1996.
[48]Lakoff,G.Women,Fire and Dangerous Things:What Categories Reveal about the Mind[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.1987.
[49]Langacker,R.W.Discourse in Cognitive Grammar[J].Cognitive Linguistics.2001(12-2):143-188.
[50]Leezenberg,M.Contexts of Metaphor[M].Amsterdam,London,New York,Oxford,Paris,Shannon,Tokyo:Elsevier.2001.
[51]Maasen,S.& Weingart,P.Metaphors and the Dynamics of Knowledge [M].London and New York:Routledge.2000.
[52]Magnani,L.,Nersessian,N.J.& Thagard,P.(Ed.).Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery[C].New York,Boston,Dordrecht,London,Moscow:Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.1998.
[53]Martin,J.R.& Veel,R.(ed.) Reading Science:critical and functional perspectives on discourse of science[C].London and New York:Routledge.1998.
[54]Martinich,A.P.The Philosophy of Language(4~(th) edition)[C].New York,Oxford:Oxford Universtiy Press.2001.
[55]Mey,Mac de.The Cognitive Paradigm[M].Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster:D.Reidel Publishing Company.1982.
[56]Miller,A.Imagery in Scientific Thought Creating 20~(th)-Century Physics[M].Boston,Basel,Stuttgart:Birkh(a|¨)user.1984.
[57]Newton,R.G.The Truth of Science:Physical Theory and Reality[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts/London,England:Harvard University Press.1997.
[58]N(o|¨)th,W.The Semiotic Framework of Textlinguistics.In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[59]Ortony,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Thought[C].Cambridge University Press.1993.
[60]Popper,K.Conjectures and Refutations[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.1963.
[61]Popper,K.Knowledge and theBody-MindProblem[M].(Ed.) Notturno,M.A.London and New York:Routledge.1996.
[62]Popper,K.Normal Science and Its Dangers,in Lakatos,I & Musgrave,A.(ed.),Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge[C].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1970.
[63]Popper,K.The Myth of Frasework---In defense of science and rationality[M].(Ed.) Notturno,M.A.London and New York:Routledge.1994.
[64]Popper,K.The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions,in Ian Hacking(Ed.),Scientific Revolutions[C].Oxford:Oxford University Press.1981.
[65]Prelli,L.J.A Rhetoric of Science:Inventing Scientific Discourse [M].University of South Carolina Press.1989.
[66]Putnam,H.Reason,Truth and History:Philosophical Paper 2[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1975.
[67]Quine,W.V.O.From a Logical Point of View(2~(nd) Edition)[M].Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press.1980.
[68]Quine,W.V.O.Meaning and Translation[A].in Harold Morick(Ed.),Challenge to Empiricism[C].California:Wadsworth Pub.Co.1972
[69]Radman,Z.Metaphors:Figures of the Mind[M].Dordrecht/Boston/London:Kluwer Academic Publishers.1997.
[70]Rieser,H.On the Development of Text Grammar[A].In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin.New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[71]Russell,B.How to Grow Old.In New Concept English(4).Etd.by Alexander,L.G.上海:上海外语教育出版社.1988.
[72]Saussure,F.Course in General Linguistics[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2001.
[73]Schmid,S.J.Some Problems of Communicative Text Theories[A].In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[74]Stenlund,S.Language and Philosophical Problems[M].London and New York:Routledge.1990.
[75]Tsoharzids,S.L.(Ed.) John Searle's Philosophy of Language:Force,Meaning,and Mind[C].Cambridge University Press.2007.
[76]Ungerer,F & Schmid,H.J.An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics [M].Beijing:Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.2001.
[77]Van de Velde,R.G.Man,Verbal Text,Inferencing,and Coherence[A].In Connexity and Coherence[C].(Ed) Heydrich,Neubauer,Pet(o|¨)fi and S(o|¨)zer.Berlin-New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[78]Van Dijk,T.A.News as Discourse[M].Hillsdale,New Jersey,Hove and London:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,Publishers.1988.
[79]Van Dijk,T.A.The Discourse-Knowledge Interface[A].in Critical Discourse Analysis:Theory and Interdisciplinary[C].Edited by Weiss,G and Wodak,R.2003:85-109.
[80]Van Dijk,T.A.& Kintsch,W.Strategies of Discourse Comprehension [M].New York:Academic Press.1983.
[81]Whorf,B.Language,Thought,and Reality[M].M.I.T press.1956.
[82]Wittgenstein,L.Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.1922.
[83]阿达玛,J.数学领域中的发明心理学[M].大连:大连理工大学出版社.2008.
[84]埃利亚＆萨尔法蒂.话语分析基础知识[M].天津:天津人民出版社.2006.
[85]爱因斯坦,A.爱因斯坦讲述《相对论》[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论[C].易洪波＆李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006:2-39.
[86]爱因斯坦,A.爱因斯坦晚年文集[C].北京:北京大学出版社.2008.
[87]安德森,L.W.学习、教学和评估分类:布卢姆教育目标分类学修订版(简缩本)[M].上海:华东师范大学出版社.2008.
[88]波普尔,K.猜想与反驳:科学知识的增长[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2005.
[89]博登,M.人工智能哲学[M].上海:世纪出版集团上海译文出版社.2005.
[90]曹雪芹,脂砚斋主人.脂砚斋重评石头记[Z].天津:天津古籍出版社.2006.
[91]查尔默斯,A.F.科学究竟是什么[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[92]常晨光.语法隐喻与经验的重新建构[J].外语教学与研究.2004(1):31-36.
[93]陈波＆韩林合(Ed.).逻辑与语言:分析哲学经典文选[C].北京:东方出版社.2005.
[94]陈波.奎因哲学研究--从逻辑和语言的观点看[M].北京:生活‘读书·新知三联书店.1998.
[95]陈波.逻辑哲学导论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2002.
[96]陈嘉映.语言哲学[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2004.
[97]德夫林,K.数学犹聊天:人人都有数学基因[M].上海:上海科技教育出版社.2009.
[98]高新民,储昭华.(Ed.)心灵哲学[C].北京:商务印书馆.2002.
[99]光学.相对论简史(代序).相对论--广义及狭义相对论[M].易洪波＆李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006:47-53.
[100]哈克,S.理性地捍卫科学--在科学主义与犬儒主义之间[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2008.
[101]霍金,S.时间简史(插图版)[M].湖南:湖南科学技术出版社.2008.
[102]霍金,S.时间简史(普及版)[M].湖南:湖南科学技术出版社.2005.
[103]霍金,S.万有理论:宇宙的起源与归宿[M].海南:海南出版社,三环出版社,2004.
[104]江天骥.逻辑经验主义的认识论,当代西方科学哲学[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社.2006.
[105]江怡(ed.).走向新世纪的西方哲学[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2004.
[106]考夫卡,K.格式塔心理学原理(上、下册)[M].杭州:浙江教育出版社.1999.
[107]柯朗,R.& 罗宾,H.什么是数学:对思想和方法的基本研究(增订版)[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2008.
[108]柯瓦雷,A.从封闭世界到无限宇宙[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2008(b).
[109]柯瓦雷,A.伽利略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2008(a).
[110]柯瓦雷,A.牛顿研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2003.
[111]克莱因,M.古今数学思想(一、二、三、四册)[M].上海:上海科学技术出版社.2007(d).
[112]克莱因,M.西方文化中的数学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007(a).
[113]克莱因,M.数学与知识的探求[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007(b).
[114]克莱因,M.数学:确定性的丧失[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社.2007(c).
[115]克里普克,S.命名与必然性[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2005.
[116]库恩,T.科学革命的结构[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2006.
[117]赖尔,G.心的概念[M].北京:商务印书馆.2006.
[118]里克曼,H.P.理性的探险--哲学在社会学中的应用[M].北京:商务印书馆.2006.
[119]刘大椿.科学哲学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006.
[120]刘润清.西方语言学流派[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2003。
[121]奈佛,J.爱因斯坦传[M].北京:中央编译出版社.2008.
[122]马蒂尼奇,A.P.(Ed.)语言哲学[C].北京:商务印书馆.2004.
[123]欧阳康.人文社会科学哲学[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社.2001.
[124]丘奇兰德,P.M.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京:中国人们大学出版社.2008.
[125]塞尔,J.心、脑与科学[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2006.
[126]孙思.科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判[J].自然辩证法通讯.2005(a)(3):46-52.
[127]孙思.理性之魂--当代科学哲学中心问题[M].北京:人民出版社.2005(b)
[128]孙思.重建科学划界标准[J].自然辩证法研究,2005(c)(10):34-37/42.
[129]索绪尔,F.D.普通语言学教程[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[130]塔巴克,J.数学和自然法则:科学语言的发展史[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[131]万德勒,Z.哲学中的语言学[M].北京:华夏出版社.2002.
[132]王寅.语篇连贯的认知世界分析方法一体验哲学和认知语言学对语篇连贯的解释[J].《外语学刊》2005(4):16-23.
[133]王寅.认知语言学与语篇分析一.Langacker的语篇分析观[J].外语教学与研究.2003(2):83-88.
[134]王寅.认知语言学与语篇连贯研究--八论语言的体验性:语篇连贯的认 知基础[J].外语研究.2006(6):6-12.
[135]维特根斯坦,L.哲学研究[M].上海:世纪出版集团上海人民出版社.2005.
[136]卫真道.篇章语言学[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2002.
[137]肖巍,刘学礼＆吴海江.科学:思想史、方法论与社会学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2008
[138]熊学亮.认知语用学概论[C].上海:上海外语教育出版社.2004.
[139]薛定谔,E.自然与希腊[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社.2007.
[140]严世清.论韩礼德的语言哲学思想[J].外语研究,2002(2):7-9/19。
[141]姚小平.人类语言学家沃尔夫的遗产--读《论语言、思维和现实》[J].外语教学与研究.2002(1):75-77。
[142]叶浩生.第二次认知革命与社会建构论的产生[J].心理科学进展.2003(1):101-107.
[143]易洪波＆李智谋(eds).爱因斯坦生命中的重要符号[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论(全译彩图精解本)[C].重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006.
[144]易洪波＆李智谋编译.广义相对论的诞生与证实[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论[C].易洪波&李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006.
[145]詹姆斯,W.心理学原理(一、二册)[M].北京:九州出版社.2007.
[146]张德禄,刘汝山.语篇连贯与衔接理论的发展及应用[M].上海:上海外语教育出版社.2003.
[147]赵敦华.现代西方哲学新编[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2004.
[148]周超,朱志方.逻辑、历史与社会:科学合理性研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2003.
[149]周林东.科学哲学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2005.
[150]周频.Halliday的建构主义的科学实在观遭遇的问题与困境[J].外国语文(四川外语学院学报).2009(1):116-121.
[151]周频.对语法隐喻与科学及真理相对论相关论题的反思[J].外国语.2008(5):44-54.
[152]周频.论理论的“内部批判”与“外部批判”[J].中国外语.2008(1):52-56.
[153]周频.论理论整合与理论的基本假定之间的关系[J].中国外语.2009(2)
[154]周频.论认知语言学与系统功能语言学对语篇连贯解释的互补性[J].外语学刊.2009(3)
[155]周频.三大语言理论的科学实在观批评[J].自然辩证法通讯.2009(3)
[156]朱志方.认知科学对现代哲学的挑战[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版).2002(1):36-43。
[157]朱志方.认知科学与涉身的实在论[J].哲学研究.2002(2):60-67.
[158]牛津英英词典
[159]http://bbs.yjsy.ecnu.edu.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardID=110&ID=105747&p age=1
[160]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science
[161]http://fangsheng2.blog.hexun.com/13493844 d.html
[162]http://old.blog.edu.cn/user1/5554/archives/2006/1458061,shtml
[163]http://plato,stanford,edu/entries/cognitive-science/Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[164]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/
[165]Yount,D.J.http://www.mc.maricopa,edu/~yount/text/empm-v-ratm,html.2003
[2]Austin,J.L.How to Do Things with Words[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社,牛津大学出版社.2003.
[3]Ayer,A.J.(Ed.).Logical Positivism[C].Westport:Greenwood Press.1959.
[4]Barcelona,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroad:A Cognitive Perspective[C].Berling and New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2003.
[5]Burtt,E.A.The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science:A ttistorical and Critical Essey[M].Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.2002.
[6]Campbell,K.S.Coherence,Continuity,and Cohesion:Theoretical Foundations for Document Design[M].New Jersey:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,Publishers.1995.
[7]Chapman,S & Routledge,C.Key Thinkers in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language[C].Edinburgh University Press.2005.
[8]Chomsky,N.New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind [M].Beijing:Foreign Language and Research Press.2002.
[9]Cohen,I.B.Revolution in Science[M].Cambridge,Massechusetts,and London,England:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.1985.
[10]Cohen,I.B.The Newtonian Revolution[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1983.
[11]Cohen,R.& Wartofsky,M.(ed).Methodology,Metaphysics and the History of Science:in Memory of Benjamin Nelson[C].D.Reidel Publishing Company.1984.
[12]Davision,D.Truth,Language,and History[M].London:Clarendon Press.2005.
[13]Devitt,M & Sterelny,K.Language and Reality:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language(2~(nd) Edition)[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts:h Bradford Book The MIT Press.1999.
[14]Dirver,R.& P(o|¨)rings,R.(Ed.) Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast[C].Berling and New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2003.
[15]Dressier,W.(ed.).Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].Berlin,New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[16]Fauconnier,G.Mapping in Thought and Language[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1997.
[17]Fauconnier,G.Mental Spaces;Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language[M].世界图书出版公司,剑桥大学出版社.2008.
[18]Gentner,D.& Jeziorski,M.The shift from metaphor to analogy in western science[A].Ortony,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Thought [C].Cambridge University Press.1993.
[19]Gumperz,J.J.& Levinson,S.C.(Ed.).Rethinking Linguistic Relativity[C].Cambridge University Press.1996.
[20]Haack,S.Philosophy of Logics[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978.
[21]Hale,B & Wright,C.A Companion to the Philosophy ofLanguage[C].Massachusetts:Blackwell Publishers.2000.
[22]Halliday,M.A.K.& C.M.I.M.Matthiessen.Construing Experience through Meaning:A Language-based Approachto Cognition[M].London:Cassell,1999.
[23]Halliday,M.A.K.& Hason,R.Cohesion in English[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2001.
[24]Halliday,M.A.K.Explorations in the Functions of Language[M].New York:Elsevier.1973.
[25]Halliday,M.A.K.New ways of meaning--the challenge to applied linguistics.Ed.by Fill,A & Muhlhausler,P.in The Ecolinguistics Reader:Language,Ecology andEnvironment[C].London and New York:Continuum.2001.
[26]Halliday,M.A.K.The Language of Science[M].Ed.by Jonathan J.Webster.London·New York:Continuum.2004.
[27]Hanfling,O.Philosophy and Ordinary Language:the Bent and Genius of our Tongue[M].London and New York:Routledge.2000.
[28]Hanson,N.R.Patterns of Discovery[M].Cambridge University Press.1961.
[29]Harweg,R.Is Coherence a Pragmatic Phenomenon? Comments on Dieter Viehweger' s Paper "Coherence-Interaction of Modules"[A].In Connexity and Coherence[C].(ed.) Heydrich,Neubauer,Pet(o|¨)fi and S(o|¨)zer.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[30]Hasan,R.Text in the Systemic-Functional Model[A].In Current Trends in Yextlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[31]Haser,V.Metaphor,Metonymy,and Experientialist Philosophy:Challenging Cognitive Semantics[M].Berlin·New York:Mouton de Gruyter.2005.
[32]Heydrieh,W.,Fritz,N.,PetSfi,J.& SSzer,E.(Ed.).Connexity and Coherence:Analysis of Text and Discourse[C].Berlin and New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[33]James,W.The Principles of Psychology(1890)[M].New York:Dover.1950.
[34]Johnson,M.The Body in the Mind[M].Chicago and London:The University of Chicago Press.1987.
[35]Johnson-Laird,P.N.Mental Models:Towards a Cognitive Science of Language,Inference,and Consciousness[M].Cambridge/Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.1983.
[36]Kline,M.Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1972.
[37]Kline,M.Mathematics and the Physical World[M].New York:Thomas Y.Crowell Company.1959.
[38]Kline,M.Mathematics and the Search for Knowledge[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1985.
[39]Kline,M.Mathematics in Western Culture[M].New York:Oxford University Press.1953.
[40]Kline,M.Mathematics,the Loss of Certainty[M].Oxford University Press.1980.
[41]Kuhn,Y.The Essential Tension[M].Chicago:Chicago University Press.1977.
[42]Kuhn,Y.The Structure of Scientific Revolutions[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1970.
[43]Kuhn,T.The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research[A].in Crombie (Ed.),Scientific Change[C].Heinemann,London.1963:347-369
[44]Kuhn,T.The Structure of Scientific Revolution[M].Beijing:China Social Sciences Publishing House Chengcheng Books LTD.1999.
[45]Lakoff,G & Johnson,M.1980.Metaphor we Live by[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.
[46]Lakoff,G & Johnson,M.Philosophy in the Flesh:The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought[M].New York:Basic Books.1999.
[47]Lakoff,G & N(?)(?)ez,R.Conceptual Metaphor in Mathematics[A].In Discourse and Cognition:Bridging the Gap[C].Koenig,J.P.(Ed.)Stanford,Calif.:CSLI Publications.1996.
[48]Lakoff,G.Women,Fire and Dangerous Things:What Categories Reveal about the Mind[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.1987.
[49]Langacker,R.W.Discourse in Cognitive Grammar[J].Cognitive Linguistics.2001(12-2):143-188.
[50]Leezenberg,M.Contexts of Metaphor[M].Amsterdam,London,New York,Oxford,Paris,Shannon,Tokyo:Elsevier.2001.
[51]Maasen,S.& Weingart,P.Metaphors and the Dynamics of Knowledge [M].London and New York:Routledge.2000.
[52]Magnani,L.,Nersessian,N.J.& Thagard,P.(Ed.).Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery[C].New York,Boston,Dordrecht,London,Moscow:Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.1998.
[53]Martin,J.R.& Veel,R.(ed.) Reading Science:critical and functional perspectives on discourse of science[C].London and New York:Routledge.1998.
[54]Martinich,A.P.The Philosophy of Language(4~(th) edition)[C].New York,Oxford:Oxford Universtiy Press.2001.
[55]Mey,Mac de.The Cognitive Paradigm[M].Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster:D.Reidel Publishing Company.1982.
[56]Miller,A.Imagery in Scientific Thought Creating 20~(th)-Century Physics[M].Boston,Basel,Stuttgart:Birkh(a|¨)user.1984.
[57]Newton,R.G.The Truth of Science:Physical Theory and Reality[M].Cambridge,Massachusetts/London,England:Harvard University Press.1997.
[58]N(o|¨)th,W.The Semiotic Framework of Textlinguistics.In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[59]Ortony,A.(Ed.) Metaphor and Thought[C].Cambridge University Press.1993.
[60]Popper,K.Conjectures and Refutations[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.1963.
[61]Popper,K.Knowledge and theBody-MindProblem[M].(Ed.) Notturno,M.A.London and New York:Routledge.1996.
[62]Popper,K.Normal Science and Its Dangers,in Lakatos,I & Musgrave,A.(ed.),Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge[C].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1970.
[63]Popper,K.The Myth of Frasework---In defense of science and rationality[M].(Ed.) Notturno,M.A.London and New York:Routledge.1994.
[64]Popper,K.The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions,in Ian Hacking(Ed.),Scientific Revolutions[C].Oxford:Oxford University Press.1981.
[65]Prelli,L.J.A Rhetoric of Science:Inventing Scientific Discourse [M].University of South Carolina Press.1989.
[66]Putnam,H.Reason,Truth and History:Philosophical Paper 2[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1975.
[67]Quine,W.V.O.From a Logical Point of View(2~(nd) Edition)[M].Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press.1980.
[68]Quine,W.V.O.Meaning and Translation[A].in Harold Morick(Ed.),Challenge to Empiricism[C].California:Wadsworth Pub.Co.1972
[69]Radman,Z.Metaphors:Figures of the Mind[M].Dordrecht/Boston/London:Kluwer Academic Publishers.1997.
[70]Rieser,H.On the Development of Text Grammar[A].In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin.New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[71]Russell,B.How to Grow Old.In New Concept English(4).Etd.by Alexander,L.G.上海:上海外语教育出版社.1988.
[72]Saussure,F.Course in General Linguistics[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2001.
[73]Schmid,S.J.Some Problems of Communicative Text Theories[A].In Current Trends in Textlinguistics[C].(Ed.)Dressler,W.U.Berlin·New York:Walter de Gruyter.1978.
[74]Stenlund,S.Language and Philosophical Problems[M].London and New York:Routledge.1990.
[75]Tsoharzids,S.L.(Ed.) John Searle's Philosophy of Language:Force,Meaning,and Mind[C].Cambridge University Press.2007.
[76]Ungerer,F & Schmid,H.J.An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics [M].Beijing:Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.2001.
[77]Van de Velde,R.G.Man,Verbal Text,Inferencing,and Coherence[A].In Connexity and Coherence[C].(Ed) Heydrich,Neubauer,Pet(o|¨)fi and S(o|¨)zer.Berlin-New York:Walter de Gruyter.1989.
[78]Van Dijk,T.A.News as Discourse[M].Hillsdale,New Jersey,Hove and London:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,Publishers.1988.
[79]Van Dijk,T.A.The Discourse-Knowledge Interface[A].in Critical Discourse Analysis:Theory and Interdisciplinary[C].Edited by Weiss,G and Wodak,R.2003:85-109.
[80]Van Dijk,T.A.& Kintsch,W.Strategies of Discourse Comprehension [M].New York:Academic Press.1983.
[81]Whorf,B.Language,Thought,and Reality[M].M.I.T press.1956.
[82]Wittgenstein,L.Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.1922.
[83]阿达玛,J.数学领域中的发明心理学[M].大连:大连理工大学出版社.2008.
[84]埃利亚＆萨尔法蒂.话语分析基础知识[M].天津:天津人民出版社.2006.
[85]爱因斯坦,A.爱因斯坦讲述《相对论》[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论[C].易洪波＆李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006:2-39.
[86]爱因斯坦,A.爱因斯坦晚年文集[C].北京:北京大学出版社.2008.
[87]安德森,L.W.学习、教学和评估分类:布卢姆教育目标分类学修订版(简缩本)[M].上海:华东师范大学出版社.2008.
[88]波普尔,K.猜想与反驳:科学知识的增长[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2005.
[89]博登,M.人工智能哲学[M].上海:世纪出版集团上海译文出版社.2005.
[90]曹雪芹,脂砚斋主人.脂砚斋重评石头记[Z].天津:天津古籍出版社.2006.
[91]查尔默斯,A.F.科学究竟是什么[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[92]常晨光.语法隐喻与经验的重新建构[J].外语教学与研究.2004(1):31-36.
[93]陈波＆韩林合(Ed.).逻辑与语言:分析哲学经典文选[C].北京:东方出版社.2005.
[94]陈波.奎因哲学研究--从逻辑和语言的观点看[M].北京:生活‘读书·新知三联书店.1998.
[95]陈波.逻辑哲学导论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2002.
[96]陈嘉映.语言哲学[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2004.
[97]德夫林,K.数学犹聊天:人人都有数学基因[M].上海:上海科技教育出版社.2009.
[98]高新民,储昭华.(Ed.)心灵哲学[C].北京:商务印书馆.2002.
[99]光学.相对论简史(代序).相对论--广义及狭义相对论[M].易洪波＆李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006:47-53.
[100]哈克,S.理性地捍卫科学--在科学主义与犬儒主义之间[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2008.
[101]霍金,S.时间简史(插图版)[M].湖南:湖南科学技术出版社.2008.
[102]霍金,S.时间简史(普及版)[M].湖南:湖南科学技术出版社.2005.
[103]霍金,S.万有理论:宇宙的起源与归宿[M].海南:海南出版社,三环出版社,2004.
[104]江天骥.逻辑经验主义的认识论,当代西方科学哲学[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社.2006.
[105]江怡(ed.).走向新世纪的西方哲学[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2004.
[106]考夫卡,K.格式塔心理学原理(上、下册)[M].杭州:浙江教育出版社.1999.
[107]柯朗,R.& 罗宾,H.什么是数学:对思想和方法的基本研究(增订版)[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2008.
[108]柯瓦雷,A.从封闭世界到无限宇宙[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2008(b).
[109]柯瓦雷,A.伽利略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2008(a).
[110]柯瓦雷,A.牛顿研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2003.
[111]克莱因,M.古今数学思想(一、二、三、四册)[M].上海:上海科学技术出版社.2007(d).
[112]克莱因,M.西方文化中的数学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007(a).
[113]克莱因,M.数学与知识的探求[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007(b).
[114]克莱因,M.数学:确定性的丧失[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社.2007(c).
[115]克里普克,S.命名与必然性[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2005.
[116]库恩,T.科学革命的结构[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2006.
[117]赖尔,G.心的概念[M].北京:商务印书馆.2006.
[118]里克曼,H.P.理性的探险--哲学在社会学中的应用[M].北京:商务印书馆.2006.
[119]刘大椿.科学哲学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006.
[120]刘润清.西方语言学流派[M].北京:外语教学与研究出版社.2003。
[121]奈佛,J.爱因斯坦传[M].北京:中央编译出版社.2008.
[122]马蒂尼奇,A.P.(Ed.)语言哲学[C].北京:商务印书馆.2004.
[123]欧阳康.人文社会科学哲学[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社.2001.
[124]丘奇兰德,P.M.科学实在论与心灵的可塑性[M].北京:中国人们大学出版社.2008.
[125]塞尔,J.心、脑与科学[M].上海:上海译文出版社.2006.
[126]孙思.科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判[J].自然辩证法通讯.2005(a)(3):46-52.
[127]孙思.理性之魂--当代科学哲学中心问题[M].北京:人民出版社.2005(b)
[128]孙思.重建科学划界标准[J].自然辩证法研究,2005(c)(10):34-37/42.
[129]索绪尔,F.D.普通语言学教程[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[130]塔巴克,J.数学和自然法则:科学语言的发展史[M].北京:商务印书馆.2007.
[131]万德勒,Z.哲学中的语言学[M].北京:华夏出版社.2002.
[132]王寅.语篇连贯的认知世界分析方法一体验哲学和认知语言学对语篇连贯的解释[J].《外语学刊》2005(4):16-23.
[133]王寅.认知语言学与语篇分析一.Langacker的语篇分析观[J].外语教学与研究.2003(2):83-88.
[134]王寅.认知语言学与语篇连贯研究--八论语言的体验性:语篇连贯的认 知基础[J].外语研究.2006(6):6-12.
[135]维特根斯坦,L.哲学研究[M].上海:世纪出版集团上海人民出版社.2005.
[136]卫真道.篇章语言学[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2002.
[137]肖巍,刘学礼＆吴海江.科学:思想史、方法论与社会学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2008
[138]熊学亮.认知语用学概论[C].上海:上海外语教育出版社.2004.
[139]薛定谔,E.自然与希腊[M].长沙:湖南科学技术出版社.2007.
[140]严世清.论韩礼德的语言哲学思想[J].外语研究,2002(2):7-9/19。
[141]姚小平.人类语言学家沃尔夫的遗产--读《论语言、思维和现实》[J].外语教学与研究.2002(1):75-77。
[142]叶浩生.第二次认知革命与社会建构论的产生[J].心理科学进展.2003(1):101-107.
[143]易洪波＆李智谋(eds).爱因斯坦生命中的重要符号[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论(全译彩图精解本)[C].重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006.
[144]易洪波＆李智谋编译.广义相对论的诞生与证实[A].相对论--广义及狭义相对论[C].易洪波&李智谋编译全译彩图精解本.重庆:重庆出版集团,重庆出版社.2006.
[145]詹姆斯,W.心理学原理(一、二册)[M].北京:九州出版社.2007.
[146]张德禄,刘汝山.语篇连贯与衔接理论的发展及应用[M].上海:上海外语教育出版社.2003.
[147]赵敦华.现代西方哲学新编[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2004.
[148]周超,朱志方.逻辑、历史与社会:科学合理性研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2003.
[149]周林东.科学哲学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2005.
[150]周频.Halliday的建构主义的科学实在观遭遇的问题与困境[J].外国语文(四川外语学院学报).2009(1):116-121.
[151]周频.对语法隐喻与科学及真理相对论相关论题的反思[J].外国语.2008(5):44-54.
[152]周频.论理论的“内部批判”与“外部批判”[J].中国外语.2008(1):52-56.
[153]周频.论理论整合与理论的基本假定之间的关系[J].中国外语.2009(2)
[154]周频.论认知语言学与系统功能语言学对语篇连贯解释的互补性[J].外语学刊.2009(3)
[155]周频.三大语言理论的科学实在观批评[J].自然辩证法通讯.2009(3)
[156]朱志方.认知科学对现代哲学的挑战[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版).2002(1):36-43。
[157]朱志方.认知科学与涉身的实在论[J].哲学研究.2002(2):60-67.
[158]牛津英英词典
[159]http://bbs.yjsy.ecnu.edu.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardID=110&ID=105747&p age=1
[160]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science
[161]http://fangsheng2.blog.hexun.com/13493844 d.html
[162]http://old.blog.edu.cn/user1/5554/archives/2006/1458061,shtml
[163]http://plato,stanford,edu/entries/cognitive-science/Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[164]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/
[165]Yount,D.J.http://www.mc.maricopa,edu/~yount/text/empm-v-ratm,html.2003