我国农民合作经济组织内部合作行为及激励机制研究
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摘要
本论文是关于我国农民合作经济组织内部合作行为及激励机制研究。由于理论和实践都可证明合作优于非合作,现实中农户仍然处于一种非合作状态,甚至让农民合作经济组织成为“空壳”组织,本论文试图通过农民合作经济组织内部农户合作行为演化博弈的视角解析农户非合作的困境,寻找促进农户走向合作的条件和机制,从而为推进农民合作经济组织的健康发展提供可借鉴的理论依据。
本论文的研究遵循以下思路展开:先界定研究对象,并对其进行概念定义与辨析;然后回顾和梳理与之相关的国内外文献研究,进行简要评价;再运用实证调查研究法和演化博弈分析法,对农户合作行为产生原因、现实意愿、合作困境以及合作行为演化均衡状态和条件进行一一剖析和研究;最后构建促进农户合作的激励机制。
一、论文的研究内容
第一部分通过研究背景分析和文献研究回顾阐述研究的问题。前人的研究多是从农民合作经济组织的制度因素进行分析,对农民合作经济组织的制度环境、制度安排和制度模式进行理论探讨和分析,对推进农民合作经济组织的发展作了有益的贡献。而农民合作经济组织是农村最基本生产单位——农户的合作结果。农户是合作产生的主体和基础,没有农户的参与农民合作经济组织是不具生命力的。而农户参与合作是一个追求个人利益最大化的经济行为决策,存在利益获得时参与将持续,否则农户就会退出。因此,针对目前我国农民合作经济组织“空壳”、“空巢”现象突出,农民合作经济组织内部农户呈现非合作的状况,论文提出从农户合作行为角度剖析农户非合作困境的研究假设与安排,弥补前人研究不足。
第二部分通过农民合作经济组织的产生与发展、绩效与困境以及参与合作经济组织的行为与机理分析农户合作意愿与合作行为相矛盾的现实问题。首先,从理论和实践两方面论证,农民合作经济组织产生与存在的重要意义,具有的现实绩效,即农户合作优于不合作。并且,设计《农户参与合作经济组织的意愿情况调查表》收集农村居住农户资料,分析证明农户存在强烈的合作意愿与需要。然而,现实中农户同样存在非合作的两大困境:一是农户的机会主义行为和“搭便车”行为导致合作“囚徒困境”;二是农户合作经济组织管理层(大户)存在内部人控制问题,从而锁定本论文研究主题。
第三部分运用复制动态(RD)和演化博弈(ESS)分析合作经济组织内部农户合作行为的动态变化,寻找农户从非合作走向合作的条件与机制。首先,针对同质性农户“搭便车”的“囚徒困境”进行复制动态演化博弈,分析农户合作行为的演化状态,和实现农户合作帕雷托改进的均衡条件。然后,构建三方演化博弈模型,分析合作经济组织内部人控制问题,剖析合作经济组织管理层与农户的动态行为策略,寻找农户与管理层的合作行为帕雷托改进的均衡条件。
第四部分就研究结果提出相应的制度建议。根据前一部分的研究结果可得,激励机制是影响农户走向合作的关键。因此,依据农民合作经济组织发展环境设计促进农户合作的激励机制,提出相应的政策建议,并展望未来研究。
二、论文的研究结论
1、农民合作经济组织的产生是制度变迁的结果也是经济主体行为博弈的均衡
通过对农民合作运动进程的历史分析,制度分析和博弈分析,可以知道,农民合作经济组织是制度变迁的必然结果,也是经济行为主体博弈的均衡。因为,随着技术的进步,社会化大生产的逐渐分工并高度专业化,市场经济交易活动的风险和不确定性也不断增大。而我国长期的家庭联产承包责任制,农户小而散,独自面对大市场竞争,其经济活动的交易成本高,经济效益低。农户为了降低经营风险,公平分享更多的市场利润,势必存在分散小农户共同联合的诱致性制度变迁需求,最终农民合作经济组织得以出现。而且,在经济活动这个博弈过程中,经济行为参与人会通过不同的战略最大化收益结果。农户的利益不仅取决于自己所采取的行动策略,也取决于其他人所采取的行动策略以及对自己行动的反应。作为生产主体,农户合作带来的收益大于不合作所得收益时,理性的农户就会选择合作行为最大化个人利益。
2、我国农民合作经济组织发展中存在农户合作意愿与农户合作行为相矛盾的问题
按传统理论观点,在个人追求利益最大化的前提下,一个由个人组成具有共同利益的集体一定会为实现这个共同利益而采取集体行动。换而言之,当合作能带来交往惠利,合作比不合作更为有利时,个人就应该为合作而集体行动。现实通过实证调查也显示出绝大部分农户具有强烈的合作意愿和需要,他们期望通过合作经济组织解决农业生产经营遇到的众多困难和进入市场。然而,在农户对合作意义有所认识,合作趋势也有所显现,理论和实践皆可证明农户合作优于不合作的情况下,农户仍然存在大量的非合作状态,机会主义行为、搭便车行为和内部人控制问题等普遍存在,这现象无疑降低了农民合作经济组织的绩效,产生绩效偏差,影响了农户合作行为的延续和农民合作经济组织的发展,甚至会让合作走向崩溃。这样的现实矛盾迫使对农户合作行为进行深入探讨,研究农户从非合作走向合作的条件。
3、农户合作行为是一个动态演化过程并决定于激励机制与约束机制的综合效益。
农户行为是有限理性认识下追求个人利润最大化的决策。农村社会的相对封闭性让农户行为不仅是一个理性的个人决策,也是一个从众的群体决策,致使农户行为是一系列复杂的需要、动机和行为的心智过程。通过演化博弈模型对农户与农户之间的合作行为、农户与合作经济组织之间的合作行为分析表明,农户个体行为总是以实现利润最大化为目标,其行为决策决定于行为主体得失的衡量。而且这种个体行为可以被模仿、学习,并演变为群体行为。当通过外界的激励机制和约束机制刺激农户行为主体时,农户行为主体将再次比较得失,做出改变、改进行为的策略,达到不同的群体行为均衡状态。如果外界的激励机制和约束机制设计到位,可以有效改善农户合作的优势需要,引发农户合作的优势动机,最终实现农户与农户、农户与合作经济组织的集体有效合作的目标。
4、促进我国农户从非合作走向合作须设计完善的正负结合的激励机制
按行为科学的观点,人的行为是动机和需要的表现结果,外在刺激可以改变需要,从而影响行为。演化博弈模型分析也证实了这一点。因此,要促进农户实现合作必须设计一系列以显性激励机制与隐性激励机制相结合、内部激励机制与外部激励机制相结合的激励机制体系进行规范和引导。一方面,显性激励机制与隐性激励机制相结合。显性激励机制包括产权激励机制、报酬激励机制的设计;隐性激励机制包括声誉机制、社会资本、道德情感的设计。另一方面内部激励机制与外部激励机制相结合。内部激励机制除了显性激励机制外,还包括约束机制、监督机制;而外部激励机制除了隐性激励机制外,还包括政府的立法支持、信贷支持、财政支持和税收优惠。通过这一系列机制设计与构建,协调农民合作经济组织中同质性、异质性农户的行为,促进农户走向合作,实现合作经济组织的稳定存续。
三、论文的重要观点
1、在理性经济人的假设下,农户是追求个人利益最大化的行为主体。当合作优于不合作,可以带来合作互惠,增加自身利益时,采取集体行动的合作是农户最优选择。但由于有限理性和信息不完全,无法及时全面的洞察和监督欺骗、说谎和毁约行为,致使农户可以投机取巧,“什么也不干”,却分享集体行动利益。随着这种投机取巧行为的被学习、模仿,合作利他行为逐渐减少,人人都成为“搭便车”机会主义行为者,陷入“囚徒困境”,形成农户有合作意愿却没有合作行为的矛盾状态。
2、促进同质性农户走向合作,必须对其行为引入恰当的奖惩机制。因为,当缺乏合作激励和搭便车约束时,或者激励和约束措施严重不到位时,农户最大的可能是都选择搭便车,导致合作经济组织消亡;当合作激励和搭便车约束的综合效益低于产品成本,即激励和约束不到位时,农户初始选择合作的人数达到一定比例时,农户会出现合作与搭便车共存的稳定进化状态;当合作激励和搭便车约束的综合效益高于产品成本时,所有农户才都会积极合作。
3、异质性农户之间的合作行为,即合作经济组织管理层和普通农户之间的行为,由于管理者具有信息、权力优势,常常出现管理层侵犯农户利益的情况。由于农户分散、弱小、信息和能力不足,在管理层侵犯的情况下常常表现出“囚徒困境”。因此,引入对管理层侵犯行为的约束和对农户抵制行为的激励,对打破农户策略选择的“囚徒困境”尤为重要。引入侵犯约束和抵制激励机制的条件下,合作经济组织是否出现内部人控制问题,也就是管理层是否侵犯农户利益决定于善意管理层受到农户联合抵制的损失与恶意管理层受到农户联合抵制的约束的大小。当前者小于后者,且抵制管理层的农户达到一定比例时,管理层将选择不侵犯农户利益,合作经济组织得以稳定;当前者大于后者时,管理层将注定选择侵犯农户利益。农户方面,当其抵制侵犯的成本低于被管理层侵犯的损失与联合抵制成功后获得的约束收益之和时,如果初始状态选择抵制的农户达到一定比例,农户行为将逐步演化向抵制,管理层侵犯行为最终被有效遏制。
4、要实现农户从非合作走向合作,打破“囚徒困境”,有效办法是建立正负激励机制规范和引导农户行为,并尽快通过法规建设、规章制度健全、教育投资、道德规范和各项优惠政策改善农民合作经济组织存生环境。
四、研究创新之处
本论文对农民合作经济组织的合作行为及激励机制研究是以行为参与者的非合作博弈为切入点,通过农户合作行为意愿调查,以及合作行为的演化博弈分析寻找破解农户非合作困境的难题。因此,特色及创新之处为:
1、研究视角的创新。农民合作经济组织发展是受到经济、社会、文化、法制等多方面影响的结果,已有的研究多从制度、机制、模式进行探讨分析,而本论文秉承制度是规范人行为的规则,又由人的行为而产生的观点,透过农户行为决策过程研究合作经济组织的产生、发展以及演变,更能揭示组织未来的发展趋势和影响因素,弥补了前人研究的不足。
2、研究方法的创新。本论文基于行为是有意识的心智过程,具有动态变化特征,在不同的刺激下表现不同行为的认识,借用生物学的演化观点,采用复制动态(RD)和演化博弈模型(ESS)研究农户合作行为动态变化,寻找实现合作博弈均衡的条件和机制。特别是构建三方演化博弈模型分析农户与农民合作经济组织之间合作行为的演变,对破解合作经济组织内部人控制问题提供有价值的参考,在前人的研究基础上进了一步。
3、研究观点的创新。一是,本论文根据演化经济学提出了合作经济组织是一个动态可进化组织,根据演化博弈分析提出了合作行为是一个动态变化过程,是行为主体依据内外诱因做的一个动态决策,区别于前人认为合作经济组织是一个静态稳定组织的观点。二是,本论文针对我国农村社会是一个“熟人社会”,非正式制度作用明显,强化了促进合作激励机制中隐性机制的设计,以声誉、信任、道德、情感等社会资本嵌入激励农户的合作行为,此对策具有一定的价值。
This dissertation is a study on the Incentive mechanism and the farmer cooperatives behavior of the Chinese farmer cooperatives.Although both theory and practice prove that cooperation is better than no cooperation,in China the farmers still do not cooperate in reality,even some farmer cooperatives become“empty hull”.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory,this essay analyzes the farmer's cooperation dilemma,finds the condition and mechanism of cooperation,and put forward some countermeasures for healthy development of farmer cooperatives.
The basic research way,is to define the research object and its concept first,analyze its differentiation to other concepts;then to look back and combed to study on related domestic and international documents and materials;and then to make use of positive economic method and evolutionary game theory to study the creation reason,realistic will,cooperative dilemma and the evolutionary stable condition of the cooperative mechanism of Chinese farmer cooperatives;and lastly to set up incentive mechanism to improve cooperation among the farmer cooperatives.
1.The contents
This dissertation is constituted by four parts,eight chapters.
Part 1:include chapter 1 and 2.This part describes the problem and reviews the documents and materials.Through analyzing the phenomenon of“empty hull”in Chinese farmer cooperatives,the dissertation describes the serious problem of no cooperation in farmers operation,and put forward the research hypothesis for farmers' cooperation behavior,and proves the great significance of this dissertation though combing the abroad and domestic farmer cooperative research.
Part 2:include chapter 3,4,5.This part analyzes the contradiction between farmer's cooperative willingness and cooperative behavior.Firstly,the part proves the great significance of the existence of farmer cooperatives through both theoretic and practice analysis,which means cooperation is better than no cooperation.The part proves the farmer's great willingness and demand of cooperative organization through investigation of Chinese farmer.However,there are two dilemmas in reality,one is the cooperative dilemma caused by the farmer's opportunistic behavior and“free ride”behavior,the other is the internal control problem caused by management layer.
Part 3:include chapter 6.This part finds the condition and mechanism of farmer's cooperative behavior through research way of evolutionary game theory.Firstly,the part analyzes the duplicate dynamic evolutionary game of the farmer's opportunistic behavior and“free ride”behavior, analyzes the condition of stable balance,and adds incentive and punishing mechanism to find conditions of farmer's cooperative Pareto improvement.Then,the part sets up three part game to analyze the internal control problem,analyzes the dynamic behavior between the management layer and common farmers,and adds incentive mechanism to find conditions of Pareto improvement of cooperation between management layer and common farmers.
Part 4:include chapter 7,8.This part studies the incentive mechanism for farmer's cooperative behavior.The anterior study proves that incentive mechanism is the key factor to influence the farmer's cooperative behavior.This part designs the incentive mechanism based on the development environment of farmer cooperative economic organization,puts forward proposals of policies,and prospects future study.
2.The study conclusions
2.1 The forming of the farmer cooperatives is not only the result of the institution change but also the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.
Through the analysis of the history,institution and game of Chinese farmer'cooperative movement, we conclude that the farmer cooperative is the inevitable result of the institution change,and also is the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.Firstly,with the technology improvement and the gradual division and professionalizing of labor under social production,the risk and indetermination of the market economy trades is enlarged continuously.Because of China's long-time household contract responsibility system,the small scale and scattered farmers should face the big market competition,the trade cost is high,economic performance is low.In order to share the market profits,lower the operation risk,the parting of the small farmer stimulates the demand of institution change,and the farmer cooperatives emerge.Secondly,in the process of economic behavior game,the economic subjects maximize the benefit through different strategy.The benefits of the farmer are not only decided by his own action,but also decided by other farmers' reaction. Being the production subject,the rational farmer will choose cooperative strategy to maximize personal benefits if cooperative benefits are higher than uncooperative benefits.
2.2 The contradiction between the willingness and the farmer's existing behavior in Chinese farmer cooperatives.
Traditional theory stands that a group consisted by individual with common benefits will take collective actions to achieve the common benefits if one is chasing to maximize his own benefit.In other words,when cooperation can bring benefit,cooperation is better than no cooperation,one will take collective action to cooperate with others.Realistic investigation data also proves that overwhelming farmers have strong cooperative willingness and demand;they expect to attend farmer cooperative to solve the numerous difficulties of current agriculture operation and to enter the agriculture market.However,there still is no cooperation phenomenon,such as opportunistic behavior,free ride behavior and internal control behavior.Such phenomenon lowers cooperative organization's performance,creates performance deviation,influences the farmer's cooperative behaviors and the development of cooperative organizations,and even causes collapse of the cooperative organization.The realistic contradiction forces us to carry on a thorough study on the farmer's cooperative behavior,and the condition of no cooperation evolving to cooperation.
2.3 The farmer's cooperative behavior is a dynamic evolutionary process which decided by comprehensive performance of incentive and penalty mechanism.
Through the evolutionary game analysis of cooperative behavior between farmer and farmer,and between farmer and cooperative organization,it is the incentive and penalty mechanism that help farmers change from uncooperative to cooperative.Firstly,through the study of evolutionary game behavior of the common farmers,when the comprehensive performance of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty is higher than production cost,the farmer's behavior will evolve to cooperate.In other conditions,they will either cooperate or take free ride behavior,or do not cooperate.Then the essay analyzes the farmer's cooperative behavior in different character.The dissertation sets up three parts evolutionary game model under the hypothesis of good and evil behavior,to explain the problem of internal control.The research describes that whether the manager infringe the common farmers is decided by the comparison of the good manager's lost caused by the farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by the farmers' boycott.If the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the manager will not infringe the farmer's benefit and the farmer cooperatives will reach stable.Otherwise,the manager is doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit,internal control problem exists.
2.4 Design the incentive mechanism to promote the farmers' behavior evolved from uncooperative to cooperative.
According to behavior theory,one's behavior is decided by his motive and demand.The external stipulation can change the demand,and then influence the behavior.The evolutionary game analysis also proves the standpoint.Therefore the farmer's behavior can be led by the combination of realistic and concealed,internal and external incentive mechanism.On the hand,the realistic incentive mechanism can be combined with concealed incentive mechanism.Realistic incentive mechanism includes property incentive,salary incentive.Concealed incentive includes reputation,social capital, ethic,and affection incentive.On the other hand,the internal incentive mechanism can be combined with the external incentive mechanism.Besides realistic incentive,internal incentive includes penalty and supervision mechanism.Besides concealed incentive,external incentive includes institution,finance,taxation supports by the government.Designing and setting up the above mechanism will coordinate farmers' behavior,stipulate them to cooperate,and achieve the stable development of the cooperatives.
3.The important point of this dissertation
3.1 Under the assumption of rational economic person,the farmer is a behavior subject chasing to maximize his own benefit.When cooperation is better than no cooperation,taking collective action is the best choice of the farmer.However,because of limited rationality and incomplete information, the deceitful and breaching contract behavior can not be fully supervised;the farmer can take opportunistic action,doing nothing but share the collective income.As this opportunistic behavior is learned and copied by other farmers,the altruistic behavior will vanish gradually,and everybody will be free ride opportunist,the cooperation will become“prisoner's dilemma”,the cooperative willingness will be contradict to cooperative behavior.
3.2 Appropriate incentive mechanisms must be introduced to promote cooperative behavior.When lack of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty,or the incentive and penalty mechanism is severely low,the most probable choice of the farmer is to take free ride behavior,and the cooperative organization will die.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is lower than the production cost,only when the initial choice of cooperation reaches a certain proportion,there will be evolution stability with coexistence of cooperation and free ride behavior.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is higher than the production cost,all the farmers will choose cooperative behavior.
3.3 The cooperation behavior character among farmers with different character,which means cooperative behavior between manager and the common farmers is like that the manager can choose to infringe the common farmer's benefit with its information and power advantage.When the manager infringes the common farmer's benefit,the farmers always behave like“prisoner's dilemma”because they are scattered,small,and weak,and lack of information and ability.Therefore introducing infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism is vital to break the“prisoner's dilemma”phenomenon.When introduced infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism, Whether there is internal control problem in cooperative organization,which also means whether the management layer will infringe the benefits of the farmers,is decided by the comparison between the good manager's lost caused by farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by farmers' boycott.When the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the management layer will not infringe the farmer's benefit.On the contrary,the management layer will be doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit.About the farmer's strategy,if the cost of boycott is lower than the sum of the manager's infringement income and infringement penalty,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the farmer's behavior will evolve to boycott,and the manager's infringement behavior will be effectively suppressed.
3.4 In order to lead the farmers to change from uncooperative behavior to cooperative behavior,and break the“prisoner's dilemma”situation,the effective way is to set up positive and negative incentive mechanism,improving the living environment for the farmer cooperatives through building institution,regulation,ethic,education and supportive policies system.
4.The research innovation
This dissertation begins with the study of the attendances' non cooperative strategy,investigates the farmer' cooperative willingness,and analyzes the evolution of cooperative behavior,and last find the solution of the cooperative dilemma.The features and creativities are:
1.Innovation of research perspective.The development of the farmers' cooperative is influenced by the economy,society,culture and legislation;the former researches were mostly on the regulation, mechanism perspective.This dissertation consider that the institution(organization) is the outcome of the human's behavior,it is more effective to find the future development trends and influence factors through the study of the behavior process of the organization's emerge,development and evolvement.
2.Innovation of research method.This dissertation is based on that the behavior is an intensive intelligent process,has dynamic changing character,and is in different characters under different stipulations.Therefore,this dissertation apply the evolutionary standpoint of biology,dynamic evolutionary model and three party game models to study the farmers' behavior change,looking for the evolutionary conditions for cooperative strategy.
3.Innovation of viewpoint.Based on the fact that China rural society is an“acquaintance society”, the informal regulation is effective,this dissertation strengthens concealed mechanism design in incentive mechanism,embedded social capital such as reputation,convincement,ethic and affection, to inhibit the uncooperative behaviors and stipulate cooperative behaviors.
本论文的研究遵循以下思路展开:先界定研究对象,并对其进行概念定义与辨析;然后回顾和梳理与之相关的国内外文献研究,进行简要评价;再运用实证调查研究法和演化博弈分析法,对农户合作行为产生原因、现实意愿、合作困境以及合作行为演化均衡状态和条件进行一一剖析和研究;最后构建促进农户合作的激励机制。
一、论文的研究内容
第一部分通过研究背景分析和文献研究回顾阐述研究的问题。前人的研究多是从农民合作经济组织的制度因素进行分析,对农民合作经济组织的制度环境、制度安排和制度模式进行理论探讨和分析,对推进农民合作经济组织的发展作了有益的贡献。而农民合作经济组织是农村最基本生产单位——农户的合作结果。农户是合作产生的主体和基础,没有农户的参与农民合作经济组织是不具生命力的。而农户参与合作是一个追求个人利益最大化的经济行为决策,存在利益获得时参与将持续,否则农户就会退出。因此,针对目前我国农民合作经济组织“空壳”、“空巢”现象突出,农民合作经济组织内部农户呈现非合作的状况,论文提出从农户合作行为角度剖析农户非合作困境的研究假设与安排,弥补前人研究不足。
第二部分通过农民合作经济组织的产生与发展、绩效与困境以及参与合作经济组织的行为与机理分析农户合作意愿与合作行为相矛盾的现实问题。首先,从理论和实践两方面论证,农民合作经济组织产生与存在的重要意义,具有的现实绩效,即农户合作优于不合作。并且,设计《农户参与合作经济组织的意愿情况调查表》收集农村居住农户资料,分析证明农户存在强烈的合作意愿与需要。然而,现实中农户同样存在非合作的两大困境:一是农户的机会主义行为和“搭便车”行为导致合作“囚徒困境”;二是农户合作经济组织管理层(大户)存在内部人控制问题,从而锁定本论文研究主题。
第三部分运用复制动态(RD)和演化博弈(ESS)分析合作经济组织内部农户合作行为的动态变化,寻找农户从非合作走向合作的条件与机制。首先,针对同质性农户“搭便车”的“囚徒困境”进行复制动态演化博弈,分析农户合作行为的演化状态,和实现农户合作帕雷托改进的均衡条件。然后,构建三方演化博弈模型,分析合作经济组织内部人控制问题,剖析合作经济组织管理层与农户的动态行为策略,寻找农户与管理层的合作行为帕雷托改进的均衡条件。
第四部分就研究结果提出相应的制度建议。根据前一部分的研究结果可得,激励机制是影响农户走向合作的关键。因此,依据农民合作经济组织发展环境设计促进农户合作的激励机制,提出相应的政策建议,并展望未来研究。
二、论文的研究结论
1、农民合作经济组织的产生是制度变迁的结果也是经济主体行为博弈的均衡
通过对农民合作运动进程的历史分析,制度分析和博弈分析,可以知道,农民合作经济组织是制度变迁的必然结果,也是经济行为主体博弈的均衡。因为,随着技术的进步,社会化大生产的逐渐分工并高度专业化,市场经济交易活动的风险和不确定性也不断增大。而我国长期的家庭联产承包责任制,农户小而散,独自面对大市场竞争,其经济活动的交易成本高,经济效益低。农户为了降低经营风险,公平分享更多的市场利润,势必存在分散小农户共同联合的诱致性制度变迁需求,最终农民合作经济组织得以出现。而且,在经济活动这个博弈过程中,经济行为参与人会通过不同的战略最大化收益结果。农户的利益不仅取决于自己所采取的行动策略,也取决于其他人所采取的行动策略以及对自己行动的反应。作为生产主体,农户合作带来的收益大于不合作所得收益时,理性的农户就会选择合作行为最大化个人利益。
2、我国农民合作经济组织发展中存在农户合作意愿与农户合作行为相矛盾的问题
按传统理论观点,在个人追求利益最大化的前提下,一个由个人组成具有共同利益的集体一定会为实现这个共同利益而采取集体行动。换而言之,当合作能带来交往惠利,合作比不合作更为有利时,个人就应该为合作而集体行动。现实通过实证调查也显示出绝大部分农户具有强烈的合作意愿和需要,他们期望通过合作经济组织解决农业生产经营遇到的众多困难和进入市场。然而,在农户对合作意义有所认识,合作趋势也有所显现,理论和实践皆可证明农户合作优于不合作的情况下,农户仍然存在大量的非合作状态,机会主义行为、搭便车行为和内部人控制问题等普遍存在,这现象无疑降低了农民合作经济组织的绩效,产生绩效偏差,影响了农户合作行为的延续和农民合作经济组织的发展,甚至会让合作走向崩溃。这样的现实矛盾迫使对农户合作行为进行深入探讨,研究农户从非合作走向合作的条件。
3、农户合作行为是一个动态演化过程并决定于激励机制与约束机制的综合效益。
农户行为是有限理性认识下追求个人利润最大化的决策。农村社会的相对封闭性让农户行为不仅是一个理性的个人决策,也是一个从众的群体决策,致使农户行为是一系列复杂的需要、动机和行为的心智过程。通过演化博弈模型对农户与农户之间的合作行为、农户与合作经济组织之间的合作行为分析表明,农户个体行为总是以实现利润最大化为目标,其行为决策决定于行为主体得失的衡量。而且这种个体行为可以被模仿、学习,并演变为群体行为。当通过外界的激励机制和约束机制刺激农户行为主体时,农户行为主体将再次比较得失,做出改变、改进行为的策略,达到不同的群体行为均衡状态。如果外界的激励机制和约束机制设计到位,可以有效改善农户合作的优势需要,引发农户合作的优势动机,最终实现农户与农户、农户与合作经济组织的集体有效合作的目标。
4、促进我国农户从非合作走向合作须设计完善的正负结合的激励机制
按行为科学的观点,人的行为是动机和需要的表现结果,外在刺激可以改变需要,从而影响行为。演化博弈模型分析也证实了这一点。因此,要促进农户实现合作必须设计一系列以显性激励机制与隐性激励机制相结合、内部激励机制与外部激励机制相结合的激励机制体系进行规范和引导。一方面,显性激励机制与隐性激励机制相结合。显性激励机制包括产权激励机制、报酬激励机制的设计;隐性激励机制包括声誉机制、社会资本、道德情感的设计。另一方面内部激励机制与外部激励机制相结合。内部激励机制除了显性激励机制外,还包括约束机制、监督机制;而外部激励机制除了隐性激励机制外,还包括政府的立法支持、信贷支持、财政支持和税收优惠。通过这一系列机制设计与构建,协调农民合作经济组织中同质性、异质性农户的行为,促进农户走向合作,实现合作经济组织的稳定存续。
三、论文的重要观点
1、在理性经济人的假设下,农户是追求个人利益最大化的行为主体。当合作优于不合作,可以带来合作互惠,增加自身利益时,采取集体行动的合作是农户最优选择。但由于有限理性和信息不完全,无法及时全面的洞察和监督欺骗、说谎和毁约行为,致使农户可以投机取巧,“什么也不干”,却分享集体行动利益。随着这种投机取巧行为的被学习、模仿,合作利他行为逐渐减少,人人都成为“搭便车”机会主义行为者,陷入“囚徒困境”,形成农户有合作意愿却没有合作行为的矛盾状态。
2、促进同质性农户走向合作,必须对其行为引入恰当的奖惩机制。因为,当缺乏合作激励和搭便车约束时,或者激励和约束措施严重不到位时,农户最大的可能是都选择搭便车,导致合作经济组织消亡;当合作激励和搭便车约束的综合效益低于产品成本,即激励和约束不到位时,农户初始选择合作的人数达到一定比例时,农户会出现合作与搭便车共存的稳定进化状态;当合作激励和搭便车约束的综合效益高于产品成本时,所有农户才都会积极合作。
3、异质性农户之间的合作行为,即合作经济组织管理层和普通农户之间的行为,由于管理者具有信息、权力优势,常常出现管理层侵犯农户利益的情况。由于农户分散、弱小、信息和能力不足,在管理层侵犯的情况下常常表现出“囚徒困境”。因此,引入对管理层侵犯行为的约束和对农户抵制行为的激励,对打破农户策略选择的“囚徒困境”尤为重要。引入侵犯约束和抵制激励机制的条件下,合作经济组织是否出现内部人控制问题,也就是管理层是否侵犯农户利益决定于善意管理层受到农户联合抵制的损失与恶意管理层受到农户联合抵制的约束的大小。当前者小于后者,且抵制管理层的农户达到一定比例时,管理层将选择不侵犯农户利益,合作经济组织得以稳定;当前者大于后者时,管理层将注定选择侵犯农户利益。农户方面,当其抵制侵犯的成本低于被管理层侵犯的损失与联合抵制成功后获得的约束收益之和时,如果初始状态选择抵制的农户达到一定比例,农户行为将逐步演化向抵制,管理层侵犯行为最终被有效遏制。
4、要实现农户从非合作走向合作,打破“囚徒困境”,有效办法是建立正负激励机制规范和引导农户行为,并尽快通过法规建设、规章制度健全、教育投资、道德规范和各项优惠政策改善农民合作经济组织存生环境。
四、研究创新之处
本论文对农民合作经济组织的合作行为及激励机制研究是以行为参与者的非合作博弈为切入点,通过农户合作行为意愿调查,以及合作行为的演化博弈分析寻找破解农户非合作困境的难题。因此,特色及创新之处为:
1、研究视角的创新。农民合作经济组织发展是受到经济、社会、文化、法制等多方面影响的结果,已有的研究多从制度、机制、模式进行探讨分析,而本论文秉承制度是规范人行为的规则,又由人的行为而产生的观点,透过农户行为决策过程研究合作经济组织的产生、发展以及演变,更能揭示组织未来的发展趋势和影响因素,弥补了前人研究的不足。
2、研究方法的创新。本论文基于行为是有意识的心智过程,具有动态变化特征,在不同的刺激下表现不同行为的认识,借用生物学的演化观点,采用复制动态(RD)和演化博弈模型(ESS)研究农户合作行为动态变化,寻找实现合作博弈均衡的条件和机制。特别是构建三方演化博弈模型分析农户与农民合作经济组织之间合作行为的演变,对破解合作经济组织内部人控制问题提供有价值的参考,在前人的研究基础上进了一步。
3、研究观点的创新。一是,本论文根据演化经济学提出了合作经济组织是一个动态可进化组织,根据演化博弈分析提出了合作行为是一个动态变化过程,是行为主体依据内外诱因做的一个动态决策,区别于前人认为合作经济组织是一个静态稳定组织的观点。二是,本论文针对我国农村社会是一个“熟人社会”,非正式制度作用明显,强化了促进合作激励机制中隐性机制的设计,以声誉、信任、道德、情感等社会资本嵌入激励农户的合作行为,此对策具有一定的价值。
This dissertation is a study on the Incentive mechanism and the farmer cooperatives behavior of the Chinese farmer cooperatives.Although both theory and practice prove that cooperation is better than no cooperation,in China the farmers still do not cooperate in reality,even some farmer cooperatives become“empty hull”.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory,this essay analyzes the farmer's cooperation dilemma,finds the condition and mechanism of cooperation,and put forward some countermeasures for healthy development of farmer cooperatives.
The basic research way,is to define the research object and its concept first,analyze its differentiation to other concepts;then to look back and combed to study on related domestic and international documents and materials;and then to make use of positive economic method and evolutionary game theory to study the creation reason,realistic will,cooperative dilemma and the evolutionary stable condition of the cooperative mechanism of Chinese farmer cooperatives;and lastly to set up incentive mechanism to improve cooperation among the farmer cooperatives.
1.The contents
This dissertation is constituted by four parts,eight chapters.
Part 1:include chapter 1 and 2.This part describes the problem and reviews the documents and materials.Through analyzing the phenomenon of“empty hull”in Chinese farmer cooperatives,the dissertation describes the serious problem of no cooperation in farmers operation,and put forward the research hypothesis for farmers' cooperation behavior,and proves the great significance of this dissertation though combing the abroad and domestic farmer cooperative research.
Part 2:include chapter 3,4,5.This part analyzes the contradiction between farmer's cooperative willingness and cooperative behavior.Firstly,the part proves the great significance of the existence of farmer cooperatives through both theoretic and practice analysis,which means cooperation is better than no cooperation.The part proves the farmer's great willingness and demand of cooperative organization through investigation of Chinese farmer.However,there are two dilemmas in reality,one is the cooperative dilemma caused by the farmer's opportunistic behavior and“free ride”behavior,the other is the internal control problem caused by management layer.
Part 3:include chapter 6.This part finds the condition and mechanism of farmer's cooperative behavior through research way of evolutionary game theory.Firstly,the part analyzes the duplicate dynamic evolutionary game of the farmer's opportunistic behavior and“free ride”behavior, analyzes the condition of stable balance,and adds incentive and punishing mechanism to find conditions of farmer's cooperative Pareto improvement.Then,the part sets up three part game to analyze the internal control problem,analyzes the dynamic behavior between the management layer and common farmers,and adds incentive mechanism to find conditions of Pareto improvement of cooperation between management layer and common farmers.
Part 4:include chapter 7,8.This part studies the incentive mechanism for farmer's cooperative behavior.The anterior study proves that incentive mechanism is the key factor to influence the farmer's cooperative behavior.This part designs the incentive mechanism based on the development environment of farmer cooperative economic organization,puts forward proposals of policies,and prospects future study.
2.The study conclusions
2.1 The forming of the farmer cooperatives is not only the result of the institution change but also the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.
Through the analysis of the history,institution and game of Chinese farmer'cooperative movement, we conclude that the farmer cooperative is the inevitable result of the institution change,and also is the equilibrium of the economic subjects' behavior game.Firstly,with the technology improvement and the gradual division and professionalizing of labor under social production,the risk and indetermination of the market economy trades is enlarged continuously.Because of China's long-time household contract responsibility system,the small scale and scattered farmers should face the big market competition,the trade cost is high,economic performance is low.In order to share the market profits,lower the operation risk,the parting of the small farmer stimulates the demand of institution change,and the farmer cooperatives emerge.Secondly,in the process of economic behavior game,the economic subjects maximize the benefit through different strategy.The benefits of the farmer are not only decided by his own action,but also decided by other farmers' reaction. Being the production subject,the rational farmer will choose cooperative strategy to maximize personal benefits if cooperative benefits are higher than uncooperative benefits.
2.2 The contradiction between the willingness and the farmer's existing behavior in Chinese farmer cooperatives.
Traditional theory stands that a group consisted by individual with common benefits will take collective actions to achieve the common benefits if one is chasing to maximize his own benefit.In other words,when cooperation can bring benefit,cooperation is better than no cooperation,one will take collective action to cooperate with others.Realistic investigation data also proves that overwhelming farmers have strong cooperative willingness and demand;they expect to attend farmer cooperative to solve the numerous difficulties of current agriculture operation and to enter the agriculture market.However,there still is no cooperation phenomenon,such as opportunistic behavior,free ride behavior and internal control behavior.Such phenomenon lowers cooperative organization's performance,creates performance deviation,influences the farmer's cooperative behaviors and the development of cooperative organizations,and even causes collapse of the cooperative organization.The realistic contradiction forces us to carry on a thorough study on the farmer's cooperative behavior,and the condition of no cooperation evolving to cooperation.
2.3 The farmer's cooperative behavior is a dynamic evolutionary process which decided by comprehensive performance of incentive and penalty mechanism.
Through the evolutionary game analysis of cooperative behavior between farmer and farmer,and between farmer and cooperative organization,it is the incentive and penalty mechanism that help farmers change from uncooperative to cooperative.Firstly,through the study of evolutionary game behavior of the common farmers,when the comprehensive performance of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty is higher than production cost,the farmer's behavior will evolve to cooperate.In other conditions,they will either cooperate or take free ride behavior,or do not cooperate.Then the essay analyzes the farmer's cooperative behavior in different character.The dissertation sets up three parts evolutionary game model under the hypothesis of good and evil behavior,to explain the problem of internal control.The research describes that whether the manager infringe the common farmers is decided by the comparison of the good manager's lost caused by the farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by the farmers' boycott.If the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the manager will not infringe the farmer's benefit and the farmer cooperatives will reach stable.Otherwise,the manager is doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit,internal control problem exists.
2.4 Design the incentive mechanism to promote the farmers' behavior evolved from uncooperative to cooperative.
According to behavior theory,one's behavior is decided by his motive and demand.The external stipulation can change the demand,and then influence the behavior.The evolutionary game analysis also proves the standpoint.Therefore the farmer's behavior can be led by the combination of realistic and concealed,internal and external incentive mechanism.On the hand,the realistic incentive mechanism can be combined with concealed incentive mechanism.Realistic incentive mechanism includes property incentive,salary incentive.Concealed incentive includes reputation,social capital, ethic,and affection incentive.On the other hand,the internal incentive mechanism can be combined with the external incentive mechanism.Besides realistic incentive,internal incentive includes penalty and supervision mechanism.Besides concealed incentive,external incentive includes institution,finance,taxation supports by the government.Designing and setting up the above mechanism will coordinate farmers' behavior,stipulate them to cooperate,and achieve the stable development of the cooperatives.
3.The important point of this dissertation
3.1 Under the assumption of rational economic person,the farmer is a behavior subject chasing to maximize his own benefit.When cooperation is better than no cooperation,taking collective action is the best choice of the farmer.However,because of limited rationality and incomplete information, the deceitful and breaching contract behavior can not be fully supervised;the farmer can take opportunistic action,doing nothing but share the collective income.As this opportunistic behavior is learned and copied by other farmers,the altruistic behavior will vanish gradually,and everybody will be free ride opportunist,the cooperation will become“prisoner's dilemma”,the cooperative willingness will be contradict to cooperative behavior.
3.2 Appropriate incentive mechanisms must be introduced to promote cooperative behavior.When lack of cooperative incentive and free ride penalty,or the incentive and penalty mechanism is severely low,the most probable choice of the farmer is to take free ride behavior,and the cooperative organization will die.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is lower than the production cost,only when the initial choice of cooperation reaches a certain proportion,there will be evolution stability with coexistence of cooperation and free ride behavior.When the comprehensive performance of the incentive and penalty mechanism is higher than the production cost,all the farmers will choose cooperative behavior.
3.3 The cooperation behavior character among farmers with different character,which means cooperative behavior between manager and the common farmers is like that the manager can choose to infringe the common farmer's benefit with its information and power advantage.When the manager infringes the common farmer's benefit,the farmers always behave like“prisoner's dilemma”because they are scattered,small,and weak,and lack of information and ability.Therefore introducing infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism is vital to break the“prisoner's dilemma”phenomenon.When introduced infringement penalty and boycott incentive mechanism, Whether there is internal control problem in cooperative organization,which also means whether the management layer will infringe the benefits of the farmers,is decided by the comparison between the good manager's lost caused by farmers' boycott and the evil manager's penalty caused by farmers' boycott.When the former is lower than the latter,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the management layer will not infringe the farmer's benefit.On the contrary,the management layer will be doomed to infringe the farmer's benefit.About the farmer's strategy,if the cost of boycott is lower than the sum of the manager's infringement income and infringement penalty,and the initial boycott rate reaches a certain proportion,the farmer's behavior will evolve to boycott,and the manager's infringement behavior will be effectively suppressed.
3.4 In order to lead the farmers to change from uncooperative behavior to cooperative behavior,and break the“prisoner's dilemma”situation,the effective way is to set up positive and negative incentive mechanism,improving the living environment for the farmer cooperatives through building institution,regulation,ethic,education and supportive policies system.
4.The research innovation
This dissertation begins with the study of the attendances' non cooperative strategy,investigates the farmer' cooperative willingness,and analyzes the evolution of cooperative behavior,and last find the solution of the cooperative dilemma.The features and creativities are:
1.Innovation of research perspective.The development of the farmers' cooperative is influenced by the economy,society,culture and legislation;the former researches were mostly on the regulation, mechanism perspective.This dissertation consider that the institution(organization) is the outcome of the human's behavior,it is more effective to find the future development trends and influence factors through the study of the behavior process of the organization's emerge,development and evolvement.
2.Innovation of research method.This dissertation is based on that the behavior is an intensive intelligent process,has dynamic changing character,and is in different characters under different stipulations.Therefore,this dissertation apply the evolutionary standpoint of biology,dynamic evolutionary model and three party game models to study the farmers' behavior change,looking for the evolutionary conditions for cooperative strategy.
3.Innovation of viewpoint.Based on the fact that China rural society is an“acquaintance society”, the informal regulation is effective,this dissertation strengthens concealed mechanism design in incentive mechanism,embedded social capital such as reputation,convincement,ethic and affection, to inhibit the uncooperative behaviors and stipulate cooperative behaviors.
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