企业的合作演化理论、模型及经验研究
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摘要
协调人力资本积累与资本深化以促进技术进步与经济转型是任何处于经济转型期的社会都必须直面的难题,而正确发挥政策诱导作用的前提是对企业运行的微观机制进行准确而富有意义地分析。多角度是必要的,但建构直接与宏观经济的外在表现相关联的、可实证的企业理论对中国经济转型却显得更为迫切,也更有理论价值。
以“交往”为分析的基本单位,仍然强调各种社会组织的契约性质,而企业的特性则在于它是要素所有者基于要素属性间“自然关系”的“私下谈判”的均衡,该均衡则进一步型构为与所处环境耦合的要素所有者之间的“社会关系”,即企业制度/组织结构;而对更高合作水平的追求不仅促进着社会一般分工和个别分工的深化,也同时是组织/制度发生和演进的动力所在;进而基于个别分工的、交换比较优势的市场与基于一般分工成长的异质的企业都只是由不同要素属性间“自然关系”所衍生出的不同“社会关系”而已,而合作水平的差异则是它们相异的基本维度,从而也阐释了企业制度/组织结构异质性的本质原因。因此,无论是市场、混合组织,还是极端的科层组织,它们都是相互促进的互补关系,企业的合作演化也因此可以很好地阐释企业的演化过程。
企业的合作演化理论的核心观点是:(1)企业制度/组织结构都是合作博弈的均衡,它既是合作的前提,也是合作的结果;(2)在既定技术、制度和市场等环境的综合作用下,要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态决定了团队的合作水平,而交往的利益与冲突状态在根本上又是由要素属性间的“自然关系”,即互补性与替代性的相对程度所决定;(3)技术、制度和市场等环境的变迁改变了要素属性间互补性与替代性的相对程度、要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态,进而交往的合作水平,并因此推动着企业制度/组织结构的演化;(4)企业的演化本质上就是企业的合作演化;(5)立足于促进社会分工不断深化的制度、技术环境的建设才是协调人力资本积累和物质资本深化、促使企业的合作演化并最终推动全面技术进步和宏观经济持续、健康发展的根本举措,这也是马克思的“技术进步是为了劳动者的本身”观点的具体体现。
由于互为因果、相互促进的“自然关系”与“社会关系”阐释了“交往”这一分析单位的本质内涵,“自然关系”是基于技术的要素属性间的战略关系、要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态并最终体现为某种程度的合作水平,而“社会关系”则是要素所有者基于既有的“自然关系”在制度、技术和市场等环境的综合作用下合作博弈的均衡解,并最终型构为企业制度/组织结构,因此,“交往”完全将强调技术资源方面的新古典“交换”与强调契约方面的新制度经济学的“交易”作为了它的两个方面,并因此可以实现企业的契约理论、能力理论与新古典企业理论的初步融合。更加重要的是,由于企业的合作演化理论借助“交往”这一基本分析单位将制度、技术和市场等环境、个人策略选择、企业制度/组织结构与宏观经济表现这四者的动态演化有机地联系在了一起,因此有望肩负起预测和解释宏观经济表现的基础理论这一任务。
首先在内生分工增长模型的基础上将协调成本内生,并以此形式化了企业的合作演化理论,并从理论上分析了企业的合作演化逆转的临界条件;然后在技术、市场和制度演化环境中分别考察企业的合作演化规律。当我们将企业看作要素使用权交易的履约过程以考察企业产生、发展和演化中的合作问题时,发现随机竞价阶段要素属性的互补性与替代性相对程度越低,要素所有者实施专有性投资的激励就越高,但在“根本转换”之后的“私人秩序”下,要素所有者反而更有激励投资于那些互补性与替代性相对程度越高的资产,从而更高合作水平的企业具有明显的演化优势;而当把企业看作是谈判力配置相异的治理结构并在竞争演化时,我们也发现了相似的结论,即谈判力更加制衡的治理结构无论在任何市场环境中都具有演化优势;最后,通过考察中国企业的演化现象验证了理论预测,即具有明显的合作演化逆转现象和开放条件对企业既有演化路径的强化效应,因此,适时协调人力资本与物质资本收益权的相对实现程度是保证企业以内部分工方式增长的关键前提,经济转型也因此才能实现。
最后就如何协调人力资本积累和物质资本深化以促进企业的合作演化、全面技术进步和实现经济转型提出了政策建议。
Any transitional economies must be suffering from the chanllege that coordinating the speed of human capital accumulation and that of physical deepening to promote technological progress and then accelerate economic transition, but it is the premise of important inducing impact that any policies can playing that we have accurately and meaningfully analyzed the operational micro-mechanism of the firm. Though we need a multi-angle comprehensive theoretical system for firm, hope there will be a kind of a theory of the firm which has the direct relation with outward manifestation of the macroeconomy and can be verified by empirical study. It is an urgent theoretical task for promoting our economic transition, and thus this kind of theory of firm must has higher theoretical value and more feasible than others for China.
We have developed a new theory of firm using‘communication’as a basic unit of analysis. Although we still emphasis the contract property of common organization, the nature of the firm is the equilibrium of private negotiation between the team members/stakeholders that give expression to a kind of natural relation of communication based on a sort of attributes of production factor among all owners. And then this kind of natural relations must be evolved and then form a certain social relation of communication among the same human beings that could be coupling with the synthetical environment the firm locates in, in one word, the social relation is also the constitute/structure of the firm; and the fact that any factor owner is willing to promote the cooperative level can give an internal dynamic for continuously deepening the general/individual division of the work and then driving the evolvement of the institute/organization structure of a firm; therefore the market-intensified organization whose growth rate is determined by individual division of the work can provide a place for exchanging comparative advantage between owners of production factor, and some heterogeneous firms whose growth rate is determined by internal and social general division of the work are only some different social relations of communication with variant co-operative level and they are all some derivates of some different natural relations among factor owners, the co-operative level is the basic dimension of differentiating communications. Due to co-operative level of communications can embody communications’essential difference, so it also can elaborates the root cause of heterogeneity of firms. For this reason, whatever for market-intensified organization, some hybrid organization and even some extreme bureaucracies, they supplement and promote each other, but not substitute each other, and naturally, the evolvement of a firm (including all possible styles of economic organization) must be an evolvement process of co-operative level.
The core points of the co-operative evolvement theory of the firm have: (1) organization structure/institute of the firm is the equilibriums of co-operative game; they are not only the prerequisites of the co-operation, but also the results of the co-operation; (2) under the integrative affection of three forces which come from established technologic, market and institutional environment, the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has can determine the co-operative level of the certain communication, furtherly the natural relation of a certain group of factor’s attributives that is also the relative degree of complementarily versus substitution among the attributives of factors plays an essential role in determining the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has; (3) the changes of technologic, market and the institutional environment can change the relative degree of complementarily versus substitution among the attributives of factors, and the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has and then co-operative level and finally push forward the evolvement of the institution/organization structure of a firm; (4) the evolvement of the firm is in nature the co-operative evolvement; (5) it is the fundamental practice of coordinating the speed of the human capital accumulation and that of the physical capital deepening, and then it could spur on the co-operative evolvement of the firm and finally promote all-round technology progress and ensuring the sustained, rapid and healthy development of the national economy that establishing the institutional and the technological environment to deepening both the general and the individual labor division continually. This is also embodies the viewpoint of Karl Marx which technical progress is only for laborers themselves.
Due to the natural relation and the social relation which are two very serious contents of communication, both each other for cause and effect and promote jointly, inter-depend on and complement each other together can illustrate the essential connotation of communication, the natural relation is the strategic relation based on technology among the attributives of factors, the state of benefits and conflicts the communication among factor owners has and it finally reflect the co-operative level of the communication, adding the social relation is the equilibrium of co-operative game under the synthetic affection of institutional, technological, and market environment, and ultimately the social relation could format a certain organizational structure/institution of the firm. So communication entirely can contain the mening of“exchange”which emphasize the technological facet and used as a basic unit of analysis by neo-classic economics, and the mening of“transaction”which emphasize the contract facet and used as a baisic unit of analysis by neo-institutional economics, we then naturally could preliminarily fuse contract theory, ability of theory and the theory of the firm of neoclassic economics by the co-operative evolvement of the firm with the basic unit of analysis of“communication”. It is more important that the co-operative evolvement theory of the firm might act as a basic theory for predicting and explaining the macro-economic outward manifestation due to the theory has linked their dynamic relation among institutional, technological and market environments, and the choice of individual strategy, and the institutional/organization structure of the firm and then macroeconomic performance with the basic unit of analysis,“communication”.
This dissertation has modeled the process of the co-operative evolvement of the firm with endogenetic coordination cost based on endogenetic growth theory at first, due to there exist many paradoxes of the co-operative evolvment of the firm, we then has analyzed the critical condition of backspin of the evolutional path a certain firm has; and then we have investigated the machnism of co-operational evolvement of the firm under the technological, market and institutional environment respectively. For example, when we regard the firm as a course of performance the transaction of the right to use factors to investigate the key problems about generating, developing and evolvement of the firm, we find that the lower the relative degree of complementarity versus substitution among attributives of factors in the phrase of random bidding, the more stimulant the production factor owners have when they are to invest asset specificity, but after radical transformation and then under the“control”of the private order, the factor owners are more willing to invest the asset specificity with higher relative degree of complementarity versus substitution among attributives of factors in a group instead, so the firm with the highest co-operational level has an evolutionary edge; On the other hand, we have hold a conclusion with the same or approximately the same meaning as this when we regard the firm as a governance structure with variant allocation of negotiating power, it is that a certain governance structure with the most counterbalancing negotiating force among group members has an evolutionary edge in any market environment; finally, we have tested and verified the predictive power of our theoretical framework through investigating the evolutional process of Chinese firm, we has concluded that there exist a reversal phenomenon during the evolutional process. It is a non-contestedly meaningful argument, so then I have analyzed the strengthening effect to established evolutional route of the firm when the firm is operating under reform and open policy background, especially in some developing countries. Based on these analysis I believe that timely coordinating the relative degree of earning right of human capital and that of physical capital is the key prerequisite of ensuring the firm growth with internal division of work and can then promot a firm’co-operative evolvment. So only by living up to the requirement, can us living up to economic transition then.
Finally, this article puts forward several related policy proposals how we coordinate the speed of the deepening human capital accumulation and that of deepening physic capital in order to promote the cooperative evolvement of firm, and all-round technological progress and realizing the economic transition in the end.
以“交往”为分析的基本单位,仍然强调各种社会组织的契约性质,而企业的特性则在于它是要素所有者基于要素属性间“自然关系”的“私下谈判”的均衡,该均衡则进一步型构为与所处环境耦合的要素所有者之间的“社会关系”,即企业制度/组织结构;而对更高合作水平的追求不仅促进着社会一般分工和个别分工的深化,也同时是组织/制度发生和演进的动力所在;进而基于个别分工的、交换比较优势的市场与基于一般分工成长的异质的企业都只是由不同要素属性间“自然关系”所衍生出的不同“社会关系”而已,而合作水平的差异则是它们相异的基本维度,从而也阐释了企业制度/组织结构异质性的本质原因。因此,无论是市场、混合组织,还是极端的科层组织,它们都是相互促进的互补关系,企业的合作演化也因此可以很好地阐释企业的演化过程。
企业的合作演化理论的核心观点是:(1)企业制度/组织结构都是合作博弈的均衡,它既是合作的前提,也是合作的结果;(2)在既定技术、制度和市场等环境的综合作用下,要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态决定了团队的合作水平,而交往的利益与冲突状态在根本上又是由要素属性间的“自然关系”,即互补性与替代性的相对程度所决定;(3)技术、制度和市场等环境的变迁改变了要素属性间互补性与替代性的相对程度、要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态,进而交往的合作水平,并因此推动着企业制度/组织结构的演化;(4)企业的演化本质上就是企业的合作演化;(5)立足于促进社会分工不断深化的制度、技术环境的建设才是协调人力资本积累和物质资本深化、促使企业的合作演化并最终推动全面技术进步和宏观经济持续、健康发展的根本举措,这也是马克思的“技术进步是为了劳动者的本身”观点的具体体现。
由于互为因果、相互促进的“自然关系”与“社会关系”阐释了“交往”这一分析单位的本质内涵,“自然关系”是基于技术的要素属性间的战略关系、要素所有者交往的利益与冲突状态并最终体现为某种程度的合作水平,而“社会关系”则是要素所有者基于既有的“自然关系”在制度、技术和市场等环境的综合作用下合作博弈的均衡解,并最终型构为企业制度/组织结构,因此,“交往”完全将强调技术资源方面的新古典“交换”与强调契约方面的新制度经济学的“交易”作为了它的两个方面,并因此可以实现企业的契约理论、能力理论与新古典企业理论的初步融合。更加重要的是,由于企业的合作演化理论借助“交往”这一基本分析单位将制度、技术和市场等环境、个人策略选择、企业制度/组织结构与宏观经济表现这四者的动态演化有机地联系在了一起,因此有望肩负起预测和解释宏观经济表现的基础理论这一任务。
首先在内生分工增长模型的基础上将协调成本内生,并以此形式化了企业的合作演化理论,并从理论上分析了企业的合作演化逆转的临界条件;然后在技术、市场和制度演化环境中分别考察企业的合作演化规律。当我们将企业看作要素使用权交易的履约过程以考察企业产生、发展和演化中的合作问题时,发现随机竞价阶段要素属性的互补性与替代性相对程度越低,要素所有者实施专有性投资的激励就越高,但在“根本转换”之后的“私人秩序”下,要素所有者反而更有激励投资于那些互补性与替代性相对程度越高的资产,从而更高合作水平的企业具有明显的演化优势;而当把企业看作是谈判力配置相异的治理结构并在竞争演化时,我们也发现了相似的结论,即谈判力更加制衡的治理结构无论在任何市场环境中都具有演化优势;最后,通过考察中国企业的演化现象验证了理论预测,即具有明显的合作演化逆转现象和开放条件对企业既有演化路径的强化效应,因此,适时协调人力资本与物质资本收益权的相对实现程度是保证企业以内部分工方式增长的关键前提,经济转型也因此才能实现。
最后就如何协调人力资本积累和物质资本深化以促进企业的合作演化、全面技术进步和实现经济转型提出了政策建议。
Any transitional economies must be suffering from the chanllege that coordinating the speed of human capital accumulation and that of physical deepening to promote technological progress and then accelerate economic transition, but it is the premise of important inducing impact that any policies can playing that we have accurately and meaningfully analyzed the operational micro-mechanism of the firm. Though we need a multi-angle comprehensive theoretical system for firm, hope there will be a kind of a theory of the firm which has the direct relation with outward manifestation of the macroeconomy and can be verified by empirical study. It is an urgent theoretical task for promoting our economic transition, and thus this kind of theory of firm must has higher theoretical value and more feasible than others for China.
We have developed a new theory of firm using‘communication’as a basic unit of analysis. Although we still emphasis the contract property of common organization, the nature of the firm is the equilibrium of private negotiation between the team members/stakeholders that give expression to a kind of natural relation of communication based on a sort of attributes of production factor among all owners. And then this kind of natural relations must be evolved and then form a certain social relation of communication among the same human beings that could be coupling with the synthetical environment the firm locates in, in one word, the social relation is also the constitute/structure of the firm; and the fact that any factor owner is willing to promote the cooperative level can give an internal dynamic for continuously deepening the general/individual division of the work and then driving the evolvement of the institute/organization structure of a firm; therefore the market-intensified organization whose growth rate is determined by individual division of the work can provide a place for exchanging comparative advantage between owners of production factor, and some heterogeneous firms whose growth rate is determined by internal and social general division of the work are only some different social relations of communication with variant co-operative level and they are all some derivates of some different natural relations among factor owners, the co-operative level is the basic dimension of differentiating communications. Due to co-operative level of communications can embody communications’essential difference, so it also can elaborates the root cause of heterogeneity of firms. For this reason, whatever for market-intensified organization, some hybrid organization and even some extreme bureaucracies, they supplement and promote each other, but not substitute each other, and naturally, the evolvement of a firm (including all possible styles of economic organization) must be an evolvement process of co-operative level.
The core points of the co-operative evolvement theory of the firm have: (1) organization structure/institute of the firm is the equilibriums of co-operative game; they are not only the prerequisites of the co-operation, but also the results of the co-operation; (2) under the integrative affection of three forces which come from established technologic, market and institutional environment, the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has can determine the co-operative level of the certain communication, furtherly the natural relation of a certain group of factor’s attributives that is also the relative degree of complementarily versus substitution among the attributives of factors plays an essential role in determining the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has; (3) the changes of technologic, market and the institutional environment can change the relative degree of complementarily versus substitution among the attributives of factors, and the state of benefits and conflicts a certain communication has and then co-operative level and finally push forward the evolvement of the institution/organization structure of a firm; (4) the evolvement of the firm is in nature the co-operative evolvement; (5) it is the fundamental practice of coordinating the speed of the human capital accumulation and that of the physical capital deepening, and then it could spur on the co-operative evolvement of the firm and finally promote all-round technology progress and ensuring the sustained, rapid and healthy development of the national economy that establishing the institutional and the technological environment to deepening both the general and the individual labor division continually. This is also embodies the viewpoint of Karl Marx which technical progress is only for laborers themselves.
Due to the natural relation and the social relation which are two very serious contents of communication, both each other for cause and effect and promote jointly, inter-depend on and complement each other together can illustrate the essential connotation of communication, the natural relation is the strategic relation based on technology among the attributives of factors, the state of benefits and conflicts the communication among factor owners has and it finally reflect the co-operative level of the communication, adding the social relation is the equilibrium of co-operative game under the synthetic affection of institutional, technological, and market environment, and ultimately the social relation could format a certain organizational structure/institution of the firm. So communication entirely can contain the mening of“exchange”which emphasize the technological facet and used as a basic unit of analysis by neo-classic economics, and the mening of“transaction”which emphasize the contract facet and used as a baisic unit of analysis by neo-institutional economics, we then naturally could preliminarily fuse contract theory, ability of theory and the theory of the firm of neoclassic economics by the co-operative evolvement of the firm with the basic unit of analysis of“communication”. It is more important that the co-operative evolvement theory of the firm might act as a basic theory for predicting and explaining the macro-economic outward manifestation due to the theory has linked their dynamic relation among institutional, technological and market environments, and the choice of individual strategy, and the institutional/organization structure of the firm and then macroeconomic performance with the basic unit of analysis,“communication”.
This dissertation has modeled the process of the co-operative evolvement of the firm with endogenetic coordination cost based on endogenetic growth theory at first, due to there exist many paradoxes of the co-operative evolvment of the firm, we then has analyzed the critical condition of backspin of the evolutional path a certain firm has; and then we have investigated the machnism of co-operational evolvement of the firm under the technological, market and institutional environment respectively. For example, when we regard the firm as a course of performance the transaction of the right to use factors to investigate the key problems about generating, developing and evolvement of the firm, we find that the lower the relative degree of complementarity versus substitution among attributives of factors in the phrase of random bidding, the more stimulant the production factor owners have when they are to invest asset specificity, but after radical transformation and then under the“control”of the private order, the factor owners are more willing to invest the asset specificity with higher relative degree of complementarity versus substitution among attributives of factors in a group instead, so the firm with the highest co-operational level has an evolutionary edge; On the other hand, we have hold a conclusion with the same or approximately the same meaning as this when we regard the firm as a governance structure with variant allocation of negotiating power, it is that a certain governance structure with the most counterbalancing negotiating force among group members has an evolutionary edge in any market environment; finally, we have tested and verified the predictive power of our theoretical framework through investigating the evolutional process of Chinese firm, we has concluded that there exist a reversal phenomenon during the evolutional process. It is a non-contestedly meaningful argument, so then I have analyzed the strengthening effect to established evolutional route of the firm when the firm is operating under reform and open policy background, especially in some developing countries. Based on these analysis I believe that timely coordinating the relative degree of earning right of human capital and that of physical capital is the key prerequisite of ensuring the firm growth with internal division of work and can then promot a firm’co-operative evolvment. So only by living up to the requirement, can us living up to economic transition then.
Finally, this article puts forward several related policy proposals how we coordinate the speed of the deepening human capital accumulation and that of deepening physic capital in order to promote the cooperative evolvement of firm, and all-round technological progress and realizing the economic transition in the end.
引文
1第一段引文出自马克思(1967,176),译文摘自马克思:《资本论》,第一卷,204-205页,北京,人民出版社。第二段引文出自萨缪尔森(1957,894)。
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