植物品种权价值链利益分配问题研究
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摘要
随着全球经济一体化进程的加快，全球价值链正深刻影响着社会经济生活中的支配关系和利益分配机制，并成为近20年来最引人注目的现象。21世纪，在知识经济全球化的背景下，农业知识产权得到了空前的发展，知识产权争夺的重心已经向农业及种子领域扩展，植物品种权正在演变成一种延伸着的权力和种子企业竞争的有力武器。种子企业的生存发展与竞争力越来越依赖于种质资源的存量、不断进行育种技术创新的能力以及将种质资源迅速产业化的能力，而这些仅仅依靠种子企业自身有限的技术和资源已经寸步维艰，越来越多的种子企业倾向于寻找合作伙伴(包括研发和销售)。因此，建立植物品种权价值链(Plant Varity Rights Value Chain, PVR-VC)已成为我国种子企业谋求发展的重要途径。而价值链建立的同时，也意味这一个新的利益分配格局的形成，若能通过选择合理的利益分配方式，设计出一套有效的利益分配契约，促使节点成员放弃投机行为，将大大提高价值链联盟的稳定性和竞争优势。因此，植物品种权价值链的利益分配问题具有很强的探讨性和研究的现实意义，也是本文的研究目的。
本文按照“理论研究→理论运用→理论拓展→政策建议”的路径，针对种子产业面临的困境提出了上述问题，构建了“PVR-VC→PVR-VC利益分配契约→实证分析→利益分配契约设计的博弈分析”的研究框架。具体内容如下：
(1)准确了解知识产权经济及我国种子产业发展的现状与趋势是本文问题提出的基础。本文从宏观和微观两个层面，全面系统地剖析了PVR-VC对于我国种子产业发展的必要性与重要性。本文从植物品种权经济视角、价值链以及利益分配三个方面对评述了国内外的研究现状。
(2)植物品种权价值链基础理论体系是本文立论的基础。植物品种权价值具有与有形物品不同的特点，植物品种权价值链也具有不同于一般价值链的特点、构建原则与结构模型。借鉴技术创新价值链、知识价值链、知识产权价值链的概念，本文较详细地界定了PVR-VC的概念，介绍了PVR-VC的构建原则及4种结构模型，强调了成员间的委托-代理关系以及基于基本链的PVR-VC利益分配研究。研究表明：PVR-VC的运行机制实质上是委托-代理实现机制，种子企业凭借自身优势成为PVR-VC上的核心成员，通过有效的利益分配契约设计来协调PVR-VC的稳定运行。
(3)委托-代理模型、契约组合、分成制和契约参数设置构成了PVR-VC利益分配契约设计的基本要点。PVR-VC利益分配契约是指通过提供合适的信息共享和激励措施，来保证节点成员之间的利益协调、优化价值链绩效的有关协议。利益分配契约至少可以保证每一方的利益不比原来差。研究表明：为了消除信息不对称对价值链利益分配的不利影响，除了基于委托-代理理论的思路设计利益分配契约外，在具体设计时，还应考虑不同契约的组合、分成制对风险分担的积极作用、合理的契约参数对价值链整体绩效的协调作用等问题。
(4)植物品种权价值链利益分配契约的影响因素与利益分配契约绩效之间相关性的实证研究是PVR-VC利益分配契约参数设计的理论依据。利益分配契约设计的过程就是利益分配模型构建的过程，借鉴供应链契约设计的研究思路，选取与利益分配契约有关的决策变量设置为契约模型参数。本文选取了成员的工作努力水平、讨价还价能力、对价值链的投入与贡献、研发模式、返利模式等变量，通过讨论它们与利益分配契约绩效之间是否存在直接的正向显著关系，来确定是否在契约模型设计时设置为模型参数。研究表明：在PVR-VC利益分配契约模型构建时，若在参数设置上尽可能地考量以上变量的参数设置，所设计出来的契约对PVR-VC的协调更为有效。
(5)植物品种权价值链利益分配契约的博弈分析是本文的理论扩展。整个PVR-VC的可分配利益通过事前约束、事后调节的方式在各成员间完成分配。研究表明：事前约束阶段，在利益分配系数的基础上，引入创新成本补贴因子和惩罚因子对植物品种权价值链利益分配契约进行博弈模型分析，有效地激励育种方与分销商参与植物品种权价值链的积极性。事后调节阶段，选用Shapley值法，依照PVR-VC利益分配原则及利益分配影响因素分析，构建契约并对原始Shapley值模型进行了修正。
(6)结合对发达国家植物品种权价值链的分析，就改善我国植物品种权价值链的利益分配提出了几点政策建议，以更好地促进我国植物品种权价值链的运行及成员间的利益分配情况。并对本论文的进一步研究进行了展望。
Along with the accelerated process of global economic integration, global value chain hasbeen influencing the profit allocation mechanism in social and economic life. In the Thetheories of Plant Variety Rights Value Chain (PVR-VC) and its profit allocation that thisarticle has put forward, was originated from the depth thinking over the present and futuresituation of Chinese Seed Industry. In the21stcentury, under the background of knowledgeglobalization, agricultural intellectual property has got an unprecedented progress, and thecenter of intellectual property has spread to the agriculture and the seed resources. PlantVariety Rights has turned into the extended power and the powerful weapon used for thecompetition among the seed companies. The existence and development of seed companieshave began to depend more and more on genetic resources storage, the constant innovation ofbreeding technology and the rapid making the genetic resources step into the industrialization,which can’t only depend on the limited technology and resources of seed companiesthemselves. Now more and more seed companies have tended to searching for the partnersincluding the breeding part and the marketing part. Therefore, it has been the importantchannel for the development of seed companies to construct the Plant Variety Rights ValueChain (PVR-VC). Simultaneously while construct PVR-VC, a new arrangement of profitallocation has been formed. If a suitable and reasonable profit allocation method and a set ofoperative profit allocation contracts could be found, the stability and competitive advantagesof value chain has got the great improvement. So, PVR-VC’s profit allocation has been of theexploratory research and the strong practical significance, which right is the article’sdestination.
Along the track “theoretical study→theoretical usage→theoretical extension→policyadvices”, the article has put forward the above mentioned problems in view of the currenttroubles of seed industry, and set up the research frame “PVR-VC→PVR-VC’s profitallocation contracts→the positive analysis→designing the profit allocation contracts ofPVR-VC”. The main contents are as followed:
(1) It is the foundation of the above given problem to exactly know about the current situation and tendency of knowledge intellectual economy and Chinese seed industry. Fromthe macro and micro levels, the article analyzed the necessity and importance of the seedindustry development in an overall. In view of the scare study on PVR-VC, the articlecommented on the domestic and foreign study conditions from the three angles, that is, PVReconomic angle, value chain angle and profit allocation angle.
(2) The theory system of PVR-VC was the foundation of analysis basis. The PVR value isof the different features from the visible goods, and PVR-VC also is of the different features,the principal of establishment and structural models from the common value chain. In view ofthe definitions of such value chain as technological innovation value chain, knowledge valuechain and intellectual property value chain, this article specified in detail the definition ofPVR-VC, introduced the principal of establishment and four models, emphasized on theprincipal-agent relationship among the partners and the PVR-VC’s profit allocation studybased on the basis chain. The study indicated that the PVR-VC operation mechanismessentially was the principal-agent mechanism, the seed company has become the coremember depending on itself advantages, and the profit allocation contracts designed by theseed company could coordinate the stability of PVR-VC’s operation.
(3) The principal-agent model, contracts combination, the share rule and the setting ofcontract parameters were the essential points of designing the PVR-VC profit allocationcontracts. The profit allocation contracts are the relative agreements to guarantee the interestcoordination among the members and optimize the performance of value chain by offering thesuitable information sharing and incentive measures. The contract at least could confirm onething that each member taking part in the value chain could get the more profit than before.The study indicated that the article, when designing the contract, in order to erase the negativeinfluence originated from information asymmetry, should consider the different contractcombination, the positive actions on sharing the risks from the share rule, the coordinationactions on the whole value chain performances from the exact contract parameters, and so on.
(4) The empirical research on the correlation between the influencing factors and theperformances of contracts were the theoretical basis. The course of designing the contracts isthe same with the course of constructing the models of profit allocation. Based on the train ofthought about supply chain, it is feasible to pick up the decision variables concerning aboutprofit allocation contracts and change the variables into the model parameters. This article haschosen such the variables as the working standards, the bargaining ability, the input andcontribution to PVR-VC, the model of R&D, rebating model, and then has fixed whether toset up the above mentioned variables into the contract models by discussing whether there existed the positive relationships between the variables and the performances. The studyindicated that the designed contracts would be effective if considering the above variables.
(5) The judgment of profit allocation contracts based on the two-stage is the first step. Togive the unified contracts to the breeding part and the marketing part is to simplify theworking procedure of the principle, and the result is that both the breeding and the marketingcan get the same incentive. The study indicated that the whole PVR-VC couldn’t depend onthe only profit allocation contracts and it needed to design the two-stage contracts accordingto themselves features, which could receive the better incentive effect.
(6) Finally, with the combination of study on the PVR-VC of the developed country, thisarticle has put forward some policy advices about the mechanism of profit allocation,concluded the main opinions or results, and pointed to the drawbacks.
本文按照“理论研究→理论运用→理论拓展→政策建议”的路径，针对种子产业面临的困境提出了上述问题，构建了“PVR-VC→PVR-VC利益分配契约→实证分析→利益分配契约设计的博弈分析”的研究框架。具体内容如下：
(1)准确了解知识产权经济及我国种子产业发展的现状与趋势是本文问题提出的基础。本文从宏观和微观两个层面，全面系统地剖析了PVR-VC对于我国种子产业发展的必要性与重要性。本文从植物品种权经济视角、价值链以及利益分配三个方面对评述了国内外的研究现状。
(2)植物品种权价值链基础理论体系是本文立论的基础。植物品种权价值具有与有形物品不同的特点，植物品种权价值链也具有不同于一般价值链的特点、构建原则与结构模型。借鉴技术创新价值链、知识价值链、知识产权价值链的概念，本文较详细地界定了PVR-VC的概念，介绍了PVR-VC的构建原则及4种结构模型，强调了成员间的委托-代理关系以及基于基本链的PVR-VC利益分配研究。研究表明：PVR-VC的运行机制实质上是委托-代理实现机制，种子企业凭借自身优势成为PVR-VC上的核心成员，通过有效的利益分配契约设计来协调PVR-VC的稳定运行。
(3)委托-代理模型、契约组合、分成制和契约参数设置构成了PVR-VC利益分配契约设计的基本要点。PVR-VC利益分配契约是指通过提供合适的信息共享和激励措施，来保证节点成员之间的利益协调、优化价值链绩效的有关协议。利益分配契约至少可以保证每一方的利益不比原来差。研究表明：为了消除信息不对称对价值链利益分配的不利影响，除了基于委托-代理理论的思路设计利益分配契约外，在具体设计时，还应考虑不同契约的组合、分成制对风险分担的积极作用、合理的契约参数对价值链整体绩效的协调作用等问题。
(4)植物品种权价值链利益分配契约的影响因素与利益分配契约绩效之间相关性的实证研究是PVR-VC利益分配契约参数设计的理论依据。利益分配契约设计的过程就是利益分配模型构建的过程，借鉴供应链契约设计的研究思路，选取与利益分配契约有关的决策变量设置为契约模型参数。本文选取了成员的工作努力水平、讨价还价能力、对价值链的投入与贡献、研发模式、返利模式等变量，通过讨论它们与利益分配契约绩效之间是否存在直接的正向显著关系，来确定是否在契约模型设计时设置为模型参数。研究表明：在PVR-VC利益分配契约模型构建时，若在参数设置上尽可能地考量以上变量的参数设置，所设计出来的契约对PVR-VC的协调更为有效。
(5)植物品种权价值链利益分配契约的博弈分析是本文的理论扩展。整个PVR-VC的可分配利益通过事前约束、事后调节的方式在各成员间完成分配。研究表明：事前约束阶段，在利益分配系数的基础上，引入创新成本补贴因子和惩罚因子对植物品种权价值链利益分配契约进行博弈模型分析，有效地激励育种方与分销商参与植物品种权价值链的积极性。事后调节阶段，选用Shapley值法，依照PVR-VC利益分配原则及利益分配影响因素分析，构建契约并对原始Shapley值模型进行了修正。
(6)结合对发达国家植物品种权价值链的分析，就改善我国植物品种权价值链的利益分配提出了几点政策建议，以更好地促进我国植物品种权价值链的运行及成员间的利益分配情况。并对本论文的进一步研究进行了展望。
Along with the accelerated process of global economic integration, global value chain hasbeen influencing the profit allocation mechanism in social and economic life. In the Thetheories of Plant Variety Rights Value Chain (PVR-VC) and its profit allocation that thisarticle has put forward, was originated from the depth thinking over the present and futuresituation of Chinese Seed Industry. In the21stcentury, under the background of knowledgeglobalization, agricultural intellectual property has got an unprecedented progress, and thecenter of intellectual property has spread to the agriculture and the seed resources. PlantVariety Rights has turned into the extended power and the powerful weapon used for thecompetition among the seed companies. The existence and development of seed companieshave began to depend more and more on genetic resources storage, the constant innovation ofbreeding technology and the rapid making the genetic resources step into the industrialization,which can’t only depend on the limited technology and resources of seed companiesthemselves. Now more and more seed companies have tended to searching for the partnersincluding the breeding part and the marketing part. Therefore, it has been the importantchannel for the development of seed companies to construct the Plant Variety Rights ValueChain (PVR-VC). Simultaneously while construct PVR-VC, a new arrangement of profitallocation has been formed. If a suitable and reasonable profit allocation method and a set ofoperative profit allocation contracts could be found, the stability and competitive advantagesof value chain has got the great improvement. So, PVR-VC’s profit allocation has been of theexploratory research and the strong practical significance, which right is the article’sdestination.
Along the track “theoretical study→theoretical usage→theoretical extension→policyadvices”, the article has put forward the above mentioned problems in view of the currenttroubles of seed industry, and set up the research frame “PVR-VC→PVR-VC’s profitallocation contracts→the positive analysis→designing the profit allocation contracts ofPVR-VC”. The main contents are as followed:
(1) It is the foundation of the above given problem to exactly know about the current situation and tendency of knowledge intellectual economy and Chinese seed industry. Fromthe macro and micro levels, the article analyzed the necessity and importance of the seedindustry development in an overall. In view of the scare study on PVR-VC, the articlecommented on the domestic and foreign study conditions from the three angles, that is, PVReconomic angle, value chain angle and profit allocation angle.
(2) The theory system of PVR-VC was the foundation of analysis basis. The PVR value isof the different features from the visible goods, and PVR-VC also is of the different features,the principal of establishment and structural models from the common value chain. In view ofthe definitions of such value chain as technological innovation value chain, knowledge valuechain and intellectual property value chain, this article specified in detail the definition ofPVR-VC, introduced the principal of establishment and four models, emphasized on theprincipal-agent relationship among the partners and the PVR-VC’s profit allocation studybased on the basis chain. The study indicated that the PVR-VC operation mechanismessentially was the principal-agent mechanism, the seed company has become the coremember depending on itself advantages, and the profit allocation contracts designed by theseed company could coordinate the stability of PVR-VC’s operation.
(3) The principal-agent model, contracts combination, the share rule and the setting ofcontract parameters were the essential points of designing the PVR-VC profit allocationcontracts. The profit allocation contracts are the relative agreements to guarantee the interestcoordination among the members and optimize the performance of value chain by offering thesuitable information sharing and incentive measures. The contract at least could confirm onething that each member taking part in the value chain could get the more profit than before.The study indicated that the article, when designing the contract, in order to erase the negativeinfluence originated from information asymmetry, should consider the different contractcombination, the positive actions on sharing the risks from the share rule, the coordinationactions on the whole value chain performances from the exact contract parameters, and so on.
(4) The empirical research on the correlation between the influencing factors and theperformances of contracts were the theoretical basis. The course of designing the contracts isthe same with the course of constructing the models of profit allocation. Based on the train ofthought about supply chain, it is feasible to pick up the decision variables concerning aboutprofit allocation contracts and change the variables into the model parameters. This article haschosen such the variables as the working standards, the bargaining ability, the input andcontribution to PVR-VC, the model of R&D, rebating model, and then has fixed whether toset up the above mentioned variables into the contract models by discussing whether there existed the positive relationships between the variables and the performances. The studyindicated that the designed contracts would be effective if considering the above variables.
(5) The judgment of profit allocation contracts based on the two-stage is the first step. Togive the unified contracts to the breeding part and the marketing part is to simplify theworking procedure of the principle, and the result is that both the breeding and the marketingcan get the same incentive. The study indicated that the whole PVR-VC couldn’t depend onthe only profit allocation contracts and it needed to design the two-stage contracts accordingto themselves features, which could receive the better incentive effect.
(6) Finally, with the combination of study on the PVR-VC of the developed country, thisarticle has put forward some policy advices about the mechanism of profit allocation,concluded the main opinions or results, and pointed to the drawbacks.
引文
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