我国资本市场审计寻租研究
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摘要
当前,由财务舞弊与审计失败引发的不利经济后果,成为理论界与实务界关注的焦点。导致财务审计舞弊的一个最基本的原因是作为市场主体的上市公司与审计师的寻租行为。我国资本市场赖以运作的制度环境和制度安排导致了租金存在,上市公司和审计师作为资本市场的主体,其寻租行为不仅会影响资本市场的资源配置效率,造成整个社会福利的损失,而且还会引起财务信息失真和审计失败。从资本市场现实角度看,如何有效进行审计和遏制审计寻租行为已成为国内外理论界、实务界乃至政界人士所关注的焦点和所需要着力研究解决的重大问题,故对此展开研究也具有重大的现实意义及其学术价值。本文在已有研究基础上,以寻租理论为视角,运用产权理论和博弈理论,分析上市公司和审计师寻租行为产生的供需动因,并为有效控制审计寻租提出政策性建议。
首先,本文运用寻租理论、产权理论与博弈论,研究了我国审计寻租的特殊产权背景与审计寻租中的非合作博弈。阐述了租金涵义演变、寻租涵义和寻租理论的主要观点,并结合现代产权理论,基于产权保护的视角分析了会计信息披露产权界定和模糊产权所形成的公共领域,以及审计师对会计信息产权进行审计界定的必要性。本文还从产权制度变迁和上市公司的产权制度安排角度,深入分析了审计寻租产生的上市公司产权界定模糊和非流通国有股比重过高这一特殊产权背景。此外,以博弈论为基础,建立了审计师、上市公司和监管者之间的动态寻租博弈模型,克服了仅仅从理论视角研究的片面性,为更全面理解审计寻租提供了理论依据。
其次,研究了我国资本市场审计寻租的基本理论。明确界定了审计寻租内涵、审计寻租主体和客体与审计寻租成本涵义,从产权角度出发剖析了审计寻租产生的内在机理,并根据我国证券市场由政府主导、政府管制、审计委托聘任机制和会计制度双轨制等特征,分析了审计寻租产生的外在条件,在审计寻租成本收益分析基础上,阐述了审计寻租产生的严重社会后果。
再次,研究了我国资本市场审计寻租产生的动因。本文明确指出,我国资本市场会计信息揭示管制主要通过会计审计准则制定管制和会计信息披露管制来实现,信息揭示管制产生了管制租金,而管制租金是审计寻租的产生诱因。本文的研究揭示了审计寻租产生的供需动因,一方面,上市公司制度性寻租、特殊产权制度安排和会计审计准则的变迁特色,构成了审计寻租形成的需求动因;另一方面,审计市场的竞争压力、法律体系缺陷和审计职业道德缺失又构成了审计寻租供给动因。
最后,从审计寻租产生的需求和供给视角两方面,检验与分析了我国资本市场审计寻租的影响因素。本文对审计寻租产生需求动因的实证检验系分别从市场管制、股权结构和董事会特征三方面进行,结果表明,审计寻租与上市公司的会计管制具有显著相关性,上市公司作为审计寻租主体也存在着强烈的避亏、增发股票和保持上市资格的寻租动机;上市公司股权集中度和控制权安排与审计寻租显著相关,第一大股东持股比例越高的公司,其审计寻租动机越小;由于国有控股的上市公司比非国有控股的上市公司受到证监会和公众监督的力度大,最终控制人为国有控股的上市公司的审计寻租需求动机比国有控股上市公司的审计寻租需求动机更弱。然而,检验结果未发现股权制衡度对审计寻租有显著影响,也未发现我国目前的董事会制度对审计寻租具有显著地抑制作用,故无法改变对独立董事作为公司治理“装饰品”的质疑。审计寻租供给动因的实证研究是从事务所规模和异常审计收费两方面进行的,结果表明,作为供给因素的事务所规模和审计收费对审计寻租有显著影响,事务所规模越大审计寻租的供给动机便越低,说明事务所规模对审计寻租起到了显著的抑制作用,异常审计收费的减少能对审计寻租起到了显著性抑制作用。
基于上述研究,本文认为,对我国资本市场的审计寻租行为应加强控制,控制原则是加大审计寻租成本、降低审计寻租的需求和供给。此外,本文提出了完善法律法规、民事赔偿机制、降低监管成本等以加大审计寻租成本,完善资本市场管制制度以降低审计寻租需求,形成合理的审计市场结构以减少审计寻租的供给等政策性建议,作为适度控制审计寻租的具体措施。
The disadvantageous economical consequence which The finance frauds and auditing failures caused becomes central issues that Politicians and scholars pay close attention to. The premise which t he finance frauds and auditing failures Causes is the auditing rent-seeking of the listed companies and the auditors as the market main body. The system environment and the system arrangement which China’s capital market depends have caused the rent existence. The listed companies and the auditors, as the main body of the capital market, their rent-seeking activities not only affected the resources disposition of the capital market efficiency, but also caused the entire social welfare loss and the financial information distortion and the audit failure. From the reality of the capital market point of view, how to effectively audit and contain auditing rent-seeking behavior at home and abroad has become the focus of attention and the practical problems for major efforts to solve, so this study is of great practical significance. Basing on the research foundation, the use of property rights theory and game theory, this dissertation analyses the supply and demand mechanism of auditing rent-seeking behaviors of the auditors and listed companies, and Put forward policy recommendations for the effective control of the auditing rent-seeking.
First of all, this dissertation applies rent-seeking theory, property rights theory and game theory to the research of special property rights background and the non-cooperative game of the auditing rent-seeking in China’s capital market. This dissertation studies the evolution of the meaning of rent, rent-seeking and the meaning of the main point of view of rent-seeking theory. Combined with the modern property rights theory, on the perspective the protection of property rights, this dissertation dialectically analyses the public domain, which is formed by the disclosure of accounting information, definition of property rights and fuzzy property rights, and the need which auditors define the property rights of accounting information. From the system transition of property rights and listed companies arrangements for the system of property rights point of view, the special property right background, which listed companies have a fuzzy definition of property rights and non-tradable state-owned shares is too high proportion, is in-depth analysis of the system. In addition, based on game theory, the dynamic model of auditing rent-seeking game among the auditors, listed companies and regulators is established, thus not only overcoming the shortcoming of existing researches due to their single- perspective of the theoretical study, but also providing a theoretical basis for a more comprehensive understanding for the auditing rent-seeking.
Second, this dissertation studies the basic issues of auditing rent-seeking of China's capital market Rent-seeking. On basis of the rent-seeking theory this dissertation clearly defines auditing rent-seeking, the bodies of auditing rent-seeking, and the main object of rent-seeking, and auditing rent-seeking costs. According to the government-led character of China's securities market, government regulation, audit commission by the appointment of Mechanisms and accounting system features such as dual-track system, this dissertation analyses the external conditions of auditing rent-seeking, and the serious social consequences which auditing rent-seeking caused in the audit cost-benefit analysis on the basis of cost-benefit analysis for auditing rent-seeking.
Third, the practical problems of auditing rent-seeking of China's capital market are studied in this dissertation. The paper makes it clear that regulation for accounting information in China's capital market is revealed through the control of the main accounting and auditing standard-setting control and control for accounting information disclosure to achieve. The mechanism which regulation rent is produced is revealed in this dissertation. This paper discusses rent-seeking mechanism of supply and demand; on the one hand, the demand mechanism is generated by the composition of the institution rent-seeking, the special arrangements for the property rights system and transition characteristics of auditing standards, on the other hand, the fierce competition in the audit market, the legal system deficiencies and lack of professional ethics of audit constitute the supply mechanism of auditing rent-seeking.
Finally, the influence factors of auditing rent-seeking in China's capital markets are tested from the demand and supply. An empirical study of demand for auditing rent-seeking is practiced from the market regulation, ownership structure and characteristics of the Board of Directors. It is found from the test that there is a significant relationship between auditing rent-seeking and the listed company’s accounting regulation. Listed companies, as the body of auditing rent-seeking, have a strong rent-seeking sense of to avoid loss, issue additional shares and maintain listed qualification. There is a significant relationship between auditing rent-seeking and ownership Structure. Concentration of ownership, ownership arrangement and auditing rent-seeking has a significant relationship. The higher the first shareholder hold, the smaller the Motivation of auditing rent-seeking is. Because the degree of supervision for state-controlled listed companies than the non-state-controlled listed companies from SEC and the public is stronger, the motivation of auditing rent-seeking of ultimate state-controlled listed companies is weaker than non-state-controlled listed companies. However, the test results don’t found the significant influence of interest balance on the auditing rent-seeking. The test results don’t found the significant influence of our current board of directors system on the auditing rent-seeking, so the question which independent director of corporate is just corporate governance "decorations" cannot be changed.
An empirical study of demand for auditing rent-seeking is practiced from the size of the accounting firm and unusual auditing fee. The results show that the supply factors as the size of the firm's and auditing fees has a significant impact on auditing rent-seeking. The larger the size of accounting firms is, the lower the supply motivation of auditing rent-seeking is. It implies that the firm size plays a significant inhibition on the auditing rent-seeking. The test results indicate that the negative abnormal auditing fee plays a significant inhibition on the auditing rent-seeking.
Based on above research, this dissertation believes that auditing rent-seeking in China's capital market should be appropriately controlled, through increasing auditing rent-seeking costs, reducing the demand and supply of auditing rent-seeking. This dissertation proposes policy recommendations to moderate control auditing rent-seeking. On the one hand, the auditing rent-seeking costs should be increased to improve laws and regulations and civil compensation mechanism and reduce the cost of supervision; on the other hand, the demands for auditing rent-seeking should be decrease to lower the demand for auditing rent-seeking, finally, the supplies for auditing rent-seeking should be decrease through forming a rational auditing structure.
首先,本文运用寻租理论、产权理论与博弈论,研究了我国审计寻租的特殊产权背景与审计寻租中的非合作博弈。阐述了租金涵义演变、寻租涵义和寻租理论的主要观点,并结合现代产权理论,基于产权保护的视角分析了会计信息披露产权界定和模糊产权所形成的公共领域,以及审计师对会计信息产权进行审计界定的必要性。本文还从产权制度变迁和上市公司的产权制度安排角度,深入分析了审计寻租产生的上市公司产权界定模糊和非流通国有股比重过高这一特殊产权背景。此外,以博弈论为基础,建立了审计师、上市公司和监管者之间的动态寻租博弈模型,克服了仅仅从理论视角研究的片面性,为更全面理解审计寻租提供了理论依据。
其次,研究了我国资本市场审计寻租的基本理论。明确界定了审计寻租内涵、审计寻租主体和客体与审计寻租成本涵义,从产权角度出发剖析了审计寻租产生的内在机理,并根据我国证券市场由政府主导、政府管制、审计委托聘任机制和会计制度双轨制等特征,分析了审计寻租产生的外在条件,在审计寻租成本收益分析基础上,阐述了审计寻租产生的严重社会后果。
再次,研究了我国资本市场审计寻租产生的动因。本文明确指出,我国资本市场会计信息揭示管制主要通过会计审计准则制定管制和会计信息披露管制来实现,信息揭示管制产生了管制租金,而管制租金是审计寻租的产生诱因。本文的研究揭示了审计寻租产生的供需动因,一方面,上市公司制度性寻租、特殊产权制度安排和会计审计准则的变迁特色,构成了审计寻租形成的需求动因;另一方面,审计市场的竞争压力、法律体系缺陷和审计职业道德缺失又构成了审计寻租供给动因。
最后,从审计寻租产生的需求和供给视角两方面,检验与分析了我国资本市场审计寻租的影响因素。本文对审计寻租产生需求动因的实证检验系分别从市场管制、股权结构和董事会特征三方面进行,结果表明,审计寻租与上市公司的会计管制具有显著相关性,上市公司作为审计寻租主体也存在着强烈的避亏、增发股票和保持上市资格的寻租动机;上市公司股权集中度和控制权安排与审计寻租显著相关,第一大股东持股比例越高的公司,其审计寻租动机越小;由于国有控股的上市公司比非国有控股的上市公司受到证监会和公众监督的力度大,最终控制人为国有控股的上市公司的审计寻租需求动机比国有控股上市公司的审计寻租需求动机更弱。然而,检验结果未发现股权制衡度对审计寻租有显著影响,也未发现我国目前的董事会制度对审计寻租具有显著地抑制作用,故无法改变对独立董事作为公司治理“装饰品”的质疑。审计寻租供给动因的实证研究是从事务所规模和异常审计收费两方面进行的,结果表明,作为供给因素的事务所规模和审计收费对审计寻租有显著影响,事务所规模越大审计寻租的供给动机便越低,说明事务所规模对审计寻租起到了显著的抑制作用,异常审计收费的减少能对审计寻租起到了显著性抑制作用。
基于上述研究,本文认为,对我国资本市场的审计寻租行为应加强控制,控制原则是加大审计寻租成本、降低审计寻租的需求和供给。此外,本文提出了完善法律法规、民事赔偿机制、降低监管成本等以加大审计寻租成本,完善资本市场管制制度以降低审计寻租需求,形成合理的审计市场结构以减少审计寻租的供给等政策性建议,作为适度控制审计寻租的具体措施。
The disadvantageous economical consequence which The finance frauds and auditing failures caused becomes central issues that Politicians and scholars pay close attention to. The premise which t he finance frauds and auditing failures Causes is the auditing rent-seeking of the listed companies and the auditors as the market main body. The system environment and the system arrangement which China’s capital market depends have caused the rent existence. The listed companies and the auditors, as the main body of the capital market, their rent-seeking activities not only affected the resources disposition of the capital market efficiency, but also caused the entire social welfare loss and the financial information distortion and the audit failure. From the reality of the capital market point of view, how to effectively audit and contain auditing rent-seeking behavior at home and abroad has become the focus of attention and the practical problems for major efforts to solve, so this study is of great practical significance. Basing on the research foundation, the use of property rights theory and game theory, this dissertation analyses the supply and demand mechanism of auditing rent-seeking behaviors of the auditors and listed companies, and Put forward policy recommendations for the effective control of the auditing rent-seeking.
First of all, this dissertation applies rent-seeking theory, property rights theory and game theory to the research of special property rights background and the non-cooperative game of the auditing rent-seeking in China’s capital market. This dissertation studies the evolution of the meaning of rent, rent-seeking and the meaning of the main point of view of rent-seeking theory. Combined with the modern property rights theory, on the perspective the protection of property rights, this dissertation dialectically analyses the public domain, which is formed by the disclosure of accounting information, definition of property rights and fuzzy property rights, and the need which auditors define the property rights of accounting information. From the system transition of property rights and listed companies arrangements for the system of property rights point of view, the special property right background, which listed companies have a fuzzy definition of property rights and non-tradable state-owned shares is too high proportion, is in-depth analysis of the system. In addition, based on game theory, the dynamic model of auditing rent-seeking game among the auditors, listed companies and regulators is established, thus not only overcoming the shortcoming of existing researches due to their single- perspective of the theoretical study, but also providing a theoretical basis for a more comprehensive understanding for the auditing rent-seeking.
Second, this dissertation studies the basic issues of auditing rent-seeking of China's capital market Rent-seeking. On basis of the rent-seeking theory this dissertation clearly defines auditing rent-seeking, the bodies of auditing rent-seeking, and the main object of rent-seeking, and auditing rent-seeking costs. According to the government-led character of China's securities market, government regulation, audit commission by the appointment of Mechanisms and accounting system features such as dual-track system, this dissertation analyses the external conditions of auditing rent-seeking, and the serious social consequences which auditing rent-seeking caused in the audit cost-benefit analysis on the basis of cost-benefit analysis for auditing rent-seeking.
Third, the practical problems of auditing rent-seeking of China's capital market are studied in this dissertation. The paper makes it clear that regulation for accounting information in China's capital market is revealed through the control of the main accounting and auditing standard-setting control and control for accounting information disclosure to achieve. The mechanism which regulation rent is produced is revealed in this dissertation. This paper discusses rent-seeking mechanism of supply and demand; on the one hand, the demand mechanism is generated by the composition of the institution rent-seeking, the special arrangements for the property rights system and transition characteristics of auditing standards, on the other hand, the fierce competition in the audit market, the legal system deficiencies and lack of professional ethics of audit constitute the supply mechanism of auditing rent-seeking.
Finally, the influence factors of auditing rent-seeking in China's capital markets are tested from the demand and supply. An empirical study of demand for auditing rent-seeking is practiced from the market regulation, ownership structure and characteristics of the Board of Directors. It is found from the test that there is a significant relationship between auditing rent-seeking and the listed company’s accounting regulation. Listed companies, as the body of auditing rent-seeking, have a strong rent-seeking sense of to avoid loss, issue additional shares and maintain listed qualification. There is a significant relationship between auditing rent-seeking and ownership Structure. Concentration of ownership, ownership arrangement and auditing rent-seeking has a significant relationship. The higher the first shareholder hold, the smaller the Motivation of auditing rent-seeking is. Because the degree of supervision for state-controlled listed companies than the non-state-controlled listed companies from SEC and the public is stronger, the motivation of auditing rent-seeking of ultimate state-controlled listed companies is weaker than non-state-controlled listed companies. However, the test results don’t found the significant influence of interest balance on the auditing rent-seeking. The test results don’t found the significant influence of our current board of directors system on the auditing rent-seeking, so the question which independent director of corporate is just corporate governance "decorations" cannot be changed.
An empirical study of demand for auditing rent-seeking is practiced from the size of the accounting firm and unusual auditing fee. The results show that the supply factors as the size of the firm's and auditing fees has a significant impact on auditing rent-seeking. The larger the size of accounting firms is, the lower the supply motivation of auditing rent-seeking is. It implies that the firm size plays a significant inhibition on the auditing rent-seeking. The test results indicate that the negative abnormal auditing fee plays a significant inhibition on the auditing rent-seeking.
Based on above research, this dissertation believes that auditing rent-seeking in China's capital market should be appropriately controlled, through increasing auditing rent-seeking costs, reducing the demand and supply of auditing rent-seeking. This dissertation proposes policy recommendations to moderate control auditing rent-seeking. On the one hand, the auditing rent-seeking costs should be increased to improve laws and regulations and civil compensation mechanism and reduce the cost of supervision; on the other hand, the demands for auditing rent-seeking should be decrease to lower the demand for auditing rent-seeking, finally, the supplies for auditing rent-seeking should be decrease through forming a rational auditing structure.
引文
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