超越相对主义科学观的探索和趋势
摘要
论文遵循唯物辩证法的基本原则,在深入研究和梳理西方科学哲学中相对主义科学观的基础上,试图实现对相对主义科学观的超越。
作为相对主义科学观,涉及到真理与实在,观察与理论等科学哲学的核心话题,论文探研了相对主义科学观的理论根源、论证依据以及实质,更为重要的是解析了来自逻辑层面的,以及科学哲学家超越相对主义科学观的多种路径,以此为根据,试图形成对相对主义科学观的有效批判。从发展的趋势看,科学哲学与人文主义日渐交融,在这样的情境下,论文有效的发挥了科学哲学的规范性作用,重新确立了对科学理论的真理性和客观性的说明。
Relativism is a very important view of philosophy, which created from duality mode of thinking in tradition philosophy. Relativism acts special role in history of philosophy since complicated mentality and society culture, especially in modern and post-modern philosophy during the 20 centuries. The core problem of this thesis discussed is the representation of relativism in philosophy of science. In the process of development of philosophy of science in recent years, relativism builds on the varietal history of science, the theory of incommensurability, and observing laden theory, which arousing controversial argument.
At first, the thesis analyses the theoretical source of relativism in philosophy of science. This Part deals with difficult position of logical empiricism. Logical empiricism rejects tradition metaphysics, explores the knowledge basis from logic and empiricism. What their suggests that demonstrates principle, significance theory are existing very serious problems, so logical empiricist have to reduce standard again and again, significance standard announces give up ultimately. Criticize rationalism criticizes to knowledge determinacy, Popper expounds that the common sense is uncertainty, and deny the realism and correspondence theory of tradition philosophy. Pragmatism also contributes to relativism view of science. The principle of efficacy of pragmatism offers up development of relativism. Postmodernism pursues the development of uncertainty, with a multicultural perspective in universal; taking pleasure in admitting the limitations of person, recognizing the limitations of knowledge. Post-modern philosophy put the relative tendencies to the extreme position, so that truth and philosophy is set down as nothing with science, becoming varies self-understanding from every person. Under these circumstances, post-modern philosophy has a certain practical significance because of exposing and criticizing modernism. It put forward to people understand the comprehensive the process of modernization, and to reflect the modern way of life with thorough understanding
However, as metaphysics, post-modern philosophy is established on exaggerated relativism is not good at building, and result in ambiguity future of philosophy. Post-modern philosophy adapts to the social negative reality, and gives up the philosophical mission of beyond the reality. Post-modern philosophy makes a focus on the novel form, and lack of content to build on the innovative. Post-modern philosophy opens up a multi-symbiotic road of thinking, diversity, pluralism, separation, broken, and these have been suppressed over the last shrinking, which in the post-modern philosophy has been placed in prominent the position free expression.
Secondly, relativism in philosophy of science set up because of the difficulties of logic empiricism has a profound theoretical basis and historical basis. Different from the pursuit of logical empiricism, historism notes that the rich and colorful history of the development of science. The change between the old and the new theory in history of science is described as similar to the paradigm of social revolution, that means the different paradigms be incommensurable. From the source of the scientific theory , there is no neutral observation, which is the infiltration theory; even using the same words, different paradigm of understanding of the concept and usage is different, so the concept is also a problem on the other hand, there is no fixed corresponds relations between the allegations and objects.
Since the 20th century, the scientific achievements reveal the amazing side of nature. The original idea of mechanical determinism lost the market gradually, since the object of natural world become uncertainty from certainty. All this indicates that relativism of science is malicious joke for rebelling tradition, but the face of the complexity of the world lamented the helplessness.
Thirdly, although relativism in philosophy of science is supported by many ways, but it‘s obviously one-sidedness and extremism. The thesis focused on the substance of relativism in philosophy of science, describing that the schools of historism and sociology of scientific knowledge denying truth, exaggerating the relative nature of knowledge. Relativism in philosophy of science brings directly out the denial of the objectivity of truth.
Kuhn and others think that there is no truth , only the difference between problem-solving ability. A theory is acceptable as long as people believe it is good for his research. Feyerabend just completely objects to the scientific theory as truth, and advocates an epistemological anarchism. Relativism is an unorthodox metaphysics fundamentally, setting up at duality of subject and object. Relativism in philosophy of science has some reasonable factors from epistemology and methodology; however, they have exaggerated the relative nature of knowledge in the process of argumentation, so that it is inevitable to eventually move toward agnostic, nihilism and solipsism.
At the forth part we point because of the extreme of relativism, philosophy of science have to give up on normative research, finally into a dead end, so as to a great past subject. Because of criticism from the relativism in philosophy of science return no-way to the past objectivism, absolutism, presetism. So, what kind of methods used to make a normative view of science and full of new vitality? Scholars from different point of view relative to the criticism and put forward the scientific concept beyond the relativism through the ways and means.
Pointing clearly out by many philosophers, relativism is self refuting in fact, which makes relativism being notorious. Begin to have discovered this problem right away from Plato, who uses reduction to criticize relativism of Protagoras. But, many philosophers all finds that, the self refuting of relativism can’t take it completely bankruptcy. If confuting relativism because of the logic is effective, relativism have been disappeared already long long ago. The point is that looking fatal criticizes from logical analysis, but it is based on the complexity reality of the world. It seems that having analyzed the proposition in logic analysis no important as imagination. Therefore, if wanting to confute relativism, we must comply with history of science and scientific theory, looking for the basis of the facts from the practice.
Post-historist are consciously trying to beyond empiricism and historism, metaphysics and relativism though a new method to solve the problem from higher level, or to find a balanced middle path. Laudan put the nature of science as a problem-solving process. Overall, Laudan has always been from the tradition of pragmatism explore new road to resolve the issue of relativism, no matter what web-model or normal naturism, who is known as a moderate relativist.
Shapere uses "domain"、"background information" to replace the word "paradigm". Around the two concepts, Shapere analysis deeply the reasons of the emergence and evolution of the modern science, advancing that the development of science has a kind of inner mechanism and depend on reasons, putting forward a new concept of scientific reason. Putnam develops inner realism in order to beyond the dilemma of traditional philosophy from the subject-object duality. Putnam regards truth as“reasonable acceptability”and gives up too much high requirements of correspondence theory, instead taking closer to rationality. The efforts of these philosophers are active pursuit beyond relativism , whether or not right, shining the spirit of exploring for theoretical value.
So to that extent, the objectivity of scientific knowledge can only look for in the scientific enterprise. Therefore, to identify the basis of objectivity, we may be find it from dividing arrangement of knowledge of science.
In general, science tradition and humanistic tradition affect each other in the process trend of contemporary philosophy of science of changing. It is growing towards sociology, anthropology, cultural studies in the field. The truth of scientific theories can not be achieved, the so-called philosophical truth is also illusory, dynamic reality most of the research process are the basis of real objectivity. There is no transcendence of the absolute truth, but the endless pursuit of mankind.
作为相对主义科学观,涉及到真理与实在,观察与理论等科学哲学的核心话题,论文探研了相对主义科学观的理论根源、论证依据以及实质,更为重要的是解析了来自逻辑层面的,以及科学哲学家超越相对主义科学观的多种路径,以此为根据,试图形成对相对主义科学观的有效批判。从发展的趋势看,科学哲学与人文主义日渐交融,在这样的情境下,论文有效的发挥了科学哲学的规范性作用,重新确立了对科学理论的真理性和客观性的说明。
Relativism is a very important view of philosophy, which created from duality mode of thinking in tradition philosophy. Relativism acts special role in history of philosophy since complicated mentality and society culture, especially in modern and post-modern philosophy during the 20 centuries. The core problem of this thesis discussed is the representation of relativism in philosophy of science. In the process of development of philosophy of science in recent years, relativism builds on the varietal history of science, the theory of incommensurability, and observing laden theory, which arousing controversial argument.
At first, the thesis analyses the theoretical source of relativism in philosophy of science. This Part deals with difficult position of logical empiricism. Logical empiricism rejects tradition metaphysics, explores the knowledge basis from logic and empiricism. What their suggests that demonstrates principle, significance theory are existing very serious problems, so logical empiricist have to reduce standard again and again, significance standard announces give up ultimately. Criticize rationalism criticizes to knowledge determinacy, Popper expounds that the common sense is uncertainty, and deny the realism and correspondence theory of tradition philosophy. Pragmatism also contributes to relativism view of science. The principle of efficacy of pragmatism offers up development of relativism. Postmodernism pursues the development of uncertainty, with a multicultural perspective in universal; taking pleasure in admitting the limitations of person, recognizing the limitations of knowledge. Post-modern philosophy put the relative tendencies to the extreme position, so that truth and philosophy is set down as nothing with science, becoming varies self-understanding from every person. Under these circumstances, post-modern philosophy has a certain practical significance because of exposing and criticizing modernism. It put forward to people understand the comprehensive the process of modernization, and to reflect the modern way of life with thorough understanding
However, as metaphysics, post-modern philosophy is established on exaggerated relativism is not good at building, and result in ambiguity future of philosophy. Post-modern philosophy adapts to the social negative reality, and gives up the philosophical mission of beyond the reality. Post-modern philosophy makes a focus on the novel form, and lack of content to build on the innovative. Post-modern philosophy opens up a multi-symbiotic road of thinking, diversity, pluralism, separation, broken, and these have been suppressed over the last shrinking, which in the post-modern philosophy has been placed in prominent the position free expression.
Secondly, relativism in philosophy of science set up because of the difficulties of logic empiricism has a profound theoretical basis and historical basis. Different from the pursuit of logical empiricism, historism notes that the rich and colorful history of the development of science. The change between the old and the new theory in history of science is described as similar to the paradigm of social revolution, that means the different paradigms be incommensurable. From the source of the scientific theory , there is no neutral observation, which is the infiltration theory; even using the same words, different paradigm of understanding of the concept and usage is different, so the concept is also a problem on the other hand, there is no fixed corresponds relations between the allegations and objects.
Since the 20th century, the scientific achievements reveal the amazing side of nature. The original idea of mechanical determinism lost the market gradually, since the object of natural world become uncertainty from certainty. All this indicates that relativism of science is malicious joke for rebelling tradition, but the face of the complexity of the world lamented the helplessness.
Thirdly, although relativism in philosophy of science is supported by many ways, but it‘s obviously one-sidedness and extremism. The thesis focused on the substance of relativism in philosophy of science, describing that the schools of historism and sociology of scientific knowledge denying truth, exaggerating the relative nature of knowledge. Relativism in philosophy of science brings directly out the denial of the objectivity of truth.
Kuhn and others think that there is no truth , only the difference between problem-solving ability. A theory is acceptable as long as people believe it is good for his research. Feyerabend just completely objects to the scientific theory as truth, and advocates an epistemological anarchism. Relativism is an unorthodox metaphysics fundamentally, setting up at duality of subject and object. Relativism in philosophy of science has some reasonable factors from epistemology and methodology; however, they have exaggerated the relative nature of knowledge in the process of argumentation, so that it is inevitable to eventually move toward agnostic, nihilism and solipsism.
At the forth part we point because of the extreme of relativism, philosophy of science have to give up on normative research, finally into a dead end, so as to a great past subject. Because of criticism from the relativism in philosophy of science return no-way to the past objectivism, absolutism, presetism. So, what kind of methods used to make a normative view of science and full of new vitality? Scholars from different point of view relative to the criticism and put forward the scientific concept beyond the relativism through the ways and means.
Pointing clearly out by many philosophers, relativism is self refuting in fact, which makes relativism being notorious. Begin to have discovered this problem right away from Plato, who uses reduction to criticize relativism of Protagoras. But, many philosophers all finds that, the self refuting of relativism can’t take it completely bankruptcy. If confuting relativism because of the logic is effective, relativism have been disappeared already long long ago. The point is that looking fatal criticizes from logical analysis, but it is based on the complexity reality of the world. It seems that having analyzed the proposition in logic analysis no important as imagination. Therefore, if wanting to confute relativism, we must comply with history of science and scientific theory, looking for the basis of the facts from the practice.
Post-historist are consciously trying to beyond empiricism and historism, metaphysics and relativism though a new method to solve the problem from higher level, or to find a balanced middle path. Laudan put the nature of science as a problem-solving process. Overall, Laudan has always been from the tradition of pragmatism explore new road to resolve the issue of relativism, no matter what web-model or normal naturism, who is known as a moderate relativist.
Shapere uses "domain"、"background information" to replace the word "paradigm". Around the two concepts, Shapere analysis deeply the reasons of the emergence and evolution of the modern science, advancing that the development of science has a kind of inner mechanism and depend on reasons, putting forward a new concept of scientific reason. Putnam develops inner realism in order to beyond the dilemma of traditional philosophy from the subject-object duality. Putnam regards truth as“reasonable acceptability”and gives up too much high requirements of correspondence theory, instead taking closer to rationality. The efforts of these philosophers are active pursuit beyond relativism , whether or not right, shining the spirit of exploring for theoretical value.
So to that extent, the objectivity of scientific knowledge can only look for in the scientific enterprise. Therefore, to identify the basis of objectivity, we may be find it from dividing arrangement of knowledge of science.
In general, science tradition and humanistic tradition affect each other in the process trend of contemporary philosophy of science of changing. It is growing towards sociology, anthropology, cultural studies in the field. The truth of scientific theories can not be achieved, the so-called philosophical truth is also illusory, dynamic reality most of the research process are the basis of real objectivity. There is no transcendence of the absolute truth, but the endless pursuit of mankind.
引文
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[1]普特南对此有进一步论证,参见:普特南.理性、真理与历史[M].童世骏,李光程,译.上海:上海译文出版社,1997:137.
[2] Harvey Siegel. Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Epistemological Relativism[M], Dordrecht: Reidel,1987:4.
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[4]参见: Christian Apologetics &Research Ministry. Refuting relativism[EB], http://www.carm.org/secular-movements/relativism/refuting-relativism.
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