上市公司资产剥离行为与绩效研究
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摘要
梳理有关资产剥离的中外文献发现,中国上市公司资产剥离行为与西方国家主要基于效率动机的资产剥离存在很大差异,因此,西方的资产剥离理论假说可能并不完全适合解释中国上市公司资产剥离的行为与绩效后果。20世纪末至21世纪初发生在中国证券市场上市公司的资产剥离事件出现了一些奇特的现象,如“关联交易”、“年末效应”、“同属管辖交易”等。然而,由于前期研究的主要关注点是证券市场监管政策以及公司自身因素对上市公司资产剥离行为与后果的影响,因而使得资产剥离的“关联交易”、“年末效应”等特征得到高度关注,相比之下,资产剥离的同属管辖交易特征并没有引起重视。我们感兴趣的是,对于正处在经济转轨进程的中国而言,上市公司的资产剥离行为是如何受到政治集权下的财政分权改革影响的?政府干预辖区内上市公司资产剥离活动的行为动机究竟是什么?又该如何评判转轨经济背景下我国上市公司资产剥离的同属管辖交易行为与绩效后果?目前,这些问题很少得到关注,更没有深入系统的分析与研究。本文认为,上市公司大量资产剥离的同属管辖交易行为,可能是目前具有研究价值、也更能体现中国分权改革制度背景的“资产剥离异象”。而对于这种资产剥离行为异象的分析与解释,必须从我国政治集权背景下财政分权改革所导致的地方政府对经济的干预行为入手。
本文立足于我国转轨经济制度背景,从政府干预的政治经济学角度入手,以我国财政分权改革带来的地方政府间竞争和政治晋升激励作为理论分析的逻辑起点和理论基石,综合研究了我国转轨制度背景下政府分权化改革(经济分权、政治集权)所导致的地方政府干预动机对上市公司资产剥离交易行为的影响及经济后果。通过这些初步的探索,试图为中国上市公司资产剥离同属管辖交易行为提供一种可能的解释,为上市公司的资产剥离活动提供有益的借鉴,也为理解转轨经济下中国地方政府干预动机、途径及后果提供经验证据,进而为地方政府进一步转变职能提供思考。
本文以2004年-2005年在上海和深圳两个证券交易所挂牌进行资产剥离交易的沪、深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了在地方政府干预背景下,不同的产权(产权性质与产权层级)是否会对上市公司资产剥离交易对象选择产生影响,市场是如何评价这种资产剥离同属管辖交易的,市场化进程的差异(换言之表现为政府干预的差异)是否会影响上市公司资产剥离的业绩改进,更进一步的,市场化进程与资产剥离的同属管辖交易以及上市公司产权的交互作用又会对资产剥离业绩产生怎样的影响。
本文的研究表明：首先,财政分权导致的政府干预是造成上市公司资产剥离同属管辖交易行为的一个主要因素,不同产权下公司资产剥离的同属管辖交易行为呈现显著差异,相对于中央政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司而言,地方政府控制的上市公司更倾向于进行资产剥离同属管辖交易；其次,就整体而言,市场给予上市公司资产剥离的反应是负面的,但是,对于上市公司资产剥离的同属管辖交易和非同属管辖交易,市场并没有做出有效区分。在资产剥离交易宣告期间,同属交易公司与非同属交易公司的累计超额收益不存在显著差异。在控制了相关影响因素后,仍然发现,针对同属管辖交易与非同属管辖交易两种不同的交易行为,市场未给予不同的评价。说明我国上市公司资产剥离活动所带来的财富再分配效应远远大于其资源配置效应,而且我国股票市场的投资者(包括基金在内的机构投资者)都热衷于借重组等题材炒作股票,赚取股票差价,获取短期收益；再次,总体而言,地方政府干预越少、市场化程度越高,越有利于企业自主经营,上市公司资产剥离后的业绩也越好；无论对于哪一类产权属性的上市公司,即使在市场化程度高、政府干预较少的地区,如果上市公司前期的资产剥离是同属管辖交易,这种非市场化配置资源的方式会对上市公司剥离后的业绩改进造成显著负面影响,即如果资产剥离交易不是基于资源优化配置的目标,而是掺杂了政府的意志与动机,即使具备良好的外部环境,也同样会对企业后续经营业绩改善造成负面影响；最后,相对于其他公司而言,由于直接的产权纽带关系,地方政府控制的上市公司在经营过程中更容易受到地方政府的行政干预,因此即使在政府干预少、市场化程度高的地区,上市公司地方政府控制的产权属性对市场化程度提高带来的上市公司资产剥离后绩效改进产生负面影响；相对于政府控制公司而言,非政府控制公司因为没有产权纽带关系,加之政府放松管制、减少干预以及市场化经营带来的众多好处,非政府控制企业不仅能够更多地通过市场途径获得资源,而且大大减少了与政府部门打交道所花费的时间、人力与财力,更多地将精力与资源投放到企业经营中,因此在市场化程度高、政府干预少的地区,非政府控制的产权性质对上市公司资产剥离业绩改进有显著的正面促进作用。
Through searching related literature of divestiture, we found that there is a big difference in divestiture motivation of listed companies in China and the Western countries which is mainly based on efficiency of divestiture. Therefore, the theory of divestiture in the West may not be entirely suited to explain China's divestiture behavior and performance consequences of listed companies. From the end of the20th century to early21st century, there have been some strange phenomena of the listed company divestiture events in China's stock market, such as "related transactions""the end of year effects" and "the same jurisdiction of trade", and so on. However, due to the main concern of early research was the securities market regulatory policy divestiture of listed companies and the company's own factors, making the divestiture feature of "connected transactions" and "late effects" are highly concerned about, by contrast,"belong to the jurisdiction of the divestiture transaction" did not pay attention to. We are interested in that and in the process of economic transition in China, what influence about the divestiture behavior of a listed company under the political centralization of fiscal decentralization reform? What motives of local government intervene in divestiture activities of listed companies? And how to evaluate the listed companies divestiture transaction behavior and performance consequences in the context of transition economies in China? Currently, these problems are seldom paid attention to and much less in-depth system analyzed and researched. This article considers that listed companies belong to the jurisdiction of divestiture transactions, is by far the more valuable research and also more reflects China's decentralization reforms institutional background "divestiture visions". In order to analyze and interpret the vision of divestiture, we must be analyzed local government intervention in the context of the reform of China's political centralization of fiscal decentralization in the economy.
Basing on background transition economy system in China and the perspective of political economy of government intervention, starting from the fiscal decentralization reform brought about by competition between local governments and political incentives for promotion as a logical starting point and the theoretical foundation, this article studies comprehensively the effects of local government intervention on divestiture trading behavior and economic consequences of listed companies in the context of the transitional system decentralization reforms (economic decentralization and political centralization). Through these initial explorations, we attempt to provide a possible explanation for divestiture of Chinese listed companies belong to governed transactions, and a useful reference of divestiture activities of the listed companies, as well as empirical evidence with understanding the economic transition in China under the local government intervention in the motive, means and results, which in turn impelling local governments further change their functions to think deeply.
Using divestiture transactions for the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from2004to2005as our study sample, we empirical test in the context of local government interference, different property will have an impact on the selection of listed company divestiture transaction object type, how to evaluate such divestiture transactions of the same jurisdiction for security marketing, the difference of marketing process(in other words the performance difference of government intervention) will affect the improving performance of divestiture of listed companies. Even further, marketing process interacts with the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transactions and listed companies in property rights will have what effect on the divestiture of performance.
There are some findings in this study. First of all, a major factor of the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transactions of listed companies is government interference root in the fiscal decentralization.There are significant differences in divestiture transactions Act between different ownership corporate. Compare with the companies controlled by Central Government and non-Government, the divestiture of listed companies controlled by local government is more likely to the same jurisdiction. As a whole, the reaction from the security marketing to divestiture of listed companies was negative. However, there isn't a different assessment of the security marketing between the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transaction and the non-jurisdictional transactions. During the announcement period of divestiture transactions, there isn't significant difference of the cumulative abnormal return of the divestiture transactions between the same jurisdiction and the non-jurisdictional transactions. After the control of the relevant factors, this phenomenon still persists. Compared to non-jurisdictional transactions, market doesn't give different evaluation to the same jurisdictional transactions. Secondly, in general, less local government intervention and higher marketing process are more conducive to enterprise independent operating, so the performance of divestiture of listed companies is better. Thirdly, regardless of which kind of property of listed company, even in the area of high marketing process and less government intervention, if early asset split of listed company is same jurisdictional transactions, this non-marketing allocation of resources will bring about significantly negative effect on performance improved, that is if asset split transactions is not based on resources optimal allocation, but mixed into Government's will and motivation, there will be negative effect on the performance of divestiture of listed companies even if good external environment. At last, due to directly of property ties relationship, listed company controlled by local government was more easy intervened by the local Government of administrative in operating process compared with other company. So there is a negative effect on performance improving for the listed company which was controlled by local government even in the area of less government intervention and high marketing process. Compared with government control company, because of no property ties, coupled with government relax control, reduced intervention and many benefits produced by marketing operating, non-government control company make contact with government with less time, human resource and finance costs, get resources more through market way, and put more energy and resources into enterprise operation. So there will be significantly positive promotion in performance of non-government Control Company in the area of high marketing process and less government intervention.
本文立足于我国转轨经济制度背景,从政府干预的政治经济学角度入手,以我国财政分权改革带来的地方政府间竞争和政治晋升激励作为理论分析的逻辑起点和理论基石,综合研究了我国转轨制度背景下政府分权化改革(经济分权、政治集权)所导致的地方政府干预动机对上市公司资产剥离交易行为的影响及经济后果。通过这些初步的探索,试图为中国上市公司资产剥离同属管辖交易行为提供一种可能的解释,为上市公司的资产剥离活动提供有益的借鉴,也为理解转轨经济下中国地方政府干预动机、途径及后果提供经验证据,进而为地方政府进一步转变职能提供思考。
本文以2004年-2005年在上海和深圳两个证券交易所挂牌进行资产剥离交易的沪、深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了在地方政府干预背景下,不同的产权(产权性质与产权层级)是否会对上市公司资产剥离交易对象选择产生影响,市场是如何评价这种资产剥离同属管辖交易的,市场化进程的差异(换言之表现为政府干预的差异)是否会影响上市公司资产剥离的业绩改进,更进一步的,市场化进程与资产剥离的同属管辖交易以及上市公司产权的交互作用又会对资产剥离业绩产生怎样的影响。
本文的研究表明：首先,财政分权导致的政府干预是造成上市公司资产剥离同属管辖交易行为的一个主要因素,不同产权下公司资产剥离的同属管辖交易行为呈现显著差异,相对于中央政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司而言,地方政府控制的上市公司更倾向于进行资产剥离同属管辖交易；其次,就整体而言,市场给予上市公司资产剥离的反应是负面的,但是,对于上市公司资产剥离的同属管辖交易和非同属管辖交易,市场并没有做出有效区分。在资产剥离交易宣告期间,同属交易公司与非同属交易公司的累计超额收益不存在显著差异。在控制了相关影响因素后,仍然发现,针对同属管辖交易与非同属管辖交易两种不同的交易行为,市场未给予不同的评价。说明我国上市公司资产剥离活动所带来的财富再分配效应远远大于其资源配置效应,而且我国股票市场的投资者(包括基金在内的机构投资者)都热衷于借重组等题材炒作股票,赚取股票差价,获取短期收益；再次,总体而言,地方政府干预越少、市场化程度越高,越有利于企业自主经营,上市公司资产剥离后的业绩也越好；无论对于哪一类产权属性的上市公司,即使在市场化程度高、政府干预较少的地区,如果上市公司前期的资产剥离是同属管辖交易,这种非市场化配置资源的方式会对上市公司剥离后的业绩改进造成显著负面影响,即如果资产剥离交易不是基于资源优化配置的目标,而是掺杂了政府的意志与动机,即使具备良好的外部环境,也同样会对企业后续经营业绩改善造成负面影响；最后,相对于其他公司而言,由于直接的产权纽带关系,地方政府控制的上市公司在经营过程中更容易受到地方政府的行政干预,因此即使在政府干预少、市场化程度高的地区,上市公司地方政府控制的产权属性对市场化程度提高带来的上市公司资产剥离后绩效改进产生负面影响；相对于政府控制公司而言,非政府控制公司因为没有产权纽带关系,加之政府放松管制、减少干预以及市场化经营带来的众多好处,非政府控制企业不仅能够更多地通过市场途径获得资源,而且大大减少了与政府部门打交道所花费的时间、人力与财力,更多地将精力与资源投放到企业经营中,因此在市场化程度高、政府干预少的地区,非政府控制的产权性质对上市公司资产剥离业绩改进有显著的正面促进作用。
Through searching related literature of divestiture, we found that there is a big difference in divestiture motivation of listed companies in China and the Western countries which is mainly based on efficiency of divestiture. Therefore, the theory of divestiture in the West may not be entirely suited to explain China's divestiture behavior and performance consequences of listed companies. From the end of the20th century to early21st century, there have been some strange phenomena of the listed company divestiture events in China's stock market, such as "related transactions""the end of year effects" and "the same jurisdiction of trade", and so on. However, due to the main concern of early research was the securities market regulatory policy divestiture of listed companies and the company's own factors, making the divestiture feature of "connected transactions" and "late effects" are highly concerned about, by contrast,"belong to the jurisdiction of the divestiture transaction" did not pay attention to. We are interested in that and in the process of economic transition in China, what influence about the divestiture behavior of a listed company under the political centralization of fiscal decentralization reform? What motives of local government intervene in divestiture activities of listed companies? And how to evaluate the listed companies divestiture transaction behavior and performance consequences in the context of transition economies in China? Currently, these problems are seldom paid attention to and much less in-depth system analyzed and researched. This article considers that listed companies belong to the jurisdiction of divestiture transactions, is by far the more valuable research and also more reflects China's decentralization reforms institutional background "divestiture visions". In order to analyze and interpret the vision of divestiture, we must be analyzed local government intervention in the context of the reform of China's political centralization of fiscal decentralization in the economy.
Basing on background transition economy system in China and the perspective of political economy of government intervention, starting from the fiscal decentralization reform brought about by competition between local governments and political incentives for promotion as a logical starting point and the theoretical foundation, this article studies comprehensively the effects of local government intervention on divestiture trading behavior and economic consequences of listed companies in the context of the transitional system decentralization reforms (economic decentralization and political centralization). Through these initial explorations, we attempt to provide a possible explanation for divestiture of Chinese listed companies belong to governed transactions, and a useful reference of divestiture activities of the listed companies, as well as empirical evidence with understanding the economic transition in China under the local government intervention in the motive, means and results, which in turn impelling local governments further change their functions to think deeply.
Using divestiture transactions for the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from2004to2005as our study sample, we empirical test in the context of local government interference, different property will have an impact on the selection of listed company divestiture transaction object type, how to evaluate such divestiture transactions of the same jurisdiction for security marketing, the difference of marketing process(in other words the performance difference of government intervention) will affect the improving performance of divestiture of listed companies. Even further, marketing process interacts with the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transactions and listed companies in property rights will have what effect on the divestiture of performance.
There are some findings in this study. First of all, a major factor of the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transactions of listed companies is government interference root in the fiscal decentralization.There are significant differences in divestiture transactions Act between different ownership corporate. Compare with the companies controlled by Central Government and non-Government, the divestiture of listed companies controlled by local government is more likely to the same jurisdiction. As a whole, the reaction from the security marketing to divestiture of listed companies was negative. However, there isn't a different assessment of the security marketing between the same jurisdiction of the divestiture transaction and the non-jurisdictional transactions. During the announcement period of divestiture transactions, there isn't significant difference of the cumulative abnormal return of the divestiture transactions between the same jurisdiction and the non-jurisdictional transactions. After the control of the relevant factors, this phenomenon still persists. Compared to non-jurisdictional transactions, market doesn't give different evaluation to the same jurisdictional transactions. Secondly, in general, less local government intervention and higher marketing process are more conducive to enterprise independent operating, so the performance of divestiture of listed companies is better. Thirdly, regardless of which kind of property of listed company, even in the area of high marketing process and less government intervention, if early asset split of listed company is same jurisdictional transactions, this non-marketing allocation of resources will bring about significantly negative effect on performance improved, that is if asset split transactions is not based on resources optimal allocation, but mixed into Government's will and motivation, there will be negative effect on the performance of divestiture of listed companies even if good external environment. At last, due to directly of property ties relationship, listed company controlled by local government was more easy intervened by the local Government of administrative in operating process compared with other company. So there is a negative effect on performance improving for the listed company which was controlled by local government even in the area of less government intervention and high marketing process. Compared with government control company, because of no property ties, coupled with government relax control, reduced intervention and many benefits produced by marketing operating, non-government control company make contact with government with less time, human resource and finance costs, get resources more through market way, and put more energy and resources into enterprise operation. So there will be significantly positive promotion in performance of non-government Control Company in the area of high marketing process and less government intervention.
引文
12 剩余控制权指的是在契约中没有特别规定的活动的决策权。由于进入企业的契约不完备性和未来世界的不确定性,必须有人决定如何解决契约中的漏洞或解散契约,由此产生了企业剩余控制权问题。企业剩余索取权指的是企业收入在扣除所有固定的合同支付(如原材料成本、固定工资、利息等)之后的余额(利润)的要求权,由于余额的风险性,剩余所有权的享有者也即企业的风险承担者。在治理结构层次上,控制权主要表现为“投票权”,剩余索取权主要表现为在收益分配优先顺序列上“最后的索取者”(张维迎：《所有制、治理结构与委托一代理关系》,载于梁能主编：《公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验》,第17-19页)。
13 Henry Hansmann,The Ownership of Enterprise,2001,中文版,中国政法大学出版社.
43 苏长和,跨国关系与国内政治——比较政治与国际政治经济学视野下的国际关系研究,美国研究,2003年第4期。
48 此图转引自刘金石,《中国转型期地方政府双重行为的经济学分析》[D],2007,P87。
49 Young的文章将中国的地方保护归因于渐进式改革和中央向地方政府的放权,但是并没有详尽地阐明并实证考察驱动地方保护的因素。越来越多的文献开始将焦点转移到探究驱动地方政府实施保护行为的因素上。既有的文献在研究地方保护的动机时,主要有政治晋升驱动(周黎安,2004；徐现祥,2007；皮建才,2008)、分工策略驱动(陆铭等,2004)、利益集团驱动(Poncet,2005)和财政驱动(Bai et al.,2004;胡向婷和张璐,2005)等不同的视角,当然不同的视角间存在着一定程度的交叉。
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