转型期中国政治过程中的利益集团问题研究
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摘要
自20世纪70年代末以来,中国社会进入转型时期。随着改革开放的深入持续发展,中国社会在经济、政治、文化方面发生巨变。经济生活的市场化选择,一方面使中国的综合国力快速增长,另一方面又使社会利益结构发生解析与重构,中国的利益集团从隐性转变为显性,从“自在”形态向“自为”形态转变,新的利益集团涌现出来。中国利益集团存在的合法性在哪里?它对中国社会的政治过程将发挥什么样的影响?执政党和政府将如何因应这一客观政治现象?如何引导和规制它?这些问题的解决,既是重大的理论问题,更是重大的现实问题。这些问题解决的好坏,事关中国特色社会主义事业的前途,事关整个民族社会福利的增减。政治学研究也应把利益集团的研究纳入自己的视域,提出科学的对策,使利益集团扬其利,避其害,促进社会经济、政治、文化的和谐发展。
本文以中国社会转型期为研究时间段,以中国的政治过程为研究背景,以利益集团的利弊为研究依据,以发展社会主义政治民主、增进全民福利为目标,以利益集团理论为研究基础,重点探讨转型期党和政府应对政治过程中利益集团的思路和策略。主要内容分为以下五章：
第一章：引言。主要阐述本文的研究目的和本选题的研究意义,简要梳理和评述中西学者的研究成果,交代本文研究所使用的主要方法和写作进路。
第二章：利益集团理论的阐释。对本文涉及的主要概念进行界定,演绎利益集团的演化变迁,探讨利益集团的划分标度及其类型,叙述利益集团影响政治过程的途径、方式与策略,揭示利益集团的功能和作用。
第三章：转型期中国利益集团的现状分析。主要阐述转型期中国利益集团的演化变迁及其机理,划分其类型,揭示其既有的格局与特点,论述其合法性问题,预测其发展趋势。
第四章：转型期中国利益集团的功能与作用。主要是阐释中国利益集团的功能,影响政治过程的途径、方法及其制约其功能与作用的因素,揭示其对中国政治过程的作用。
第五章：党和政府应对中国利益集团的思路和策略。
最后是本文的基本结论。
Since the seventies in 20th century, Chinese society enters into the transformation period. With the deep continuing development of the reform, Chinese society has changed in economy, politics, and culture. The marking choice of the economic life makes the comprehensive power increasingly increase, and the social structure reconstruct. The profit group has changed from intrinsic into extrinsic, from the situation of self-existence into self-improvement. New profit groups emerge. What is the legal existence of Chinese profit group? What influence does it exert on the government deal with the objective political phenomenon? How to lead and regulate it.The solution to these problems is the important theoretical problem and realistic problem. Whether solve these problems or not is of vital importance to the future of the Chinese characteristic socialism, and the increasing and decreasing of the whole social benefits. The studies on the politics should put the research on the profit group into its field, and put forward the scientific solution, make its advantages improve and avoid the disadvantages, enchance the social economy, politics and culture develop harmoniously.
This paper is based on the advantages and disadvantages of the profit group during the transformation period in China, having Chinese political process as a background. Its purpose is to develop the socialism politics democracy, and enhance the people's benefits. Applying the theory of the profit group, it mainly discusses the thought and solution to the profit group during the transformation period. The content is as follows.
Chapter One:Introduction. It illustrates the purpose and the meaning of this research, simply analyses the research results of the researchers home and abroad, puts forward the main method and writing thought of the research.
Chapter Two:Explanation of the theory on the profit group. It defines the main concepts and the development of the profit group, discusses the level and type of the profit group, and the methods, strategies influenced by the profit group, It reveals the functions and usages of the profit group.
Chapter Three:Analysis of the present situation of the Chinese profit group during the transformation period. It mainly analyzes the development and function of the Chinese profit group and reveals the layout and character tic.It illustrates the legal problem and predicts the development tendency.
Chapter Four:The functions and usages of the profit group during the transformation period. It illustrates the function of Chinese profit group, the element of the functions and usage influenced on the political process.It reveal its influence on the political process.
Chapter Five:Suggestions on the policies of profit group.
本文以中国社会转型期为研究时间段,以中国的政治过程为研究背景,以利益集团的利弊为研究依据,以发展社会主义政治民主、增进全民福利为目标,以利益集团理论为研究基础,重点探讨转型期党和政府应对政治过程中利益集团的思路和策略。主要内容分为以下五章：
第一章：引言。主要阐述本文的研究目的和本选题的研究意义,简要梳理和评述中西学者的研究成果,交代本文研究所使用的主要方法和写作进路。
第二章：利益集团理论的阐释。对本文涉及的主要概念进行界定,演绎利益集团的演化变迁,探讨利益集团的划分标度及其类型,叙述利益集团影响政治过程的途径、方式与策略,揭示利益集团的功能和作用。
第三章：转型期中国利益集团的现状分析。主要阐述转型期中国利益集团的演化变迁及其机理,划分其类型,揭示其既有的格局与特点,论述其合法性问题,预测其发展趋势。
第四章：转型期中国利益集团的功能与作用。主要是阐释中国利益集团的功能,影响政治过程的途径、方法及其制约其功能与作用的因素,揭示其对中国政治过程的作用。
第五章：党和政府应对中国利益集团的思路和策略。
最后是本文的基本结论。
Since the seventies in 20th century, Chinese society enters into the transformation period. With the deep continuing development of the reform, Chinese society has changed in economy, politics, and culture. The marking choice of the economic life makes the comprehensive power increasingly increase, and the social structure reconstruct. The profit group has changed from intrinsic into extrinsic, from the situation of self-existence into self-improvement. New profit groups emerge. What is the legal existence of Chinese profit group? What influence does it exert on the government deal with the objective political phenomenon? How to lead and regulate it.The solution to these problems is the important theoretical problem and realistic problem. Whether solve these problems or not is of vital importance to the future of the Chinese characteristic socialism, and the increasing and decreasing of the whole social benefits. The studies on the politics should put the research on the profit group into its field, and put forward the scientific solution, make its advantages improve and avoid the disadvantages, enchance the social economy, politics and culture develop harmoniously.
This paper is based on the advantages and disadvantages of the profit group during the transformation period in China, having Chinese political process as a background. Its purpose is to develop the socialism politics democracy, and enhance the people's benefits. Applying the theory of the profit group, it mainly discusses the thought and solution to the profit group during the transformation period. The content is as follows.
Chapter One:Introduction. It illustrates the purpose and the meaning of this research, simply analyses the research results of the researchers home and abroad, puts forward the main method and writing thought of the research.
Chapter Two:Explanation of the theory on the profit group. It defines the main concepts and the development of the profit group, discusses the level and type of the profit group, and the methods, strategies influenced by the profit group, It reveals the functions and usages of the profit group.
Chapter Three:Analysis of the present situation of the Chinese profit group during the transformation period. It mainly analyzes the development and function of the Chinese profit group and reveals the layout and character tic.It illustrates the legal problem and predicts the development tendency.
Chapter Four:The functions and usages of the profit group during the transformation period. It illustrates the function of Chinese profit group, the element of the functions and usage influenced on the political process.It reveal its influence on the political process.
Chapter Five:Suggestions on the policies of profit group.
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