邮政普遍服务补偿机制研究
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摘要
邮政业是社会发展的基础性行业,具有比较典型的正外部性和自然垄断性,长期以来世界各国都将其作为公共服务行业由政府独家专营。自20世纪90年代以来,电信、电力等其他自然垄断产业的市场化改革取得了显著成效,各国政府也纷纷通过政企分开、放开专营和引入竞争等方式来促进本国邮政产业快速发展,掀起了邮政体制改革的浪潮。2006年11月29日,中国邮政集团公司注册成立,标志着我国政企分开、分业经营的邮政改革大幕正式拉开。
市场化改革和竞争的引入对邮政普遍服务这一课题提出了新的挑战。一方面,以公司效益最大化为导向的邮政企业不愿意承担普遍服务导致的亏损,同时“撇脂”行为的存在也使传统基于专营的内部交叉补贴方式不可持续；另一方面,邮政普遍服务作为保障人权、促进经济发展、增进社会福利的重要手段,政府有义务为全体公民提供邮政基础服务的普遍接入。鉴于此,在邮政改革的行业背景下,如何构建高效的普遍服务补偿机制,使承担普遍服务义务的邮政企业在参与竞争的同时,也能够得到必要的补偿以保持其企业活力和普遍服务的积极性,能够更有效率、更符合实际地为广大居民提供邮政服务,这对学术界、邮政规制机构和邮政企业都具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文在总结前人及其他行业普遍服务研究成果的基础上,围绕邮政普遍服务的三个核心问题展开研究,并由此形成本文的三大创新点：
一是“为什么”要提供邮政普遍服务。目前国内关于普遍服务的相关文献中绝大部分默认邮政普遍服务是必需的,以此为基础展开对普遍服务的分析和研究。国外有类学术观点认为普遍服务不能被看成生来就是合理的,对其可能会带来的效率损失不能视而不见。本文以中国1990-2009年近二十年的实际数据为基础,采用线性模型和双对数模型定量模拟了邮政普遍服务与经济增长之间的关系,再提取高成本地区数据印证了模型推导的结论,从邮政普遍服务与区域经济发展的紧密关系角度说明了高成本地区邮政普遍服务的必要性。
二是“怎么样”提供高成本地区的邮政普遍服务。高成本地区的普遍服务补偿问题是邮政行业规制的核心问题,美国经济学大师弗里德曼对自然垄断产业的规制有一个著名的论断：“不幸的是,根本没有什么好办法来解决自然垄断问题。只有三种不怎么样的办法：一是不受政府规制的私人垄断,二是受到规制的私人垄断,三是政府亲自运作；因而只能是三害相权取其轻”。因此,在阐述专营、政府补贴、普遍服务基金等几种补贴方式的基础上,本文并不试图比较各种方式的优劣,而是从补贴额度合理、竞争中立等角度深入研究了不同补贴方式对市场竞争主体的影响、补贴方式的适用范围。希望通过上述研究,能推动对邮政普遍服务补偿机制的深化和完善,并为市场化改革下的邮政规制机构达成普遍服务目标、合理选择补偿方式提供借鉴。
三是“怎么样”提供低收入群体的邮政普遍服务。首先,本文定性阐述了对低收入者进行普遍服务补贴的必要性。其次,定量分析了影响我国居民邮政消费的主要因素,从理论和实证两个角度得出人均个人可支配收入和邮政资费水平直接显著的影响着人均邮政消费量,并用高低收入地区的实际数据模拟测算了高低收入群体对于邮政的需求价格弹性系数。最后,本文通过统一定价和差别定价(即按消费者支付能力和意愿的不同确定不同的资费)对消费者福利和生产者剩余两方面的影响对比,说明了通过对低收入者制定低价政策是收入补偿较好的实现方式,也从另一个侧面验证了目前统一定价对价格进行扭曲的规制并不符合邮政市场经济的需求。
基于以上研究,本文得出的主要结论如下：
一是通过我国的实际数据,采用计量经济模型定量模拟了邮政发展与区域经济增长的相互关系,证明了邮政普遍服务与经济发展具有密不可分的紧密联系。尽管从企业内部效率来看,普遍服务造成了对自由市场经济的扭曲和效率的损失；而在经济社会发展的实践当中,但由于邮政行业典型的外部性特征,邮政普遍服务与区域经济增长互为促进,邮政普遍服务的存在具有一定的合理性和说服力。
二是对于竞争环境下通过普遍服务基金进行的外部成本补贴,不同的补贴额度、不同的资金筹措方式对市场竞争主体会造成不同的影响,这种影响主要由邮政市场的客观条件决定。在不同的补贴方式下,当普遍服务净成本大于不同的临界值时,邮政普遍服务补偿机制或者造成不公平竞争或者造成行业亏损而导致不可持续。因此,不同的补贴方式的适用范围也各不相同,对邮政普遍服务在何种情况下采取何种资金来源、补贴至何种水平需要以动态化的定量研究视野对具体情况具体分析。
三是对于低收入者的收入补偿机制,通过实证测算得出我国低收入者的需求价格弹性显著低于高收入者,得出结论：以差别定价的方式提供邮政服务,既有利于提升消费者福利,也有利于提高生产者剩余,收入补偿机制应该通过差别定价为主来实现。
Postal industry is the foundation of social development. With its typical positive externality and natural monopoly, for a long time, it is exclusive operated by the government as a public-service industry all over the world. Since the late 20th century, the marketization reform of other natural monopoly industries, such as Telecommunications, Electricity and so on, have achieved significant results. Many countries promote the rapid development of national postal industry through separating government functions from enterprise management and introducing competition mechanism, which set off a wave of postal reform.29th November,2006, China Post Group was established, which marked the beginning of postal reform through separating government functions from enterprise management and divided operation in China.
The reform of marketization and the introducing of competition present a new challenge for universal postal service. One hand, postal carries, which aim at maximizing the profits of the company, would unwilling to bear the loss due to universal service. Meantime, the "Skimming" behavior makes internal cross-subsidies that are based on the traditional monopoly operation unsustainable. On the other hand, since universal postal service is a significant method to protect human rights, promote economic development and improve social welfare, the government has an obligation ensure all citizens can access to basic postal services. In view of this, in the context of postal reform, how to build efficient universal service compensation mechanism, to make the universal service postal carries participate in the competition and gain necessary compensation to remain their vitality and zeal, and to provide postal service to our residents practically, has important theoretical and practical significance for academia, the postal regulatory agencies and the postal carries.
Based on the research of predecessors and the research on universal services in other industries, this paper focuses on the three core problems of universal postal service and proposes three main innovation points:
1. Why we should provide universal postal service.
At present, the literatures on universal service mostly admit that universal postal service is required, and then basing on this premise to do researches on universal service. Some academic points in foreign countries hold that universal service cannot be naturally reasonable, and the lost of efficiency cannot be oversaw. This paper bases on the real data of China in 1990-2010, and adopts linear model and double-log model to quantitatively simulate the relations of universal postal service and the development of economics. It also proves the conclusion derived by the model by using data in areas of high cost. From the angle of the close relation between universal postal service and regional economic development, it states the necessity to provide universal postal service in high cost region.
2. How to provide universal postal service at areas of high service costs.
The core problem of regulating universal service is the compensation of universal service in high cost regions. Friedman, the U.S. economics master, has a well-known thesis on the regulation of industry of natural monopoly:"Unfortunately, there is no good way to solve the natural monopoly problem, only three not very good ways:first, private monopolies that are not regulated by the government, and second, private monopolies that is regulated and the third the operation of the government in person, which can only be the minimum when three evils". Therefore, basing on explaining the exclusive sales, government subsidies, and fund subsidies of universal service, this paper does not try to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these ways but from a reasonable amount of subsidies, competition neutrality point of view, make an in-depth study on impacts on the market competitors due to different subsidies, the scope of subsidies.
3. How to provide universal postal service for low-income groups.
At first, this paper qualitatively explains on the need of universal service subsidies for low-income people. Second, quantitatively analyzes of the main factors that impact on the postal consumption of residents, and from the theoretical and empirical perspective, get the result that personal disposable income and the level of postal price significantly and directly affect the post consumption. And with the simulation using actual data of low-income areas, it calculates the price elasticity of the demand for postal service of high and low income groups. At last, comparing the impacts on customer welfare and producer surplus by uniform pricing and price discrimination, this paper illustrates that it is a better way to realize compensation policy by making low-price policy for low-income people, and verifies from another perspective that the current uniform pricing which distortions the price does not meet the needs of the postal market economy.
Based on the research above, this paper make the following conclusions:
First, through the actual data in China, it simulates the associated model between postal development and regional economic growth to prove the universal postal service and regional economic development are inseparable in close contact. From the internal efficiency perspective, regulating universal service leads to the free market economy distortions and efficiency losses. However, because of the typical external characteristics of postal sector, universal postal service mutually promotes the regional economic growth, thus the existence of universal postal service has its reasonability.
Second, in the competitive environment, for the external costs of subsidies supported by the universal service funds, different amounts of subsidies and different ways of financing will cause different effects on main body of market competition. This effect mainly according to the objective conditions of the postal market. In different ways of subsidies, when the net cost of universal service higher than different thresholds, the postal service compensation mechanism may cause unfair competition or industry losses that lead to unsustainable development. Therefore, different ways of subsidies apply to different scope. From a neutral competitive point of view, the mutual funding, which is mostly adopted by current theory and practice, has narrower application scope than the scope of government finances and services or payment methods.
Third, for the compensation mechanism for low-income people, since the price elasticity of demand for low-income people is significantly lower than for high-income earners in China, provide postal services by differential pricing not only enhance consumer welfare, but also help improve the producer surplus. Therefore, income compensation mechanism should be achieved mainly through differential pricing.
市场化改革和竞争的引入对邮政普遍服务这一课题提出了新的挑战。一方面,以公司效益最大化为导向的邮政企业不愿意承担普遍服务导致的亏损,同时“撇脂”行为的存在也使传统基于专营的内部交叉补贴方式不可持续；另一方面,邮政普遍服务作为保障人权、促进经济发展、增进社会福利的重要手段,政府有义务为全体公民提供邮政基础服务的普遍接入。鉴于此,在邮政改革的行业背景下,如何构建高效的普遍服务补偿机制,使承担普遍服务义务的邮政企业在参与竞争的同时,也能够得到必要的补偿以保持其企业活力和普遍服务的积极性,能够更有效率、更符合实际地为广大居民提供邮政服务,这对学术界、邮政规制机构和邮政企业都具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文在总结前人及其他行业普遍服务研究成果的基础上,围绕邮政普遍服务的三个核心问题展开研究,并由此形成本文的三大创新点：
一是“为什么”要提供邮政普遍服务。目前国内关于普遍服务的相关文献中绝大部分默认邮政普遍服务是必需的,以此为基础展开对普遍服务的分析和研究。国外有类学术观点认为普遍服务不能被看成生来就是合理的,对其可能会带来的效率损失不能视而不见。本文以中国1990-2009年近二十年的实际数据为基础,采用线性模型和双对数模型定量模拟了邮政普遍服务与经济增长之间的关系,再提取高成本地区数据印证了模型推导的结论,从邮政普遍服务与区域经济发展的紧密关系角度说明了高成本地区邮政普遍服务的必要性。
二是“怎么样”提供高成本地区的邮政普遍服务。高成本地区的普遍服务补偿问题是邮政行业规制的核心问题,美国经济学大师弗里德曼对自然垄断产业的规制有一个著名的论断：“不幸的是,根本没有什么好办法来解决自然垄断问题。只有三种不怎么样的办法：一是不受政府规制的私人垄断,二是受到规制的私人垄断,三是政府亲自运作；因而只能是三害相权取其轻”。因此,在阐述专营、政府补贴、普遍服务基金等几种补贴方式的基础上,本文并不试图比较各种方式的优劣,而是从补贴额度合理、竞争中立等角度深入研究了不同补贴方式对市场竞争主体的影响、补贴方式的适用范围。希望通过上述研究,能推动对邮政普遍服务补偿机制的深化和完善,并为市场化改革下的邮政规制机构达成普遍服务目标、合理选择补偿方式提供借鉴。
三是“怎么样”提供低收入群体的邮政普遍服务。首先,本文定性阐述了对低收入者进行普遍服务补贴的必要性。其次,定量分析了影响我国居民邮政消费的主要因素,从理论和实证两个角度得出人均个人可支配收入和邮政资费水平直接显著的影响着人均邮政消费量,并用高低收入地区的实际数据模拟测算了高低收入群体对于邮政的需求价格弹性系数。最后,本文通过统一定价和差别定价(即按消费者支付能力和意愿的不同确定不同的资费)对消费者福利和生产者剩余两方面的影响对比,说明了通过对低收入者制定低价政策是收入补偿较好的实现方式,也从另一个侧面验证了目前统一定价对价格进行扭曲的规制并不符合邮政市场经济的需求。
基于以上研究,本文得出的主要结论如下：
一是通过我国的实际数据,采用计量经济模型定量模拟了邮政发展与区域经济增长的相互关系,证明了邮政普遍服务与经济发展具有密不可分的紧密联系。尽管从企业内部效率来看,普遍服务造成了对自由市场经济的扭曲和效率的损失；而在经济社会发展的实践当中,但由于邮政行业典型的外部性特征,邮政普遍服务与区域经济增长互为促进,邮政普遍服务的存在具有一定的合理性和说服力。
二是对于竞争环境下通过普遍服务基金进行的外部成本补贴,不同的补贴额度、不同的资金筹措方式对市场竞争主体会造成不同的影响,这种影响主要由邮政市场的客观条件决定。在不同的补贴方式下,当普遍服务净成本大于不同的临界值时,邮政普遍服务补偿机制或者造成不公平竞争或者造成行业亏损而导致不可持续。因此,不同的补贴方式的适用范围也各不相同,对邮政普遍服务在何种情况下采取何种资金来源、补贴至何种水平需要以动态化的定量研究视野对具体情况具体分析。
三是对于低收入者的收入补偿机制,通过实证测算得出我国低收入者的需求价格弹性显著低于高收入者,得出结论：以差别定价的方式提供邮政服务,既有利于提升消费者福利,也有利于提高生产者剩余,收入补偿机制应该通过差别定价为主来实现。
Postal industry is the foundation of social development. With its typical positive externality and natural monopoly, for a long time, it is exclusive operated by the government as a public-service industry all over the world. Since the late 20th century, the marketization reform of other natural monopoly industries, such as Telecommunications, Electricity and so on, have achieved significant results. Many countries promote the rapid development of national postal industry through separating government functions from enterprise management and introducing competition mechanism, which set off a wave of postal reform.29th November,2006, China Post Group was established, which marked the beginning of postal reform through separating government functions from enterprise management and divided operation in China.
The reform of marketization and the introducing of competition present a new challenge for universal postal service. One hand, postal carries, which aim at maximizing the profits of the company, would unwilling to bear the loss due to universal service. Meantime, the "Skimming" behavior makes internal cross-subsidies that are based on the traditional monopoly operation unsustainable. On the other hand, since universal postal service is a significant method to protect human rights, promote economic development and improve social welfare, the government has an obligation ensure all citizens can access to basic postal services. In view of this, in the context of postal reform, how to build efficient universal service compensation mechanism, to make the universal service postal carries participate in the competition and gain necessary compensation to remain their vitality and zeal, and to provide postal service to our residents practically, has important theoretical and practical significance for academia, the postal regulatory agencies and the postal carries.
Based on the research of predecessors and the research on universal services in other industries, this paper focuses on the three core problems of universal postal service and proposes three main innovation points:
1. Why we should provide universal postal service.
At present, the literatures on universal service mostly admit that universal postal service is required, and then basing on this premise to do researches on universal service. Some academic points in foreign countries hold that universal service cannot be naturally reasonable, and the lost of efficiency cannot be oversaw. This paper bases on the real data of China in 1990-2010, and adopts linear model and double-log model to quantitatively simulate the relations of universal postal service and the development of economics. It also proves the conclusion derived by the model by using data in areas of high cost. From the angle of the close relation between universal postal service and regional economic development, it states the necessity to provide universal postal service in high cost region.
2. How to provide universal postal service at areas of high service costs.
The core problem of regulating universal service is the compensation of universal service in high cost regions. Friedman, the U.S. economics master, has a well-known thesis on the regulation of industry of natural monopoly:"Unfortunately, there is no good way to solve the natural monopoly problem, only three not very good ways:first, private monopolies that are not regulated by the government, and second, private monopolies that is regulated and the third the operation of the government in person, which can only be the minimum when three evils". Therefore, basing on explaining the exclusive sales, government subsidies, and fund subsidies of universal service, this paper does not try to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these ways but from a reasonable amount of subsidies, competition neutrality point of view, make an in-depth study on impacts on the market competitors due to different subsidies, the scope of subsidies.
3. How to provide universal postal service for low-income groups.
At first, this paper qualitatively explains on the need of universal service subsidies for low-income people. Second, quantitatively analyzes of the main factors that impact on the postal consumption of residents, and from the theoretical and empirical perspective, get the result that personal disposable income and the level of postal price significantly and directly affect the post consumption. And with the simulation using actual data of low-income areas, it calculates the price elasticity of the demand for postal service of high and low income groups. At last, comparing the impacts on customer welfare and producer surplus by uniform pricing and price discrimination, this paper illustrates that it is a better way to realize compensation policy by making low-price policy for low-income people, and verifies from another perspective that the current uniform pricing which distortions the price does not meet the needs of the postal market economy.
Based on the research above, this paper make the following conclusions:
First, through the actual data in China, it simulates the associated model between postal development and regional economic growth to prove the universal postal service and regional economic development are inseparable in close contact. From the internal efficiency perspective, regulating universal service leads to the free market economy distortions and efficiency losses. However, because of the typical external characteristics of postal sector, universal postal service mutually promotes the regional economic growth, thus the existence of universal postal service has its reasonability.
Second, in the competitive environment, for the external costs of subsidies supported by the universal service funds, different amounts of subsidies and different ways of financing will cause different effects on main body of market competition. This effect mainly according to the objective conditions of the postal market. In different ways of subsidies, when the net cost of universal service higher than different thresholds, the postal service compensation mechanism may cause unfair competition or industry losses that lead to unsustainable development. Therefore, different ways of subsidies apply to different scope. From a neutral competitive point of view, the mutual funding, which is mostly adopted by current theory and practice, has narrower application scope than the scope of government finances and services or payment methods.
Third, for the compensation mechanism for low-income people, since the price elasticity of demand for low-income people is significantly lower than for high-income earners in China, provide postal services by differential pricing not only enhance consumer welfare, but also help improve the producer surplus. Therefore, income compensation mechanism should be achieved mainly through differential pricing.
引文
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