生态经济化制度研究
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摘要
生态经济化是指生态资源转化为生态资本的过程,它的研究对象是生态资源及其与人所构成的一系列关系。伴随着中国要素市场化改革的深入,中国各地开展了多种不同思路的生态经济化实践。因此,本文将以生态经济化的三种思路为主线并基于生态经济化案例来研究生态经济化制度创新。
区域内生态资源通过交易方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第一种思路。嘉兴市排污权有偿使用和交易制度的案例分析表明,区域内生态资源有偿化过程就是一个典型的生态经济化过程。这一过程既是生态权从无偿使用向有偿使用转变的过程,也是生态权从不完全产权到完全产权的过程,还是区域政府主导的制度演化过程,并逐步向政府主导下的政府与民间合力推进方式转型。不过,这一转型需要满足一系列条件,如产权的可分解性避免了生态经济化的意识形态约束,利益诉求的错位使得生态经济化过程各个主体各得其所,在线监控等环境基础设施的建设为排污权有偿使用提供了技术条件等。
区域间生态资源通过补偿方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第二种思路。通过新安江流域生态补偿纠纷案例研究得到的结论是：生态补偿资金量的决定问题是生态补偿机制诱发诸多区域矛盾的最重要原因,而失业率和减排约束是决定生态补偿资金多少和明确地区政府补偿责任的两大关键因素。基于新安江试点水环境补偿最终决策的分析表明,环境保护所导致失业率的变动区间约为5%-7%,条件附加性影响着下游地区所应承担的生态补偿责任。当然,生态补偿机制也会由于利益诉求模糊、信息传递不畅和政策设计有偏等原因而使区域关系复杂化。
国际间生态资源通过投资方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第三种思路。CDM框架下协议缔约方的偏好分析表明,生态经济化过程还受到其它因素的影响——如偏好。基于一致偏好假定,影响生态投资缔约方偏好的因素包括内部收益率、技术效率和制度性收益。内部收益率陷阱表明协议缔约方偏好于CDM项目的附加性和可持续性,技术效率偏好表明协议缔约方偏好于高技术效率的项目,制度性收益偏好表明协议缔约方对CDM制度具有一定的偏好。
基于三种生态经济化的思路,三类生态经济化战略构想水到渠成。生态资源有偿化战略一般包括排污权有偿使用制度、排污收费制度、碳税制度、特定的许可证制度等。生态保护补偿战略是指环境保护的受益者或公共财政支出应向采取了诸多生态保护措施且提供了优良生态环境的地区和人们给予补偿。生态环境投资战略是指具有生态环境效应的投资和生态环境效应所引致的投资。以长江三角洲地区两类生态经济化战略为例,实证结果表明不同的生态经济化战略均在不同程度上能够实现区域经济协调发展,但是以生态经济化促区域经济协调发展存在显著的补偿资金结构差异。
总之,本文在研究视角、分析框架和相关观点上均有创新：
第一,区分了自然经济资源与自然生态资源,明确了自然生态资源的内涵与外延,并将生态经济化的研究聚焦到自然生态资源转化为生态资本的过程。自然资源可以细分为自然经济资源与自然生态资源,自然生态资源是指那些生态产品和生态服务,它们具有市场价值但其市场价值往往未被发掘,它们的产权能够明晰但又往往未被界定,它们具有数量的特征但在没有界定产权的情形下量化过程又往往比较困难,而且稀缺的生态资源在供求机制的作用下会在各主体之间互通有无,实现资源的增殖和价值的增加。在满足相应条件下,自然生态资源可以转化为生态资本,即生态经济化。
第二,提出了由“三类空间标准生态资源——三种生态经济化实现方式——三类生态经济化操作机制”所构成的生态经济化理论分析框架,并基于此提出了三种常见的生态经济化思路。自然生态资源与自然经济资源不同,具有明显的空间特征,案例分析也表明生态资源可以细分为区域内生态资源、区域间生态资源和国际间生态资源。不同类别的生态资源均可对应着三类不同的生态经济化方式——交易、补偿和投资。不同生态资源的经济化方式又对应着不同的生态经济化操作机制,包括有偿使用和交易机制、生态补偿机制和生态投资机制。基于上述逻辑,生态经济化理论分析框架同时指出了现实中三种常见的生态经济化思路,即区域内、区域间和国际间生态资源分别通过交易、补偿和投资方式转化为生态资本。
第三,指出了生态资本的形成条件,明确了一种生态资本量的决定方式以及影响生态资本量大小的可能因素。生态资源转化为生态资本是一个过程,也是生态资本从无到有的一个过程,这一过程需要满足总量控制政策、政府的可置信承诺、隐性一致同意等条件。当生态资源可以转化为生态资本时,由环境保护所导致的失业率对应的潜在产出是生态资本量大小的决定性因素,而总量控制政策所引发的机会成本是生态资本量在各级政府间分配的关键性因素。此外,不同主体的偏好也会影响到生态资本量的大小。
中国要素市场化改革的不断推进要求生态经济问题通过市场手段来实现有效治理。本文归纳了生态经济化制度创新的诸多实践经验,这对于进一步深化生态资源要素市场化改革而言意义重大。与此同时,本文也指出了生态经济化研究有待深入的几个问题,这也是将来努力的方向。
Ecological economization (eco-economization) is referred as the transformation process from ecological resource to ecological capital, and the research on eco-economization focuses on the ecological resource and the relationship between the ecological resource and the human. With the deepening of market-oriented reform in Chinese element market, there are being and to be such practices of eco-economization in many Chinese regions. So this paper probes into these innovative institutions of eco-economization according to the three main propositions of eco-economization based on the cases listed in the common combinations of the framework.
It is the first proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of an administrative region transfers into ecological capital in a transaction way. The case study of compensated use of certified emission reductions in Jiaxing city shows that pay for certified emission reductions is just the way that ecological resource transfers into ecological capital. The transformation process shows that, firstly the ecological rights become completed property rights instead of uncompleted ones; secondly eco-economization could be considered as an institutional change from using ecological rights without any payment to pay for the ecological rights; thirdly the process is dominated by a regional government and gradually shifted to be promoted by a cooperation between the government and other agents. However, ecological capital can be achieved if and only if a series of conditions are satisfied, like the decomposition of property rights, the dislocation of interest demands and the environmental infrastructures.
It is the second proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of a drainage basin transfers into ecological capital in a compensation way. The issue on the determinants of associated ecological compensation fund is considered as the most important cause of the complicated regional relationships through the case study on the dispute of ecological compensation in Xin'an river basin. The unemployment rate and emission reduction constraint are the two key factors of determining the compensation fund and the quantity of ecological capital in terms of the eco-economization. Meanwhile, the analysis of the final compensation policy shows that the environmental protection could lead to 5%-7% change of the unemployment rate and additional conditionality would specify the responsibility of the downstream government. Besides, the complicated regional relationship might also be due to the unclear benefit pursuit, unsmooth information transfer and biased policy design.
It is the third proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of a global area transfers into ecological capital in an investment way. Based on the preference analysis of the ecological investment under the framework of CDM, there is another important factor—preference influencing eco-economization so much. Based on the consistent preference assumption, the specific factors influencing the investment preference include the internal rate of return, technical efficiency and institutional benefit. It is shown that the EB prefers the project with lower IRR which means the higher additionality and sustainability, higher technical efficiency, higher ecological effect, and higher institutional benefit.
According to the three propositions of eco-economization, the three eco-economization strategies are logically to be achieved. The strategy of compensated use of ecological resource includes such institutions as compensated use of certified emission reductions, pay for the certified emission reductions, carbon tax system and specific allowance system. The strategy of ecological compensation means that the beneficiaries of ecological protection or public finance should pay to the regional government or people who takes lots of ecological protections or offers the good ecological environment. And the strategy of ecological investment is referred as the investment with ecological effects or the induced investment due to ecological effects. Based on the empirical study of the two eco-economization strategies in Yangtze River Delta, the results show that it is helpful for the coordinated development of a regional economy to take different eco-economization strategies while there are structural differences among different strategies'impacts on the coordinated development.
In a word, in terms of the academic angle, framework and relative propositions, the great innovations of this paper are as follows:
Firstly, distinguish the two concepts of economic nature resource and ecological resource, define the connotation and denotation of ecological resource, and make the research of eco-economization concentrate on the transformation process from ecological resource to ecological capital. Natural resource can be divided into economic nature resource and ecological resource, and the ecological resources are these ecological products and services, which can be quantified but it is not easy to do the quantification, can be priced but the prices have not yet been made, can be clarified but it may be still discussed widely, can be traded but there is no such a market with the price, and the values of them can increase a lot as the time passes by but the expected values may fluctuate a lot. When all the conditions are met properly, ecological resources can transfer into ecological capital and the transformation process is just the process of eco-economization.
Secondly, propose the framework of "three kinds of ecological resource--three styles of eco-economization--three mechanisms of eco-economization", and the three common propositions of eco-economization are also revealed in the framework. Compared to economic nature resource, ecological resource has the dimensional properties and can be divided into ecological resource of an administrative region, ecological resource of a drainage basin and ecological resource of a global area. Different ecological resources can transfer into ecological capital in a transaction, compensation or an investment way and there are also different eco-economization mechanisms including compensated use and transaction mechanism, ecological compensation mechanism and ecological investment mechanism. Based on the above logics, the framework suggests three common propositions of eco-economization, which is that the ecological resource of an administrative region, a drainage basin or a global area relatively transfers into ecological capital in the transaction, compensation or investment way.
Thirdly, point out the conditions of forming the ecological capital; clarify how to determine the quantity of ecological capital and whether there are other possible factors influencing the ecological capital. It is the process that the ecological resource transfers into ecological capital and the ecological capital will be achieved after the transformation process if such conditions as the total control policy, the credible commitment of the government and the public awareness of implicit unanimity are met. When ecological resource can be transferred into ecological capital, the quantity of ecological capital will be determined by the potential output of unemployment rate caused by environmental protection and how many a certain government should be undertook is determined by the opportunity cost of total control policy. Besides, the preference will also influence whether the ecological capital could be achieved and the quantity of the ecological capital.
Along with the deepening of market-oriented reform in Chinese element market, some ecological economic issues are required to be done in market-oriented ways. Lots of these experiences are summarized in this paper based on the case studies and they would be meaningful for the next steps of the reform. Meanwhile, several problems needed to be further probed into are also conveyed.
区域内生态资源通过交易方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第一种思路。嘉兴市排污权有偿使用和交易制度的案例分析表明,区域内生态资源有偿化过程就是一个典型的生态经济化过程。这一过程既是生态权从无偿使用向有偿使用转变的过程,也是生态权从不完全产权到完全产权的过程,还是区域政府主导的制度演化过程,并逐步向政府主导下的政府与民间合力推进方式转型。不过,这一转型需要满足一系列条件,如产权的可分解性避免了生态经济化的意识形态约束,利益诉求的错位使得生态经济化过程各个主体各得其所,在线监控等环境基础设施的建设为排污权有偿使用提供了技术条件等。
区域间生态资源通过补偿方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第二种思路。通过新安江流域生态补偿纠纷案例研究得到的结论是：生态补偿资金量的决定问题是生态补偿机制诱发诸多区域矛盾的最重要原因,而失业率和减排约束是决定生态补偿资金多少和明确地区政府补偿责任的两大关键因素。基于新安江试点水环境补偿最终决策的分析表明,环境保护所导致失业率的变动区间约为5%-7%,条件附加性影响着下游地区所应承担的生态补偿责任。当然,生态补偿机制也会由于利益诉求模糊、信息传递不畅和政策设计有偏等原因而使区域关系复杂化。
国际间生态资源通过投资方式转化为生态资本是生态经济化的第三种思路。CDM框架下协议缔约方的偏好分析表明,生态经济化过程还受到其它因素的影响——如偏好。基于一致偏好假定,影响生态投资缔约方偏好的因素包括内部收益率、技术效率和制度性收益。内部收益率陷阱表明协议缔约方偏好于CDM项目的附加性和可持续性,技术效率偏好表明协议缔约方偏好于高技术效率的项目,制度性收益偏好表明协议缔约方对CDM制度具有一定的偏好。
基于三种生态经济化的思路,三类生态经济化战略构想水到渠成。生态资源有偿化战略一般包括排污权有偿使用制度、排污收费制度、碳税制度、特定的许可证制度等。生态保护补偿战略是指环境保护的受益者或公共财政支出应向采取了诸多生态保护措施且提供了优良生态环境的地区和人们给予补偿。生态环境投资战略是指具有生态环境效应的投资和生态环境效应所引致的投资。以长江三角洲地区两类生态经济化战略为例,实证结果表明不同的生态经济化战略均在不同程度上能够实现区域经济协调发展,但是以生态经济化促区域经济协调发展存在显著的补偿资金结构差异。
总之,本文在研究视角、分析框架和相关观点上均有创新：
第一,区分了自然经济资源与自然生态资源,明确了自然生态资源的内涵与外延,并将生态经济化的研究聚焦到自然生态资源转化为生态资本的过程。自然资源可以细分为自然经济资源与自然生态资源,自然生态资源是指那些生态产品和生态服务,它们具有市场价值但其市场价值往往未被发掘,它们的产权能够明晰但又往往未被界定,它们具有数量的特征但在没有界定产权的情形下量化过程又往往比较困难,而且稀缺的生态资源在供求机制的作用下会在各主体之间互通有无,实现资源的增殖和价值的增加。在满足相应条件下,自然生态资源可以转化为生态资本,即生态经济化。
第二,提出了由“三类空间标准生态资源——三种生态经济化实现方式——三类生态经济化操作机制”所构成的生态经济化理论分析框架,并基于此提出了三种常见的生态经济化思路。自然生态资源与自然经济资源不同,具有明显的空间特征,案例分析也表明生态资源可以细分为区域内生态资源、区域间生态资源和国际间生态资源。不同类别的生态资源均可对应着三类不同的生态经济化方式——交易、补偿和投资。不同生态资源的经济化方式又对应着不同的生态经济化操作机制,包括有偿使用和交易机制、生态补偿机制和生态投资机制。基于上述逻辑,生态经济化理论分析框架同时指出了现实中三种常见的生态经济化思路,即区域内、区域间和国际间生态资源分别通过交易、补偿和投资方式转化为生态资本。
第三,指出了生态资本的形成条件,明确了一种生态资本量的决定方式以及影响生态资本量大小的可能因素。生态资源转化为生态资本是一个过程,也是生态资本从无到有的一个过程,这一过程需要满足总量控制政策、政府的可置信承诺、隐性一致同意等条件。当生态资源可以转化为生态资本时,由环境保护所导致的失业率对应的潜在产出是生态资本量大小的决定性因素,而总量控制政策所引发的机会成本是生态资本量在各级政府间分配的关键性因素。此外,不同主体的偏好也会影响到生态资本量的大小。
中国要素市场化改革的不断推进要求生态经济问题通过市场手段来实现有效治理。本文归纳了生态经济化制度创新的诸多实践经验,这对于进一步深化生态资源要素市场化改革而言意义重大。与此同时,本文也指出了生态经济化研究有待深入的几个问题,这也是将来努力的方向。
Ecological economization (eco-economization) is referred as the transformation process from ecological resource to ecological capital, and the research on eco-economization focuses on the ecological resource and the relationship between the ecological resource and the human. With the deepening of market-oriented reform in Chinese element market, there are being and to be such practices of eco-economization in many Chinese regions. So this paper probes into these innovative institutions of eco-economization according to the three main propositions of eco-economization based on the cases listed in the common combinations of the framework.
It is the first proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of an administrative region transfers into ecological capital in a transaction way. The case study of compensated use of certified emission reductions in Jiaxing city shows that pay for certified emission reductions is just the way that ecological resource transfers into ecological capital. The transformation process shows that, firstly the ecological rights become completed property rights instead of uncompleted ones; secondly eco-economization could be considered as an institutional change from using ecological rights without any payment to pay for the ecological rights; thirdly the process is dominated by a regional government and gradually shifted to be promoted by a cooperation between the government and other agents. However, ecological capital can be achieved if and only if a series of conditions are satisfied, like the decomposition of property rights, the dislocation of interest demands and the environmental infrastructures.
It is the second proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of a drainage basin transfers into ecological capital in a compensation way. The issue on the determinants of associated ecological compensation fund is considered as the most important cause of the complicated regional relationships through the case study on the dispute of ecological compensation in Xin'an river basin. The unemployment rate and emission reduction constraint are the two key factors of determining the compensation fund and the quantity of ecological capital in terms of the eco-economization. Meanwhile, the analysis of the final compensation policy shows that the environmental protection could lead to 5%-7% change of the unemployment rate and additional conditionality would specify the responsibility of the downstream government. Besides, the complicated regional relationship might also be due to the unclear benefit pursuit, unsmooth information transfer and biased policy design.
It is the third proposition of eco-economization that ecological resource of a global area transfers into ecological capital in an investment way. Based on the preference analysis of the ecological investment under the framework of CDM, there is another important factor—preference influencing eco-economization so much. Based on the consistent preference assumption, the specific factors influencing the investment preference include the internal rate of return, technical efficiency and institutional benefit. It is shown that the EB prefers the project with lower IRR which means the higher additionality and sustainability, higher technical efficiency, higher ecological effect, and higher institutional benefit.
According to the three propositions of eco-economization, the three eco-economization strategies are logically to be achieved. The strategy of compensated use of ecological resource includes such institutions as compensated use of certified emission reductions, pay for the certified emission reductions, carbon tax system and specific allowance system. The strategy of ecological compensation means that the beneficiaries of ecological protection or public finance should pay to the regional government or people who takes lots of ecological protections or offers the good ecological environment. And the strategy of ecological investment is referred as the investment with ecological effects or the induced investment due to ecological effects. Based on the empirical study of the two eco-economization strategies in Yangtze River Delta, the results show that it is helpful for the coordinated development of a regional economy to take different eco-economization strategies while there are structural differences among different strategies'impacts on the coordinated development.
In a word, in terms of the academic angle, framework and relative propositions, the great innovations of this paper are as follows:
Firstly, distinguish the two concepts of economic nature resource and ecological resource, define the connotation and denotation of ecological resource, and make the research of eco-economization concentrate on the transformation process from ecological resource to ecological capital. Natural resource can be divided into economic nature resource and ecological resource, and the ecological resources are these ecological products and services, which can be quantified but it is not easy to do the quantification, can be priced but the prices have not yet been made, can be clarified but it may be still discussed widely, can be traded but there is no such a market with the price, and the values of them can increase a lot as the time passes by but the expected values may fluctuate a lot. When all the conditions are met properly, ecological resources can transfer into ecological capital and the transformation process is just the process of eco-economization.
Secondly, propose the framework of "three kinds of ecological resource--three styles of eco-economization--three mechanisms of eco-economization", and the three common propositions of eco-economization are also revealed in the framework. Compared to economic nature resource, ecological resource has the dimensional properties and can be divided into ecological resource of an administrative region, ecological resource of a drainage basin and ecological resource of a global area. Different ecological resources can transfer into ecological capital in a transaction, compensation or an investment way and there are also different eco-economization mechanisms including compensated use and transaction mechanism, ecological compensation mechanism and ecological investment mechanism. Based on the above logics, the framework suggests three common propositions of eco-economization, which is that the ecological resource of an administrative region, a drainage basin or a global area relatively transfers into ecological capital in the transaction, compensation or investment way.
Thirdly, point out the conditions of forming the ecological capital; clarify how to determine the quantity of ecological capital and whether there are other possible factors influencing the ecological capital. It is the process that the ecological resource transfers into ecological capital and the ecological capital will be achieved after the transformation process if such conditions as the total control policy, the credible commitment of the government and the public awareness of implicit unanimity are met. When ecological resource can be transferred into ecological capital, the quantity of ecological capital will be determined by the potential output of unemployment rate caused by environmental protection and how many a certain government should be undertook is determined by the opportunity cost of total control policy. Besides, the preference will also influence whether the ecological capital could be achieved and the quantity of the ecological capital.
Along with the deepening of market-oriented reform in Chinese element market, some ecological economic issues are required to be done in market-oriented ways. Lots of these experiences are summarized in this paper based on the case studies and they would be meaningful for the next steps of the reform. Meanwhile, several problems needed to be further probed into are also conveyed.
引文
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①钟兆盈、赵晓.浙江排污权交易探索中前行.中国环境报,2009年3月27日,第1版。
①环境保护部环境规划院.太湖流域水污染物排放权有偿使用及交易技术指南(内部讨论稿).2008年6月。
①孙钰.探索建立中国式生态补偿机制——访中国工程院院士李文华.环境保护,2006(19)。
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