空间信息网公钥安全技术研究
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摘要
随着通信技术的快速发展和用户需求的不断提高，各种新型的网络不断涌现，其中空间信息网已经成为近年来的研究热点。空间信息网是以卫星网络作为骨干网络，包含具有空间通信能力的各类航天设备、航空设备以及相关地面设备所组成的异构式网络体系。由于空间通信的开放性，空间信息网的节点很容易遭受到各种类型的攻击，因此需要建立合适的安全机制以保证空间信息网的通信安全。
目前空间信息网还没有成熟的公钥安全架构，本文针对这一问题，就空间信息网的公钥证书管理体制、CA架构形式、证书撤销机制以及访问控制等具有重要地位的公钥安全技术进行了研究，取得了以下主要成果。
1、研究了空间信息网的体系结构。分析了组成空间信息网的不同节点的特点，提出了一种分层式的体系结构。其中卫星网络作为骨干网承担主要的数据处理与通信任务，其余航天、航空设备以及地面用户作为网络的接入节点。
2、研究了空间信息网基于证书的公钥安全机制。针对分层式的空间信息网体系结构，提出了一种分层混合式的证书管理方案。其中网络的核心卫星层采用分布式CA对节点证书进行管理以提高核心网络的安全性，而接入节点层则采用集中式CA以实现节点可靠和有效的接入。该方案将空间信息网的安全划分为不同的层次，有效地提高了网络的抗毁性，还可以随着网络规模的扩大而方便的接入更多的节点，具有良好的可扩展性。
3、研究了安全性更高的分布式CA模型。针对现有分布式CA模型中存在的安全隐患，提出了一种自适应分布式的CA模型。该模型中保管CA私钥的管理者节点不再是传统模型中的静态选择，而是随着网络运行由全体节点动态的进行选择。为节点引入信用值的概念，信用值随着网络中节点之间发起的有效的指控信息而改变，其中信用值最高的n个节点将自动成为CA私钥的管理者。该模型可以有效地防止攻击者获取证书管理权限，用于空间信息网的核心卫星层能够提高整个网络的安全性。
4、研究了分布式的证书撤销机制。针对空间信息网的特点，提出了一种高效的分布式证书撤销机制。该机制基于自适应分布式CA模型中的节点监督与指控，引入撤销份额以标识节点证书是否被撤销。该机制中节点之间只需要较少的数据通信，有效地降低了通信负载，比较适合于空间信息网高时延的场合。理论分析和仿真实验表明，本文给出的机制更符合实时性的要求，并且能够更好的抵抗恶意节点的合谋攻击，具有更高的安全性。
5、研究了空间信息网的访问控制机制。根据空间信息网的特点，在两种不同的服务场景下为其分别构建了基于用户属性的访问控制机制。该机制中卫星节点用属性加密密钥加密数据并发送给用户，而用户根据门限原则用所持有的属性解密密钥解密数据，可以实现细粒度的访问控制。该机制中卫星节点与用户之间的信息交互次数达到了最小，卫星节点承担的运算负担也较小，还可以方便的实现用户对于网络数据的匿名性访问。
With the rapid growth of communication technology and the increasing userdemand, many new types of network have been emerging, in which space informationnetworks has become a research hotspot in recent years. The space informationnetworks, as a heterogeneous type of network system, which take satellite network asthe backbone network, include various types of space equipment, aerospace equipmentand associated ground equipment. The nodes in the space information networks arevulnerable to various types of attacks because of the open space communication, sothere is a need to establish suitable security mechanisms to ensure the communicationsafety in space information networks.
As there is no proven public key security architecture in space informationnetworks currently, this paper focus on the most important public key securitytechnology such as the management system of public key certificate, organization ofcertificate authority, certificate revocation mechanism and access control mechanism.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
Firstly, the architecture of the space information networks is considered. Accordingto the features of different nodes in it, we propose a layered architecture for spaceinformation networks in which the satellite network performs main tasks of dataprocessing and communication and other equipments in space and the users on theground have been taken as the access nodes.
Secondly, the public key security architecture based on certificate is given. Wepropose a hierarchical hybrid certificate management solution in accordance with thelayered architecture of space information networks. In this solution, the core satellitelayer uses distributed CA model in order to improve the security of the core network,but the access node layer uses centralized CA model so as to achieve reliable andefficient access. The solution which divides the security of the space informationnetworks into different levels, effectively improves the network survivability.Furthermore, the solution has a good scalability because it will include more accessnodes conveniently with the expansion of network size.
Thirdly, a more secure distributed CA model is proposed. We propose an adaptivedistributed CA model in order to avoid security risks in the existing distributed CAmodel. In our model, the nodes which keep shares of CA private key are no longer beselected statically as in traditional model, but selected dynamically by all the nodes inthe networks. We introduce the credit value which changes with effective accusations for the nodes in networks, and the credit values of share-keepers are always the top n.The model can effectively prevent an attacker from obtaining a certificate managementauthority, and can improve the security of the entire network when used in the core
satellite layer of the space information networks.Fourthly, distributed certificate revocation mechanisms are studied. An efficientdistributed certificate revocation mechanism based on node monitoring and charges inadaptive distributed CA model is proposed. Share of revocation is labeled in every nodewhich identify whether the node’s certificate is revoked. This mechanism whichrequires less data communication between nodes effectively reduces the traffic load, soit is more suitable for space information network. Theoretical analysis and simulationexperiments indicate that the mechanism presented in this paper are more in line withreal-time requirements and can resist the collusion attacks between malicious nodes, a
higher security.Fifthly, the access control mechanisms in space information networks areconsidered. The access control mechanisms based on user’s attributes are constructed intwo different service scenarios. In our schemes, satellite node encrypts data with theattributes encryption keys and sends the cipher to user, while the user decrypts thecipher text with the attributes decryption keys according to the principle of threshold.These schemes can achieve fine-grained access control and reach a minimum number ofinformation exchanges between satellite node and user. Furthermore, the satellite nodebears a smaller burden of computation and the user can easily achieve anonymity fornetwork data access.
目前空间信息网还没有成熟的公钥安全架构，本文针对这一问题，就空间信息网的公钥证书管理体制、CA架构形式、证书撤销机制以及访问控制等具有重要地位的公钥安全技术进行了研究，取得了以下主要成果。
1、研究了空间信息网的体系结构。分析了组成空间信息网的不同节点的特点，提出了一种分层式的体系结构。其中卫星网络作为骨干网承担主要的数据处理与通信任务，其余航天、航空设备以及地面用户作为网络的接入节点。
2、研究了空间信息网基于证书的公钥安全机制。针对分层式的空间信息网体系结构，提出了一种分层混合式的证书管理方案。其中网络的核心卫星层采用分布式CA对节点证书进行管理以提高核心网络的安全性，而接入节点层则采用集中式CA以实现节点可靠和有效的接入。该方案将空间信息网的安全划分为不同的层次，有效地提高了网络的抗毁性，还可以随着网络规模的扩大而方便的接入更多的节点，具有良好的可扩展性。
3、研究了安全性更高的分布式CA模型。针对现有分布式CA模型中存在的安全隐患，提出了一种自适应分布式的CA模型。该模型中保管CA私钥的管理者节点不再是传统模型中的静态选择，而是随着网络运行由全体节点动态的进行选择。为节点引入信用值的概念，信用值随着网络中节点之间发起的有效的指控信息而改变，其中信用值最高的n个节点将自动成为CA私钥的管理者。该模型可以有效地防止攻击者获取证书管理权限，用于空间信息网的核心卫星层能够提高整个网络的安全性。
4、研究了分布式的证书撤销机制。针对空间信息网的特点，提出了一种高效的分布式证书撤销机制。该机制基于自适应分布式CA模型中的节点监督与指控，引入撤销份额以标识节点证书是否被撤销。该机制中节点之间只需要较少的数据通信，有效地降低了通信负载，比较适合于空间信息网高时延的场合。理论分析和仿真实验表明，本文给出的机制更符合实时性的要求，并且能够更好的抵抗恶意节点的合谋攻击，具有更高的安全性。
5、研究了空间信息网的访问控制机制。根据空间信息网的特点，在两种不同的服务场景下为其分别构建了基于用户属性的访问控制机制。该机制中卫星节点用属性加密密钥加密数据并发送给用户，而用户根据门限原则用所持有的属性解密密钥解密数据，可以实现细粒度的访问控制。该机制中卫星节点与用户之间的信息交互次数达到了最小，卫星节点承担的运算负担也较小，还可以方便的实现用户对于网络数据的匿名性访问。
With the rapid growth of communication technology and the increasing userdemand, many new types of network have been emerging, in which space informationnetworks has become a research hotspot in recent years. The space informationnetworks, as a heterogeneous type of network system, which take satellite network asthe backbone network, include various types of space equipment, aerospace equipmentand associated ground equipment. The nodes in the space information networks arevulnerable to various types of attacks because of the open space communication, sothere is a need to establish suitable security mechanisms to ensure the communicationsafety in space information networks.
As there is no proven public key security architecture in space informationnetworks currently, this paper focus on the most important public key securitytechnology such as the management system of public key certificate, organization ofcertificate authority, certificate revocation mechanism and access control mechanism.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
Firstly, the architecture of the space information networks is considered. Accordingto the features of different nodes in it, we propose a layered architecture for spaceinformation networks in which the satellite network performs main tasks of dataprocessing and communication and other equipments in space and the users on theground have been taken as the access nodes.
Secondly, the public key security architecture based on certificate is given. Wepropose a hierarchical hybrid certificate management solution in accordance with thelayered architecture of space information networks. In this solution, the core satellitelayer uses distributed CA model in order to improve the security of the core network,but the access node layer uses centralized CA model so as to achieve reliable andefficient access. The solution which divides the security of the space informationnetworks into different levels, effectively improves the network survivability.Furthermore, the solution has a good scalability because it will include more accessnodes conveniently with the expansion of network size.
Thirdly, a more secure distributed CA model is proposed. We propose an adaptivedistributed CA model in order to avoid security risks in the existing distributed CAmodel. In our model, the nodes which keep shares of CA private key are no longer beselected statically as in traditional model, but selected dynamically by all the nodes inthe networks. We introduce the credit value which changes with effective accusations for the nodes in networks, and the credit values of share-keepers are always the top n.The model can effectively prevent an attacker from obtaining a certificate managementauthority, and can improve the security of the entire network when used in the core
satellite layer of the space information networks.Fourthly, distributed certificate revocation mechanisms are studied. An efficientdistributed certificate revocation mechanism based on node monitoring and charges inadaptive distributed CA model is proposed. Share of revocation is labeled in every nodewhich identify whether the node’s certificate is revoked. This mechanism whichrequires less data communication between nodes effectively reduces the traffic load, soit is more suitable for space information network. Theoretical analysis and simulationexperiments indicate that the mechanism presented in this paper are more in line withreal-time requirements and can resist the collusion attacks between malicious nodes, a
higher security.Fifthly, the access control mechanisms in space information networks areconsidered. The access control mechanisms based on user’s attributes are constructed intwo different service scenarios. In our schemes, satellite node encrypts data with theattributes encryption keys and sends the cipher to user, while the user decrypts thecipher text with the attributes decryption keys according to the principle of threshold.These schemes can achieve fine-grained access control and reach a minimum number ofinformation exchanges between satellite node and user. Furthermore, the satellite nodebears a smaller burden of computation and the user can easily achieve anonymity fornetwork data access.
引文
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