准金融控股企业集团的发展及其破产风险控制与处置研究
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摘要
改革开放至今,中国的资本市场已经取得了长足的发展,一些实业企业集团在市场经济体制的改革进程中逐渐向金融产业渗透,参股控股一些金融机构,从而形成了本文所说的“准金融控股企业集团”。根据中国人民银行2005年的调查,截至当年6月30日,我国已有528家实业企业控股或参股了两种类型以上金融机构,形成的准金融控股集团已有57家。就在国内产融结合进行的如火如荼的时候,大名鼎鼎的民营准金融控股企业集团——德隆系却在2004年轰然倒塌,其影响波及到与之有关系的金融机构、上市公司、相关企业和个人,对国家的金融体系、经济与社会发展造成很大的负面影响,给金融监管机构和其它准金融控股企业集团的危机防范敲响了警钟。
本文以德隆系企业的风险处置为案例和背景,对中国准金融控股企业集团的发展、破产风险的控制和处置进行较为系统地研究。试图解决如下问题:我国的准金融控股企业集团应该借鉴哪种成功的国际模式以便实现可持续发展?应该如何有效地评估、控制和处置集团及其成员企业的破产风险?如何在新《企业破产法》的框架下建立符合市场经济规律的、能够有效指导企业破产实践的重整理论?华融资产管理有限公司在政府的行政干预下对德隆系企业的破产操作是否符合破产程序的效率目标?以及如何对准金融控股企业集团进行有效监管,如何确定政府在干预可能引发金融系统风险的企业破产时的角色定位等一系列问题。
文章首先简要地从交易费用理论、产权理论、委托代理理论、基于资源与能力的企业理论对准金融控股企业集团的形成进行经济学解释。比较了准金融控股企业集团在基于市场的金融系统和基于银行的金融系统中不同的发展模式,前者容易形成“资本溢出型”发展模式,而后者容易形成“融资依赖型”发展模式。接着分析中国准金融控股企业集团的发展现状与风险特征。由于中国在发展经济的过程中,更多地是借鉴日韩经验,政府在准金融控股企业集团的形成过程中起了很大的推动作用,因此也使得我国的准金融控股企业集团更偏向于“融资依赖型”。由于准金融控股企业集团具有风险传染和风险外溢的特征,其破产很可能引发金融危机和社会动荡,因此德隆集团遭遇的破产危机为解决“如何有效控制和处置准金融控股企业集团的破产风险”提供了一个很好案例研究机会。
通过把合金投资、湘火炬和新疆屯河三家上市公司作为德隆实业的代表,文章分析了我国实业集团进行产融结合的财务动机,即解决企业快速发展过程中面临的融资约束问题。在准金融控股企业集团管理层建立企业帝国的趋向下,容易忽视负债能力而使企业过度负债,从而使集团暴露于不可控的破产风险之中。为控制好破产风险,管理者可以从资产担保和偿债资金来源的角度分别估计企业的整体负债能力、应该负债极限和有息负债能力,并尽量坚持把企业的实际债务水平控制在应该负债极限的范围之内。德隆危机起源于旗下的金融机构,之所以会波及到实体上市公司的一个重要原因就是企业超过负债能力严重过度负债,以至于无法偿付到期债务。
为了说明在新破产法颁布之前,华融公司在政府的行政干预下对德隆系企业所实施的一系列破产操作是否符合市场经济条件下企业破产的效率目标,文章在现有的关于企业如何私下解决财务困境的理论研究基础上,依据我国新破产法建立了财务困境企业的破产重整模型。研究发现:重整制度搭建的谈判平台有助于消除财务困境在庭下解决阶段的无效决策问题,从而证明重整是一种Pareto改进的制度安排;当企业的重整期望价值较低但仍大于其清算价值而与分散债权人进行债务减免的谈判成本又较高时,提高银行DIP重整融资的优先级则会有助于重整制度的Pareto改进。通过对“合金投资”的重组案例进行分析和比较,文章验证了上述重整理论的有效性,同时也认为德隆系的市场化破产在满足事后有效目标的同时也兼顾了事前效率。同时也认为德隆系的市场化风险处置在满足事后有效目标的同时也兼顾了事前效率。
文章最后针对德隆集团破产危机爆发的原因及风险的处置经验,就如何防止破产风险在准金融控股企业集团内部相互传染、如何有效监管准金融控股集团的金融风险,以及政府在处理准金融控股企业集团的破产危机等类似金融风险的过程中如何进行角色定位等方面提出了一些政策建议。
Since Chinese reform and opening up, the domestic capital market has made great development. Many industrial enterprise groups has transformed into the so-called“Quasi-Financial Holding Group (abbreviated QFHG)”that controlling no less than two financial institutions through direct investment or mergers and acquisitions during the reforming process of China’s market economic system. According to a survey conducted by People’s Bank of China, up to June 30, 2005, there have been 528 industrial enterprise groups investing in more than two types of financial institutions, and 57 among them have formed the QFHG. When the integration of industry-finance capital (IIFC) was carried out enthusiastically at home, the famous private QFHG, Delong collapsed in 2004. As Delong is such a mighty group with many financial institutions, listed or non-listed companies and investors, the crisis has left a great amout of bad assets to the country’s financial system, and led to a major negative impact on the economic and social development. It also gave an alarm on the bankruptcy risk to other QFHGs and the financial regulatory agencies alike.
This dissertation takes the Delong’s bankruptcy as case and background to study systematically how the QFHG develops, and how to control and dispose of its bankruptcy risk, and tries to answer the following questions: What lessons can we learn from Delong, and which kind of mode should be taken for China’s QFHG to achieve sustainable development? How to effectively assess, control and dispose the bankruptcy risk of QFHG and its subsidaries? How to carry on reorganization prossess in accordance with the market economy rules in the framework of new bankruptcy law? Did the Delong’s bankruptcy conducted by Huarong Asset Management Corporation (HAMC) with the administrative support meet the efficiency goals of insolvency procedures? And how to supervise the QFHG effectively, and how to keep an arm’s length of distance when government has to play a role in the bankruptcy prossess of an entity with protential systemic financial risk?
This dissertation includes the following main content.
Firstly, this dissertation gives a brief economic explanation to the formation of QFHG on the bais of transaction cost theory, property rights, agency theory, and the resource-based and capability theory of firm, and tells the QFHG’s different developing modes in market-based financial system and bank-based financial system. The former is called“capital overflow”mode, and the latter is called“finance-dependent”mode. Then we analyze the development status and risk characteristics of Chinese QFHGs. Because China draws more experiences from Japan and Korea in economy development, the financial markets are dominated by banks, so China’s QFHGs are prone to be "finance-dependent" mode. As the risk of QFHG is contagious, the bankruptcy of QFHG may cause financial crisis and social upheaval. The Delong crisis provides an excellent case study opportunity.
Taken the three listed companies“Hejin Investment, Xiang Torch, and Xinjiang Tunhe”as the industrial representatives of Delong, this paper analyzes the financial motivation of industrial groups’IIFC in China, that is aiming at the resolution of financial constraints faced by the group’s rapid development. But the QFHG’s managers usually overestimate the company’s debt capacity (DC) with their dreams of empire building. This may result in the problem of serious debt overhang, and therefore brings the group exposing to non-controllable bankruptcy risk. In order to control the bankruptcy risk, managers should reasonably estimate the overall debt capacity (ODC), the debt-limit-should-be(DLSB)and the interest bearing debt capacity (IBDC) based on the assets cover and net operating cash flow, and manage to control the actual related financial leverages within the scope of DLSB. Delong’s crisis originated in its financial institutions, one important reason that the industrial listed companies are affected is their serious debt overhang, that is the real leverages exceeding their objective DCs too much, and so can’t pay their due debt.
To illustrate whether the Delong’s bankruptcy conducted by HAMC under administrative support before the new bankruptcy law is enacted meets the efficiency goals of insolvency procedures. The dissertation, based on theories about how to solve financial difficulties privately, proposes a new reorganization model of financially distressed firm according to the specific regulations of the new enacted bankruptcy law. The main findings are that the negotiation platform provided by the statutory reorganization mechanism can contribute to the elimination of inefficient decisions existing in the out-of-court workouts. This shows that the reorganization procedure is a Pareto efficient institutional arrangement. When the firm’s expected reorganization value is relative low but still more than the liquidation value and the bargaining cost of the debt cut exceeds the abandoned reorganizing proceeds of dispersed creditors, then the senior bank’s debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing will be conducive to the Pareto improvement of the debtor’s reorganization. Based on the case study of“Hejin Investment”, we find that the reorganization theory are effective, and suggest the Delong crisis disposal basically meets the goal of ex post efficiency while taking the ex ante efficiency into consideration.
Finally, learning from Delong crisis and the disposal experience, the dissertation gives some policy recommendations on how to prevent the transmission of bankruptcy risk in QFHG, and how to monitor the QFHG’s bankruptcy risk effectively, and how government can play a role during a QFHG crisis and other similar events with protential systemic financial risk.
本文以德隆系企业的风险处置为案例和背景,对中国准金融控股企业集团的发展、破产风险的控制和处置进行较为系统地研究。试图解决如下问题:我国的准金融控股企业集团应该借鉴哪种成功的国际模式以便实现可持续发展?应该如何有效地评估、控制和处置集团及其成员企业的破产风险?如何在新《企业破产法》的框架下建立符合市场经济规律的、能够有效指导企业破产实践的重整理论?华融资产管理有限公司在政府的行政干预下对德隆系企业的破产操作是否符合破产程序的效率目标?以及如何对准金融控股企业集团进行有效监管,如何确定政府在干预可能引发金融系统风险的企业破产时的角色定位等一系列问题。
文章首先简要地从交易费用理论、产权理论、委托代理理论、基于资源与能力的企业理论对准金融控股企业集团的形成进行经济学解释。比较了准金融控股企业集团在基于市场的金融系统和基于银行的金融系统中不同的发展模式,前者容易形成“资本溢出型”发展模式,而后者容易形成“融资依赖型”发展模式。接着分析中国准金融控股企业集团的发展现状与风险特征。由于中国在发展经济的过程中,更多地是借鉴日韩经验,政府在准金融控股企业集团的形成过程中起了很大的推动作用,因此也使得我国的准金融控股企业集团更偏向于“融资依赖型”。由于准金融控股企业集团具有风险传染和风险外溢的特征,其破产很可能引发金融危机和社会动荡,因此德隆集团遭遇的破产危机为解决“如何有效控制和处置准金融控股企业集团的破产风险”提供了一个很好案例研究机会。
通过把合金投资、湘火炬和新疆屯河三家上市公司作为德隆实业的代表,文章分析了我国实业集团进行产融结合的财务动机,即解决企业快速发展过程中面临的融资约束问题。在准金融控股企业集团管理层建立企业帝国的趋向下,容易忽视负债能力而使企业过度负债,从而使集团暴露于不可控的破产风险之中。为控制好破产风险,管理者可以从资产担保和偿债资金来源的角度分别估计企业的整体负债能力、应该负债极限和有息负债能力,并尽量坚持把企业的实际债务水平控制在应该负债极限的范围之内。德隆危机起源于旗下的金融机构,之所以会波及到实体上市公司的一个重要原因就是企业超过负债能力严重过度负债,以至于无法偿付到期债务。
为了说明在新破产法颁布之前,华融公司在政府的行政干预下对德隆系企业所实施的一系列破产操作是否符合市场经济条件下企业破产的效率目标,文章在现有的关于企业如何私下解决财务困境的理论研究基础上,依据我国新破产法建立了财务困境企业的破产重整模型。研究发现:重整制度搭建的谈判平台有助于消除财务困境在庭下解决阶段的无效决策问题,从而证明重整是一种Pareto改进的制度安排;当企业的重整期望价值较低但仍大于其清算价值而与分散债权人进行债务减免的谈判成本又较高时,提高银行DIP重整融资的优先级则会有助于重整制度的Pareto改进。通过对“合金投资”的重组案例进行分析和比较,文章验证了上述重整理论的有效性,同时也认为德隆系的市场化破产在满足事后有效目标的同时也兼顾了事前效率。同时也认为德隆系的市场化风险处置在满足事后有效目标的同时也兼顾了事前效率。
文章最后针对德隆集团破产危机爆发的原因及风险的处置经验,就如何防止破产风险在准金融控股企业集团内部相互传染、如何有效监管准金融控股集团的金融风险,以及政府在处理准金融控股企业集团的破产危机等类似金融风险的过程中如何进行角色定位等方面提出了一些政策建议。
Since Chinese reform and opening up, the domestic capital market has made great development. Many industrial enterprise groups has transformed into the so-called“Quasi-Financial Holding Group (abbreviated QFHG)”that controlling no less than two financial institutions through direct investment or mergers and acquisitions during the reforming process of China’s market economic system. According to a survey conducted by People’s Bank of China, up to June 30, 2005, there have been 528 industrial enterprise groups investing in more than two types of financial institutions, and 57 among them have formed the QFHG. When the integration of industry-finance capital (IIFC) was carried out enthusiastically at home, the famous private QFHG, Delong collapsed in 2004. As Delong is such a mighty group with many financial institutions, listed or non-listed companies and investors, the crisis has left a great amout of bad assets to the country’s financial system, and led to a major negative impact on the economic and social development. It also gave an alarm on the bankruptcy risk to other QFHGs and the financial regulatory agencies alike.
This dissertation takes the Delong’s bankruptcy as case and background to study systematically how the QFHG develops, and how to control and dispose of its bankruptcy risk, and tries to answer the following questions: What lessons can we learn from Delong, and which kind of mode should be taken for China’s QFHG to achieve sustainable development? How to effectively assess, control and dispose the bankruptcy risk of QFHG and its subsidaries? How to carry on reorganization prossess in accordance with the market economy rules in the framework of new bankruptcy law? Did the Delong’s bankruptcy conducted by Huarong Asset Management Corporation (HAMC) with the administrative support meet the efficiency goals of insolvency procedures? And how to supervise the QFHG effectively, and how to keep an arm’s length of distance when government has to play a role in the bankruptcy prossess of an entity with protential systemic financial risk?
This dissertation includes the following main content.
Firstly, this dissertation gives a brief economic explanation to the formation of QFHG on the bais of transaction cost theory, property rights, agency theory, and the resource-based and capability theory of firm, and tells the QFHG’s different developing modes in market-based financial system and bank-based financial system. The former is called“capital overflow”mode, and the latter is called“finance-dependent”mode. Then we analyze the development status and risk characteristics of Chinese QFHGs. Because China draws more experiences from Japan and Korea in economy development, the financial markets are dominated by banks, so China’s QFHGs are prone to be "finance-dependent" mode. As the risk of QFHG is contagious, the bankruptcy of QFHG may cause financial crisis and social upheaval. The Delong crisis provides an excellent case study opportunity.
Taken the three listed companies“Hejin Investment, Xiang Torch, and Xinjiang Tunhe”as the industrial representatives of Delong, this paper analyzes the financial motivation of industrial groups’IIFC in China, that is aiming at the resolution of financial constraints faced by the group’s rapid development. But the QFHG’s managers usually overestimate the company’s debt capacity (DC) with their dreams of empire building. This may result in the problem of serious debt overhang, and therefore brings the group exposing to non-controllable bankruptcy risk. In order to control the bankruptcy risk, managers should reasonably estimate the overall debt capacity (ODC), the debt-limit-should-be(DLSB)and the interest bearing debt capacity (IBDC) based on the assets cover and net operating cash flow, and manage to control the actual related financial leverages within the scope of DLSB. Delong’s crisis originated in its financial institutions, one important reason that the industrial listed companies are affected is their serious debt overhang, that is the real leverages exceeding their objective DCs too much, and so can’t pay their due debt.
To illustrate whether the Delong’s bankruptcy conducted by HAMC under administrative support before the new bankruptcy law is enacted meets the efficiency goals of insolvency procedures. The dissertation, based on theories about how to solve financial difficulties privately, proposes a new reorganization model of financially distressed firm according to the specific regulations of the new enacted bankruptcy law. The main findings are that the negotiation platform provided by the statutory reorganization mechanism can contribute to the elimination of inefficient decisions existing in the out-of-court workouts. This shows that the reorganization procedure is a Pareto efficient institutional arrangement. When the firm’s expected reorganization value is relative low but still more than the liquidation value and the bargaining cost of the debt cut exceeds the abandoned reorganizing proceeds of dispersed creditors, then the senior bank’s debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing will be conducive to the Pareto improvement of the debtor’s reorganization. Based on the case study of“Hejin Investment”, we find that the reorganization theory are effective, and suggest the Delong crisis disposal basically meets the goal of ex post efficiency while taking the ex ante efficiency into consideration.
Finally, learning from Delong crisis and the disposal experience, the dissertation gives some policy recommendations on how to prevent the transmission of bankruptcy risk in QFHG, and how to monitor the QFHG’s bankruptcy risk effectively, and how government can play a role during a QFHG crisis and other similar events with protential systemic financial risk.
引文
7参见:杰克·韦尔奇著,谢德高译《经理法则全书》,九州出版社,2002
10参见:类金融控股企业集团监管课题组,类金融控股企业集团的监管与风险处置-德隆事件引发的思考,南开大学出版社,2008年8月。
32《德隆系实业企业托管重组》中国华融资产管理公司,2006年12月,P121-125。
33参见:中国华融资产管理公司编著,《德隆系非证券金融机构案例》,2006年12月。
46刘欣然,从以毒攻毒到毒发身亡:老庄德隆轰塌回放,21世纪经济报道,2008年1月1日,第15版。
47凌华薇、曹海丽、周帆,产业整合神话背后,财经杂志2006年第1期,P54-55
48银监会,关于客户风险统计监测和预警工作进展情况的报告,P3-4
51参见:国务院办公厅关于《中华人民共和国信托法》公布执行后有关问题的通知,2001年12月。
52新华社快讯,法治视线·法治快递,德隆主案在武汉公开宣判,唐万新被判处8年有期徒刑,2006年4月29日。
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10参见:类金融控股企业集团监管课题组,类金融控股企业集团的监管与风险处置-德隆事件引发的思考,南开大学出版社,2008年8月。
32《德隆系实业企业托管重组》中国华融资产管理公司,2006年12月,P121-125。
33参见:中国华融资产管理公司编著,《德隆系非证券金融机构案例》,2006年12月。
46刘欣然,从以毒攻毒到毒发身亡:老庄德隆轰塌回放,21世纪经济报道,2008年1月1日,第15版。
47凌华薇、曹海丽、周帆,产业整合神话背后,财经杂志2006年第1期,P54-55
48银监会,关于客户风险统计监测和预警工作进展情况的报告,P3-4
51参见:国务院办公厅关于《中华人民共和国信托法》公布执行后有关问题的通知,2001年12月。
52新华社快讯,法治视线·法治快递,德隆主案在武汉公开宣判,唐万新被判处8年有期徒刑,2006年4月29日。
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