水电站参与市场竞争的代理机制设计
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摘要
随着我国电力体制改革的逐步深入、能源供应短缺的加剧和环境保护要求的日益提高,水电资源的优化配置与充分利用已经成为优化能源结构、实现电力工业可持续发展的重要途径,对于建设资源节约型和环境友好型社会具有十分重要的现实意义。水电站具有与火电不同的技术、经济特性,在市场竞争中如何保证水电资源的最优配置是近年来我国学者关注的热点问题之一。本文借鉴国外水电站参与电力市场竞争的成功经验,结合我国国情,重点研究了所属同一投资主体的梯级水电站参与市场竞价模型、所属不同投资主体的梯级水电站参与市场的代理机制设计和小水电站参与市场的代理机制设计,对于保证市场环境下水电资源有效利用的机制设计具有一定的参考价值。
在电力市场中,所属同一投资主体的梯级水电站必然会以梯级整体收入最大化为目标、考虑梯级约束协调参与竞争。针对这种情况,论文建立了以电能交易和备用服务收入综合最大为目标的梯级水电站日前市场竞价模型,并采用免疫遗传算法和随机模拟技术求解。
我国梯级水电站存在投资主体不统一的现状。当所属不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争时,会导致梯级水电资源配置的低效性。针对这一问题,论文首先建立了不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争时的水电资源配置低效性分析模型和上下游梯级间的信息不对称风险分析模型,并采用非线性互补方法和随机模拟技术求解;在此基础上,提出了不同投资主体的梯级水电站采用代理机制参与市场竞争的方式,并对梯级水电站代理机制进行了初步设计;最后,运用实物期权和谈判模型的相关理论,对梯级水电站代理的博弈均衡状态进行分析,初步验证了相对于不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争,文中提出的梯级水电站代理机制可以实现水电资源配置的帕累托改进。
从小水电站的技术经济特点出发,论文提出在小水电比重较大的省(区)采用代理机制实现小水电参与发电侧市场竞争,并对小水电代理机制进行了初步设计;建立了小水电代理商参与市场竞争的线性供应函数均衡模型,采用随机模拟技术和高斯随机搜索算法求解市场均衡状态,初步验证了小水电代理机制的有效性与合理性。
With gradual deepening of the reform in the electric power system, exacerbation of energy shortage and environmental protection requirements, the optimizing deployment and making full use of hydropower resources are of great practical significance for the construction of a resource-saving and environment-friendly society, and have become more and more important for accelerating energy industry structure optimization and realizing sustainable development of electric power industry. Compared with thermal power, hydropower stations have different technical and economic characteristics. How to ensure optimized deployment of hydropower resources by electricity market competition is paid much attention by our researchers. The successful experiences of hydropower participation in foreign electricity markets are used for reference, and China's national conditions are considered, the dissertation focus on the bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to the same investment entity in electricity market, the agency mechanism design of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to different investment entities for electricity market competition, and the agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations for electricity market competition. The research achievement of this dissertation has a certain reference value on the mechanism design of ensuring efficient utilization of hydropower resources in electricity market.
In electricity market, cascaded hydropower stations from the same investor will joint together to participate the market, and the objective function is maximizing the overall revenue of cascaded hydropower stations. In this case, a bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations considering reserve service in day-ahead market is presented in the dissertation. A hybrid algorithm that combines immune genetic algorithm and probabilistic simulation is proposed to solve the model.
It is a common phenomenon that the investors of cascaded hydropower stations are different in China. When cascaded hydropower stations individually behave on behalf of their respective interests, the optimized deployment of hydropower resources will not be achieved. To deal with the problem, models used to analyze the low efficiency of cascaded hydropower resources and the market risk resulted from the asymmetric information between cascaded hydropower stations are established in the dissertation firstly, and a hybrid strategy which combines nonlinear complementarity method and probabilistic simulation is presented. Secondly, an agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations is designed to resolve the problem. Thirdly, the real option and bargaining model theory are used to analysis the equilibrium under the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations, the equilibrium result verifies that the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations which is proposed in the dissertation can achieve the Pareto Improvement of hydropower resources’deployment.
Based on the features of small hydropower stations, an agency mechanism is designed in the dissertation to deal with market competition of small hydropower stations in some provinces which small hydropower stations have a big market proportion. The agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations is discussed in the dissertation. A supply function model considering uncertainty of inflows is proposed, and a mixed optimization strategy combined with stochastic simulation and greedy algorithm is applied to obtain the market gaming equilibrium. Numerical results verify the validity and the rationality of the agency mechanism.
在电力市场中,所属同一投资主体的梯级水电站必然会以梯级整体收入最大化为目标、考虑梯级约束协调参与竞争。针对这种情况,论文建立了以电能交易和备用服务收入综合最大为目标的梯级水电站日前市场竞价模型,并采用免疫遗传算法和随机模拟技术求解。
我国梯级水电站存在投资主体不统一的现状。当所属不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争时,会导致梯级水电资源配置的低效性。针对这一问题,论文首先建立了不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争时的水电资源配置低效性分析模型和上下游梯级间的信息不对称风险分析模型,并采用非线性互补方法和随机模拟技术求解;在此基础上,提出了不同投资主体的梯级水电站采用代理机制参与市场竞争的方式,并对梯级水电站代理机制进行了初步设计;最后,运用实物期权和谈判模型的相关理论,对梯级水电站代理的博弈均衡状态进行分析,初步验证了相对于不同投资主体的梯级水电站单独参与市场竞争,文中提出的梯级水电站代理机制可以实现水电资源配置的帕累托改进。
从小水电站的技术经济特点出发,论文提出在小水电比重较大的省(区)采用代理机制实现小水电参与发电侧市场竞争,并对小水电代理机制进行了初步设计;建立了小水电代理商参与市场竞争的线性供应函数均衡模型,采用随机模拟技术和高斯随机搜索算法求解市场均衡状态,初步验证了小水电代理机制的有效性与合理性。
With gradual deepening of the reform in the electric power system, exacerbation of energy shortage and environmental protection requirements, the optimizing deployment and making full use of hydropower resources are of great practical significance for the construction of a resource-saving and environment-friendly society, and have become more and more important for accelerating energy industry structure optimization and realizing sustainable development of electric power industry. Compared with thermal power, hydropower stations have different technical and economic characteristics. How to ensure optimized deployment of hydropower resources by electricity market competition is paid much attention by our researchers. The successful experiences of hydropower participation in foreign electricity markets are used for reference, and China's national conditions are considered, the dissertation focus on the bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to the same investment entity in electricity market, the agency mechanism design of cascaded hydropower stations which belong to different investment entities for electricity market competition, and the agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations for electricity market competition. The research achievement of this dissertation has a certain reference value on the mechanism design of ensuring efficient utilization of hydropower resources in electricity market.
In electricity market, cascaded hydropower stations from the same investor will joint together to participate the market, and the objective function is maximizing the overall revenue of cascaded hydropower stations. In this case, a bidding model of cascaded hydropower stations considering reserve service in day-ahead market is presented in the dissertation. A hybrid algorithm that combines immune genetic algorithm and probabilistic simulation is proposed to solve the model.
It is a common phenomenon that the investors of cascaded hydropower stations are different in China. When cascaded hydropower stations individually behave on behalf of their respective interests, the optimized deployment of hydropower resources will not be achieved. To deal with the problem, models used to analyze the low efficiency of cascaded hydropower resources and the market risk resulted from the asymmetric information between cascaded hydropower stations are established in the dissertation firstly, and a hybrid strategy which combines nonlinear complementarity method and probabilistic simulation is presented. Secondly, an agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations is designed to resolve the problem. Thirdly, the real option and bargaining model theory are used to analysis the equilibrium under the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations, the equilibrium result verifies that the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations which is proposed in the dissertation can achieve the Pareto Improvement of hydropower resources’deployment.
Based on the features of small hydropower stations, an agency mechanism is designed in the dissertation to deal with market competition of small hydropower stations in some provinces which small hydropower stations have a big market proportion. The agency mechanism design of small hydropower stations is discussed in the dissertation. A supply function model considering uncertainty of inflows is proposed, and a mixed optimization strategy combined with stochastic simulation and greedy algorithm is applied to obtain the market gaming equilibrium. Numerical results verify the validity and the rationality of the agency mechanism.
引文
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