基于合作博弈理论的经营性公路资产转让研究
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摘要
在市场经济条件下,公路资产作为一类特殊的资产已经进入市场,越来越多的非公有资本参与公路项目的建设与运营。这些国内外经济组织成立专门的项目公司从建设期到特许经营期结束这段时间对公路项目进行管理,主要以获得经济利益为目的。但是在实际运作过程中,很多项目公司会因为种种内在或外在的原因导致财务亏损,本文就如何最大限度降低项目公司的亏损,同时提高社会效益的问题提出了一个解决思路,即在特许经营期尚未结束的时候,政府给予项目公司一定的经济补偿,项目公司将收费经营权归还国家,公路由政府交通主管部门统一经营管理。
这个解决问题的方法中,资产转让价值的确定成为了一个关键问题,它关系到政府和项目公司双方利益的博弈,以及这个方法是否能够顺利实施。本论文分析了经营性公路资产特点及特许经营项目的风险,提出了能使政府和项目公司尽量达到双赢的一个思路;进行了经营性公路二人讨价还价博弈的基本设定和要素分析,进而构建了一个二人讨价还价合作博弈模型,研究了模型的K-S求解方法;论文还对合作博弈模型中的几个重要参数进行了量化研究,包括特许经营期内远景交通流量预测方法、项目公司亏损值的计算方法和项目社会效益的计算方法。通过这些方法的研究来解决政府究竟补偿多少的问题。
论文最后通过实证分析,进行了经营性公路资产转让价值的计算,验证了方法和模型的实用性和正确性。论文研究成果为解决经营性公路资产转让问题提供了一个新思路和新方法,这些理论、模型与方法具有一定的理论和实践价值。
Under the condition of market economy, highway asset as a kind of special assets has entered the market, more and more non-public capital participates in the construction and operation of highway project. These domestic and foreign economic organizations set up a special project company to manage highway project from construction to the end of charter period, mainly for the purpose of economic benefits. But in actual operation process, a lot of project companies have financial losses because of a variety of internal or external cause. This paper puts forward a solution for how to minimize the project company losses and improve the social benefit, the solution is that the government gives a certain economic compensation to the project company when the concession period hasn’t finished, the project company gives franchise back to the government, and state transportation departments unified management highway.
In the solution to the problems, the determination of the assets transferring value becomes a key issues, it is linked to the interest game between the government and the project company, and whether the method of the game can be smooth implemented. This paper analyzes the characteristics of the profit-making highway asset and risks of franchising project, puts forward a train of thought which can make the government and the project companies try to achieve win-win; It gives some two-person bargain game basic settings and factor analysis for the profit-making highway, and then builds a two-person bargain game model, researches the K-S solution of the model; This paper also does the quantitative research of several important parameters in the cooperative game theory model, including franchise period traffic flow forecasting methods, calculation method of company’s losses value and calculation method of project’s social benefits. Through the research of these methods, this paper solves the problem that the government how to compensate.
Finally, this paper takes the profit-making highway asset transfer value calculation through empirical analysis, verifies the practicability and validity of the method and model. This paper’s research results provides a new thinking and new methods for solving profit-making highway asset transfer. These theories, model and methods have certain theoretical and practical value.
这个解决问题的方法中,资产转让价值的确定成为了一个关键问题,它关系到政府和项目公司双方利益的博弈,以及这个方法是否能够顺利实施。本论文分析了经营性公路资产特点及特许经营项目的风险,提出了能使政府和项目公司尽量达到双赢的一个思路;进行了经营性公路二人讨价还价博弈的基本设定和要素分析,进而构建了一个二人讨价还价合作博弈模型,研究了模型的K-S求解方法;论文还对合作博弈模型中的几个重要参数进行了量化研究,包括特许经营期内远景交通流量预测方法、项目公司亏损值的计算方法和项目社会效益的计算方法。通过这些方法的研究来解决政府究竟补偿多少的问题。
论文最后通过实证分析,进行了经营性公路资产转让价值的计算,验证了方法和模型的实用性和正确性。论文研究成果为解决经营性公路资产转让问题提供了一个新思路和新方法,这些理论、模型与方法具有一定的理论和实践价值。
Under the condition of market economy, highway asset as a kind of special assets has entered the market, more and more non-public capital participates in the construction and operation of highway project. These domestic and foreign economic organizations set up a special project company to manage highway project from construction to the end of charter period, mainly for the purpose of economic benefits. But in actual operation process, a lot of project companies have financial losses because of a variety of internal or external cause. This paper puts forward a solution for how to minimize the project company losses and improve the social benefit, the solution is that the government gives a certain economic compensation to the project company when the concession period hasn’t finished, the project company gives franchise back to the government, and state transportation departments unified management highway.
In the solution to the problems, the determination of the assets transferring value becomes a key issues, it is linked to the interest game between the government and the project company, and whether the method of the game can be smooth implemented. This paper analyzes the characteristics of the profit-making highway asset and risks of franchising project, puts forward a train of thought which can make the government and the project companies try to achieve win-win; It gives some two-person bargain game basic settings and factor analysis for the profit-making highway, and then builds a two-person bargain game model, researches the K-S solution of the model; This paper also does the quantitative research of several important parameters in the cooperative game theory model, including franchise period traffic flow forecasting methods, calculation method of company’s losses value and calculation method of project’s social benefits. Through the research of these methods, this paper solves the problem that the government how to compensate.
Finally, this paper takes the profit-making highway asset transfer value calculation through empirical analysis, verifies the practicability and validity of the method and model. This paper’s research results provides a new thinking and new methods for solving profit-making highway asset transfer. These theories, model and methods have certain theoretical and practical value.
引文
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[9]袁剑波,周雁,江宏.资产价值评估方法在公路建设项目国民经济评价中的应用.公路与汽运,2009(4):248-250
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[20] Ghosh S, Jakkapan J. Identifying and assessing the critical risk factors in an underground rail project in Thailand:a factor analysis approach. International Journal of Project Management, 2004,22(8):633-643.
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[28] Malini E. Build operate transfer municipal bridge projects in India. Journal of Management in Engineering, 1999, 15(4):51—58.
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[41]黄慧君.论BOT特许协议的若干定性.广东教育学院学报,2010,30(1):13-17
[42]周旦平.BOT的类型及风险控制.施工企业管理,2010,258(2):99-100
[43]高岚君.BOT方式中的政府保证研究.北京:法律出版社,2002,279
[44]冯宁.国际公路工程BOT项目政治风险评估与防范.北方交通,2010,(5):126-128
[45]张水波,高颖.国际BOT项目合同框架分析以及风险防范.天津大学﹡国际工程管理论坛, 2010,(1):74-77
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[2]鲍海君,申立银,吴宇哲.基础设施BOT(build-operate-transfer)项目特许权期决策的Bargaining博弈模型.浙江大学学报(理学版),2010,37 (2):160-165
[3]郑淑贤,王斐民.论BOT特许权协议的性质及其争议解决.经济研究导刊,2009,71(33):92-94
[4]周忠于.民营企业参与BOT项目面临的问题及对策.长沙铁道学院学报(社会科学版),2010,11(2):42-46
[5]王克宝.公路经营权转让研究:[西安公路交通大学硕士学位论文].西安:交通运输规划与管理系,2000,25-28
[6]周国光,李颜娟.规范公路收费权转让行为的政策研究.中国公路学报,2005,18(4):104-109
[7]曹翔.我国收费公路权益转让问题研究.交通财会,2010,278(9):8-10
[8]宣江平,周凯.规范经营性公路收费权政府回购问题研究.交通企业管理,2009,251(7):22-23
[9]袁剑波,周雁,江宏.资产价值评估方法在公路建设项目国民经济评价中的应用.公路与汽运,2009(4):248-250
[10]徐海成.影响公路资产评估的因素分析.辽宁交通科技,1995,18(4):26-27
[11]龙敏,沈新华,郑莉.高速公路经营权估价理论与方法综述.重庆交通大学学报(社科版),2007,7(3):23-28
[12]李颜娟,程龙.收益法和成本法评估公路收费权结果的趋同性分析.长安大学学报(社会科学版),2004,6(4):14-20
[13]赖慧敏,曾政委.法国高速公路供给的公私伙伴关系分析.牡丹江教育学院学报,2006,(5):153-154
[14]武玉琴.我国高速公路项目融资结构及融资决策研究:[暨南大学硕士学位论文].广州:暨南大学管理科学与工程系,2006,15-19
[15]王学玲.北美公路建设的融资方式及其投资回收.国外交通运输,1997,(8):35-38
[16]石友服.日本收费高速公路的建设及管理体制.中外公路, 2004 ,24(1):112-114
[17]邹志云,毛保华,郭志勇.公路交通资产管理系统框架研究.华中科技大学学报,2005,(6):19-22
[18] Gallimore P, Williams W, Woodward D. Perceptions of risk in the private finance initiative.Journal of Property Finance, 1997,8(2):164-176.
[19] Mohamed M A, Ahmed A G. Problems facing parties involved in Build, Opcrate, and Transport projects in Egypt. Journal of Management in Engineering, 2002,18(4):173-178.
[20] Ghosh S, Jakkapan J. Identifying and assessing the critical risk factors in an underground rail project in Thailand:a factor analysis approach. International Journal of Project Management, 2004,22(8):633-643.
[21] Miller R, Lessard D. Understanding and managing risks in large engineering projects. International Journal of Project Management, 2001, 19(8):437-443.
[22] Schaufelberger J E, Isr W. Alternate Financing strategies for build-operate-transfer projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 2003, 129(2):205-213.
[23] Vega, Arturo 0. Risk allocation in infrastructure financing. Journal of Project Finance, 1997, 3(2):38-42.
[24] Tiong R L K, Alum J. Final negotiation in competitive BOT tender.Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 1997,123(1):6-10.
[25] Burnes B, Coram R. Barriers to partnerships in the public sector: the case of the UK construction industry. Supply Chain Management, 1999, 4(1):43-50.
[26] Scharle P. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) as a social game.Innovation, 2002, 15(3):227-254.
[27] Froud J, Shaoul J. Appraising and evaluating PFI for NHS hospitals. Financial Accountability and Management, 2001, 17(3):247-270.
[28] Malini E. Build operate transfer municipal bridge projects in India. Journal of Management in Engineering, 1999, 15(4):51—58.
[29] Michael Klein, Bidding for Concessions-The Impact of Contract Design, The World Bank Group: Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Network, note No.158, November 1998.
[30] Juan Rosellon, Jonathan Halpem, Designing Natural Gas Distribution Concessions in Mexico City: Tradeoffs between Scale Economies and Information Disclosure in Mexico City,The World Bank, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER, No.2538, Finance,Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit, January 2001.
[31]苏淑欢,朱健仪.资产评估学.广州:中山大学出版社.2002,1-7
[32]李海东.高速公路资产问题研究.中国资产评估,2003,(5):25-27
[33]新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京:经济科学出版社.1992,1101
[34]马克思.政治经济学批判大纲(草稿)第三分册.北京:人民出版社.1963,113-114
[35]岳福斌.现代产权制度研究.北京:中央编译出版社.2007,4-6
[36]朱心来,和丕禅.财产所有权与产权关系探析.福建论坛﹡经济社会版,2001(7):12-15
[37]陈国恒.国有产权制度改革研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社.2004,90-93
[38]徐海成.公路资产论:[西安公路交通大学博士学位论文].西安:西安公路交通大学交通运输工程系,1999,23-29
[39]朱明侠,魏铁梅.特许经营.北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社.2007,2-3
[40]张丽桂.关于公路资产价值确定及会计核算问题的初探.交通财会,1997,116(3):33-35
[41]黄慧君.论BOT特许协议的若干定性.广东教育学院学报,2010,30(1):13-17
[42]周旦平.BOT的类型及风险控制.施工企业管理,2010,258(2):99-100
[43]高岚君.BOT方式中的政府保证研究.北京:法律出版社,2002,279
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