农业产业投资基金治理研究
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摘要
本文从新制度经济学和委托代理理论的角度对农业产业投资基金的治理问题作了新的界定,以投资、金融、契约、博弈论和新制度经济学等理论为基础,从制度层面来认识、考察和分析农业产业投资基金,以农业产业投资基金的治理现状为切入点,研究了包括治理结构、代理关系、激励约束机制以及道德风险问题等在内的农业产业投资基金的治理问题,为人们研究农业产业投资基金提供了一个新的视角。
对于农业产业投资基金的治理问题,本文作了如下几个方面的研究。第一,分析了农业产业投资基金治理结构及其委托代理关系,对农业产业投资基金委托代理关系的形成机制和机理进行了理论分析,并对农业产业投资基金的主要参与者的行为特征进行了分析。提出了农业产业投资基金内部治理的双重委托代理关系,并通过一般化模型分别分析了其中的道德风险问题与逆向选择问题的形成原因与解决思路。第二,研究了农业产业投资基金双重委托代理的激励约束机制,通过委托代理的薪酬模型分析了两重委托代理中代理人的激励需求,结合投资基金的激励机制和约束机制的实践经验分析了农业产业投资基金的激励约束需求问题,并在此基础上分别探讨了第一重委托代理和第二重委托代理的激励约束机制设计。第三,针对农业产业投资基金项目选择过程中的逆向选择问题,建立了一个基于DEA的成本效率模型的投资项目选择模型,并通过算法改进有效的降低了其对决策单元数量的要求。投资项目选择模型在项目评价过程中将农业项目的经济效益和社会效益相结合,在备选项目较少的情况下同样能有效地选择出综合效益最高的项目。第四,研究了农业产业投资基金的组织模式及组织形式选择。第五,对农业产业投资基金中的寻租问题进行了演化博弈分析,通过非对称演化博弈分析了农业产业投资基金中的基金管理人和农业企业家的寻租问题。通过寻租博弈的四种情况分析了基金管理人和农业企业家寻租策略的演化路径和稳定状态,并探讨了农业产业投资基金中的寻租双方的可能寻租演化路径。
就当前我国农业产业投资基金蓬勃兴起的背景下,如何完善农业产业投资基金的治理机制及治理制度,保障农业产业投资基金的健康快速发展,本文提出了相关政策建议,主要有两个方面,一是现有农业产业投资基金治理结构的完善,其中包括契约型治理结构的完善和构建有限合伙型基金制度；二是农业产业投资基金治理环境的优化,要发挥市场竞争在农业产业投资基金治理中的作用,并建立健全的农业产业投资基金监管体系。
In this paper, we use new institutional economics and principal-agent theory, giving a new definition of governance agriculture industrial investment funds, basic on investment, finance, contracts, game theory and new institutional economics theory, from a system perspective to understand, investigation and analysis of agricultural investment fund industry, take the governance situation of the agricultural industrial investment fund as the starting point,study the governance issues of agricultural industrial investment fund governance issues, including governance structure, agency relationship, incentive and restraint mechanisms, and moral hazard problems, and provide a new perspective for people to study agricultural investment fund.
To the governance issues for the agricultural industrial investment funds, this paper made the following aspects of the study. Firstl, analysis of agricultural industrial investment fund's organizational structure, theoretical analysis the Agricultural Industrial Investment Fund the formation mechanism of the principle-agency relationship and mechanism, analyzing the characteristics of the participants'behavior, using the generalized model analysis the causes of moral hazard problem and adverse selection the problem and proposed the solution ideas. Second, through the theoretical model to study the agricultural industrial investment fund's rent-seeking problems arising from principal-agent, through principle-agents remuneration model to analysis of the double agent of the principal-agent incentive needs, combined with practical experience of the investment fund incentive and restraint mechanisms to incentive and restraint needs of the agricultural industry investment fund, study the agricultural industrial investment fund's dual principal-agent incentive and restraint mechanisms. Third, basic on data envelopment analysis model, established a DEA model based on the cost efficiency of the investment decision-making model, and reduce the number of decision making units of requirements. Investment decision-making model to evaluate the agricultural projects will consider both economic benefits and social benefits, and it also can effectively choose the highest comprehensive benefit project in the circumstances of less DMU. Fourth, discusses about the content and mechanism of agricultural industrial investment fund's organizational models and organizational form, and make a comparative analysis of each. Fifth, use asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of rent-seeking problems of the fund managers and agricultural entrepreneurs in the agricultural industrial investment funds. Through analysis four Rent-seeking game situations, we analysis the evolution path of agricultural entrepreneurs'and fund managers' rent-seeking strategies.
Finally, in the context of the booming of China's agricultural industrial investment fund, to improve the agricultural industrial investment fund governance mechanism and governance system, and ensure the healthy and rapid development of the agricultural industrial investment fund, this paper presents some policy recommendations. There are two main aspects, First, the improvement of the existing agricultural industrial investment fund governance structure, including improve contractual governance structure and build a limited partnership system; second, the optimization of the environment of agricultural industrial investment fund governance, give scope to the role of market competition to the governance of agricultural industrial investment fund, and establish sound agricultural industrial investment fund regulatory system.
对于农业产业投资基金的治理问题,本文作了如下几个方面的研究。第一,分析了农业产业投资基金治理结构及其委托代理关系,对农业产业投资基金委托代理关系的形成机制和机理进行了理论分析,并对农业产业投资基金的主要参与者的行为特征进行了分析。提出了农业产业投资基金内部治理的双重委托代理关系,并通过一般化模型分别分析了其中的道德风险问题与逆向选择问题的形成原因与解决思路。第二,研究了农业产业投资基金双重委托代理的激励约束机制,通过委托代理的薪酬模型分析了两重委托代理中代理人的激励需求,结合投资基金的激励机制和约束机制的实践经验分析了农业产业投资基金的激励约束需求问题,并在此基础上分别探讨了第一重委托代理和第二重委托代理的激励约束机制设计。第三,针对农业产业投资基金项目选择过程中的逆向选择问题,建立了一个基于DEA的成本效率模型的投资项目选择模型,并通过算法改进有效的降低了其对决策单元数量的要求。投资项目选择模型在项目评价过程中将农业项目的经济效益和社会效益相结合,在备选项目较少的情况下同样能有效地选择出综合效益最高的项目。第四,研究了农业产业投资基金的组织模式及组织形式选择。第五,对农业产业投资基金中的寻租问题进行了演化博弈分析,通过非对称演化博弈分析了农业产业投资基金中的基金管理人和农业企业家的寻租问题。通过寻租博弈的四种情况分析了基金管理人和农业企业家寻租策略的演化路径和稳定状态,并探讨了农业产业投资基金中的寻租双方的可能寻租演化路径。
就当前我国农业产业投资基金蓬勃兴起的背景下,如何完善农业产业投资基金的治理机制及治理制度,保障农业产业投资基金的健康快速发展,本文提出了相关政策建议,主要有两个方面,一是现有农业产业投资基金治理结构的完善,其中包括契约型治理结构的完善和构建有限合伙型基金制度；二是农业产业投资基金治理环境的优化,要发挥市场竞争在农业产业投资基金治理中的作用,并建立健全的农业产业投资基金监管体系。
In this paper, we use new institutional economics and principal-agent theory, giving a new definition of governance agriculture industrial investment funds, basic on investment, finance, contracts, game theory and new institutional economics theory, from a system perspective to understand, investigation and analysis of agricultural investment fund industry, take the governance situation of the agricultural industrial investment fund as the starting point,study the governance issues of agricultural industrial investment fund governance issues, including governance structure, agency relationship, incentive and restraint mechanisms, and moral hazard problems, and provide a new perspective for people to study agricultural investment fund.
To the governance issues for the agricultural industrial investment funds, this paper made the following aspects of the study. Firstl, analysis of agricultural industrial investment fund's organizational structure, theoretical analysis the Agricultural Industrial Investment Fund the formation mechanism of the principle-agency relationship and mechanism, analyzing the characteristics of the participants'behavior, using the generalized model analysis the causes of moral hazard problem and adverse selection the problem and proposed the solution ideas. Second, through the theoretical model to study the agricultural industrial investment fund's rent-seeking problems arising from principal-agent, through principle-agents remuneration model to analysis of the double agent of the principal-agent incentive needs, combined with practical experience of the investment fund incentive and restraint mechanisms to incentive and restraint needs of the agricultural industry investment fund, study the agricultural industrial investment fund's dual principal-agent incentive and restraint mechanisms. Third, basic on data envelopment analysis model, established a DEA model based on the cost efficiency of the investment decision-making model, and reduce the number of decision making units of requirements. Investment decision-making model to evaluate the agricultural projects will consider both economic benefits and social benefits, and it also can effectively choose the highest comprehensive benefit project in the circumstances of less DMU. Fourth, discusses about the content and mechanism of agricultural industrial investment fund's organizational models and organizational form, and make a comparative analysis of each. Fifth, use asymmetric evolutionary game analysis of rent-seeking problems of the fund managers and agricultural entrepreneurs in the agricultural industrial investment funds. Through analysis four Rent-seeking game situations, we analysis the evolution path of agricultural entrepreneurs'and fund managers' rent-seeking strategies.
Finally, in the context of the booming of China's agricultural industrial investment fund, to improve the agricultural industrial investment fund governance mechanism and governance system, and ensure the healthy and rapid development of the agricultural industrial investment fund, this paper presents some policy recommendations. There are two main aspects, First, the improvement of the existing agricultural industrial investment fund governance structure, including improve contractual governance structure and build a limited partnership system; second, the optimization of the environment of agricultural industrial investment fund governance, give scope to the role of market competition to the governance of agricultural industrial investment fund, and establish sound agricultural industrial investment fund regulatory system.
引文
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