房地产市场寻租行为的博弈分析
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摘要
改革开放以来,我国的房地产市场迅速发展,成为直接推动经济增长的庞大作用力。房地产业是我国经济发展的支柱产业之一,房地产投资额年平均涨幅超过20%,高于经济增长率,一直拉动国民经济持续、快速增长。同时,房地产市场也产生了大量的负面效应。房地产市场存在问题的具体表现为：投机需求过度、高空置率、房价收入比过高、房地产市场存在大量的寻租现象。这些问题直接或间接影响房价的稳定增加和房地产业健康发展。
房地产市场存在大量的寻租行为。在我国,土地的使用权和所有权分离,国家控制着重要的土地资源。政府依靠转让、出售国有土地资源,获得财政收入。由于我国政府对土地的配置具有特许权,所以稀缺的土地资源就成为了房地产开发商的寻租目标。由于拍卖出让存在大量的暗箱操作,由此产生了大量的寻租行为。
房地产市场寻租行为的结果是社会资源的极大浪费。寻租活动分三个层次：第一层次是房地产开发商为了获得政府的特殊保护,需要资源向相关部门去进行游说；第二层次是政府部门工作人员为了应对房地产企业的寻租行为,需要付出相应的时间和精力；第三层,当寻租行为完成,房地产市场上充满大量寻租者。当寻租行为得以实现,相关的生产者与消费者将由于政府的干预而付出代价。这种代价比寻租者所得到的利润率还要高,因而导致社会福利的净损失。
房地产市场上的各种寻租活动都是竞争性行为活动。每一个利益相关者在做出抉择时都要充分考虑对方的反应,根据对方的反应做出最优选择。本文从博弈论的角度出发,在理性经济人的假设下,讨论房地产市场中不同利益相关者之间的关系,建立两方和三方博弈模型。运用博弈论的研究方法,可以理清当前我国房地产市场中各个经济主体的行为关系,为政府的制度建设提出一些建议。
本文一共分为五大部分：
第一部分,导论。简要介绍选题的研究背景和意义,综述国内外学者对房地产市场寻租行为的研究成果。
第二部分,理论基础。这部分主要介绍了本文将用到的寻租理论和博弈理论,给出两个理论的一些基本原理。
第三部分,房地产市场寻租行为。阐述房地产市场的发展现状,从产生的原因、具体表现、带来的后果来剖析房地产市场上利益相关者的寻租行为。
第四部分,房地产市场的博弈研究。用博弈论的方法分析了房地产市场上利益相关者之问的寻租行为,并对博弈模型结果进行分析。
第五部分,结论。主要对第三部分和第四部分进行总结,并给出建议。
Since the reform and opening-up policy, China's real estate market develops rapidly and becomes the driving force of economic growth. The real estate industry is one of China's pillar industries and always stimulates economic growth。The growth of real estate investment is more than 20% and above the rate of economic growth. Meanwhile, the real estate market also produces a lot of negative effects. There are some problems, such as excessive speculative demand、high vacancy rate、high housing price-income ratio and a lot of rent-seeking phenomenon on the real estate market. These problems directly or indirectly affect steady increase of prices and healthy development of the real estate industry.
There are large amounts of rent-seeking behavior on the real estate market. In China, because of the use right and ownership of land separates, state control the land resources. Government obtains financial income through transferring and selling the land resources. The scarcity of land resources becomes real estate developers'rent-seeking goal because local government has land configuration rights. There are many darkroom operations in the auctioned-sold manner and then appear a lot of rent-seeking behavior.
The result of rent-seeking behaviors on the real estate market is tremendous waste of social resources. Rent-seeking activities by three layers have three levels: The first level, to obtain government'special protection, real estate developers lobby to the relevant departments using resources; The second level, in order to cope with the estate enterprises'rent-seeking behaviors, the government department staffs must pay the corresponding time and energy; The third level, When the rent-seeking behavior completed, there are full of rent seekers on the real estate market. When rent-seeking behavior realized, the related producers and consumers will pay the price due to the government's intervention. The price is higher than profit margins of rent seekers and lead to social welfare's net loss.
The various rent-seeking activities on the real estate market are competitive activities. Each stakeholder make a decision with fully consider each other's reaction and make the best choice according to each other's reaction. Using the game theory and based on the assumption of the rational agent, this paper discusses the relationship between different stakeholders and builds bi-game and tri-game model. Using game research method, we can find out the behavior relationship of the economic subject on the current China's real estate market and give some suggestions for government's system construction.
This paper is divided into 5 parts:
First part, introduction. This part introduces the research background and significance and research results of scholars at home and abroad on the rent-seeking behavior.
Second part, theoretical basis. This part mainly introduces rent-seeking theories and game theory which will be used in the paper and gives some basic principles.
The third part, the rent-seeking on the real estate market. This part expounds the development present situation of the real estate market and analysis the rent-seeking behavior of stakeholders on the real estate market from the causes、the specific performance and the consequences.
The fourth part, game analysis on the real estate market. This part analysis the rent-seeking behavior of prime participants on the real estate market and results of the game model.
The fifth part, conclusion. This part summarizes the third and the fourth part and gives some advices.
房地产市场存在大量的寻租行为。在我国,土地的使用权和所有权分离,国家控制着重要的土地资源。政府依靠转让、出售国有土地资源,获得财政收入。由于我国政府对土地的配置具有特许权,所以稀缺的土地资源就成为了房地产开发商的寻租目标。由于拍卖出让存在大量的暗箱操作,由此产生了大量的寻租行为。
房地产市场寻租行为的结果是社会资源的极大浪费。寻租活动分三个层次：第一层次是房地产开发商为了获得政府的特殊保护,需要资源向相关部门去进行游说；第二层次是政府部门工作人员为了应对房地产企业的寻租行为,需要付出相应的时间和精力；第三层,当寻租行为完成,房地产市场上充满大量寻租者。当寻租行为得以实现,相关的生产者与消费者将由于政府的干预而付出代价。这种代价比寻租者所得到的利润率还要高,因而导致社会福利的净损失。
房地产市场上的各种寻租活动都是竞争性行为活动。每一个利益相关者在做出抉择时都要充分考虑对方的反应,根据对方的反应做出最优选择。本文从博弈论的角度出发,在理性经济人的假设下,讨论房地产市场中不同利益相关者之间的关系,建立两方和三方博弈模型。运用博弈论的研究方法,可以理清当前我国房地产市场中各个经济主体的行为关系,为政府的制度建设提出一些建议。
本文一共分为五大部分：
第一部分,导论。简要介绍选题的研究背景和意义,综述国内外学者对房地产市场寻租行为的研究成果。
第二部分,理论基础。这部分主要介绍了本文将用到的寻租理论和博弈理论,给出两个理论的一些基本原理。
第三部分,房地产市场寻租行为。阐述房地产市场的发展现状,从产生的原因、具体表现、带来的后果来剖析房地产市场上利益相关者的寻租行为。
第四部分,房地产市场的博弈研究。用博弈论的方法分析了房地产市场上利益相关者之问的寻租行为,并对博弈模型结果进行分析。
第五部分,结论。主要对第三部分和第四部分进行总结,并给出建议。
Since the reform and opening-up policy, China's real estate market develops rapidly and becomes the driving force of economic growth. The real estate industry is one of China's pillar industries and always stimulates economic growth。The growth of real estate investment is more than 20% and above the rate of economic growth. Meanwhile, the real estate market also produces a lot of negative effects. There are some problems, such as excessive speculative demand、high vacancy rate、high housing price-income ratio and a lot of rent-seeking phenomenon on the real estate market. These problems directly or indirectly affect steady increase of prices and healthy development of the real estate industry.
There are large amounts of rent-seeking behavior on the real estate market. In China, because of the use right and ownership of land separates, state control the land resources. Government obtains financial income through transferring and selling the land resources. The scarcity of land resources becomes real estate developers'rent-seeking goal because local government has land configuration rights. There are many darkroom operations in the auctioned-sold manner and then appear a lot of rent-seeking behavior.
The result of rent-seeking behaviors on the real estate market is tremendous waste of social resources. Rent-seeking activities by three layers have three levels: The first level, to obtain government'special protection, real estate developers lobby to the relevant departments using resources; The second level, in order to cope with the estate enterprises'rent-seeking behaviors, the government department staffs must pay the corresponding time and energy; The third level, When the rent-seeking behavior completed, there are full of rent seekers on the real estate market. When rent-seeking behavior realized, the related producers and consumers will pay the price due to the government's intervention. The price is higher than profit margins of rent seekers and lead to social welfare's net loss.
The various rent-seeking activities on the real estate market are competitive activities. Each stakeholder make a decision with fully consider each other's reaction and make the best choice according to each other's reaction. Using the game theory and based on the assumption of the rational agent, this paper discusses the relationship between different stakeholders and builds bi-game and tri-game model. Using game research method, we can find out the behavior relationship of the economic subject on the current China's real estate market and give some suggestions for government's system construction.
This paper is divided into 5 parts:
First part, introduction. This part introduces the research background and significance and research results of scholars at home and abroad on the rent-seeking behavior.
Second part, theoretical basis. This part mainly introduces rent-seeking theories and game theory which will be used in the paper and gives some basic principles.
The third part, the rent-seeking on the real estate market. This part expounds the development present situation of the real estate market and analysis the rent-seeking behavior of stakeholders on the real estate market from the causes、the specific performance and the consequences.
The fourth part, game analysis on the real estate market. This part analysis the rent-seeking behavior of prime participants on the real estate market and results of the game model.
The fifth part, conclusion. This part summarizes the third and the fourth part and gives some advices.
引文
①魏玲.“以权谋私”根源何在[J].视点，1992.
①吴力.新经济时代背景下对我国房地产经济的理性思考[J].沿海企业与科技,2008,(92)： 17-20.
① Posner, Richard A.,1975, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.83, Aug, PP 807-828.
[1]陈柳钦.中国房地产发展回顾与发展态势分析[J].中国房地产金融,2009,(6)：40-45.
[2]贺卫、李政军.寻租理论在中国的传播与发展述评[J].经济学研究,2002(24)： 182-186.
[3]侯继超、聂琦波.房地产联合开发项目的合作博弈分析[J].建筑经济,2007,(7)： 193-194.
[4]黄臻.中国房地产业发展过程中出现的问题及解决措施[J].太原大学学报,2010, (1)： 73-75.
[5]康志强.投资性商品市场炒作现象分析及警示[J].金融纵论,2008,(8)：10-12.
[6]李连光.中国房地产行业的垄断性分析[J].经济研究导刊,2008,(13)：134-135.
[7]罗慧媛.我国房地产发展阶段和政策探析[J].行业发展,2010,(8)：69-70.
[8]王进、李准、曹升元.基于博弈论的房地产开发商行为决策研究[J].建筑经济,2007,(6)：60-63.
[9]王性玉、薛来义.寻租理论三方博弈模型分析[J].财经问题研究,2001,(216)： 14-17.
[10]吴建业.中国房地产发展前景与应对策略[J].闽西职业技术学院学报,2009,(2)：14-18.
[11]吴力.新经济时代背景下对我国房地产经济的理性思考[J].沿海企业与科技,2008,(92)：17-20.
[12]杨文志.房地产联合开发实务研究[J].时代金融,2007,(344)：98-100.
[13]易宪容.房地产市场几个重大理论问题反思[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2006,(5)：55-55.
[14]余凯.我国寡头垄断下的房地产价格形成机制研究[J].城市发展研究, 2007, (3)： 63-70.
[15]赵曼曼、周文魁.我国房地产泡沫及其成因分析[J].企业导报,2009,(3)： 97.
[16](美)阿兰·德拉珍著,杜两省史永东等译.宏观经济学中的政治经济学[M].经济科学出版社,2003.326-336
[17](美)范里安.微观经济学：现代观点[M].第六版.格致出版社,2006. 342-422
[18]陈杰.中国住宅价格的收入弹性估计及其区域性差异[J].世界经济文海,2010,(3)：42-52.
[19]崔万田、白旭.风险的特征与租金的消散[J].生产力研究,2008,(7)：89-91.
[20]顾湘.房地产市场供给机制策略分析[J].产业研究,2006,(1)：34.
[21]华武、缪柏.其战略联盟寻租博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2002,(3)：18-21.
[22]黄忠华、杜雪君.房价与宏观经济研究综述[J].中国土地科学,2009,(1)： 62-67.
[23]蒋涛.构建我国房地产企业的战略联盟[J].城市开发,2004：43-44.
[24]况伟大.空间竞争、房价收入比与房价[J].财贸经济,2004,(7)：79-87.
[25]李宏瑾.我国房地产市场垄断程度研究——勒纳指数的测算[J].财经问题研究,2005,(256)：3-10.
[26]吕剑.房地产行业寻租行为的制度经济学分析[J].管理观察,2010,(397)：13-14.
[27]吕妍、韩京位.论地方政府对房地产业的规制[J].北方经济,2009,(8)：37-38.
[28]罗春华.寻租社会成本的构成及其扩张——公共选择分析视角[J].宏观经济研究,2010,(2)：47-52.
[29]潘宇鑫.浅谈房地产市场的“寻租”行为[J].产业市场,2009,(11)：51-52.
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①吴力.新经济时代背景下对我国房地产经济的理性思考[J].沿海企业与科技,2008,(92)： 17-20.
① Posner, Richard A.,1975, "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.83, Aug, PP 807-828.
[1]陈柳钦.中国房地产发展回顾与发展态势分析[J].中国房地产金融,2009,(6)：40-45.
[2]贺卫、李政军.寻租理论在中国的传播与发展述评[J].经济学研究,2002(24)： 182-186.
[3]侯继超、聂琦波.房地产联合开发项目的合作博弈分析[J].建筑经济,2007,(7)： 193-194.
[4]黄臻.中国房地产业发展过程中出现的问题及解决措施[J].太原大学学报,2010, (1)： 73-75.
[5]康志强.投资性商品市场炒作现象分析及警示[J].金融纵论,2008,(8)：10-12.
[6]李连光.中国房地产行业的垄断性分析[J].经济研究导刊,2008,(13)：134-135.
[7]罗慧媛.我国房地产发展阶段和政策探析[J].行业发展,2010,(8)：69-70.
[8]王进、李准、曹升元.基于博弈论的房地产开发商行为决策研究[J].建筑经济,2007,(6)：60-63.
[9]王性玉、薛来义.寻租理论三方博弈模型分析[J].财经问题研究,2001,(216)： 14-17.
[10]吴建业.中国房地产发展前景与应对策略[J].闽西职业技术学院学报,2009,(2)：14-18.
[11]吴力.新经济时代背景下对我国房地产经济的理性思考[J].沿海企业与科技,2008,(92)：17-20.
[12]杨文志.房地产联合开发实务研究[J].时代金融,2007,(344)：98-100.
[13]易宪容.房地产市场几个重大理论问题反思[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2006,(5)：55-55.
[14]余凯.我国寡头垄断下的房地产价格形成机制研究[J].城市发展研究, 2007, (3)： 63-70.
[15]赵曼曼、周文魁.我国房地产泡沫及其成因分析[J].企业导报,2009,(3)： 97.
[16](美)阿兰·德拉珍著,杜两省史永东等译.宏观经济学中的政治经济学[M].经济科学出版社,2003.326-336
[17](美)范里安.微观经济学：现代观点[M].第六版.格致出版社,2006. 342-422
[18]陈杰.中国住宅价格的收入弹性估计及其区域性差异[J].世界经济文海,2010,(3)：42-52.
[19]崔万田、白旭.风险的特征与租金的消散[J].生产力研究,2008,(7)：89-91.
[20]顾湘.房地产市场供给机制策略分析[J].产业研究,2006,(1)：34.
[21]华武、缪柏.其战略联盟寻租博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2002,(3)：18-21.
[22]黄忠华、杜雪君.房价与宏观经济研究综述[J].中国土地科学,2009,(1)： 62-67.
[23]蒋涛.构建我国房地产企业的战略联盟[J].城市开发,2004：43-44.
[24]况伟大.空间竞争、房价收入比与房价[J].财贸经济,2004,(7)：79-87.
[25]李宏瑾.我国房地产市场垄断程度研究——勒纳指数的测算[J].财经问题研究,2005,(256)：3-10.
[26]吕剑.房地产行业寻租行为的制度经济学分析[J].管理观察,2010,(397)：13-14.
[27]吕妍、韩京位.论地方政府对房地产业的规制[J].北方经济,2009,(8)：37-38.
[28]罗春华.寻租社会成本的构成及其扩张——公共选择分析视角[J].宏观经济研究,2010,(2)：47-52.
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