垄断企业高管薪酬分配模型研究
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摘要
目前，石油、石化、电信、电力、烟草等垄断企业高管薪酬畸高现象引起了社会大众的广泛关注，政府及相关部门也给予了高度重视。垄断企业高管高薪问题一直被视为社会分配不公的重要表现形式，其高管薪酬分配的合理性和公平性遭到质疑，如何遏制垄断企业高管高工资、高福利，让垄断企业高管薪酬分配接受社会公平的检验显得尤为必要。垄断企业高管薪酬分配作为社会收入分配的重要组成部分，其有效合理的分配方式有利于逐步理顺我国社会收入分配关系，有利于建立科学合理、公正公平的社会分配体系。同时，在我国经济转轨、市场化尚未完成的情况下，建立起兼顾社会公平、又有利于提升企业竞争力的高管薪酬分配体系，对积极应对全球经济一体化挑战，增强垄断企业的竞争力具有重大的理论价值及现实意义。
如何构建科学合理，公平公正的垄断企业高管薪酬分配体系是目前理论界和实务界关注的热点问题之一。本文采用比较分析法、应用分析法以及总结归纳法等并以博弈论作为理论研究工具分五章对垄断企业高管薪酬分配进行了研究。首先通过对国内外文献的分析和归纳提出本文的思路及创新。其次运用人力资本理论、委托代理理论、激励理论对垄断企业高管薪酬分配中的委托代理关系及相关的激励问题进行分析，并结合目前垄断企业高管薪酬分配的现状及存在的问题进行高管薪酬分配的理论研究并对后续章节的变量进行假设。然后在垄断企业薪酬分配中出于公平性的考虑对垄断利润进行了剔除，采用了垄断调整基数，同时摒弃了传统的业绩考核体系引入了EVA的业绩评价。垄断企业高管薪酬分配考虑了长短期的激励改变了原有薪酬结构的单一性使薪酬结构更加合理化，为了防止垄断企业控制权的稀释和国有资产的流失，在股权激励分配方式中采用了虚拟股票期权激励的方式。最后采用中国石油天然气股份有限公司有关高管薪酬分配的案例对新的高管薪酬分配方案进行了分析和验证，并在此基础上指出了模型的不足。通过以上研究在结束部分得出文章结论的同时指出了本文研究不足之处及以后进一步研究的方向。
本文的创新之处主要体现在两方面：一是对垄断企业高管进行业绩评价时考虑了垄断因素的影响。二是在高管薪酬分配中实现长期激励的股权分配方式采用了虚拟股票期权。不足之处主要是没有明确垄断调整基数的具体数值，对基于EVA的虚拟股票期权激励方式没有提出具体的实施方案及授予数额。
At present, the phenomenon of extremely high executive compensation inmonopoly enterprises such as petroleum, petrochemical, telecommunications, electricpower, tobacco, etc, has caused widespread concern of the public, the government andrelated departments have also given the high attention. Monopoly executives to highsalary problem has always been viewed as an important form of the social inequality,the rationality and fairness of the distribution of executive compensation have beenquestioned, how to curb the high wages and welfare of executives in monopolyenterprises, so it is particularly necessary to let the distribution of monopolyexecutives’compensation accept the test of social justice. As an important part of thedistribution of social income, monopoly executive pay allocated effectively andrationally, which can be conducive to gradually straighten out the distribution ofsocial income in China, and also be helpful to establish the scientific and rational, justand fair the system of social distribution. Meanwhile, under the circumstances of ourcountry’s economic transition and the market has not yet completed, it is of greattheoretical value and practical significance for responding actively to global economicintegration challenges and enhancing the competitiveness of the monopoly toestablish the distribution system of executive compensation which gives considerationto social justice but also conduce to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises.
How to construct a scientific and rational, fair and impartial allocation system ofexecutives pay in monopoly enterprises, which is one of the hot issues concerned bythe current theory and practice. In this paper, comparative analysis, applicationanalysis and summarizes the induction method are used, the thesis is divided into fivechapters and use Game Theory as a theoretical research tool to study on thedistribution of executives compensation in monopoly enterprises. The thesis’train ofthought and innovation based on summarizing and analyzing the domestic and foreignliteratures, then using the human capital theory, the principal-agent theory, incentive theory to analyze the relationship of principal-agent and related incentive problems ofthe allocation of executives pay in monopoly enterprises, the paper also combinedwith the current situation and existing problems of allocation of executivescompensation in monopoly corporations to discuss the theoretical study about thedistribution of executives compensation, and assumed the variables of subsequentchapters. And then out of consideration for the fairness of the compensation allocationof monopoly enterprises, the thesis used monopoly adjusted basis to removemonopoly profits, at the same time introducing the performance of EVA to abandonthe traditional performance appraisal system. The distribution of monopoly executivespay considered a short-term and long-term incentive to make the singularity of theexisting salary structure become more rationalization, in order to prevent diluting thecontrol power of monopoly enterprises and losing state assets, the distribution ofequity incentive realized by the virtual stock options. Finally, the case was assignedby the China National Petroleum Corporation on the allocation of executive pay toanalyze and verify the new plan about the distribution of executive compensation,basis on this research, the paper also point out the deficiencies of the model. Throughthe above research the paper came to the conclusions and also pointed out theinadequacies of this study and the subsequent direction of further research in the endof the article.
The innovation of this paper is mainly embodied in two aspects: First, theperformance evaluation of the executives of monopolistic corporations considered themonopoly factors. The second is that the distribution of executive compensation usedthe virtual stock options for the allocation of equity incentive to achieve long-termincentive. The deficiencies of this thesis mainly perform these following aspects: thespecific number of the monopoly adjusted basis is not clear, a specific plan ofimplementation and the amount of grant weren’t made on the incentive pattern ofEVA-based virtual stock options.
如何构建科学合理，公平公正的垄断企业高管薪酬分配体系是目前理论界和实务界关注的热点问题之一。本文采用比较分析法、应用分析法以及总结归纳法等并以博弈论作为理论研究工具分五章对垄断企业高管薪酬分配进行了研究。首先通过对国内外文献的分析和归纳提出本文的思路及创新。其次运用人力资本理论、委托代理理论、激励理论对垄断企业高管薪酬分配中的委托代理关系及相关的激励问题进行分析，并结合目前垄断企业高管薪酬分配的现状及存在的问题进行高管薪酬分配的理论研究并对后续章节的变量进行假设。然后在垄断企业薪酬分配中出于公平性的考虑对垄断利润进行了剔除，采用了垄断调整基数，同时摒弃了传统的业绩考核体系引入了EVA的业绩评价。垄断企业高管薪酬分配考虑了长短期的激励改变了原有薪酬结构的单一性使薪酬结构更加合理化，为了防止垄断企业控制权的稀释和国有资产的流失，在股权激励分配方式中采用了虚拟股票期权激励的方式。最后采用中国石油天然气股份有限公司有关高管薪酬分配的案例对新的高管薪酬分配方案进行了分析和验证，并在此基础上指出了模型的不足。通过以上研究在结束部分得出文章结论的同时指出了本文研究不足之处及以后进一步研究的方向。
本文的创新之处主要体现在两方面：一是对垄断企业高管进行业绩评价时考虑了垄断因素的影响。二是在高管薪酬分配中实现长期激励的股权分配方式采用了虚拟股票期权。不足之处主要是没有明确垄断调整基数的具体数值，对基于EVA的虚拟股票期权激励方式没有提出具体的实施方案及授予数额。
At present, the phenomenon of extremely high executive compensation inmonopoly enterprises such as petroleum, petrochemical, telecommunications, electricpower, tobacco, etc, has caused widespread concern of the public, the government andrelated departments have also given the high attention. Monopoly executives to highsalary problem has always been viewed as an important form of the social inequality,the rationality and fairness of the distribution of executive compensation have beenquestioned, how to curb the high wages and welfare of executives in monopolyenterprises, so it is particularly necessary to let the distribution of monopolyexecutives’compensation accept the test of social justice. As an important part of thedistribution of social income, monopoly executive pay allocated effectively andrationally, which can be conducive to gradually straighten out the distribution ofsocial income in China, and also be helpful to establish the scientific and rational, justand fair the system of social distribution. Meanwhile, under the circumstances of ourcountry’s economic transition and the market has not yet completed, it is of greattheoretical value and practical significance for responding actively to global economicintegration challenges and enhancing the competitiveness of the monopoly toestablish the distribution system of executive compensation which gives considerationto social justice but also conduce to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises.
How to construct a scientific and rational, fair and impartial allocation system ofexecutives pay in monopoly enterprises, which is one of the hot issues concerned bythe current theory and practice. In this paper, comparative analysis, applicationanalysis and summarizes the induction method are used, the thesis is divided into fivechapters and use Game Theory as a theoretical research tool to study on thedistribution of executives compensation in monopoly enterprises. The thesis’train ofthought and innovation based on summarizing and analyzing the domestic and foreignliteratures, then using the human capital theory, the principal-agent theory, incentive theory to analyze the relationship of principal-agent and related incentive problems ofthe allocation of executives pay in monopoly enterprises, the paper also combinedwith the current situation and existing problems of allocation of executivescompensation in monopoly corporations to discuss the theoretical study about thedistribution of executives compensation, and assumed the variables of subsequentchapters. And then out of consideration for the fairness of the compensation allocationof monopoly enterprises, the thesis used monopoly adjusted basis to removemonopoly profits, at the same time introducing the performance of EVA to abandonthe traditional performance appraisal system. The distribution of monopoly executivespay considered a short-term and long-term incentive to make the singularity of theexisting salary structure become more rationalization, in order to prevent diluting thecontrol power of monopoly enterprises and losing state assets, the distribution ofequity incentive realized by the virtual stock options. Finally, the case was assignedby the China National Petroleum Corporation on the allocation of executive pay toanalyze and verify the new plan about the distribution of executive compensation,basis on this research, the paper also point out the deficiencies of the model. Throughthe above research the paper came to the conclusions and also pointed out theinadequacies of this study and the subsequent direction of further research in the endof the article.
The innovation of this paper is mainly embodied in two aspects: First, theperformance evaluation of the executives of monopolistic corporations considered themonopoly factors. The second is that the distribution of executive compensation usedthe virtual stock options for the allocation of equity incentive to achieve long-termincentive. The deficiencies of this thesis mainly perform these following aspects: thespecific number of the monopoly adjusted basis is not clear, a specific plan ofimplementation and the amount of grant weren’t made on the incentive pattern ofEVA-based virtual stock options.
引文
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[1] Lewellen W.G. Huntsman B. Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance. American EconomicReview.September.1970:710—720
[2] Murphy K.J. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration：an Empirical Analysis．Journalof Accounting and Economics.1985,7(123):11-41
[3] Jensen. M．C．and Murphy k. J．.Performance pay and top-management incentives .Journal ofPolitical Economy，1990：225-263
[4] Mark A. Wilson. Thomas I. Chacko. Charles B.Shrader .Ellen Mullen.Top Executive Pay And FirmPerformance. Journal of Business And Psychology. 1992,6(4)
[5] Rosen S. Contracts and the Market for Executives in Contract Economics. Journal of Accountingand Economics,2001(12)．
[6] Gerhart B. Milkovich G. Organizational Differences in Managerial Compensation and FinancialPerformance.The Academy of Management Journal.1990,33(4):663—691.
[7] Jensen M.C. and Murphy K.J. CEO incentives—It’s not how much you pay but how . HarvardBusiness Review, 1990, a(3):138—153.
[8] Garen J.E., Executive Compensation and Principal—Agent Theory. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,1994,102(6):1175～1199.
[9] Mehran .H. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance Journal ofFinancial Economics.1995, 38(2):163—184．
[10] Brickley J. S Bhagat. R Lease. The impact of long-term material compensation plans onshareholder wealth．Journal of accounting and economics，1985，7(123)：115—129．
[11] Morck. Shieifer. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation. Journal of FinancialEconomics.1988, Vol.20:292-3 1 5
[12] Kerr J. Kren L. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief companies. Academy ManagementJournal,1992,(2):370-397
[13] Anandi P. Sahu . Robert T.Kleiman. Joseph Callaghan. The Timing and Stock Selection Abilitiesof Bank Funds:Evidence Based on Meta-Analysis. Journal of Financial Services Research 1998（13）:2137–152
[14]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效.经济研究.2000(3)
[15]杨瑞龙.论国有经济的多级委托代理关系.管理世界.2005(1).106—115
[16]谌新民.刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究.经济研究.2003(8)
[17]张俊瑞.赵进文.张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析.会计研究.2003( 9)
[18]杜兴强.王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究.会计研究.2007(1)
[19]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?.经济研究.2009(3)
[20]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究.会计研究.2000(1 )
[21]林晓婉.车宏生.朱敏.李姣.中国上市公司经营者薪酬激励召开的三年比较研究.管理现代化.2001(5 )
[22]王虎,高管薪酬制度与公司治理绩效的相关性研究——以中国上市公司为例[华中科技大学硕士论文],武汉:华中科技大学,2004(10)
[23]陈冬华.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究.2005(2)
[24]李渝萍.论国企高管人员薪酬激励机制的创新.企业参考.2007(8)
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[7] Jensen M.C. and Murphy K.J. CEO incentives—It’s not how much you pay but how . HarvardBusiness Review, 1990, a(3):138—153.
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[12] Kerr J. Kren L. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief companies. Academy ManagementJournal,1992,(2):370-397
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[20]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究.会计研究.2000(1 )
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