基于博弈论的建筑市场信用机制研究
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摘要
当前,随着我国经济飞速发展,建筑业在经济腾飞的过程中起着至关重要的作用,良好的建筑行业环境是经济腾飞的必要条件,营造良好的环境就是要优化建筑市场信用、完善建筑市场机制等。虽然目前我国政府非常注重建筑市场信用的发展,连续几年采取了相应的措施来打击市场上一些不守信用的行为,但是随着基础设施建设的扩大和建筑行业利润的剧增导致了新的一轮不守信行为涌向建筑市场。比如工程在暗地里被转包、大量的资金莫名的消失、行业领头人腐败惊人、质量隐患严重等。这些不守信用的行为严重打乱了建筑市场秩序,造成了不良的社会影响,给社会造成了严重的资源浪费,增加了建筑行业的成本。所以如何更好的解决建筑市场上的信用问题,完善目前的建筑市场信用机制和建立有效的信用体系是刻不容缓的事情了。
在对本文进行书写之前就进行大量的文献查阅和社会调查,在阅读有关建筑市场信用文献的同时做了一定的社会调查,对建筑市场主体的各个企业、公司(施工单位、房地产开发商、咨询单位、监理企业)进行了相关的信用状况调查,从这些调查结果中分析得到了目前建筑市场各个主体的信用状况都不是太好,在短期交易中,主体为了追求眼前的利益大部分选择了失信,然而在长期的合作过程中,大部分主体就会选择守信；并且信用好的企业,收益明显的较好；信用不好的企业,收益就会相应的不好,同行同业也不太愿意与那些信用不好的企业合作。
本文从研究信用以及建筑市场信用问题开始入手,分析了市场主体不守信用的具体表现以及不守信用会产生的严重后果,然后分析市场上主体间的信息不对称问题,最后运用经济博弈理论对市场主体失信的原因进行了透彻的分析,建立了不同类型的博弈模型,最后根据结论提出了一些对策和建议。本文的研究很好的分析了建筑市场主体失信的方法内容、失信产生的后果以及失信的动机,本文的研究对节约社会资源,提高建筑市场运转效率,规范建筑市场秩序,恢复建筑市场主体的诚信和保持国民经济快速健康的发展都具有非常重要的作用。
Present in China, with the rapid development of economy, the construction industry plays a vital role in the process of economic growth. A good construction industry environment is a necessary condition for the economic growth, create a good environment is necessary to optimize the credit of the construction market and improve the mechanism of the construction market. Although our governments pay great attention on the development of credit and take some appropriate measures to combat somebody who against the credit of construction market for several years, the expansion of infrastructure and the surge of profits in construction industry led to a new behavior which is not trustworthy flock to the construction market. Such as works were subcontracted secretly, inexplicable disappearance of a lot of money, more and more industry leaders were corruption, and serious quality problems. These acts of bad faith seriously disrupted the order in the construction market, causing adverse social impact to society and a serious waste of resources, increasing the cost of the construction industry. So how to solve the credit problems better on the construction market, and improve the current construction market credit mechanism and the establishment of an effective credit system is an urgent thing.
Before writing the article I have searched extensive literatures about the construction market and social surveys, and I also researched the related credit investigation about some enterprises and companies (construction units, real- estate developers, advisory unit, and management enterprises) in the main construction market, from the analysis of these researches I found the credit of each main construction market is not very good, in the short-term transactions, most of them select against the credit when they pursuit the immediate interest. But in the long-term process of cooperation, most also prefer to compliance with credit; and the enterprises with good credit, income significantly better; credit bad business, bad earnings accordingly, the peers are not willing to cooperate with the companies which have a bad credit.
The paper is starting from the credit research and the credit problems of our construction markets, analyzes the specific bad faith performances of the main construction markets and the serious consequences of the bad faith would lead, and the asymmetric problem on information between the main construction markets. Then I used the economic game theory thoroughly analyzed why the main construction markets lost their credit, established different types of game models, and finally put forward some strategies and recommendations based on the conclusions and recommendations. This study analyzed the content of method about the main construction market losing the trust, the consequences of losing the trust and the motivation of the dishonesty, this research plays an important role on saving the social resources, improving the operational efficiency of the construction market, standardizing the construction market order, restoring the integrity of the construction markets, and maintaining the development of the national economy keep rapidly and healthily.
在对本文进行书写之前就进行大量的文献查阅和社会调查,在阅读有关建筑市场信用文献的同时做了一定的社会调查,对建筑市场主体的各个企业、公司(施工单位、房地产开发商、咨询单位、监理企业)进行了相关的信用状况调查,从这些调查结果中分析得到了目前建筑市场各个主体的信用状况都不是太好,在短期交易中,主体为了追求眼前的利益大部分选择了失信,然而在长期的合作过程中,大部分主体就会选择守信；并且信用好的企业,收益明显的较好；信用不好的企业,收益就会相应的不好,同行同业也不太愿意与那些信用不好的企业合作。
本文从研究信用以及建筑市场信用问题开始入手,分析了市场主体不守信用的具体表现以及不守信用会产生的严重后果,然后分析市场上主体间的信息不对称问题,最后运用经济博弈理论对市场主体失信的原因进行了透彻的分析,建立了不同类型的博弈模型,最后根据结论提出了一些对策和建议。本文的研究很好的分析了建筑市场主体失信的方法内容、失信产生的后果以及失信的动机,本文的研究对节约社会资源,提高建筑市场运转效率,规范建筑市场秩序,恢复建筑市场主体的诚信和保持国民经济快速健康的发展都具有非常重要的作用。
Present in China, with the rapid development of economy, the construction industry plays a vital role in the process of economic growth. A good construction industry environment is a necessary condition for the economic growth, create a good environment is necessary to optimize the credit of the construction market and improve the mechanism of the construction market. Although our governments pay great attention on the development of credit and take some appropriate measures to combat somebody who against the credit of construction market for several years, the expansion of infrastructure and the surge of profits in construction industry led to a new behavior which is not trustworthy flock to the construction market. Such as works were subcontracted secretly, inexplicable disappearance of a lot of money, more and more industry leaders were corruption, and serious quality problems. These acts of bad faith seriously disrupted the order in the construction market, causing adverse social impact to society and a serious waste of resources, increasing the cost of the construction industry. So how to solve the credit problems better on the construction market, and improve the current construction market credit mechanism and the establishment of an effective credit system is an urgent thing.
Before writing the article I have searched extensive literatures about the construction market and social surveys, and I also researched the related credit investigation about some enterprises and companies (construction units, real- estate developers, advisory unit, and management enterprises) in the main construction market, from the analysis of these researches I found the credit of each main construction market is not very good, in the short-term transactions, most of them select against the credit when they pursuit the immediate interest. But in the long-term process of cooperation, most also prefer to compliance with credit; and the enterprises with good credit, income significantly better; credit bad business, bad earnings accordingly, the peers are not willing to cooperate with the companies which have a bad credit.
The paper is starting from the credit research and the credit problems of our construction markets, analyzes the specific bad faith performances of the main construction markets and the serious consequences of the bad faith would lead, and the asymmetric problem on information between the main construction markets. Then I used the economic game theory thoroughly analyzed why the main construction markets lost their credit, established different types of game models, and finally put forward some strategies and recommendations based on the conclusions and recommendations. This study analyzed the content of method about the main construction market losing the trust, the consequences of losing the trust and the motivation of the dishonesty, this research plays an important role on saving the social resources, improving the operational efficiency of the construction market, standardizing the construction market order, restoring the integrity of the construction markets, and maintaining the development of the national economy keep rapidly and healthily.
引文
[1]徐正洪,石征元.打造诚信品牌治理拖欠顽症提高管理效率.建筑经济,2003,(8)：45-48.
[2]林钧跃.社会信用体系原理.北京.中国方正出版社,2003.
[3]李坤岳,赵德福.建筑施工领域企业信用建设刍议[J].长江建设,2002,(Z1)：26-27.
[4]厉以宁.信任的前提是产权明晰.西部论丛.2003,(3)：25-25.
[5]潘晓峰.信用体系建设的努力方向.工商行政管理,2002,(12)：46-50.
[6]姚兵,萧利民.建筑业行业及企业发展战略概论.华南理工大学出版,2001.
[7]徐宪平.关于美国信用体系的研究与思考.管理世界,2006.
[8]王孟钧.建筑市场信用机制与制度建设研究.[博士论文].湖南.中南大学.2004.
[9]Kathleen MJ, HamDon, Conflicts between Owner and contractor:Proposed Intervention Process, Journalofl nagementinEngineering,2003,(7):120-123.
[10]马涛,高田娟.关于加强建筑市场信用体系建设的探讨.山西建筑,2004,(9)：135-137.
[11]R Kavasseri, B Stewart. Distributed Management Expression Mib Request for Commuenis,2000.
[12]孙智英.信用问题的经济学分析.[博士论文]福建.福建师范大学.2002.
[13]陈孝凯.工程建设领域信用体系重构之我见.施工企业管理,2004,(10)：19-21
[14]林健.从外国企业征信模式的利弊看我国征信模式的选择.经济纵横,2003,(7)：40-42.
[15]闫文周,刘春江.建设领域拖欠工程款和民工工资解决机制研究.理论导刊,2004,(7)：52-54.
[16]王孟钧,何继善,张勇军.建筑市场信用机制研究.中南大学学报(社会科学版),2003,9(8)：508-511.
[17]曹正汉.国有企业多重委托代理关系中的合谋问题：一个博弈模型.佛山科学技术学院学报,1999,(2)：2-27.
[18]黄学军.声誉对建筑承包商的隐形激励作用.工业工程与管理.2006,(2)：74-76.
[19]Jells Gnmert, Lars Norden, Martin Weber. The role of non-financial factors in internal credit rafingss, Jourusl ofBanking&Finance,2005, (29):509-531.
[20]Treiber, Donald. WhatistheICPC7. Business Credit,1998,95-40.
[21]赵作平.安徽建筑企业信用体系建设的思考与建议.建筑经济与管理.2005,114-115.
[22]范珉.建设领域拖欠工程款问题解决机制研究：[硕士论文].西安.西安建筑科技大学.2004.
[23]王盂钧.张勇军.建筑市场制度建设探讨.2003,(2)：9-11.
[24]沈红华.对建立我国建设领域信用管理模式的构想.建筑,2004,53-55.
[25]湖北省建筑市场信用体系建设规划(www.gcjs.hbcic.gov.cn).
[26]周丽涛.重建社会信用的几点思考.问题探讨,2002,(6)：13-18.
[27]诸晓明.对建筑市场目前存在问题的思考[J].经济师,2005,(2)：288.
[28]张天森,李元生.建筑市场信息不对称研究.建筑经济,2002,(9)：11-13.
[29]周恒.警惕建筑市场信用危机[J].中国建设信息,2005,(24)：3-8.
[30]陈孝凯.工程建设领域信用体系重构之我见[J].施工企业管理,2004,(10)：19-21.
[31](英)亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上、下卷)[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997,56-57.
[32](英)马特拉沃斯.休谟论信用[J].国外社会科学,2006,(1)：103-104
[33]Richard eTucker, Alfin L., and Allan P.GHuman and environmental risks Of chlorinated dioxins and related compounds[M]. Plenum Press,1983.
[34](英)罗吉-弗兰根,乔治·诺曼.工程建设风险管理[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2000.
[35]周丽涛.重建社会信用的几点思考.问题探讨,2002,(6)：13-8
[36]谭中明.社会信用管理体系[M].合肥：中国科学技术大学出版社,2005,189-202.
[37]廖国荣.论建筑市场之诚信[J].基建优化,2004,25(1)：20-21.
[38]Halil shevket Neap, Seran A, Owner's factor in value-based project management in construction.Journal of Business Ethics[J].2004,(50):97-103.
[39]孙雪妹.建筑企业信用档案深析[J].上海档案,2002,(6)：41-42.
[40]王井祥.我国建筑业信用系统的研究[D].上海：同济大学,2004.
[41]王孟钧.建筑市场激励机制的博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2003,(8)：508-511.
[42]陈瑞华.信息经济学[M].北京：南开大学出版社,2003,77-124.
[43]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：三联书店,1999.
[44]徐娟.重复博弈与信用的形成[J].商业研究,2005,(19)：22-24.
[45]胡浩,王永日.基于交易成本分析的信息技术外包行为研究[J].科技进步理论与管理,2005,(7)：51-53.
[46]李建峰,杨海欧.基于博弈理论对建筑市场信用机理分析及体系构建[J].建筑经济,2006,(12)：8-10.
[2]林钧跃.社会信用体系原理.北京.中国方正出版社,2003.
[3]李坤岳,赵德福.建筑施工领域企业信用建设刍议[J].长江建设,2002,(Z1)：26-27.
[4]厉以宁.信任的前提是产权明晰.西部论丛.2003,(3)：25-25.
[5]潘晓峰.信用体系建设的努力方向.工商行政管理,2002,(12)：46-50.
[6]姚兵,萧利民.建筑业行业及企业发展战略概论.华南理工大学出版,2001.
[7]徐宪平.关于美国信用体系的研究与思考.管理世界,2006.
[8]王孟钧.建筑市场信用机制与制度建设研究.[博士论文].湖南.中南大学.2004.
[9]Kathleen MJ, HamDon, Conflicts between Owner and contractor:Proposed Intervention Process, Journalofl nagementinEngineering,2003,(7):120-123.
[10]马涛,高田娟.关于加强建筑市场信用体系建设的探讨.山西建筑,2004,(9)：135-137.
[11]R Kavasseri, B Stewart. Distributed Management Expression Mib Request for Commuenis,2000.
[12]孙智英.信用问题的经济学分析.[博士论文]福建.福建师范大学.2002.
[13]陈孝凯.工程建设领域信用体系重构之我见.施工企业管理,2004,(10)：19-21
[14]林健.从外国企业征信模式的利弊看我国征信模式的选择.经济纵横,2003,(7)：40-42.
[15]闫文周,刘春江.建设领域拖欠工程款和民工工资解决机制研究.理论导刊,2004,(7)：52-54.
[16]王孟钧,何继善,张勇军.建筑市场信用机制研究.中南大学学报(社会科学版),2003,9(8)：508-511.
[17]曹正汉.国有企业多重委托代理关系中的合谋问题：一个博弈模型.佛山科学技术学院学报,1999,(2)：2-27.
[18]黄学军.声誉对建筑承包商的隐形激励作用.工业工程与管理.2006,(2)：74-76.
[19]Jells Gnmert, Lars Norden, Martin Weber. The role of non-financial factors in internal credit rafingss, Jourusl ofBanking&Finance,2005, (29):509-531.
[20]Treiber, Donald. WhatistheICPC7. Business Credit,1998,95-40.
[21]赵作平.安徽建筑企业信用体系建设的思考与建议.建筑经济与管理.2005,114-115.
[22]范珉.建设领域拖欠工程款问题解决机制研究：[硕士论文].西安.西安建筑科技大学.2004.
[23]王盂钧.张勇军.建筑市场制度建设探讨.2003,(2)：9-11.
[24]沈红华.对建立我国建设领域信用管理模式的构想.建筑,2004,53-55.
[25]湖北省建筑市场信用体系建设规划(www.gcjs.hbcic.gov.cn).
[26]周丽涛.重建社会信用的几点思考.问题探讨,2002,(6)：13-18.
[27]诸晓明.对建筑市场目前存在问题的思考[J].经济师,2005,(2)：288.
[28]张天森,李元生.建筑市场信息不对称研究.建筑经济,2002,(9)：11-13.
[29]周恒.警惕建筑市场信用危机[J].中国建设信息,2005,(24)：3-8.
[30]陈孝凯.工程建设领域信用体系重构之我见[J].施工企业管理,2004,(10)：19-21.
[31](英)亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上、下卷)[M].北京：商务印书馆,1997,56-57.
[32](英)马特拉沃斯.休谟论信用[J].国外社会科学,2006,(1)：103-104
[33]Richard eTucker, Alfin L., and Allan P.GHuman and environmental risks Of chlorinated dioxins and related compounds[M]. Plenum Press,1983.
[34](英)罗吉-弗兰根,乔治·诺曼.工程建设风险管理[M].北京：中国建筑工业出版社,2000.
[35]周丽涛.重建社会信用的几点思考.问题探讨,2002,(6)：13-8
[36]谭中明.社会信用管理体系[M].合肥：中国科学技术大学出版社,2005,189-202.
[37]廖国荣.论建筑市场之诚信[J].基建优化,2004,25(1)：20-21.
[38]Halil shevket Neap, Seran A, Owner's factor in value-based project management in construction.Journal of Business Ethics[J].2004,(50):97-103.
[39]孙雪妹.建筑企业信用档案深析[J].上海档案,2002,(6)：41-42.
[40]王井祥.我国建筑业信用系统的研究[D].上海：同济大学,2004.
[41]王孟钧.建筑市场激励机制的博弈分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2003,(8)：508-511.
[42]陈瑞华.信息经济学[M].北京：南开大学出版社,2003,77-124.
[43]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：三联书店,1999.
[44]徐娟.重复博弈与信用的形成[J].商业研究,2005,(19)：22-24.
[45]胡浩,王永日.基于交易成本分析的信息技术外包行为研究[J].科技进步理论与管理,2005,(7)：51-53.
[46]李建峰,杨海欧.基于博弈理论对建筑市场信用机理分析及体系构建[J].建筑经济,2006,(12)：8-10.