中国上市公司债务治理绩效的实证研究
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摘要
公司治理包括公司内部治理和公司外部治理,债务治理是公司外部治理的一种重要形式。公司治理效率的提高依赖于公司内外部治理效率的提高。然而,2008年席卷全球的金融危机验证了我国上市公司的内部治理不容乐观,甚至有专家认为此次金融危机的肇源即为公司内部治理机制失灵。那么公司外部治理是否发挥了其治理作用,债务治理作为公司外部治理的一种重要形式其治理现状如何,其发挥治理作用受哪些因素的影响,不同行业上市公司债务治理是否存在本质差别,这些问题是当前公司治理理论与实务领域亟待研究的课题。
本文在对国内外债务治理相关文献研究的基础上,首先从财务契约理论、契约成本理论、相机治理理论、信号传递理论、产品市场理论和公司控制权理论等理论角度分析了公司债务融资的治理机制及作用；然后明确界定了债务治理的概念,即债务治理是一种激励、约束和协调机制；再次归纳总结出债务治理绩效的主要表现形式及影响因素；最后用我国沪深两市上市的A股上市公司2006-2010年的数据为样本,实证检验了债务治理的现状、影响因素及行业差别。
本文创新性工作及形成的主要结论如下：
(1)在前人研究基础上发展了债务治理的概念,并运用主成分分析法构建了代表债务治理的三个综合变量,而非直接采用某一个或几个财务指标来代替债务治理变量。
(2)系统地从各种理论角度推导出债务融资的治理作用机理,并描述了债务治理绩效的几种表现形式,其主要包括公司显性股权和债权代理成本的降低(以管理费用和财务费用两项费用占营业收入的比率代替,与前人不同)、过度投资的减少(以公司成长机会的函数确定过度投资变量,与前人不同)、经营绩效的提高和公司价值的增加,并从理论上系统分析了可能影响公司债务治理绩效的几个主要因素。
(3)得出银行借款不能发挥预期治理作用的结论。在第四章不考虑外部因素情况下以全部上市公司为样本进行实证检验时发现,银行借款比例的提高会降低公司经营绩效和公司价值,即没有起到促进公司经营绩效和公司价值提升的治理作用。为此本文在第五章进一步对削弱或促进银行借款治理功能的因素进行实证检验。
(4)得出企业政治关联会削弱银行借款治理功能,而地区金融发展水平可促进银行借款治理功能提高的结论。在总体样本检验得出的上述结论(3)的基础上,本文在第五章进一步检验造成银行借款不能发挥治理作用的因素,结果发现企业政治关联是造成其银行借款不能发挥治理作用的主要因素,而地区金融发展水平的提高可以显著提高银行借款的治理作用,并可减弱政治关联的负面影响。
(5)得出农业上市公司的债务融资程度、债务期限结构和债务类型结构的治理作用均在一定程度上显示出与其他行业上市公司之间存在显著差异。在债务融资程度治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的债务融资程度不能降低代理成本,但可以显著提高公司绩效,而其他行业正好相反；在债务融资类型结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：银行借款比例与代理成本、过度投资、经营绩效和公司价值之间的关系方面,农业上市公司与其他行业均存在显著差异；在债务融资期限结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的长期债务融资可以显著降低其过度投资,却与公司价值不存在显著的相关关系,这与其他行业截然不同。
Corporate governance includes internal corporate governance and corporate external governance. The efficiency of corporate governance depends on the efficiency of internal and external governance. However, the financial crisis sweeping the globe in2008verified the internal governance of listed companies in China is not optimistic, even some experts believe the root of the financial crisis is the internal corporate governance failure. Whether external corporate governance played its governance role? As a form of external governance of the company, how is governance status quo of the debt management, and which factors influence on its governance role to play? Whether the debt governance of listed companies of different industries has an essential distinction? These problems are the subject of corporate governance theory and practice areas to be studied.
On the basis of domestic and foreign debt governance literature, firstly, this paper analyzed the governance mechanism and effect of the debt financing from a theoretical point of view of financial contract theory, contracting costs theory, camera governance theory, signaling theory, product market theory and company control theory. Then clearly define the concept of debt governance, that is, debt management is an incentive, constraints, and coordination mechanisms. And then we summarized the main manifestations and its influencing factors of the debt governance performance. Finally, this paper examines the status of the debt governance, influencing factors and industry differences using2006-2010data of the A-shares listed companies in China' s Shanghai and Shenzhen-listed as a sample.
The innovative work and the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Having built the conceptual framework of debt governance and defined the concept of debt governance. And having built three integrated variables representing the debt governance by using principal component analysis, rather than directly use one or several financial indicators as debt governance variables.
(2) Systematically derived the governance role and mechanism of debt financing from a variety of theoretical point of view, and described several forms of debt governance performance, which mainly including the reduction of equity and debt agency costs (using the ratio of management expenses and financial expenses to total operating income as its substitution variable, this is different from predecessors), the reduction of over-investment (using the function of the company's growth opportunities as over-investment variables, this is different from predecessors), business performance improvement and company value increase. And systematically this paper analyzed several major factors that may affect the company's debt governance performance.
(3) Having come to the conclusions that bank loans can not play a governance role expected. In the fourth chapter, not considering external factors and taking an empirical test by using all listed companies as sample, then we found A higher proportion of bank loans will reduce the corporate operating performance and corporate value, that is bank loans did not play a governance role in facilitating the promotion of the corporate operating performance and corporate value. Therefore, this paper further examined the factors that weaken or to promote the governance function of bank loan in Chapter Five.
(4)Having the conclusion that corporate political association would weaken the bank loan governance, while the level of regional financial development can promote the governance function of bank loan. On the basis of the above conclusions (3), further examined the factors that caused bank loan not to play the governance corporate role,and we found that corporate political association is the main factors that caused bank loan not to play the governance corporate role, while raising the level of regional financial development can significantly improve the governance of the bank loan, and can weaken the negative impact of political association.
(5) Having come to the conclusion that the governance role of debt financing degree, debt maturity and debt type structure of agricultural listed companies shows a certain extent significant differences with the other industries listed companies. Significant differences of governance role of debt financing degree embodied in:Debt financing degree of agricultural listed companies can not reduce agency costs, but can significantly improve corporate performance, while other industries is just the opposite; Significant difference of governance role of debt financing type structure reflected in:the relationship between bank loan proportion and the agent cost, overinvestment, operating performance and company value, agricultural listed companies exist significant differences from other industries; significant differences in governance role of debt financing period structure embodied in:long-term debt financing of agricultural listed companies can significantly reduce its over-investment, but there is not a significant correlation with corporate value, which is very different from other industries.
本文在对国内外债务治理相关文献研究的基础上,首先从财务契约理论、契约成本理论、相机治理理论、信号传递理论、产品市场理论和公司控制权理论等理论角度分析了公司债务融资的治理机制及作用；然后明确界定了债务治理的概念,即债务治理是一种激励、约束和协调机制；再次归纳总结出债务治理绩效的主要表现形式及影响因素；最后用我国沪深两市上市的A股上市公司2006-2010年的数据为样本,实证检验了债务治理的现状、影响因素及行业差别。
本文创新性工作及形成的主要结论如下：
(1)在前人研究基础上发展了债务治理的概念,并运用主成分分析法构建了代表债务治理的三个综合变量,而非直接采用某一个或几个财务指标来代替债务治理变量。
(2)系统地从各种理论角度推导出债务融资的治理作用机理,并描述了债务治理绩效的几种表现形式,其主要包括公司显性股权和债权代理成本的降低(以管理费用和财务费用两项费用占营业收入的比率代替,与前人不同)、过度投资的减少(以公司成长机会的函数确定过度投资变量,与前人不同)、经营绩效的提高和公司价值的增加,并从理论上系统分析了可能影响公司债务治理绩效的几个主要因素。
(3)得出银行借款不能发挥预期治理作用的结论。在第四章不考虑外部因素情况下以全部上市公司为样本进行实证检验时发现,银行借款比例的提高会降低公司经营绩效和公司价值,即没有起到促进公司经营绩效和公司价值提升的治理作用。为此本文在第五章进一步对削弱或促进银行借款治理功能的因素进行实证检验。
(4)得出企业政治关联会削弱银行借款治理功能,而地区金融发展水平可促进银行借款治理功能提高的结论。在总体样本检验得出的上述结论(3)的基础上,本文在第五章进一步检验造成银行借款不能发挥治理作用的因素,结果发现企业政治关联是造成其银行借款不能发挥治理作用的主要因素,而地区金融发展水平的提高可以显著提高银行借款的治理作用,并可减弱政治关联的负面影响。
(5)得出农业上市公司的债务融资程度、债务期限结构和债务类型结构的治理作用均在一定程度上显示出与其他行业上市公司之间存在显著差异。在债务融资程度治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的债务融资程度不能降低代理成本,但可以显著提高公司绩效,而其他行业正好相反；在债务融资类型结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：银行借款比例与代理成本、过度投资、经营绩效和公司价值之间的关系方面,农业上市公司与其他行业均存在显著差异；在债务融资期限结构治理作用方面的显著差异体现在：农业上市公司的长期债务融资可以显著降低其过度投资,却与公司价值不存在显著的相关关系,这与其他行业截然不同。
Corporate governance includes internal corporate governance and corporate external governance. The efficiency of corporate governance depends on the efficiency of internal and external governance. However, the financial crisis sweeping the globe in2008verified the internal governance of listed companies in China is not optimistic, even some experts believe the root of the financial crisis is the internal corporate governance failure. Whether external corporate governance played its governance role? As a form of external governance of the company, how is governance status quo of the debt management, and which factors influence on its governance role to play? Whether the debt governance of listed companies of different industries has an essential distinction? These problems are the subject of corporate governance theory and practice areas to be studied.
On the basis of domestic and foreign debt governance literature, firstly, this paper analyzed the governance mechanism and effect of the debt financing from a theoretical point of view of financial contract theory, contracting costs theory, camera governance theory, signaling theory, product market theory and company control theory. Then clearly define the concept of debt governance, that is, debt management is an incentive, constraints, and coordination mechanisms. And then we summarized the main manifestations and its influencing factors of the debt governance performance. Finally, this paper examines the status of the debt governance, influencing factors and industry differences using2006-2010data of the A-shares listed companies in China' s Shanghai and Shenzhen-listed as a sample.
The innovative work and the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Having built the conceptual framework of debt governance and defined the concept of debt governance. And having built three integrated variables representing the debt governance by using principal component analysis, rather than directly use one or several financial indicators as debt governance variables.
(2) Systematically derived the governance role and mechanism of debt financing from a variety of theoretical point of view, and described several forms of debt governance performance, which mainly including the reduction of equity and debt agency costs (using the ratio of management expenses and financial expenses to total operating income as its substitution variable, this is different from predecessors), the reduction of over-investment (using the function of the company's growth opportunities as over-investment variables, this is different from predecessors), business performance improvement and company value increase. And systematically this paper analyzed several major factors that may affect the company's debt governance performance.
(3) Having come to the conclusions that bank loans can not play a governance role expected. In the fourth chapter, not considering external factors and taking an empirical test by using all listed companies as sample, then we found A higher proportion of bank loans will reduce the corporate operating performance and corporate value, that is bank loans did not play a governance role in facilitating the promotion of the corporate operating performance and corporate value. Therefore, this paper further examined the factors that weaken or to promote the governance function of bank loan in Chapter Five.
(4)Having the conclusion that corporate political association would weaken the bank loan governance, while the level of regional financial development can promote the governance function of bank loan. On the basis of the above conclusions (3), further examined the factors that caused bank loan not to play the governance corporate role,and we found that corporate political association is the main factors that caused bank loan not to play the governance corporate role, while raising the level of regional financial development can significantly improve the governance of the bank loan, and can weaken the negative impact of political association.
(5) Having come to the conclusion that the governance role of debt financing degree, debt maturity and debt type structure of agricultural listed companies shows a certain extent significant differences with the other industries listed companies. Significant differences of governance role of debt financing degree embodied in:Debt financing degree of agricultural listed companies can not reduce agency costs, but can significantly improve corporate performance, while other industries is just the opposite; Significant difference of governance role of debt financing type structure reflected in:the relationship between bank loan proportion and the agent cost, overinvestment, operating performance and company value, agricultural listed companies exist significant differences from other industries; significant differences in governance role of debt financing period structure embodied in:long-term debt financing of agricultural listed companies can significantly reduce its over-investment, but there is not a significant correlation with corporate value, which is very different from other industries.
引文
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