IPO公司盈余管理动因与治理研究
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摘要
首次公开发行市场是一个特殊的市场，发行双方“契约磨擦”与“沟通阻碍”的存在导致IPO公司盈余管理是一个非常普遍的现象。综观相关文献，国内外对于IPO中盈余管理问题的研究主要集中于二个方面，一是IPO公司盈余管理动因研究；二是IPO盈余管理治理机制研究。关于盈余管理动因的属性，会计学界有两种不同的观点：信号观和机会主义观。盈余管理究竟是有益的，还是有害的？还是一个有待回答的理论和实证问题。不论是机会主义观还是信号观，都会导致利益再分配效应。盈余管理行为会引发契约关系人之间财富的重新分配，并且过分的盈余管理容易演变成会计欺诈和内幕交易等非法行为，影响到资本配置效率，甚至导致市场失败。探讨IPO公司盈余管理的动因与治理，有利于促进IPO市场的健康持续发展。
在文献综述的基础上，本文运用统计模拟的方法，首先比较各盈余管理应计利润计量模型的检验效果；然后运用实证方法，探讨IPO公司盈余管理的动机；最后检验证券监管制度的变迁对IPO公司盈余管理的约束。本文的主要研究内容有三个方面：
运用统计模拟的方法，本文通过测试各模型产生第一类错误和第二类错误的频率，比较基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型、无形资产琼斯模型、前瞻性修正琼斯模型、收益匹配琼斯模型、现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型等七种常用的截面操纵性应计利润模型在中国资本市场的检验效果。研究发现，在中国资本市场上，基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型和无形资产琼斯模型相对较优，它们所犯第一类错误和第二类错误的频率较小，但在收入操纵检测上，修正琼斯模型检验能力更突出；现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型虽然检验盈余管理的能力较强，但是存在较为严重的第一类错误，易夸大中国上市公司盈余管理的程度。前瞻性修正琼斯模型计算复杂，存在第一类错误，而且检验盈余管理的能力上比修正琼斯模型没有明显的提高；收益匹配琼斯模型对于费用操纵的检验能力较差。综合各项检测结果发现中国证券市场上，分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳。
本文利用“承销商声誉”划分好企业与差企业，分析企业类型、IPO公司盈余管理水平与IPO后股票异常业绩之间的相关性。结果发现无论是高声誉的承销商所承销的好企业，还是低声誉的承销商所承销的差企业，其上市前一年盈余管理水平都显著为正，且与企业类型没有显著相关性，表明IPO公司盈余管理是一种普遍策略。但通过IPO后股票异常业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平相关性的进一步检验，发现对于差企业，IPO后异常股票业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平之间有显著的负相关性，而对于好企业，这种显著的负相关性并不存在。总体的实证结果支持企业类型决定IPO公司盈余管理动因属性的理论分析。表明对于好企业，盈余管理是传递企业未来业绩的信号，而对于差企业，盈余管理是一个机会主义行为。这一发现为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争议提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。
基于中国IPO公司管制诱发型盈余管理动因的考虑，本文根据中国证券发行制度演变，运用应计利润模型和实质盈余管理模型来计量IPO公司盈余管理水平，通过描述性统计和多元回归方法，分析证券发行制度市场化进程对于中国IPO公司盈余管理程度和方式的动态影响。研究发现随着证券发行制度由审批准转向核准制，通道制转向保荐制，IPO公司盈余管理水平显著下降。在盈余管理方式的研究上，本文发现在中国IPO市场上，应计盈余管理和实质盈余管理是显著正相关，并没有发现，Cohen et al.(2008)等西方研究文献所证明的随着监管制度的加强，应计管理和实质盈余管理方式相互替代，此消彼长的趋势。总体的实证结果表明核准制的实施，可以约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理的行为，系统提高中国上市公司质量。
本文通过对IPO盈余管理常用计量模型的检验能力的分析，发现分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳，为盈余管理研究的模型选择提供了一种依据。另外对IPO公司盈余管理动因的实证分析，为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争论提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。同时从制度变迁的角度，研究IPO公司盈余管理行为，验证了证券发行制度的市场化的完善能有效约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理，为证券发行制度进一步向注册制发展提供了证据。
The Initial public offering market is a special market, due to “contracting frictions”and “blocked communication” between issuers and investors, earnings managementsurrounding IPO is very common. Throughout the related studies of earnings managementsurrounding IPO, there are two important issues. One is the nature of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO, the other is the constraint mechanism of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO. For the first one, there are two different views. Someresearchers think the manager takes advantage of earnings management to obtain someprivate gain; others argue earnings management can be used to deliver a more precisemeasure of firm performance. Is earnings management opportunistic or signaling? Whichis still a theoretical and empirical question needed to be answered. Nevertheless, no matterwhich kind of view, earnings management may lead to interest redistribution effect andtrigger the wealth retribution between the related persons. Excessive earnings managementeasily evolve into accounting fraud, insider trading and other illegal behavior, which canharm efficiency of capital allocation and even lead to stock market failure. Studying onnature and constraint mechanism of earnings management surrounding IPO can promotethe healthy and sustainable development of IPO market.
Based on the literature review, this paper firstly uses statistical simulation method toevaluate the specification and power of different discretionary accruals in the Chinesecontext, to looking for the suitable measure model. Then we theoretically and empiricallyanalyze the nature of earnings management surround IPO. Finally, based on issuingsupervision system changes, we study the dynamic change on the level and means ofearnings management by Chinese IPO firms. This paper has three main conclusions:
In the third chapter of this article, this paper evaluates alternative discretionaryaccruals models for detecting earnings management. This comparison uses test statistics toevaluate the specification and power of different discretionary accruals in the Chinesecontext. Specifically, we assess the Jones standard model, the modified Jones model, theJones model with intangible assets, the Jones model with ROA, The forward-lookingmodified Jones model, the Jones model with cash flow, and the non-linear Jones model.We find that:(1) the Jones standard model, the Modified Jones model and the Jones modelwith intangible assets exhibit well specified and the better power in detecting earningsmanagement, especially the modified Jones model, which is more powerful than its standard version at detecting revenue-based manipulation.(2)The Jones model with cashflow and the non-linear Jones model exhibit the most power in detecting earningmanagement, but appear worse specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years.(3)The forward-looking modified Jones model is complicated in computation and itdoesn’t improve the power in detecting earnings management than the original modifiedversion.(4)The Jones mode with ROA performs is worst at detecting expense-basedearnings management. Finally we think it is advisable to put the cross-sectional modifiedJones model in priority when we use the discretionary accruals models in our research ofthe earnings management in the Chinese stock market.
In the forth chapter of the article, we distinguish between IPO firms according to thereputation ranking of underwriters. We find that IPO firms associated with moreprestigious underwriters have significantly less aggressive earnings management, and thatthe negative relationship between earnings management and the post-IPO performance ofa firm’s stocks is discernible only for firms associated with less prestigious underwriters,with no significant results being found for firms associated with more prestigiousunderwriters. Our findings suggest that the firms’ type determines the nature of earningsmanagement.
In the fifth chapter of the article, this paper studies the dynamic change on the leveland means of earnings management by Chinese IPO firms. Based on Chinese stockissuance system evolution, we adopt Jones model and real earnings management model asour measure of earning management, while providing controls for the changes indiscretionary accruals attributable to changes in performance. We found the level ofearnings management declines with the transformation from authorized system toapproval system, and from channel system to sponsor system, but we can’t find the accrualmanagement and real management action can replace each other. On the whole, our studyproves stock issuance system reform can restrain the opportunistic earnings managementactions and improve the earnings quality of Chinese IPO firms.
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on the nature of IPO firm’s earningsmanage by verifying that the firms’ type determines the nature of earnings management,These findings could provide one possible explanation to the dispute betweenopportunistic earnings management view and signal view. Meanwhile what we foundshow the Chinese underwriter reputation mechanism is effective to a certain extent. Ourstudy is also closely related to the literature on the constraint mechanism of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO by proving stock issuance system reform can restrain the opportunistic earnings management actions surrounding IPO, What we finding providessupport for the market-oriented stock supervision system reform.
在文献综述的基础上，本文运用统计模拟的方法，首先比较各盈余管理应计利润计量模型的检验效果；然后运用实证方法，探讨IPO公司盈余管理的动机；最后检验证券监管制度的变迁对IPO公司盈余管理的约束。本文的主要研究内容有三个方面：
运用统计模拟的方法，本文通过测试各模型产生第一类错误和第二类错误的频率，比较基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型、无形资产琼斯模型、前瞻性修正琼斯模型、收益匹配琼斯模型、现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型等七种常用的截面操纵性应计利润模型在中国资本市场的检验效果。研究发现，在中国资本市场上，基本琼斯模型、修正琼斯模型和无形资产琼斯模型相对较优，它们所犯第一类错误和第二类错误的频率较小，但在收入操纵检测上，修正琼斯模型检验能力更突出；现金流量琼斯模型、非线性琼斯模型虽然检验盈余管理的能力较强，但是存在较为严重的第一类错误，易夸大中国上市公司盈余管理的程度。前瞻性修正琼斯模型计算复杂，存在第一类错误，而且检验盈余管理的能力上比修正琼斯模型没有明显的提高；收益匹配琼斯模型对于费用操纵的检验能力较差。综合各项检测结果发现中国证券市场上，分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳。
本文利用“承销商声誉”划分好企业与差企业，分析企业类型、IPO公司盈余管理水平与IPO后股票异常业绩之间的相关性。结果发现无论是高声誉的承销商所承销的好企业，还是低声誉的承销商所承销的差企业，其上市前一年盈余管理水平都显著为正，且与企业类型没有显著相关性，表明IPO公司盈余管理是一种普遍策略。但通过IPO后股票异常业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平相关性的进一步检验，发现对于差企业，IPO后异常股票业绩与IPO公司盈余管理水平之间有显著的负相关性，而对于好企业，这种显著的负相关性并不存在。总体的实证结果支持企业类型决定IPO公司盈余管理动因属性的理论分析。表明对于好企业，盈余管理是传递企业未来业绩的信号，而对于差企业，盈余管理是一个机会主义行为。这一发现为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争议提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。
基于中国IPO公司管制诱发型盈余管理动因的考虑，本文根据中国证券发行制度演变，运用应计利润模型和实质盈余管理模型来计量IPO公司盈余管理水平，通过描述性统计和多元回归方法，分析证券发行制度市场化进程对于中国IPO公司盈余管理程度和方式的动态影响。研究发现随着证券发行制度由审批准转向核准制，通道制转向保荐制，IPO公司盈余管理水平显著下降。在盈余管理方式的研究上，本文发现在中国IPO市场上，应计盈余管理和实质盈余管理是显著正相关，并没有发现，Cohen et al.(2008)等西方研究文献所证明的随着监管制度的加强，应计管理和实质盈余管理方式相互替代，此消彼长的趋势。总体的实证结果表明核准制的实施，可以约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理的行为，系统提高中国上市公司质量。
本文通过对IPO盈余管理常用计量模型的检验能力的分析，发现分年度分行业回归的截面修正琼斯模型在模型的设定和盈余管理的检验能力方面表现更佳，为盈余管理研究的模型选择提供了一种依据。另外对IPO公司盈余管理动因的实证分析，为盈余管理的机会主义观与信号观的争论提供了一种可能的解释，也在一定程度上，证明了中国IPO市场承销商声誉机制的有效性。同时从制度变迁的角度，研究IPO公司盈余管理行为，验证了证券发行制度的市场化的完善能有效约束IPO公司机会主义盈余管理，为证券发行制度进一步向注册制发展提供了证据。
The Initial public offering market is a special market, due to “contracting frictions”and “blocked communication” between issuers and investors, earnings managementsurrounding IPO is very common. Throughout the related studies of earnings managementsurrounding IPO, there are two important issues. One is the nature of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO, the other is the constraint mechanism of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO. For the first one, there are two different views. Someresearchers think the manager takes advantage of earnings management to obtain someprivate gain; others argue earnings management can be used to deliver a more precisemeasure of firm performance. Is earnings management opportunistic or signaling? Whichis still a theoretical and empirical question needed to be answered. Nevertheless, no matterwhich kind of view, earnings management may lead to interest redistribution effect andtrigger the wealth retribution between the related persons. Excessive earnings managementeasily evolve into accounting fraud, insider trading and other illegal behavior, which canharm efficiency of capital allocation and even lead to stock market failure. Studying onnature and constraint mechanism of earnings management surrounding IPO can promotethe healthy and sustainable development of IPO market.
Based on the literature review, this paper firstly uses statistical simulation method toevaluate the specification and power of different discretionary accruals in the Chinesecontext, to looking for the suitable measure model. Then we theoretically and empiricallyanalyze the nature of earnings management surround IPO. Finally, based on issuingsupervision system changes, we study the dynamic change on the level and means ofearnings management by Chinese IPO firms. This paper has three main conclusions:
In the third chapter of this article, this paper evaluates alternative discretionaryaccruals models for detecting earnings management. This comparison uses test statistics toevaluate the specification and power of different discretionary accruals in the Chinesecontext. Specifically, we assess the Jones standard model, the modified Jones model, theJones model with intangible assets, the Jones model with ROA, The forward-lookingmodified Jones model, the Jones model with cash flow, and the non-linear Jones model.We find that:(1) the Jones standard model, the Modified Jones model and the Jones modelwith intangible assets exhibit well specified and the better power in detecting earningsmanagement, especially the modified Jones model, which is more powerful than its standard version at detecting revenue-based manipulation.(2)The Jones model with cashflow and the non-linear Jones model exhibit the most power in detecting earningmanagement, but appear worse specified when applied to a random sample of firm-years.(3)The forward-looking modified Jones model is complicated in computation and itdoesn’t improve the power in detecting earnings management than the original modifiedversion.(4)The Jones mode with ROA performs is worst at detecting expense-basedearnings management. Finally we think it is advisable to put the cross-sectional modifiedJones model in priority when we use the discretionary accruals models in our research ofthe earnings management in the Chinese stock market.
In the forth chapter of the article, we distinguish between IPO firms according to thereputation ranking of underwriters. We find that IPO firms associated with moreprestigious underwriters have significantly less aggressive earnings management, and thatthe negative relationship between earnings management and the post-IPO performance ofa firm’s stocks is discernible only for firms associated with less prestigious underwriters,with no significant results being found for firms associated with more prestigiousunderwriters. Our findings suggest that the firms’ type determines the nature of earningsmanagement.
In the fifth chapter of the article, this paper studies the dynamic change on the leveland means of earnings management by Chinese IPO firms. Based on Chinese stockissuance system evolution, we adopt Jones model and real earnings management model asour measure of earning management, while providing controls for the changes indiscretionary accruals attributable to changes in performance. We found the level ofearnings management declines with the transformation from authorized system toapproval system, and from channel system to sponsor system, but we can’t find the accrualmanagement and real management action can replace each other. On the whole, our studyproves stock issuance system reform can restrain the opportunistic earnings managementactions and improve the earnings quality of Chinese IPO firms.
Our paper contributes to the extant literature on the nature of IPO firm’s earningsmanage by verifying that the firms’ type determines the nature of earnings management,These findings could provide one possible explanation to the dispute betweenopportunistic earnings management view and signal view. Meanwhile what we foundshow the Chinese underwriter reputation mechanism is effective to a certain extent. Ourstudy is also closely related to the literature on the constraint mechanism of earningsmanagement surrounding IPO by proving stock issuance system reform can restrain the opportunistic earnings management actions surrounding IPO, What we finding providessupport for the market-oriented stock supervision system reform.
引文
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