中国上市公司债权人治理机制及效应研究
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摘要
中国上市公司正面临着由行政型治理向经济型治理的转型,仅依靠公司内部治理机制的运行已不能为公司治理的成功转型提供足够的动力。在公司的契约网络中,利益相关者的权益保护也不能完全依赖于由内部治理主体引导的具有利益偏向的治理机制。公司治理转型背景下,治理目标不再是围绕股东权益或公司价值的最大化展开,已演进成利益相关者的责、权、利均衡。所以,突破单一的内部治理范式,建立和完善公司外部治理机制,形成内部治理与外部治理机制的协同,对于保护利益相关者权益,维护契约网络的稳定性,推动公司治理顺利转型具有重要意义。
债权人作为公司重要的外部利益相关者,不仅能够为公司的存续和发展提供资金支持,并且在税盾效应和股东收益效率的提升方面比股权融资具有优势,同时也是重要的公司治理主体。以债权人治理为公司外部治理领域的切入点,重点探讨以下几个方面的问题：债权人参与公司治理的动机是什么?债权人风险防御行为是否具有动态性?债权人能够带给公司治理怎样的影响?在已有的文献中,公司负债规模对绩效的关系成为债权人治理的大众研究范式,然而公司治理质量的高低,是对公司运营合法性和公正性的反应,是利益相关者责、权、利均衡的结果,因而财务绩效并不能成为衡量公司治理效应的指标。再者,传统的研究范式未能建立在对债权人治理动机的剖析基础之上,所以研究结论缺乏全面性,使得债权人治理领域留有较大的研究空白和解释空间。
首先构建了债务代理成本的生成模型,债务代理成本的产生受到了债权人和负债企业契约中的内生要素和外生要素的综合影响,其中,内生要素主要包括信息不对称、不完全契约、交易成本等契约的本身特质,外生要素包括负债企业的有限理性、机会主义和道德风险等因素。代理成本直接能够转化为债权人风险,而出于风险规避动机,债权人会采取一系列防御措施来降低风险损失。根据生命周期理论,在不同的生命周期,负债企业在企业规模、风险偏好、信息不对称程度和投融资行为等方面具有显著的差异性,因此债权人风险水平也会随着企业在生命周期内演进而发生波动,所以债权人应建立动态防御能力来抵御风险,这便构成了债权人内源性治理的第一类治理机制：动态防御治理。在日本、德国等地区,债权人被允许持有企业的股票,与之形成股权和债权关系并存的局面,此时,债权人和企业的日标函数在一定程度上达成统一,二者能够形成战略协同效应以抵御外部风险,实现联盟组合的利益最大化,此时,债权人的协同型治理便显得尤为重要。因此,防御型治理和协同型治理构成了债权人内源性治理的主要内容。由于法律的限制,在中国,债权人与企业之间仅存在债权债务关系,在这种联结模式下,债权人风险防御治理机制更为重要。
在对债权人内源性治理进行理论分析的基础上,对债权人的外部性治理进行了数理分析。在中国,债权人在债务契约关系中主要关注负债企业在盈利能力、偿债能力、发展潜力、财务质量等指标,面对公司治理状况缺乏足够的关注动机。然而,负债融资本身所具有的刚性还本付息的特征,以及债权人对公司的监督和干预行为能够对公司的治理状况产生影响,因此这种影响具有鲜明的的外部性特征。回归了“债权人——代理成本”这一经典研究范式,在分析经理人效用来源,构建经理人效用体系的基础上,建立了经理人效用一般模型,考察了债权人外生变量引入之后,负债规模、利率水平和惩罚机制对经理人行为选择,尤其是私利行为产生的影响。考虑到外部性效应能够在较大程度上受到情境因素的影响,进步分析了以政治关联和两权分离度刻画的公司内部治理环境以及结构洞和中心度刻画的连锁债权人网络对债权人外部性治理效应产生的调节作用。
最后,运用计量分析的方法,对债权人风险防御和外部·性治理效应进行了实证检验。考虑到民营企业对融资、风险和偿债压力的敏感性,选取民营上市公司的而板数据作为研究样本。在风险防御的实证检验部分,首先构建了民营上市公司生命周期的评价指标,依据评价指数对样本进行分组。在检验非效率投资风险波动显著性的基础上,分别对成长期、成熟期和衰退期中,债权人短期借款和长期借款对公司.非效率投资风险的影响进行了验证,以检验债权人的动态防御治理效应。在外部性治理效应的实证研究部分,通过选取行业均值调整后的管理费用率作为代理成本的替代变量,检验了两类债权人贷款对代理成本的影响,进而折射岀债权人外部性治理在股东与经理代理冲突中所具有的作用。通过构建政治关联指数、两权分离度、结构洞指数、中心性,进一步探讨了内部治理环境和连锁债权人网络环境在债权人外部治理机制中的调节作用。基于对债权人治理效应的理论分析、数理分析和计量分析,主要得出如下结论：
第一,在债权人内源性治理方面,由于法律环境的因素,中国银行债权人与企业之间更多的表现出风险规避导向下的防御型治理。随着企业在生命周期内演进,企业非效率投资水平具有显著的差异性特征,并且,债权人能够围绕短期贷款形成良好的动态治理效应,即在生命周期的各个阶段表现出对企业非效率投资的抑制能力,且抑制能力边际递增。但长期贷款不但缺乏对非效率投资的抑制,反而能够促进企业的非效率投资水平。表明长期贷款一方面为债权人带来了高昂的监督成本,另一方面在降低企业偿债压力的同时,扩充了经理人的可支配资源规模,刺激了企业决策者的自利动机,丧失了风险防御能力。所以,就风险防御而言,债务期限结构的差异能够为债权人发挥不同的保护作用,这一结论在动态能力和生命周期的角度补充了债务期限结构理论在中国本土情境下民营上市公司中应用的证据,进而说明债权人一方面应在企业生命周期和契约时序的维度建立二维的动态防御型治理,另一方面应关注长期贷款增值的稳健性,为债权人权益的全面保护打下基础。
第二,债权人外部性治理效应能够作用于经理人的自利行为选择,能够对股东与经理之间的第一类委托代理冲突产生影响,其依赖于负债融资特征和债权人风险防御导向下的监督、干预行为对企业决策者产生的外部性作用。与内源性治理的本质差别在于外部性治理目标并不是债权人所关注的重点,具有鲜明的被动性特征。通过梳理经理人的效用体系,构建经理人效用模型,研究发现,经理人用来创造私人效用的劳动量随着负债规模的增加而减少,均衡条件下同样如此。并且,惩罚合同的执行和利率的提高均会对经理人私利行为产生抑制作用。表明债权人外部性治理作用能够迫使经理人将有限的劳动力和资本资源投入到有效的价值创造活动中,进而缓解了第一类委托代理冲突。接着,在计量分析的基础上,通过计量分析研究发现,尽管短期借款能够抑制代理成本的增加,但长期借款却促进了代理成本的增长,再一次体现出长期借款能够引发高昂的监督成本和宽松的偿债压力,使其丧失了对经理人行为的外部性治理作用。在进一步的研究中,发现政治关联和两权分离度分别能够逆向和正向调节短期借款的治理作用和长期借款的促进作用,并且连锁债权人网络中的结构洞指数和中心度能够在总上限制债权人治理效应的发挥,证实了债权人外部性治理机制的运行受到公司内部治理环境的影响。本研究突破了单一情境下,债权人“担保机制”的分析范式,在此基础上,提岀应从治理动机内化和治理工具功能优化两个角度来提升债权人的外部性治理效应,为全面提升公司治理质量准备条件。
China's listed corporations governance have been passing through a transformation period, which is, to be specific, from administrative governance pattern to economic one. and can not be realized simply relied on corporations interior governance mechanism, for example, incentive mechanism, decision mechanism or board of supervisors et al. Exterior governance mechanisms are urgently needed not only for a successful transformation, but a outstanding protection of stakeholders' benefit which could be sabotaged by insiders of the corporations. During the transformation period, the goal of corporation governance has converted from shareholders' benefit maximum to a balance between stakeholders' interests, responsibilities and rights. Therefore, to meet this goal, exterior governance mechanism should be set up and form a synergetic effect with interior one so as to protect stakeholders' interests, maintain the stability of corporations' contract network and promote the governance transformation effectively.
As one of the most important exterior stakeholders of corporation, creditor can not only supply capital resource, which brings lever and tax shield effect, for the organization's development, but is a crucial governance principal. This dissertation has made creditors' governance for corporations as a breakthrough point in exterior governance study area, and focused on the questions that what creditors' motivation of taking part in corporations' governance, what impact creditors can bring for corporations, whether creditors risk-defending behavior is dynamic. Most of existing studies have paid attention to a "capital structure—finance performance" pattern, and made it as a path to get the result of creditors' governance effect. However, on one hand, corporations' finance performance can not mirror out governance quality which truly reflects equity, fairness and justice of corporation operation, on the other, without analyzing creditors motivation of participation in corporations' governance, comprehensive and objective conclusions can not be drawn by the studies following the old pattern, and this leaves sufficient and meaningful study space in creditor governance area.
In this dissertation, a generation model of agency cost for debt financing has been set up firstly. It has been figured out that this agency cost is generated by endogenous as well as external factors of the contract between creditor and corporation. Endogenous factors have covered information asymmetry, incomplete contract, transaction cost and so on. while external factors have included bounded rationality, opportunism and moral risk. Since the agency cost of debt can turn into a serious financial risk, creditors have to make and implement a serial of risk-defending measures. According to life cycle theory, during different life period, aspects of corporation size, information asymmetry, investment preference are different, which manifests that creditors have different risk-taking level. So creditors ought to build up dynamic risk-defending capability to make sure their capital value could increase, and this is the first governance mechanism of creditor. In Japan or Germany, creditors are allowed to take corporations' stock share which means there are both debt and stock contracts between creditor and corporation. A double identity make creditors' object function is identical to the stakeholders' to some extent. Then creditors are motivated to assist corporation to maximize its benefits, and there is strong and effective interaction between creditor and corporation so as to defend market risk together and realize a win-win situation. This is called creditors'synergetic governance. In China, because creditors are forbidden to invest as a shareholder by law, their dynamic risk defending governance mechanism has more significant meaning. Since synergetic and risk defending governance mechanism are motivated by the protection of creditors' own benefit, they are named as creditors' endogenous governance.
Based on the analysis of creditors endogenous governance, creditors'external governance mechanisms have been mathematically analyzed in this dissertation. In China, creditors have paid sufficient attention on corporations'capability of making profit, paying debt, growth and development when they are forming or maintaining a debt contract, but rarely have focused their eyes on corporation's governance quality. However, a rigid paying off requirement of debt financing as well as creditors' protection behavior (supervising and intervening) can actually influence managers' decision making in corporations, and this may throw impact on the agency problem between stakeholder and manager so as to act as a governance mechanism. This governance mechanism is not motivated by creditor, and therefore, named as external mechanism. This dissertation has reverted on a classical study mode,"creditor—agency cosf"(Hart,1995). After analyzing managers' utility system, a manger utility model has been designed, and impacts of debt size, interest rate, and punishment contract upon mangers' self-interest behavior have been discussed. In consideration that creditors' external governance is easily affected by circumstances, the impact of corporations' interior governance environment and creditor chain network upon creditors" external governance effect have also been discussed in this dissertation.
Economy analysis method has also been used in this dissertation to test creditors' dynamic risk-defending effect and external governance effect in China's listed corporations. Because private corporations are more sensitive to debt financing, financial risk and paying-off pressure than state-owned ones, panel data of private listed corporations are selected as our research sample. In the part of risk defending effect test, life cycle evaluation system are designed firstly, according which the sample can be classified into groups of growing, mature, and falling period. Significance of difference of corporations' inefficient investment risk during different life period has then been tested, based on which the relationship of long-term debt and short-term debt and the risk can be researched so as to find out the dynamic governance effect. In the part of external governance effect test, rate of management fee adjusted by industry means is selected to reflect the agency cost between stakeholder and manger. We have also tested debt of long-term and short-term's influence upon the agency cost to find out creditors' external governance effect. Furthermore, after accessing samples'index of political connection, powers'separation, structure hole and centrality, moderation effect of corporation interior governance environment and creditor chain network have then been tested. Based on the theory analysis, mathematical analysis, economy analysis and social network analysis of creditors' governance effect, several conclusions have been drawn as following:
First, in the aspect of creditors' endogenous governance, Since the regulation of native law environment, China's creditor(Bank) can only perform risk defending mechanism. Along with corporations progressing in life cycle, their inefficient investment has shown significant difference in different life period. Creditor can built up dynamic risk defending mechanism around short-term debt. In another word, short-term debt can restrain shareholder—manger agency cost in every life period, and the restrain effect increases marginally. However, long-term debt hasn't show any governance effect towards the agency cost, despite that, it can promote the cost into a higher level, and the promotion effect also increases marginally. This test result reflects that long-term debt brings the creditor higher supervising cost on one hand, and brings the manger's disposable resources stimulates their self-interest behavior on the other. Thus, in terms of risk-defending, different term structure of debt can protect creditors' benefit on different level. This conclusion has filled the study blank of the application of debt's term structure in China's private corporations by the viewpoint of life cycle and dynamic capability. Furthermore, it can be reasonably suggested that creditors should setup dynamic risk-defending mechanism by dimensions of life cycle and contract time order. and pay more attention the stability of value increasing of long-term debt.
Secondly, in terms creditors' external governance effect, there is a impact of creditor upon managers' behavior choice, which means creditor can influence the agency problem of shareholder and manger. Differing form endogenous governance, since creditors' lacking of enough motivation in taking part into the original agency problem the corporation has, and debts' rigid paying-off requirement and creditors risk defending behavior can actually affect managers' decision, this governance mechanism has a significant external feature. On the basis of managers utility model, it is found out that along with the increase of debt size or interest rate or punishment risk, manager is less motivated to take self-interest behavior, instead, they are more likely to contribute more labor force or capital resources to create positive value for corporations. This result remains the same under equilibrium condition. Then, through economy analysis of private listed corporations data sample, though short-term debt can restrain the increasing of agency cost, long-term debt has promoted its increase, and this, again, shows that long-term brings much more supervising cost for creditors and loosen the external governance effect. In the further study, it has been tested positively that political connection index and power separation index can moderate the relationship between short-term and long-term debt and agency cost, while the structure hole and centrality in creditor chain network also have moderation effect, which manifests that interior governance environment and creditor chain network environment can affect creditors' external governance. This study has broken trough the study mode of creditors'"guarantee mechanism" under single circumstance, and suggest that creditors' motivation of external governance should be converted into endogenous one. meanwhile, governance tools' function should be promoted so as to advance creditors external governance effect.
债权人作为公司重要的外部利益相关者,不仅能够为公司的存续和发展提供资金支持,并且在税盾效应和股东收益效率的提升方面比股权融资具有优势,同时也是重要的公司治理主体。以债权人治理为公司外部治理领域的切入点,重点探讨以下几个方面的问题：债权人参与公司治理的动机是什么?债权人风险防御行为是否具有动态性?债权人能够带给公司治理怎样的影响?在已有的文献中,公司负债规模对绩效的关系成为债权人治理的大众研究范式,然而公司治理质量的高低,是对公司运营合法性和公正性的反应,是利益相关者责、权、利均衡的结果,因而财务绩效并不能成为衡量公司治理效应的指标。再者,传统的研究范式未能建立在对债权人治理动机的剖析基础之上,所以研究结论缺乏全面性,使得债权人治理领域留有较大的研究空白和解释空间。
首先构建了债务代理成本的生成模型,债务代理成本的产生受到了债权人和负债企业契约中的内生要素和外生要素的综合影响,其中,内生要素主要包括信息不对称、不完全契约、交易成本等契约的本身特质,外生要素包括负债企业的有限理性、机会主义和道德风险等因素。代理成本直接能够转化为债权人风险,而出于风险规避动机,债权人会采取一系列防御措施来降低风险损失。根据生命周期理论,在不同的生命周期,负债企业在企业规模、风险偏好、信息不对称程度和投融资行为等方面具有显著的差异性,因此债权人风险水平也会随着企业在生命周期内演进而发生波动,所以债权人应建立动态防御能力来抵御风险,这便构成了债权人内源性治理的第一类治理机制：动态防御治理。在日本、德国等地区,债权人被允许持有企业的股票,与之形成股权和债权关系并存的局面,此时,债权人和企业的日标函数在一定程度上达成统一,二者能够形成战略协同效应以抵御外部风险,实现联盟组合的利益最大化,此时,债权人的协同型治理便显得尤为重要。因此,防御型治理和协同型治理构成了债权人内源性治理的主要内容。由于法律的限制,在中国,债权人与企业之间仅存在债权债务关系,在这种联结模式下,债权人风险防御治理机制更为重要。
在对债权人内源性治理进行理论分析的基础上,对债权人的外部性治理进行了数理分析。在中国,债权人在债务契约关系中主要关注负债企业在盈利能力、偿债能力、发展潜力、财务质量等指标,面对公司治理状况缺乏足够的关注动机。然而,负债融资本身所具有的刚性还本付息的特征,以及债权人对公司的监督和干预行为能够对公司的治理状况产生影响,因此这种影响具有鲜明的的外部性特征。回归了“债权人——代理成本”这一经典研究范式,在分析经理人效用来源,构建经理人效用体系的基础上,建立了经理人效用一般模型,考察了债权人外生变量引入之后,负债规模、利率水平和惩罚机制对经理人行为选择,尤其是私利行为产生的影响。考虑到外部性效应能够在较大程度上受到情境因素的影响,进步分析了以政治关联和两权分离度刻画的公司内部治理环境以及结构洞和中心度刻画的连锁债权人网络对债权人外部性治理效应产生的调节作用。
最后,运用计量分析的方法,对债权人风险防御和外部·性治理效应进行了实证检验。考虑到民营企业对融资、风险和偿债压力的敏感性,选取民营上市公司的而板数据作为研究样本。在风险防御的实证检验部分,首先构建了民营上市公司生命周期的评价指标,依据评价指数对样本进行分组。在检验非效率投资风险波动显著性的基础上,分别对成长期、成熟期和衰退期中,债权人短期借款和长期借款对公司.非效率投资风险的影响进行了验证,以检验债权人的动态防御治理效应。在外部性治理效应的实证研究部分,通过选取行业均值调整后的管理费用率作为代理成本的替代变量,检验了两类债权人贷款对代理成本的影响,进而折射岀债权人外部性治理在股东与经理代理冲突中所具有的作用。通过构建政治关联指数、两权分离度、结构洞指数、中心性,进一步探讨了内部治理环境和连锁债权人网络环境在债权人外部治理机制中的调节作用。基于对债权人治理效应的理论分析、数理分析和计量分析,主要得出如下结论：
第一,在债权人内源性治理方面,由于法律环境的因素,中国银行债权人与企业之间更多的表现出风险规避导向下的防御型治理。随着企业在生命周期内演进,企业非效率投资水平具有显著的差异性特征,并且,债权人能够围绕短期贷款形成良好的动态治理效应,即在生命周期的各个阶段表现出对企业非效率投资的抑制能力,且抑制能力边际递增。但长期贷款不但缺乏对非效率投资的抑制,反而能够促进企业的非效率投资水平。表明长期贷款一方面为债权人带来了高昂的监督成本,另一方面在降低企业偿债压力的同时,扩充了经理人的可支配资源规模,刺激了企业决策者的自利动机,丧失了风险防御能力。所以,就风险防御而言,债务期限结构的差异能够为债权人发挥不同的保护作用,这一结论在动态能力和生命周期的角度补充了债务期限结构理论在中国本土情境下民营上市公司中应用的证据,进而说明债权人一方面应在企业生命周期和契约时序的维度建立二维的动态防御型治理,另一方面应关注长期贷款增值的稳健性,为债权人权益的全面保护打下基础。
第二,债权人外部性治理效应能够作用于经理人的自利行为选择,能够对股东与经理之间的第一类委托代理冲突产生影响,其依赖于负债融资特征和债权人风险防御导向下的监督、干预行为对企业决策者产生的外部性作用。与内源性治理的本质差别在于外部性治理目标并不是债权人所关注的重点,具有鲜明的被动性特征。通过梳理经理人的效用体系,构建经理人效用模型,研究发现,经理人用来创造私人效用的劳动量随着负债规模的增加而减少,均衡条件下同样如此。并且,惩罚合同的执行和利率的提高均会对经理人私利行为产生抑制作用。表明债权人外部性治理作用能够迫使经理人将有限的劳动力和资本资源投入到有效的价值创造活动中,进而缓解了第一类委托代理冲突。接着,在计量分析的基础上,通过计量分析研究发现,尽管短期借款能够抑制代理成本的增加,但长期借款却促进了代理成本的增长,再一次体现出长期借款能够引发高昂的监督成本和宽松的偿债压力,使其丧失了对经理人行为的外部性治理作用。在进一步的研究中,发现政治关联和两权分离度分别能够逆向和正向调节短期借款的治理作用和长期借款的促进作用,并且连锁债权人网络中的结构洞指数和中心度能够在总上限制债权人治理效应的发挥,证实了债权人外部性治理机制的运行受到公司内部治理环境的影响。本研究突破了单一情境下,债权人“担保机制”的分析范式,在此基础上,提岀应从治理动机内化和治理工具功能优化两个角度来提升债权人的外部性治理效应,为全面提升公司治理质量准备条件。
China's listed corporations governance have been passing through a transformation period, which is, to be specific, from administrative governance pattern to economic one. and can not be realized simply relied on corporations interior governance mechanism, for example, incentive mechanism, decision mechanism or board of supervisors et al. Exterior governance mechanisms are urgently needed not only for a successful transformation, but a outstanding protection of stakeholders' benefit which could be sabotaged by insiders of the corporations. During the transformation period, the goal of corporation governance has converted from shareholders' benefit maximum to a balance between stakeholders' interests, responsibilities and rights. Therefore, to meet this goal, exterior governance mechanism should be set up and form a synergetic effect with interior one so as to protect stakeholders' interests, maintain the stability of corporations' contract network and promote the governance transformation effectively.
As one of the most important exterior stakeholders of corporation, creditor can not only supply capital resource, which brings lever and tax shield effect, for the organization's development, but is a crucial governance principal. This dissertation has made creditors' governance for corporations as a breakthrough point in exterior governance study area, and focused on the questions that what creditors' motivation of taking part in corporations' governance, what impact creditors can bring for corporations, whether creditors risk-defending behavior is dynamic. Most of existing studies have paid attention to a "capital structure—finance performance" pattern, and made it as a path to get the result of creditors' governance effect. However, on one hand, corporations' finance performance can not mirror out governance quality which truly reflects equity, fairness and justice of corporation operation, on the other, without analyzing creditors motivation of participation in corporations' governance, comprehensive and objective conclusions can not be drawn by the studies following the old pattern, and this leaves sufficient and meaningful study space in creditor governance area.
In this dissertation, a generation model of agency cost for debt financing has been set up firstly. It has been figured out that this agency cost is generated by endogenous as well as external factors of the contract between creditor and corporation. Endogenous factors have covered information asymmetry, incomplete contract, transaction cost and so on. while external factors have included bounded rationality, opportunism and moral risk. Since the agency cost of debt can turn into a serious financial risk, creditors have to make and implement a serial of risk-defending measures. According to life cycle theory, during different life period, aspects of corporation size, information asymmetry, investment preference are different, which manifests that creditors have different risk-taking level. So creditors ought to build up dynamic risk-defending capability to make sure their capital value could increase, and this is the first governance mechanism of creditor. In Japan or Germany, creditors are allowed to take corporations' stock share which means there are both debt and stock contracts between creditor and corporation. A double identity make creditors' object function is identical to the stakeholders' to some extent. Then creditors are motivated to assist corporation to maximize its benefits, and there is strong and effective interaction between creditor and corporation so as to defend market risk together and realize a win-win situation. This is called creditors'synergetic governance. In China, because creditors are forbidden to invest as a shareholder by law, their dynamic risk defending governance mechanism has more significant meaning. Since synergetic and risk defending governance mechanism are motivated by the protection of creditors' own benefit, they are named as creditors' endogenous governance.
Based on the analysis of creditors endogenous governance, creditors'external governance mechanisms have been mathematically analyzed in this dissertation. In China, creditors have paid sufficient attention on corporations'capability of making profit, paying debt, growth and development when they are forming or maintaining a debt contract, but rarely have focused their eyes on corporation's governance quality. However, a rigid paying off requirement of debt financing as well as creditors' protection behavior (supervising and intervening) can actually influence managers' decision making in corporations, and this may throw impact on the agency problem between stakeholder and manager so as to act as a governance mechanism. This governance mechanism is not motivated by creditor, and therefore, named as external mechanism. This dissertation has reverted on a classical study mode,"creditor—agency cosf"(Hart,1995). After analyzing managers' utility system, a manger utility model has been designed, and impacts of debt size, interest rate, and punishment contract upon mangers' self-interest behavior have been discussed. In consideration that creditors' external governance is easily affected by circumstances, the impact of corporations' interior governance environment and creditor chain network upon creditors" external governance effect have also been discussed in this dissertation.
Economy analysis method has also been used in this dissertation to test creditors' dynamic risk-defending effect and external governance effect in China's listed corporations. Because private corporations are more sensitive to debt financing, financial risk and paying-off pressure than state-owned ones, panel data of private listed corporations are selected as our research sample. In the part of risk defending effect test, life cycle evaluation system are designed firstly, according which the sample can be classified into groups of growing, mature, and falling period. Significance of difference of corporations' inefficient investment risk during different life period has then been tested, based on which the relationship of long-term debt and short-term debt and the risk can be researched so as to find out the dynamic governance effect. In the part of external governance effect test, rate of management fee adjusted by industry means is selected to reflect the agency cost between stakeholder and manger. We have also tested debt of long-term and short-term's influence upon the agency cost to find out creditors' external governance effect. Furthermore, after accessing samples'index of political connection, powers'separation, structure hole and centrality, moderation effect of corporation interior governance environment and creditor chain network have then been tested. Based on the theory analysis, mathematical analysis, economy analysis and social network analysis of creditors' governance effect, several conclusions have been drawn as following:
First, in the aspect of creditors' endogenous governance, Since the regulation of native law environment, China's creditor(Bank) can only perform risk defending mechanism. Along with corporations progressing in life cycle, their inefficient investment has shown significant difference in different life period. Creditor can built up dynamic risk defending mechanism around short-term debt. In another word, short-term debt can restrain shareholder—manger agency cost in every life period, and the restrain effect increases marginally. However, long-term debt hasn't show any governance effect towards the agency cost, despite that, it can promote the cost into a higher level, and the promotion effect also increases marginally. This test result reflects that long-term debt brings the creditor higher supervising cost on one hand, and brings the manger's disposable resources stimulates their self-interest behavior on the other. Thus, in terms of risk-defending, different term structure of debt can protect creditors' benefit on different level. This conclusion has filled the study blank of the application of debt's term structure in China's private corporations by the viewpoint of life cycle and dynamic capability. Furthermore, it can be reasonably suggested that creditors should setup dynamic risk-defending mechanism by dimensions of life cycle and contract time order. and pay more attention the stability of value increasing of long-term debt.
Secondly, in terms creditors' external governance effect, there is a impact of creditor upon managers' behavior choice, which means creditor can influence the agency problem of shareholder and manger. Differing form endogenous governance, since creditors' lacking of enough motivation in taking part into the original agency problem the corporation has, and debts' rigid paying-off requirement and creditors risk defending behavior can actually affect managers' decision, this governance mechanism has a significant external feature. On the basis of managers utility model, it is found out that along with the increase of debt size or interest rate or punishment risk, manager is less motivated to take self-interest behavior, instead, they are more likely to contribute more labor force or capital resources to create positive value for corporations. This result remains the same under equilibrium condition. Then, through economy analysis of private listed corporations data sample, though short-term debt can restrain the increasing of agency cost, long-term debt has promoted its increase, and this, again, shows that long-term brings much more supervising cost for creditors and loosen the external governance effect. In the further study, it has been tested positively that political connection index and power separation index can moderate the relationship between short-term and long-term debt and agency cost, while the structure hole and centrality in creditor chain network also have moderation effect, which manifests that interior governance environment and creditor chain network environment can affect creditors' external governance. This study has broken trough the study mode of creditors'"guarantee mechanism" under single circumstance, and suggest that creditors' motivation of external governance should be converted into endogenous one. meanwhile, governance tools' function should be promoted so as to advance creditors external governance effect.
引文
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②样本中,2007年涵盖上市公司2228家,2008年2468家,2009年2583家,2010年2578家,2011年2488 家。所数据来源于国泰安CSMAR数据库
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