中国国有商业银行产权制度改革研究
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摘要
中国银行业中,国有商业银行是主体和核心,发挥着主导作用。因此,保持国有商业银行的稳定和健康的发展,成为我国金融政策的一个长期发展目标。在我国加入WTO之后,国内金融业进一步开放,国际竞争异常激烈。对此,国有商业银行必须要在诸多方面进行综合改革,逐步建立起现代金融企业制度。其中,产权制度改革是最核心的内容,它标志着改革的实质。近几十年来,越来越多的经济学家对国有商业银行产权制度改革进行了理论研究,这对于产权理论在我国国有商业银行改革中的政策选择方面具有一定的借鉴意义和参考价值。
     本文对中国国有商业银行产权制度改革进行了理论和实证研究,全文共分为六个部分:
     第一部分:引言。主要阐述了我国国有商业银行产权制度改革的背景、研究的理论、现实意义和研究目的。本文采用了定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,一方面从规范角度对国有商业银行产权制度改革进行分析;另一方面从实证角度对国内外国有商业银行产权制度改革进行了深入研究。在国有商业银行产权制度改革的理论与文献综述中,主要总结和分析了国内外关于国有商业银行产权制度改革的研究成果。大体分为两类:产权说和非产权说,其中产权说是主流观点,细分为国有化和私有化两个方案。我的观点是中国国有商业银行产权制度改革必须以马克思的所有制和产权理论作为指导,同时结合国情进行改革。
     第二部分:中国国有商业银行的现状。主要阐述了中国国有商业银行的现状,如:功能定位不清、资产质量低下、不良贷款率高和传导效率低等等。
     第三部分:中国国有商业银行现存问题的原因及其改革依据。主要说明了我国国有商业银行之所以存在效率低下等诸多问题,根本原因在于产权问题,即:产权不清晰和权责利不明确。从而又接连派生出存在问题的很多直接原因,如:不确定性、激励和约束机制不健全、政企不分和资源配置无效率等。而改革的依据是国有商业银行的性质。因此,只有进行产权制度改革,才能解决中国国有商业银行效率低下的问题。
     第四部分:国外国有商业银行产权制度改革的启示。主要通过国外国有商业银行产权制度改革的过程,总结出一些经验和教训。
     第五部分:中国国有商业银行产权制度改革的环境和条件。主要明确了我国国有商业银行产权制度改革的有利环境和条件及不利环境和条件。
     第六部分:对策建议和结论。针对中国国有商业银行产权制度改革,提出了一些具体的对策和建议。即:以马克思的所有制和产权理论为指导,把握中国国有商业银行产权制度改革的方向;明晰产权,分清权责利;进一步深化股份制改革,提高其经济效率;加强对战略投资者的监管,保证我国金融安全。最后得出结论和进一步的研究方向。
China's banking sector, state-owned commercial banks are the main and core play a leading role. Therefore, the state-owned commercial banks to maintain stable and healthy development, and has become a long-term development of monetary policy objectives. After China joins the WTO, the domestic financial sector to further develop international competition is fierce. In this regard, the state-owned commercial banks must be in many aspects of comprehensive reform, and gradually establish a modern financial enterprise system. Among them, the reform of property rights system is the core content, which represents the essence of reform. In recent decades, an increasing number of economists on the property rights reform of state-owned commercial banks carried out theoretical research, which for the Theory of Property Rights in China's state-owned commercial bank reform in the policy choice has certain reference significance and reference value.
     In this paper, state-owned commercial banks, the reform of property rights system theory and empirical research paper is divided into five parts: PartⅠ:Introduction. Mainly elaborated on China's state-owned commercial banks, property rights reform of the background, theory, practical and research purposes. This paper uses qualitative and quantitative analysis method of combining the one hand, from a normative point of view of state-owned commercial banks, the reform of property right system analysis; the other hand, at home and abroad from a positivist point of view of property rights reform of state-owned commercial banks, conducted in-depth study. In the state-owned commercial banks reform of property rights theory and literature review, the main summary and analysis of state-owned commercial banks at home and abroad on the property rights system reform research. Be divided into two categories:property rights, said that non-property rights, including property that is the mainstream view, subdivided into nationalization and privatization of the two proposals. My view is that Chinese state-owned commercial banks, reform of property rights must be based on Marx's ownership and property rights theory as a guide, combined with national conditions for reform.
     PartⅡ:Status and problems. Expounded on China's main state-owned commercial banks have many problems, such as:functional orientation bias, poor asset quality, non-performing loan rate and a low transmission efficiency, as well as Chinese state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock reform of the status quo and existing problems.
     PartⅢ:analysis of the nature and reason for the reforms. Mainly describes the reason for the existence of China's state-owned commercial banks, inefficient, and many other problems, the fundamental reason is that issue of property rights, namely: property rights and responsibilities is not clear benefit is not clear. Which in turn derive successive uncertainty, incentive and constraint mechanism is not perfect, and resource allocation inefficiencies Zhengqibufen a series of problems. Therefore, only the reform of property rights in order to solve China's inefficient state-owned commercial banks in question.
     PartⅣ:Foreign property rights reform of state-owned commercial banks inspiration. Foreign state-owned commercial banks, mainly through property rights reform process, and gained some experience and lessons learned, and make clear China's property rights reform of state-owned commercial banks, the favorable conditions and unfavorable conditions.
     Part V:Measures to establish and conclusions. Chinese state-owned commercial banks for the reform of property rights system and put forward some specific measures and suggestions. Namely:to Marx's ownership and property rights theory as a guide, grasp the direction of reform, clarifying property rights, clarifying responsibilities benefits, the introduction of foreign strategic investors, the implementation of joint-stock reform. Finally draw conclusions and the inadequacies of this article, as well as further research directions
引文
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