考虑损失规避型决策者的价格补贴契约研究
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摘要
随着科技的进步、市场竞争的加剧,企业不仅获得更多的发展机遇,同时也面临了前所未有的不确定性。随着越来越多的产品具有易逝品的特征,易逝品供应链管理成为供应链管理中的重要前沿问题。在易逝品供应链管理中,由于风险决策者的决策行为比风险中性决策者的决策行为更能真实反映现实生活中的实际行为,因此风险度对决策者行为的影响引起了学者们的关注。
如何刻画决策者的风险和分析风险决策者的决策行为是供应链契约设计中的热点问题。本文用前景理论刻画决策者风险,研究决策者在一对一、一对多、信息不对称、供应链终端为策略型顾客等情况下的最优策略,设计了价格补贴契约,并用算例进行了验证。
论文首先研究供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构。分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。我们发现零售商通过订单向供应商传递其损失规避度信息,供应商通过契约向零售商传递其损失规避度信息,证明了批发价格契约下损失规避型零售商的最优订货量可能小于集中化供应链的最优订货量,供应商可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。
然后,在上述研究基础上将一个零售商拓展到多个相互竞争的零售商,分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。证明了批发价格契约下损失规避型零售商的最优订货量总和可能小于集中化供应链的最优订货量,供应商可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。算例还表明批发价格契约和价格补贴契约下零售商数量增加对零售商都是有利的;价格补贴契约下供应商或许有缩减零售商数量的愿望。
接着,在信息对称研究的基础上,论文研究信息不对称时供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构结构。分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。证明了供应商不能通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调,零售商在信息不对称情况时获取的收益比信息对称时更大,供应商在信息不对称情况时获取的收益比信息对称时更小,供应商有消除与零售商之间信息不对称情况的愿望。
最后,论文研究供应链终端为策略型顾客、供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构。首先分析零售商的最优定价和最优订货量决策,然后分析消费者效用在不同决策者损失规避度组合下对决策者最优策略的影响,进行供应链契约设计。研究结果表明消费者效用使得供应商在批发价格契约下不能实现供应链协调,但可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。算例还表明零售商和供应商的期望收益都随消费者效用增大而增大。
With the advancement of technology and market competition intensifing, enterprises get more development opportunities while facing an unprecedented uncertainty. With more and more products become to have the characteristics of perishable goods, perishable product supply chain management becomes an important frontier issues in supply chain management. In the perishable product supply chain management, the risk decision makers are concerned from the scholars for the reason that the acts of risk decision makers more truly reflect the actual behavior in real life than the acts of the risk-neutral decision makers.
How to characterize the decision maker’risk level and analyze the optimal strategy of risk decision makers are the hot issues in the supply chain contract designing. We characterize the decision makers’risk level by applying the prospect theory. The aim of our study is to investigate the optimal strategy of decision makers under the condition of a-supplier-a-retailer, a-supplier-multi-retailers, information asymmetry, and strategic customer being the end of the supply chain, design the markdown allowance contract. The numerical example analysis has further confirmed the validity of the markdown allowance contract.
First, we study the a-supplier-a-retailer single-product supply chain whose leader is the supplier, analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy under different combinations of loss-averse level, and then design the markdown allowance contract. We find the retailer reveals her loss-averse level through her order and the supplier shows his loss-averse level through the contract. The results are proved that the optimal retailer order quantity under the wholesale price contract maybe less than that of the centralized supply chain and that the supplier can coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract.
Based on these above studies, retailer number is extended to more than one competing retailers. We analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level, and then design the markdown allowance contract. The results are proved that the optimal retailer order quantity under the wholesale price contract maybe less than that of the centralized supply chain and that the supplier can coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract. The numerical examples also show that the retailer will benefit from the number of retailer increasing under the wholesale price contract and the markdown allowance contract and that the supplier maybe decrease the number of retailer under the markdown allowance contract.
Then, we analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level under information asymmetry when the supply chain is composed of a retailer and a supplier being the supplier, and then design the markdown allowance contract. We prove that the supplier can not coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract and that the retailer obtains the greater income from the supplier under information asymmetry than under the information symmetry and that the supplier has desire to eliminate the information asymmetry between the supplier and the retailer.
Lastly, we study the strategic customer being the end of the single-product supply chain composed of a leader supplier and a follower retailer. We begin to analyzes the retailer’s optimal pricing and order behavior facing the strategic customer, and then analyzes what impact of the consumer utility have on the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level. The results show that the wholesale price contract can not be used to coordinate the retailer’s optimal order quantity while the markdown allowance contract can be when the customer is strategic. The numerical example analysis also confirmed the expectations utility of retailer and supplier increase with the consumer utility increaseing.
如何刻画决策者的风险和分析风险决策者的决策行为是供应链契约设计中的热点问题。本文用前景理论刻画决策者风险,研究决策者在一对一、一对多、信息不对称、供应链终端为策略型顾客等情况下的最优策略,设计了价格补贴契约,并用算例进行了验证。
论文首先研究供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构。分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。我们发现零售商通过订单向供应商传递其损失规避度信息,供应商通过契约向零售商传递其损失规避度信息,证明了批发价格契约下损失规避型零售商的最优订货量可能小于集中化供应链的最优订货量,供应商可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。
然后,在上述研究基础上将一个零售商拓展到多个相互竞争的零售商,分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。证明了批发价格契约下损失规避型零售商的最优订货量总和可能小于集中化供应链的最优订货量,供应商可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。算例还表明批发价格契约和价格补贴契约下零售商数量增加对零售商都是有利的;价格补贴契约下供应商或许有缩减零售商数量的愿望。
接着,在信息对称研究的基础上,论文研究信息不对称时供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构结构。分析决策者在不同损失规避度组合下的决策行为,然后设计价格补贴契约。证明了供应商不能通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调,零售商在信息不对称情况时获取的收益比信息对称时更大,供应商在信息不对称情况时获取的收益比信息对称时更小,供应商有消除与零售商之间信息不对称情况的愿望。
最后,论文研究供应链终端为策略型顾客、供应商为领导者的一对一供应链结构。首先分析零售商的最优定价和最优订货量决策,然后分析消费者效用在不同决策者损失规避度组合下对决策者最优策略的影响,进行供应链契约设计。研究结果表明消费者效用使得供应商在批发价格契约下不能实现供应链协调,但可通过价格补贴契约实现供应链协调。算例还表明零售商和供应商的期望收益都随消费者效用增大而增大。
With the advancement of technology and market competition intensifing, enterprises get more development opportunities while facing an unprecedented uncertainty. With more and more products become to have the characteristics of perishable goods, perishable product supply chain management becomes an important frontier issues in supply chain management. In the perishable product supply chain management, the risk decision makers are concerned from the scholars for the reason that the acts of risk decision makers more truly reflect the actual behavior in real life than the acts of the risk-neutral decision makers.
How to characterize the decision maker’risk level and analyze the optimal strategy of risk decision makers are the hot issues in the supply chain contract designing. We characterize the decision makers’risk level by applying the prospect theory. The aim of our study is to investigate the optimal strategy of decision makers under the condition of a-supplier-a-retailer, a-supplier-multi-retailers, information asymmetry, and strategic customer being the end of the supply chain, design the markdown allowance contract. The numerical example analysis has further confirmed the validity of the markdown allowance contract.
First, we study the a-supplier-a-retailer single-product supply chain whose leader is the supplier, analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy under different combinations of loss-averse level, and then design the markdown allowance contract. We find the retailer reveals her loss-averse level through her order and the supplier shows his loss-averse level through the contract. The results are proved that the optimal retailer order quantity under the wholesale price contract maybe less than that of the centralized supply chain and that the supplier can coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract.
Based on these above studies, retailer number is extended to more than one competing retailers. We analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level, and then design the markdown allowance contract. The results are proved that the optimal retailer order quantity under the wholesale price contract maybe less than that of the centralized supply chain and that the supplier can coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract. The numerical examples also show that the retailer will benefit from the number of retailer increasing under the wholesale price contract and the markdown allowance contract and that the supplier maybe decrease the number of retailer under the markdown allowance contract.
Then, we analyze the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level under information asymmetry when the supply chain is composed of a retailer and a supplier being the supplier, and then design the markdown allowance contract. We prove that the supplier can not coordinate the decentralized supply chain by the markdown allowance contract and that the retailer obtains the greater income from the supplier under information asymmetry than under the information symmetry and that the supplier has desire to eliminate the information asymmetry between the supplier and the retailer.
Lastly, we study the strategic customer being the end of the single-product supply chain composed of a leader supplier and a follower retailer. We begin to analyzes the retailer’s optimal pricing and order behavior facing the strategic customer, and then analyzes what impact of the consumer utility have on the decision makers’optimal strategy with different combinations of loss-averse level. The results show that the wholesale price contract can not be used to coordinate the retailer’s optimal order quantity while the markdown allowance contract can be when the customer is strategic. The numerical example analysis also confirmed the expectations utility of retailer and supplier increase with the consumer utility increaseing.
引文
①企业经营过程中还有逆向物流。本文不考虑企业逆向物流。
①这种线性效用函数假设在金融、运作管理文献中得到广泛使用,例如Kahneman和
Tversky(1979)[138],Schweitzer和Cachon(2000)[94]。
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①这种线性效用函数假设在金融、运作管理文献中得到广泛使用,例如Kahneman和
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