我国国有商业银行总分行激励约束机制研究
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摘要
目前,我国国有商业银行实行的是总分行制管理体制。学术界对商业银行公司治理问题的研究已经比较多了,但对总分行制下商业银行总行如何实现对分支行的有效管控这类问题研究的却不多。而对分支机构的管理,一直是国有商业银行改革和发展中努力探索的核心问题。在“一级法人,逐级授权”的经营模式下,总行与分支行的利益和目标函数是不同的,统一法人制度要求总行作为一级法人承担全部经营责任,但是经营主体却在分支机构,因而会出现法律主体和行为主体分离的情况。如果总行对分支机构控制失效,就会出现分支机构越权行为,由此出现的风险最终由总行承担。这样,分支机构很容易形成内部人控制,追求自身利益而损害总行和银行整体利益。所以,国有商业银行总行在实现企业价值最大化目标时,面临着两个问题：一方面必须激励分支机构管理者努力工作并加强对他们的监督；另一方面在引导分支机构管理者承担期望承担的风险的同时,又必须对他们承担的风险进行必要的限制,避免其过度冒险行为导致整个银行的危机。因此,我国国有商业银行迫切需要研究制定对分支行有效的激励约束机制,从制度上保证对分支行的风险控制和资源配置效率。而这正是本文所要研究解决的主要问题。
本文的研究思路是：从现行的国有商业银行总分行管理体制的特点入手,考察激励约束体制的现状,分析其不足和存在的问题；在此基础上,运用信息经济学的委托-代理模型设计出总分行薪酬激励合约,分析影响激励效果的各种因素,有针对性地提出解决目前我国国有商业银行总分行制下激励约束问题的建议和措施；同时,从监督约束的角度,研究总行如何利用好监督部门的作用,防范其与分支机构的合谋,研究设计有效的防合谋激励合约；从授权激励的角度,考查我国商业银行分支机构授权现状,构建一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度；对我国国有商业银行近年来高管薪酬进行实证分析,检验其与业绩的关联程度,同时也检验模型分析结论的适用性和正确性；从实现激励约束机制的手段-总分行绩效考评体系入手,对我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系进行调查,同时以一家国有银行现行绩效考评办法和实际执行情况为例进行案例分析,深入剖析我国国有商业银行总分行绩效考评体系存在的问题,分析问题产生的原因,构建适合我国商业银行总分行特点的绩效考评体系。文章的最后,借鉴国外银行的先进经验,提出我国商业银行总分行激励约束的政策建议。
通过考察多家国有商业银行的激励约束现状,发现我国国有商业银行激励约束机制存在的主要问题是晋升渠道单一,只有职务晋升一条渠道,人治现象严重；薪酬设计不尽合理,短期激励为主、长期激励不足,国有商业银行薪资在同业市场上不具有竞争力；资源配置方式不利于激励作用的发挥；行政约束为主,经济资本约束不足等。
通过分析国有商业银行总分行目标冲突的三个主要表现,文章构建了一个总分行激励约束机制模型,在传统的委托-代理模型的基础上考虑了商业银行资产质量对银行利润的影响,在激励合约中引入了总行的监督机制,增加了对分行违规的惩罚比率,通过对模型的求解,最终得出结论：分行经营者的努力程度与固定收入无关,与总行管理者制定的激励系数正相关、分行经营者的负向努力程度与总行管理者发现该行为的概率和惩罚比率负相关；激励系数与总行的监督管理水平和惩罚系数正相关、与分行的资产质量正相关、与分行经营者的风险规避程度负相关。也就是说,总行对分行经营者进行激励时,既要考虑分行经营者的努力程度,又要考虑资产质量状况和经营者的风险规避程度,同时更要加强对分行经营者的监督约束,唯有如此,才能发挥激励机制的导向作用,有效规避分行经营者的机会主义行为对银行整体利益的侵害。
在设计总分行激励合约时,我们发现有效的监督机制有助于最优激励合同的实现,那么,反过来,如果监督机构与分行经营者合谋对付总行管理者,致使监督机制发挥不了应有的作用,总行又该如何应对呢?总行如何设计一个对监督者的有效激励合约,来防止监督者(内部审计部门)与分行经营者的合谋?本文构建了一个委托人—监督人—代理人的三层次代理模型,来探讨总分行层级结构中的审计合谋问题。模型中,我们设定委托人为商业银行总行,监督人为总行委派的内部审计机构,代理人为一级分行。此次,我们将总行的监督成本考虑进来,同时将合谋的交易费用一并纳入模型。通过模型的求解,我们得出一个非常重要的结论：总行在设计防合谋激励报酬时,惩罚机制的存在,是一个必不可少的条件。
对国有商业银行分支机构来说,授权激励是一种重要的激励方式。论文构建了一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析了最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度。得出结论：一是总行最优授权度与总行管理者的内控管理能力和分行管理者的监督管理能力正相关、与分行管理者的工作厌恶度负相关；在某一临界值以内,是分行管理者风险规避度的增函数,随着分行管理者的风险规避度增加而加大,当分行管理者的风险规避度达到某一临界值以后,最优授权度又将随着风险规避度的增加而减小,是风险规避度的减函数。二是分行管理者的监督管理努力程度与授权度成正比。授权度越高,分行管理者的努力程度越高,工作积极性越大。由这一结论可以看出,如果总行过度集权,授予分支机构管理者经营管理权限过小,则不利于分支机构管理者工作积极性的发挥。
绩效管理是企业管理的生命线,绩效考评是绩效管理的重要手段,是企业经营的指挥棒,激励机制最终是通过绩效考评来传导和实施的。激励约束合约能否得到有效实施以及将发挥多大作用,最终将依赖于银行绩效考评体系的科学设计、传导一致以及执行有效性。为了深入分析我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系的现状,存在的问题和原因,我们对一家国有商业银行通过采取统计分析、座谈与业务验证相结合的方式进行了调查研究,并以此为例进行全面分析。通过调查,我们发现我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系存在诸多问题,并对问题产生的原因进行了分析,既有绩效管理体制方面的,也有制度本身缺陷方面的。在此基础上,文章构建了一个以平衡计分卡为基础、EVA为核心绩效指标的商业银行绩效考评体系,并设计了EVA长期激励机制。
在实证检验方面,文章对6家股份制银行、4家国有银行4个年度共40组样本数据进行了相关分析和回归分析,实证检验结果为：股份制商业银行高管人员薪酬基本上还是与银行的经营业绩相关的,国有商业银行高管薪酬与业绩相关性不大,薪酬设计主要还是与规模挂钩,未与效益指标挂钩,特别是未考虑银行资产质量状况(与不良贷款率正相关),由此得出,国有商业银行的薪酬设计未体现银行价值最大化的目标,未有效发挥激励作用,同时也证明我们在设计激励合约时,把银行资产质量纳入考核体系是完全有必要和正确的。
文章的最后对论文结论进行了总结,并提出了有针对性的政策建议。激励方面：一是完善银行职业经理人制度,建立科学的选拔用人机制；二是构建以平衡计分卡为基础、EVA为核心业绩指标的分支机构绩效考评体系；三是完善分支机构经营者的薪酬激励机制；四是建立完善的法人授权管理体系,提高授权激励的科学性。约束方面：一是建立健全独立的内部审计体系,加强监督约束；二是加强全面风险管理,控制分支机构经营风险；三是强化分支机构经济资本约束。
本文的主要创新为：一是本文在设计激励合约时,引入了资产质量参数,以分行经营者的努力创造的收入和资产质量状况同时作为绩效考核的依据,实证检验表明,这一做法是正确的。二是在设计总分行激励合约时考虑了监督机制,引入惩罚系数。本文通过引入惩罚系数,发现激励系数与发现问题的概率和惩罚系数成正比,即总行可以通过增加惩罚机制,加强监督约束来保证激励机制的执行效果。三是考虑了国有商业银行总行对分支机构授权激励约束的方式。文章构建了一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析了最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度,为商业银行分支机构授权管理提供了决策依据。
Until now, branch banking system is commonly adopted by China's state-owned commercial banks. A lot of studies on the corporate governance of commercial banks have been done among the academic field. However, there are little studies on how to efficiently regulate the branches from the view of head offices of commercial banks. It is an un-solved but meaningful question. Moreover, the management of branches is the central question of state-owned commercial bank reform and development. Under the operating mode of "a legal entity, level-authorization", there exist conflicts regarding the interests and the objective function between the head office and branches. According to the unified legal system, head office is the first-grade legal entity which assumes full management responsibility. In the real, the main business activities are done in the branch institutions. This leads to the separation of legal subjects and actors. If the head office cannot efficiently control the activities of branches, the branches will overstep their authority, but the emerging risks from the overstepping are ultimately taken by the head office. In this view, insider-control comes easily into being for the branches, which pursuit their own interests at the expense of head offices and the whole bank. Thus, to realize the objectives of enterprise value maximization, the head office of state-owned commercial bank unavoidably faces two problems:first, he needs to create incentives for branch managers to work hard and to strengthen suitable supervision; second, to guide that the branch managers assume expected risk, he needs do increase risk control in order to avoid the whole banking crisis. Therefore, China's state-owned commercial banks need urgently to study the effective incentive and restraint mechanisms to sub-branches to ensure the branch risk control and resource allocation efficiency institutionally. This is the major problem that this paper study and try to solve.
The research line of this study is as follows. Starting from the characteristics of current branch management system of state-owned commercial banks, we examine the present situation of incentive and restriction mechanism, and then analyze its deficiencies and problems; in the following part, we make use of principal-agent model of information economics to design incentive compensation contracts for head offices to branches. We analyze the various factors that affect the incentive effect, and our target is to propose solutions to China's current system of state-owned commercial bank's branch banking. At the same time, from the perspective of supervision constraint, we study how the head office make good use of the role of oversight bodies to prevent collusions from the affiliates, and then design effective anti-collusion incentive contracts. From the authorized incentive point of view, we also examine the present situation of China's commercial bank branches authorization, and then give the optimal degree of authority decision model in order to analyze the factors affecting the optimal degree of authority, as well as the degree of influence on the branch managers. We analyze empirically the executive pays of China's state-owned commercial banks in recent years in order to test its relevance and performance level, as well as the applicability and validity of model's conclusions. Taking one state-owned bank's overall performance appraisal system as an example, we analyze deeply the problems of China's state-owned commercial bank's total branch performance evaluation system, and build the overall branch performance evaluation system suitable to the characteristics of China's commercial banks. Finally, we provide the policy recommendations on incentive and constraint mechanism between the head office and branches of China's commercial banks from the experiences of foreign banks.
By examining several state-owned commercial banks'incentive and constraint status, we find that the main problems of the state-owned commercial banks' incentive and restraint mechanisms are:first, there is only a single channel for promotion, which means there exists severe personal-controlling; second, the remuneration design is not entirely reasonable, e.g., fixed wages accounting for a larger portion, which mainly focuses on the form of short-term incentive and thus makes the state-owned banks pay in the interbank market un-competitive; third, resource allocation is not conducive to the working of incentive mechanisms; and the last, it is short of capital constraints and large dependence on administrative constraints.
By analyzing the three main manifestations of the goal conflict between head office and branches of state-owned commercial banks, we find that the main reason and its corresponding conflicts on risk management of commercial banks. This article constructs a model of incentive and restraint mechanisms between head office and branches of state-owned commercial banks. Based on the traditional principal-agent model, we consider the impact of asset equity on bank profits, by introducing into the model the monitoring mechanism of the head office, which increases penalties for non-compliance rate of the branch. The final conclusions are: first, the level of effort of the branch operator is unrelated with the fixed-income, but positively correlated with the incentive factor of the head office managers made; second, the level of negative effort of the branch managers is negatively correlated with probability that head office managers find the act and the punishment ratio; third, incentive coefficient is positively correlated with the level of supervision and management of the head office and the punishment coefficient, with the asset quality of branches,negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion of branch operators. In other words, when the head office motivates branch managers, they not only need to consider the level of effort of branches operators, but also consider the asset quality situation and the operator's level of risk aversion in order to strengthen the supervision and constraint on branch of operators. It is the only way to play the guiding role of incentives and avoid effectively branch operator's opportunistic behavior against the overall interests of the bank.
In the design of incentive contracts between head office and branches, we find that an effective monitoring mechanism is helpful to realize the optimal incentive contract. Then, in turn, if the monitoring bodies and the branch operators conspire to deal with the head office manager, it causes that monitoring mechanism can not be its proper role. How should the head office deal with this problem? This paper builds three-tier agent model (a principal-supervisor-agent) to explore the audit conspiracy issue of hierarchy among state-owned commercial banks in our country. In the model, we set commercial banks head office act as principal, internal auditor appointed by head office act as supervisor, branch act as agent. We take the monitoring costs of head office into account, the transaction costs of collusion at the same time be integrated into models. By solving the model, we have gotten a very important conclusion:in the design of anti-collusion incentive compensation, the punishment mechanism is a necessary condition. Moreover, from the model it can be seen:if you do not attach importance to the building of punishment mechanism merely considering incentives, the anti-collusion mechanism is not an adequate and effective mechanism.
As for the state-owned commercial bank branches, the authority from the head office is an important incentive way. The article builds an optimal authorization decision model between head office and branches to analyze the influence factors of optimal degree as well as the impact on branch managers. We conclude as follows: first, the optimal licensing degree of head office managers is positively correlated with the internal control management and supervision capabilities of head office, but negatively correlated with the branch manager's job aversion; second, at a critical value, which is an increasing function of the branch manager's risk aversion degree, increasing with the branch manager's risk aversion degree increase, beyond the risk aversion degree of branch manager reaches a certain critical value the optimal degree of authority in turn decreases with the degree of risk aversion increases, now which becomes a decreasing function of degree of risk aversion. In addition, the level of effort to supervision and management of branch manager is proportional to licensing degree. The higher the licensing degree the harder the branch manager works. As can be seen from this conclusion, if the head office is over-centralized and the permissions granted to branch managers is so small that it can not give full play to branch managers'working activeness.
Performance management is the lifeblood of enterprise management, while performance appraisal is an important means of performance management which is the baton of the business. The incentive mechanism is conducted and implemented ultimately through the performance appraisal. Incentive constraint contract can or not be effectively implemented as well as will play how much role, which will ultimately depend on the scientific design, conduction consistency and effectiveness of the implementation of the bank's performance appraisal system. In order to deeply analyze the status quo, problems and causes of China's state-owned commercial bank's performance appraisal system, we take one state-owned commercial bank for an example to conduct a comprehensive analysis adoption ways of statistical analysis, discussion and business validation. Through investigation, we found that the state-owned commercial bank's performance appraisal system exist many issues and the causes arise from both aspects of performance management system and the system itself. On this basis, the article constructs a commercial bank performance appraisal system based on balanced scorecard, EVA as the core indicators.
In the empirical test, through the correlation and regression analysis on the six joint-stock banks, four state-owned banks four years a total of 40 groups sample data, we obtain results as follows:joint-stock commercial bank executives pay is basically related to the bank's operating performance, while state-owned commercial bank executives pay is not related to operating performance and the payment design is mainly linked with the scale of bank not linked with the efficiency indicators, in particular, not take into account the quality of bank assets (positively correlated with the non-performing loan ratio).From this we can conclude that the pay of state-owned commercial banks does not reflect the bank's objectives of value maximization, as well as incentive mechanism not play a role effectively;which also proves that it is entirely necessary and right that we bring asset quality of banks into the evaluation system in designing incentive contracts.
Last of the article summarizes the conclusions of the paper and put forward targeted policy recommendations. With respect to Incentives, First, improving the bank professional managers system, establishing a scientific mechanism for selecting personnel; Second,building the branch performance evaluation system based on the Balanced Scorecard, EVA as the core performance indicators; Third, improving the pay incentive mechanism to branch managers;Fourth, establishing a sound corporate authorization management system to improve incentives for scientific authority. With respect to Constrains, First, establishing a sound independent internal audit system, and strengthening supervision and restraint; Second, strengthening the comprehensive risk management, by controlling branch business risks; Third, strengthening economic capital constraint of the branches.
The main innovations in this paper are as follows:First, in the design of incentive contracts, the paper introduced asset quality parameters, and empirical tests show that this approach is correct. Second,in the design of incentive contracts, monitoring mechanisms were taken into account. Third, the paper considered the authorization as an important incentive and constraint method to bank branches by the head office.
本文的研究思路是：从现行的国有商业银行总分行管理体制的特点入手,考察激励约束体制的现状,分析其不足和存在的问题；在此基础上,运用信息经济学的委托-代理模型设计出总分行薪酬激励合约,分析影响激励效果的各种因素,有针对性地提出解决目前我国国有商业银行总分行制下激励约束问题的建议和措施；同时,从监督约束的角度,研究总行如何利用好监督部门的作用,防范其与分支机构的合谋,研究设计有效的防合谋激励合约；从授权激励的角度,考查我国商业银行分支机构授权现状,构建一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度；对我国国有商业银行近年来高管薪酬进行实证分析,检验其与业绩的关联程度,同时也检验模型分析结论的适用性和正确性；从实现激励约束机制的手段-总分行绩效考评体系入手,对我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系进行调查,同时以一家国有银行现行绩效考评办法和实际执行情况为例进行案例分析,深入剖析我国国有商业银行总分行绩效考评体系存在的问题,分析问题产生的原因,构建适合我国商业银行总分行特点的绩效考评体系。文章的最后,借鉴国外银行的先进经验,提出我国商业银行总分行激励约束的政策建议。
通过考察多家国有商业银行的激励约束现状,发现我国国有商业银行激励约束机制存在的主要问题是晋升渠道单一,只有职务晋升一条渠道,人治现象严重；薪酬设计不尽合理,短期激励为主、长期激励不足,国有商业银行薪资在同业市场上不具有竞争力；资源配置方式不利于激励作用的发挥；行政约束为主,经济资本约束不足等。
通过分析国有商业银行总分行目标冲突的三个主要表现,文章构建了一个总分行激励约束机制模型,在传统的委托-代理模型的基础上考虑了商业银行资产质量对银行利润的影响,在激励合约中引入了总行的监督机制,增加了对分行违规的惩罚比率,通过对模型的求解,最终得出结论：分行经营者的努力程度与固定收入无关,与总行管理者制定的激励系数正相关、分行经营者的负向努力程度与总行管理者发现该行为的概率和惩罚比率负相关；激励系数与总行的监督管理水平和惩罚系数正相关、与分行的资产质量正相关、与分行经营者的风险规避程度负相关。也就是说,总行对分行经营者进行激励时,既要考虑分行经营者的努力程度,又要考虑资产质量状况和经营者的风险规避程度,同时更要加强对分行经营者的监督约束,唯有如此,才能发挥激励机制的导向作用,有效规避分行经营者的机会主义行为对银行整体利益的侵害。
在设计总分行激励合约时,我们发现有效的监督机制有助于最优激励合同的实现,那么,反过来,如果监督机构与分行经营者合谋对付总行管理者,致使监督机制发挥不了应有的作用,总行又该如何应对呢?总行如何设计一个对监督者的有效激励合约,来防止监督者(内部审计部门)与分行经营者的合谋?本文构建了一个委托人—监督人—代理人的三层次代理模型,来探讨总分行层级结构中的审计合谋问题。模型中,我们设定委托人为商业银行总行,监督人为总行委派的内部审计机构,代理人为一级分行。此次,我们将总行的监督成本考虑进来,同时将合谋的交易费用一并纳入模型。通过模型的求解,我们得出一个非常重要的结论：总行在设计防合谋激励报酬时,惩罚机制的存在,是一个必不可少的条件。
对国有商业银行分支机构来说,授权激励是一种重要的激励方式。论文构建了一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析了最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度。得出结论：一是总行最优授权度与总行管理者的内控管理能力和分行管理者的监督管理能力正相关、与分行管理者的工作厌恶度负相关；在某一临界值以内,是分行管理者风险规避度的增函数,随着分行管理者的风险规避度增加而加大,当分行管理者的风险规避度达到某一临界值以后,最优授权度又将随着风险规避度的增加而减小,是风险规避度的减函数。二是分行管理者的监督管理努力程度与授权度成正比。授权度越高,分行管理者的努力程度越高,工作积极性越大。由这一结论可以看出,如果总行过度集权,授予分支机构管理者经营管理权限过小,则不利于分支机构管理者工作积极性的发挥。
绩效管理是企业管理的生命线,绩效考评是绩效管理的重要手段,是企业经营的指挥棒,激励机制最终是通过绩效考评来传导和实施的。激励约束合约能否得到有效实施以及将发挥多大作用,最终将依赖于银行绩效考评体系的科学设计、传导一致以及执行有效性。为了深入分析我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系的现状,存在的问题和原因,我们对一家国有商业银行通过采取统计分析、座谈与业务验证相结合的方式进行了调查研究,并以此为例进行全面分析。通过调查,我们发现我国国有商业银行绩效考评体系存在诸多问题,并对问题产生的原因进行了分析,既有绩效管理体制方面的,也有制度本身缺陷方面的。在此基础上,文章构建了一个以平衡计分卡为基础、EVA为核心绩效指标的商业银行绩效考评体系,并设计了EVA长期激励机制。
在实证检验方面,文章对6家股份制银行、4家国有银行4个年度共40组样本数据进行了相关分析和回归分析,实证检验结果为：股份制商业银行高管人员薪酬基本上还是与银行的经营业绩相关的,国有商业银行高管薪酬与业绩相关性不大,薪酬设计主要还是与规模挂钩,未与效益指标挂钩,特别是未考虑银行资产质量状况(与不良贷款率正相关),由此得出,国有商业银行的薪酬设计未体现银行价值最大化的目标,未有效发挥激励作用,同时也证明我们在设计激励合约时,把银行资产质量纳入考核体系是完全有必要和正确的。
文章的最后对论文结论进行了总结,并提出了有针对性的政策建议。激励方面：一是完善银行职业经理人制度,建立科学的选拔用人机制；二是构建以平衡计分卡为基础、EVA为核心业绩指标的分支机构绩效考评体系；三是完善分支机构经营者的薪酬激励机制；四是建立完善的法人授权管理体系,提高授权激励的科学性。约束方面：一是建立健全独立的内部审计体系,加强监督约束；二是加强全面风险管理,控制分支机构经营风险；三是强化分支机构经济资本约束。
本文的主要创新为：一是本文在设计激励合约时,引入了资产质量参数,以分行经营者的努力创造的收入和资产质量状况同时作为绩效考核的依据,实证检验表明,这一做法是正确的。二是在设计总分行激励合约时考虑了监督机制,引入惩罚系数。本文通过引入惩罚系数,发现激励系数与发现问题的概率和惩罚系数成正比,即总行可以通过增加惩罚机制,加强监督约束来保证激励机制的执行效果。三是考虑了国有商业银行总行对分支机构授权激励约束的方式。文章构建了一个商业银行总分行最优授权度决定模型,分析了最优授权度的影响因素以及对分行管理者的影响程度,为商业银行分支机构授权管理提供了决策依据。
Until now, branch banking system is commonly adopted by China's state-owned commercial banks. A lot of studies on the corporate governance of commercial banks have been done among the academic field. However, there are little studies on how to efficiently regulate the branches from the view of head offices of commercial banks. It is an un-solved but meaningful question. Moreover, the management of branches is the central question of state-owned commercial bank reform and development. Under the operating mode of "a legal entity, level-authorization", there exist conflicts regarding the interests and the objective function between the head office and branches. According to the unified legal system, head office is the first-grade legal entity which assumes full management responsibility. In the real, the main business activities are done in the branch institutions. This leads to the separation of legal subjects and actors. If the head office cannot efficiently control the activities of branches, the branches will overstep their authority, but the emerging risks from the overstepping are ultimately taken by the head office. In this view, insider-control comes easily into being for the branches, which pursuit their own interests at the expense of head offices and the whole bank. Thus, to realize the objectives of enterprise value maximization, the head office of state-owned commercial bank unavoidably faces two problems:first, he needs to create incentives for branch managers to work hard and to strengthen suitable supervision; second, to guide that the branch managers assume expected risk, he needs do increase risk control in order to avoid the whole banking crisis. Therefore, China's state-owned commercial banks need urgently to study the effective incentive and restraint mechanisms to sub-branches to ensure the branch risk control and resource allocation efficiency institutionally. This is the major problem that this paper study and try to solve.
The research line of this study is as follows. Starting from the characteristics of current branch management system of state-owned commercial banks, we examine the present situation of incentive and restriction mechanism, and then analyze its deficiencies and problems; in the following part, we make use of principal-agent model of information economics to design incentive compensation contracts for head offices to branches. We analyze the various factors that affect the incentive effect, and our target is to propose solutions to China's current system of state-owned commercial bank's branch banking. At the same time, from the perspective of supervision constraint, we study how the head office make good use of the role of oversight bodies to prevent collusions from the affiliates, and then design effective anti-collusion incentive contracts. From the authorized incentive point of view, we also examine the present situation of China's commercial bank branches authorization, and then give the optimal degree of authority decision model in order to analyze the factors affecting the optimal degree of authority, as well as the degree of influence on the branch managers. We analyze empirically the executive pays of China's state-owned commercial banks in recent years in order to test its relevance and performance level, as well as the applicability and validity of model's conclusions. Taking one state-owned bank's overall performance appraisal system as an example, we analyze deeply the problems of China's state-owned commercial bank's total branch performance evaluation system, and build the overall branch performance evaluation system suitable to the characteristics of China's commercial banks. Finally, we provide the policy recommendations on incentive and constraint mechanism between the head office and branches of China's commercial banks from the experiences of foreign banks.
By examining several state-owned commercial banks'incentive and constraint status, we find that the main problems of the state-owned commercial banks' incentive and restraint mechanisms are:first, there is only a single channel for promotion, which means there exists severe personal-controlling; second, the remuneration design is not entirely reasonable, e.g., fixed wages accounting for a larger portion, which mainly focuses on the form of short-term incentive and thus makes the state-owned banks pay in the interbank market un-competitive; third, resource allocation is not conducive to the working of incentive mechanisms; and the last, it is short of capital constraints and large dependence on administrative constraints.
By analyzing the three main manifestations of the goal conflict between head office and branches of state-owned commercial banks, we find that the main reason and its corresponding conflicts on risk management of commercial banks. This article constructs a model of incentive and restraint mechanisms between head office and branches of state-owned commercial banks. Based on the traditional principal-agent model, we consider the impact of asset equity on bank profits, by introducing into the model the monitoring mechanism of the head office, which increases penalties for non-compliance rate of the branch. The final conclusions are: first, the level of effort of the branch operator is unrelated with the fixed-income, but positively correlated with the incentive factor of the head office managers made; second, the level of negative effort of the branch managers is negatively correlated with probability that head office managers find the act and the punishment ratio; third, incentive coefficient is positively correlated with the level of supervision and management of the head office and the punishment coefficient, with the asset quality of branches,negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion of branch operators. In other words, when the head office motivates branch managers, they not only need to consider the level of effort of branches operators, but also consider the asset quality situation and the operator's level of risk aversion in order to strengthen the supervision and constraint on branch of operators. It is the only way to play the guiding role of incentives and avoid effectively branch operator's opportunistic behavior against the overall interests of the bank.
In the design of incentive contracts between head office and branches, we find that an effective monitoring mechanism is helpful to realize the optimal incentive contract. Then, in turn, if the monitoring bodies and the branch operators conspire to deal with the head office manager, it causes that monitoring mechanism can not be its proper role. How should the head office deal with this problem? This paper builds three-tier agent model (a principal-supervisor-agent) to explore the audit conspiracy issue of hierarchy among state-owned commercial banks in our country. In the model, we set commercial banks head office act as principal, internal auditor appointed by head office act as supervisor, branch act as agent. We take the monitoring costs of head office into account, the transaction costs of collusion at the same time be integrated into models. By solving the model, we have gotten a very important conclusion:in the design of anti-collusion incentive compensation, the punishment mechanism is a necessary condition. Moreover, from the model it can be seen:if you do not attach importance to the building of punishment mechanism merely considering incentives, the anti-collusion mechanism is not an adequate and effective mechanism.
As for the state-owned commercial bank branches, the authority from the head office is an important incentive way. The article builds an optimal authorization decision model between head office and branches to analyze the influence factors of optimal degree as well as the impact on branch managers. We conclude as follows: first, the optimal licensing degree of head office managers is positively correlated with the internal control management and supervision capabilities of head office, but negatively correlated with the branch manager's job aversion; second, at a critical value, which is an increasing function of the branch manager's risk aversion degree, increasing with the branch manager's risk aversion degree increase, beyond the risk aversion degree of branch manager reaches a certain critical value the optimal degree of authority in turn decreases with the degree of risk aversion increases, now which becomes a decreasing function of degree of risk aversion. In addition, the level of effort to supervision and management of branch manager is proportional to licensing degree. The higher the licensing degree the harder the branch manager works. As can be seen from this conclusion, if the head office is over-centralized and the permissions granted to branch managers is so small that it can not give full play to branch managers'working activeness.
Performance management is the lifeblood of enterprise management, while performance appraisal is an important means of performance management which is the baton of the business. The incentive mechanism is conducted and implemented ultimately through the performance appraisal. Incentive constraint contract can or not be effectively implemented as well as will play how much role, which will ultimately depend on the scientific design, conduction consistency and effectiveness of the implementation of the bank's performance appraisal system. In order to deeply analyze the status quo, problems and causes of China's state-owned commercial bank's performance appraisal system, we take one state-owned commercial bank for an example to conduct a comprehensive analysis adoption ways of statistical analysis, discussion and business validation. Through investigation, we found that the state-owned commercial bank's performance appraisal system exist many issues and the causes arise from both aspects of performance management system and the system itself. On this basis, the article constructs a commercial bank performance appraisal system based on balanced scorecard, EVA as the core indicators.
In the empirical test, through the correlation and regression analysis on the six joint-stock banks, four state-owned banks four years a total of 40 groups sample data, we obtain results as follows:joint-stock commercial bank executives pay is basically related to the bank's operating performance, while state-owned commercial bank executives pay is not related to operating performance and the payment design is mainly linked with the scale of bank not linked with the efficiency indicators, in particular, not take into account the quality of bank assets (positively correlated with the non-performing loan ratio).From this we can conclude that the pay of state-owned commercial banks does not reflect the bank's objectives of value maximization, as well as incentive mechanism not play a role effectively;which also proves that it is entirely necessary and right that we bring asset quality of banks into the evaluation system in designing incentive contracts.
Last of the article summarizes the conclusions of the paper and put forward targeted policy recommendations. With respect to Incentives, First, improving the bank professional managers system, establishing a scientific mechanism for selecting personnel; Second,building the branch performance evaluation system based on the Balanced Scorecard, EVA as the core performance indicators; Third, improving the pay incentive mechanism to branch managers;Fourth, establishing a sound corporate authorization management system to improve incentives for scientific authority. With respect to Constrains, First, establishing a sound independent internal audit system, and strengthening supervision and restraint; Second, strengthening the comprehensive risk management, by controlling branch business risks; Third, strengthening economic capital constraint of the branches.
The main innovations in this paper are as follows:First, in the design of incentive contracts, the paper introduced asset quality parameters, and empirical tests show that this approach is correct. Second,in the design of incentive contracts, monitoring mechanisms were taken into account. Third, the paper considered the authorization as an important incentive and constraint method to bank branches by the head office.
引文
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