欧佩克产量行为不确定性及其对国际油价波动的影响研究
|
摘要
作为一种重要的战略性资源,石油在世界经济发展中的重要性已日益凸现。近年来,国际油价的频繁波动引起了人们对国际油价影响因素的关注。从价格决定的基本关系上看,石油价格是由石油的供求关系决定的。由于石油的短期需求弹性小于供给弹性,因此,石油供给对国际油价的影响大于石油需求。国际石油市场是一个典型的寡头垄断市场,欧佩克作为唯一的石油供给组织,对国际油价波动的影响力不可忽视。
以往对欧佩克产量影响国际油价波动的研究把欧佩克看作国际石油市场的主要垄断者,研究方法侧重实证分析。然而,自20世纪80年代起,国际石油市场结构发生了变化,欧佩克在国际石油市场的市场份额下降,不再是世界石油供给的绝对垄断者。同时,国际油价的影响因素越来越多,欧佩克对国际油价波动的影响力因而受到多种因素的影响。这些因素不同的策略选择影响到欧佩克产量行为,并最终影响到国际油价的波动。传统的产业组织理论强调市场结构的作用,认为市场结构影响市场行为,进而影响市场绩效,新产业组织理论则强调了市场行为的作用,并且采用博弈论的研究方法分析了非合作下的市场均衡,是针对寡头垄断市场的一种有效的研究方法。本文基于不确定性理论和新产业组织理论,从研究国际石油市场厂商行为入手,运用博弈论的研究方法,通过分析欧佩克与其不确定性影响因素的产量博弈模型,揭示内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为,并利用计量模型分析欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的影响。
本文首先分析欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的传导问题。从长期看,国际油价主要受欧佩克产量行为的影响。在考虑数据长时期容易发生结构变化的基础上,通过对欧佩克产量影响国际油价进行实证分析并结合欧佩克产量事件对国际油价影响的分析,发现欧佩克产量行为对国际油价的影响力受非欧佩克产量、石油消费国需求以及欧佩克成员产量的影响而减弱。然后在阐述欧佩克产量行为不确定性基本问题的基础上,分析了欧佩克产量不确定性对国际油价波动的传导机制问题,为分析内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定性以及欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的影响奠定基础。其次,构建了欧佩克产量行为与其影响因素的博弈模型,分析内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定:(1)欧佩克成员在石油储产量、经济实力等方面的差异使得不同成员倾向采取不同的产量策略。本文基于非合作博弈构建了欧佩克成员产量配额分配的讨价还价模型和产量配额执行的重复博弈模型,研究不同信息完备性和博弈次数下的欧佩克产量不确定;(2)构建了欧佩克和非欧佩克合作与非合作的产量博弈模型,分别揭示完全信息以及成本和产量信息不完全博弈均衡下的欧佩克产量。并针对国际石油市场作为寡头垄断市场,厂商行为相互影响的特点,在欧佩克与非欧佩克非合作的产量博弈中引入推测变差,分析非欧佩克产量影响下的欧佩克产量不确定;(3)鉴于现实中石油消费国时常通过观察欧佩克产量事件发布进行购买决策,构建了以产量事件发布做为信号的欧佩克产量行为与石油消费需求的信号传递模型,揭示石油消费国不同购买策略下的欧佩克产量行为不确定。最后,基于以上对欧佩克产量行为不确定性的分析,实证检验了内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量不确定性以及欧佩克产量行为不确定性对国际油价波动的影响。
本文基于不确定性理论和新产业组织理论,分析了内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定性及其对国际油价波动的影响,丰富了不确定性理论和新产业组织理论的应用,有一定的理论意义;同时,通过构建欧佩克产量行为与其内生和外生影响因素的博弈模型,全面完整地分析了欧佩克与各影响因素博弈时的双方策略选择和利益变化,对于国际石油市场石油厂商制定产量策略以及为石油消费国防范石油价格风险有实践指导意义。
As a kind of strategic resource, oil has shown the significance in the development of the world economy. People’s attentions recently have been focused on the frequently volatility of world oil prices. Oil prices are decided by the supply and demand relationship according to the basic rules of price-decision. Compared with the oil consumption,the oil supply influences the oil price more for the elasticity of oil demand is less than the elasticity of oil supply in short term. In summary, as the oil exporting organization in a classic monopoly market, OPEC has un-neglectable influences on the volatility of oil prices.
The previous studies took OPEC as the absolute monopoly in the world oil market and having the controlling power of oil prices, so the main research methodology is the empirical analysis. Since 1980s’, the world oil market structures has changed a lot, for example, OPEC lost the controlling status with its market share deceasing constantly and oil prices were easily swung by many disturbing factors. These disturbing factors intervened in OPEC output conducts and the world oil prices further for their uncertainty in choosing the output strategies. The theory of traditional industrial organization emphasizes the function of market structure and thinks that market structure decides the manufacturers’conducts and finally the market performances; However, the theory of new industrial organization (NIO) transformes the viewpoints to the manufacturers’conducts and analyzes the market equilibrium of non-cooperation with the Game theory, so NIO is a more effective way aiming at the monopoly market. Based on the Theory of Uncertainty and NIO, this paper explained OPEC’s output conducts with uncertainty factors by analyzing the production game model from the point of analyzing manufacturer conducts with Game theory and the influences of OPEC output uncertainties on the world oil prices.
This paper firstly analyzed the transmission problems from OPEC output uncertainty to oil prices’volatilities. In the long view, OPEC output conducts exerted influences on oil prices. With the consideration of the structural breaks in the long run, this paper demonstrated the dynamic influences of the OPEC output on oil prices. Together with OPEC output announcements, it explained the weakening situation of the influencing power for the existed disturbing factors. Then, based on the ideas of OPEC output uncertainty, this paper analyzed the tramsmission mechanism from OPEC output conducts to oil prices’volatilities to lay a foundation for the game models between OPEC output conducts and the disturbing factors, also the influences on the oil prices of the OPEC output conducts uncertainty. Secondly, the uncertainty of OPEC output comes from three aspects: the endogenesis uncertainty comes from the interior OPEC, and the exogenous uncertainty from non-OPEC output and oil demand. All the three aspects disturbed the exertion of OPEC output’s influences on oil prices. We established the game models between OPEC output and the uncertainty factors to analyze the different OPEC output conducts under different output game equilibrium in turn. (1)OPEC members are different in many aspects, such as the oil reserves, output and the economic conditions etc, which caused different members having different production strategies, thus the bargaining happens when the quotas are distributed and the deception emerges when the output quotas are executed. This paper established the bargaining and repeated game models to analyze OPEC’s output under uncertain information completeness and Game times; (2) The manufacturers’conducts are interacting in the monopoly market, so Non-OPEC output is very important to interfere with the exertion of OPEC’s output power and oil prices. This paper illustrated the uncertainty factors of Non-OPEC output and the output Game models with complete or incomplete information to analyze OPEC output under different game results. And based on the fact of communicating connections between the manufacturers of the monopoly market, this paper introduced a variable to identify the output of opponents; (3) Owing that oil consumers always judge OPEC’s remaining capability by observing the output announcements, this paper established the signaling game model to analyze OPEC output conducts under oil consumers’different buying decision. Finally, we made empirical analysis of the influences on the OPEC output uncertainty of the disturbing factors, also the influences on oil prices of OPEC output conducts uncertainty.
Based on the Theory of Uncertainty and NIO, this paper analyzed the OPEC output conducts’uncertainty with the disturbances of endogenesis and exogenous factors, further the influences on the volatilities of oil prices, so it enriched the applications of the above two theory, thus it is meaningful in the theoretic aspect; Meanwhile, the all-around output strategies and the corresponding volatilities of oil prices are analyzed to make the paper instructable for the manufacturer’s output decisions and also meaningful for oil consumers to formulate strategies to keep away the oil crisis and ensure the oil consumption.
以往对欧佩克产量影响国际油价波动的研究把欧佩克看作国际石油市场的主要垄断者,研究方法侧重实证分析。然而,自20世纪80年代起,国际石油市场结构发生了变化,欧佩克在国际石油市场的市场份额下降,不再是世界石油供给的绝对垄断者。同时,国际油价的影响因素越来越多,欧佩克对国际油价波动的影响力因而受到多种因素的影响。这些因素不同的策略选择影响到欧佩克产量行为,并最终影响到国际油价的波动。传统的产业组织理论强调市场结构的作用,认为市场结构影响市场行为,进而影响市场绩效,新产业组织理论则强调了市场行为的作用,并且采用博弈论的研究方法分析了非合作下的市场均衡,是针对寡头垄断市场的一种有效的研究方法。本文基于不确定性理论和新产业组织理论,从研究国际石油市场厂商行为入手,运用博弈论的研究方法,通过分析欧佩克与其不确定性影响因素的产量博弈模型,揭示内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为,并利用计量模型分析欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的影响。
本文首先分析欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的传导问题。从长期看,国际油价主要受欧佩克产量行为的影响。在考虑数据长时期容易发生结构变化的基础上,通过对欧佩克产量影响国际油价进行实证分析并结合欧佩克产量事件对国际油价影响的分析,发现欧佩克产量行为对国际油价的影响力受非欧佩克产量、石油消费国需求以及欧佩克成员产量的影响而减弱。然后在阐述欧佩克产量行为不确定性基本问题的基础上,分析了欧佩克产量不确定性对国际油价波动的传导机制问题,为分析内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定性以及欧佩克产量行为不确定对国际油价波动的影响奠定基础。其次,构建了欧佩克产量行为与其影响因素的博弈模型,分析内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定:(1)欧佩克成员在石油储产量、经济实力等方面的差异使得不同成员倾向采取不同的产量策略。本文基于非合作博弈构建了欧佩克成员产量配额分配的讨价还价模型和产量配额执行的重复博弈模型,研究不同信息完备性和博弈次数下的欧佩克产量不确定;(2)构建了欧佩克和非欧佩克合作与非合作的产量博弈模型,分别揭示完全信息以及成本和产量信息不完全博弈均衡下的欧佩克产量。并针对国际石油市场作为寡头垄断市场,厂商行为相互影响的特点,在欧佩克与非欧佩克非合作的产量博弈中引入推测变差,分析非欧佩克产量影响下的欧佩克产量不确定;(3)鉴于现实中石油消费国时常通过观察欧佩克产量事件发布进行购买决策,构建了以产量事件发布做为信号的欧佩克产量行为与石油消费需求的信号传递模型,揭示石油消费国不同购买策略下的欧佩克产量行为不确定。最后,基于以上对欧佩克产量行为不确定性的分析,实证检验了内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量不确定性以及欧佩克产量行为不确定性对国际油价波动的影响。
本文基于不确定性理论和新产业组织理论,分析了内生和外生因素影响下的欧佩克产量行为不确定性及其对国际油价波动的影响,丰富了不确定性理论和新产业组织理论的应用,有一定的理论意义;同时,通过构建欧佩克产量行为与其内生和外生影响因素的博弈模型,全面完整地分析了欧佩克与各影响因素博弈时的双方策略选择和利益变化,对于国际石油市场石油厂商制定产量策略以及为石油消费国防范石油价格风险有实践指导意义。
As a kind of strategic resource, oil has shown the significance in the development of the world economy. People’s attentions recently have been focused on the frequently volatility of world oil prices. Oil prices are decided by the supply and demand relationship according to the basic rules of price-decision. Compared with the oil consumption,the oil supply influences the oil price more for the elasticity of oil demand is less than the elasticity of oil supply in short term. In summary, as the oil exporting organization in a classic monopoly market, OPEC has un-neglectable influences on the volatility of oil prices.
The previous studies took OPEC as the absolute monopoly in the world oil market and having the controlling power of oil prices, so the main research methodology is the empirical analysis. Since 1980s’, the world oil market structures has changed a lot, for example, OPEC lost the controlling status with its market share deceasing constantly and oil prices were easily swung by many disturbing factors. These disturbing factors intervened in OPEC output conducts and the world oil prices further for their uncertainty in choosing the output strategies. The theory of traditional industrial organization emphasizes the function of market structure and thinks that market structure decides the manufacturers’conducts and finally the market performances; However, the theory of new industrial organization (NIO) transformes the viewpoints to the manufacturers’conducts and analyzes the market equilibrium of non-cooperation with the Game theory, so NIO is a more effective way aiming at the monopoly market. Based on the Theory of Uncertainty and NIO, this paper explained OPEC’s output conducts with uncertainty factors by analyzing the production game model from the point of analyzing manufacturer conducts with Game theory and the influences of OPEC output uncertainties on the world oil prices.
This paper firstly analyzed the transmission problems from OPEC output uncertainty to oil prices’volatilities. In the long view, OPEC output conducts exerted influences on oil prices. With the consideration of the structural breaks in the long run, this paper demonstrated the dynamic influences of the OPEC output on oil prices. Together with OPEC output announcements, it explained the weakening situation of the influencing power for the existed disturbing factors. Then, based on the ideas of OPEC output uncertainty, this paper analyzed the tramsmission mechanism from OPEC output conducts to oil prices’volatilities to lay a foundation for the game models between OPEC output conducts and the disturbing factors, also the influences on the oil prices of the OPEC output conducts uncertainty. Secondly, the uncertainty of OPEC output comes from three aspects: the endogenesis uncertainty comes from the interior OPEC, and the exogenous uncertainty from non-OPEC output and oil demand. All the three aspects disturbed the exertion of OPEC output’s influences on oil prices. We established the game models between OPEC output and the uncertainty factors to analyze the different OPEC output conducts under different output game equilibrium in turn. (1)OPEC members are different in many aspects, such as the oil reserves, output and the economic conditions etc, which caused different members having different production strategies, thus the bargaining happens when the quotas are distributed and the deception emerges when the output quotas are executed. This paper established the bargaining and repeated game models to analyze OPEC’s output under uncertain information completeness and Game times; (2) The manufacturers’conducts are interacting in the monopoly market, so Non-OPEC output is very important to interfere with the exertion of OPEC’s output power and oil prices. This paper illustrated the uncertainty factors of Non-OPEC output and the output Game models with complete or incomplete information to analyze OPEC output under different game results. And based on the fact of communicating connections between the manufacturers of the monopoly market, this paper introduced a variable to identify the output of opponents; (3) Owing that oil consumers always judge OPEC’s remaining capability by observing the output announcements, this paper established the signaling game model to analyze OPEC output conducts under oil consumers’different buying decision. Finally, we made empirical analysis of the influences on the OPEC output uncertainty of the disturbing factors, also the influences on oil prices of OPEC output conducts uncertainty.
Based on the Theory of Uncertainty and NIO, this paper analyzed the OPEC output conducts’uncertainty with the disturbances of endogenesis and exogenous factors, further the influences on the volatilities of oil prices, so it enriched the applications of the above two theory, thus it is meaningful in the theoretic aspect; Meanwhile, the all-around output strategies and the corresponding volatilities of oil prices are analyzed to make the paper instructable for the manufacturer’s output decisions and also meaningful for oil consumers to formulate strategies to keep away the oil crisis and ensure the oil consumption.
引文
1 Hotelling, H. The economics of exhaustible resources. Journal of Political Economy. 1931,39:137~175
2 Marie N. Fagan. Resource depletion and technical change: Effects on U.S. crude oil finding costs from 1977 to 1994. Energy Journal. 1995,18(4):91~95
3 Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, Armando Razo. When the law does not matter: the rise and decline of the Mexican oil industry. Journal of Economic History. 2003,63(1): 1~32
4 Engle. R. F., Granger.C.J.. Cointegration and error correction:Representation, estimation and testing. Econometrica. 1987,55:119~139
5冯春山,吴家春,蒋馥.国际石油市场的ARCH效应分析.石油大学学报(社会科学版). 2003,19(2):18~20
6 Granger C.W. Spurious regression in Econometrics. Journal of Econometrics. 1974,2(7):111~120
7 C.W.Yang, M.J.Hwang, B.N.Huang. An analysis of factors affecting price volatility of the US oil market.Energy Economics. 2002,24(2):107~119
8 Salant,S. Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: A Nash-Cournot approach to the world oil market. Journal of Political Economy.1976,84(10):1079~1093
9 Pindyck, R.S., Gains to producers from the cartelization of exhaustible resources. Review of Economic Statistics. 1978,60(2):238~251
10 Gately, D. OPEC: Retrospective and prospects 1972-1990. European Economic Review. 1983,21:313~331
11 Gately, D. A ten-year retrospective on OPEC and the world oil market. Journal of Economic Literature, 1984,22(3):1100~1114
12张宇燕,管清友.世界能源格局的演进、现状及其未来.中国远洋航务.2007,(8):32~34
13李纪建,管清友.石油双重属性与国际油价波动分析——一个国际政治经济的视角.国际石油经济.2007,(1):44~49
14陈新华.世界石油市场动荡不安.瞭望新闻周刊. 2002,25(2):35~36
15汤湘华.2000年以来世界石油市场供需综述.国际石油经济.2006,(9):11~15
16潘继平.全球石油供需状况与资源潜力.国际石油经济.2004,12(12):21~26
17 Kathleen L Abdalla. The changing structure of the international oil industry---Implications for OPEC. Energy policy. 1995,23(10): 871~877
18管清友.加入预期因素的多重均衡模型:市场结构与权力结构———国际市场油价波动的政治经济学分析.世界经济与政治.2007,(1):69~74
19朱起煌.非欧佩克产油国的生产能力及其与油价走势的关系.国际石油经济.2000,8(1):19~24
20王华.石油消费国与石油输出国的“博奕”.中国石油化工.2005,(10):24~27
21汪巍.欧佩克与国际石油市场发展趋势.对外经贸实务.2005,(10):35~36
22 Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky.What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels? The case of OPEC. Resource and Energy Economics.2005,27(4):321~342
23 Robert K. Kaufmann. Does OPEC matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices. the Energy Journal. 2005, 25(4):67~92
24 Stephane Dees, Pavols Karadeloglou, Robert K.Kaufmann, Marcelo Sanchez. Modelling the world oil market: Assessment of a quarterly econometric model. Energy Policy.2007,35(1):178~191
25齐中英,朱彬,鞠晓峰.欧佩克行为对石油价格波动的影响分析.哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版).2006,8(1):43~46
26单卫国.欧佩克对油价的影响力及其政策取向.国际石油经济.2000,8(1):25~29
27 Belton.B. OPEC can no longer make“people quake”. USA Today, March, 27, 1998.
28 Wilfrid L. Kohl. OPEC behavior, 1998-2001. the quarterly review of economics and finance,.2002,42(3):209~233
29 Jostein Tvedt. The effect of uncertainty and aggregate investments on crude oil price dynamics. Engergy Economics.2002,24(6):615~628
30 Griffin,J. OPEC and world oil prices: is the Genie back in the bottle?. Energy Studies Review.1992,4(1):27~39
31 Elin Berg et al. Gains from Cartelization in the oil market. Energy Policy. 1997,25(10):1075~1091
32 Griffin, J., Xiong, W., The incentive to cheat: an empirical analysis of OPEC. Journal of Law & Economics. 1997,40(2):289~316
33 Green,D. The world oil market: an examination using small scale models. The Energy Journal.1988,9(3):61~76
34 Griffin,J.M., OPEC behavior: a test of alternative hypotheses. AmericanEconomic Review.1985,75(5):954~963
35 Jones,C.T., OPEC behavior under falling prices: implications for cartel stability. Energy Journal. 1990,(7):117~134
36 Harri Ramcharran. Oil Production Responses to Price Changes: an Empirical Application of the Competitive Model to OPEC and Non-OPEC Countries. Energy Economics.2002,24(2):97~106
37 Alhajji,A.F. David Huettner. OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison. Energy Policy.2000,28(12):1151~1164
38 Johany. A.D. OPEC and the price of oil: cartelization or alteration of property rights. The Journal of Energy and Development.1979,5(1):72~80
39 Ezzati. A. Future OPEC price and production strategies as affected by its capacity to absorb oil revenues. European Economic Revies.1976,8(2):112~129
40 Griffin, J.M., Teece,D.J. OPEC behavior and world oil prices. International Journal of Middle East Studies.1985,5(7):120~122
41 Bohi, D.R.M.A.Toman. Energy security: externalities and policies.Energy Policy.1993,21(11):1093~1109
42 Loderer, C. The utility of wealth. Journal of Political Economy.1985,60:991~1008
43 Dahl,C. Yucel,M. Testing alternative hypotheses of oil producer behavior. The Energy Journal. 1991,12(10):117~138
44 Gulen.S.G. Is OPEC a cartel? Evidence from cointegration and causality tests. The Energy Journal.1996,17(1):43~57
45 A. F.Alhajji, David Huettner. OPEC and world crude oil markets from 1973 to 1994: cartel, oligopoly or competitive? Energy Journal. 2000,21(3):31~60
46 Adelman,M.A. Constraints on the world oil monopoly price. Resource Energy. 1978,1(1):3~19
47 Adelman, M.A.. Modelling world oil supply. Energy Journal. 1993,14:1-32
48 Danielsen, A. L. OPEC stability: an empirical assessment. Energy Economics. 1988,10(7):174~184
49 Antonio Spilimbergo. Testing the hypothesis of collusive behavior among OPEC members. Energy Economics. 2001,23:339~353
50 Mabro,R. OPEC and the price of oil. Energy Journal. 1991,13:1~17
51 Mabro,R. The world’s oil supply 1930-2050: a review article. Journal of Energy Literature. 1996,2:25~34
52 Erickson,N. Developments in the world oil market. In:Pachauri, R.(Ed.), International Energy Studies. Wiley, New York:115~132
53 Plaut,S. OPEC is not a cartel. Challenge. 1981,24:18~24
54 Singer,S.F. The price of world oil. Annual Review of Energy. 1983,8:97~116
55 M.A.Adelman. The genie out of the bottle. The MIT Press, 1995
56吉炳安.寡头垄断中的“囚徒困境”与卡特尔联盟分析.华中科技大学学报. 2001,29(4):33-35
57 J.Gault et al . OPEC production quotas and their application to non-OPEC countries, In proceedings of the 11th Annual IAEE Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, June1989:111~121
58 A.Alsalem et al. Fairness measures and importance weights for allocating quotas to OPEC member countries. The Energy Journal. 1997,18(4):1~21
59 Mabro,R. OPEC’s production policies: how do they work? Why don’t theywork? Baltimore: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
60 John Gault et al. How does OPEC allocate quotas?. Journal of Energy Finance and Development. 1999,4: 137~148
61 Salman, R. OPEC: time to move to production management. Middle East Economic Survey(3 May)1999:D6~D7
62刘慧宏等.合作竞争博弈及其求解.预测.2005,24(2):73~76
63龙勇,漆东,龙健.战略联盟中的诚信机制.工业技术经济.2004,23(3):56~58
64赵小惠.寡占理论与重复博弈.系统工程理论与实践.2001,(3):116~119
65 Porter R H. Optimal cartel trigger-price strategies. Journal Economy Theory.1983,29(4):313~338
66 Friedman, J., A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies.1971,38(1):1~12
67 Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica. 1986,54(5):533~556
68刘怀德.不确定性经济学研究.上海财经大学出版社,2001:82~141
69胡汉辉.不确定性与企业集团问题.东南大学出版社,2001:4~15
70凯温·胡佛.新古典主义宏观经济学.中国经济出版社,1991:306
71王荣江.经济学方法论的分水岭:如何认识和处理不确定性.南京财经大学学报,2004,(4):19~24
72 F.H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 191
73肖传亮.“不确定性”与现代经济学的发展.番禺职业技术学院学报.2006,5(3):11~15
74黄奕林,赵爱华.不确定性经济学的发展.经济学动态,1997,(9):15~18
75曹雷.不确定性:经济学的研究及社会管理.上海市经济管理干部学院学报.2004,2(3):25~29
76 Chris Manolis, Arne Nygaard, Bard Stillerud. Uncertainty and vertical control: an international investigation. International Business Review.1997,6(5):501~518
77 Donald D. Bergh. Product-Market Uncertainty, Portfolio Restructuring, and Performance: An Information-processing and Resource-based View. Journal of Mangement. 1998,24(2):135~155
78张培刚.微观经济学的产生和发展.湖南人民出版社,1997:347-358、467~474
79埃瑞克·菲吕博顿.新制度经济学.上海财经大学出版社,1998:76~77
80威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆,2002
81樊纲.现代三大经济理论体系的比较与综合.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994:291~293
82黄淳,何伟.信息经济学.经济科学出版社,1998:42~45
83秦合舫.传统思维对中国企业领导进行不确定性决策的影响.清华大学硕士论文.2005:6~15
84刘霞,潘晓良.不确定性问题解决策略研究及存在的问题分析.心理科学.1997,20(1):36~39
85张梅琳.不确定性分析在投资决策中的应用.安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版).1999,23(5):59~61
86王益谊.组织环境的不确定性研究综述.管理工程学报.2005,19(1):46~50
87胡晓薇.信息、不确定性与投资者选择行为研究.求索. 2006,(11):18~20
88 Eva Regnier. Oil and energy price volatility.Energy Economics. 2007,29(3):405~427
89 Paresh Kumar Narayan, Seema Narayan. Modelling oil price volatility. Energy Policy.2007,35(12):6549~6553
90管清友.国际油价波动的周期模型及其政策含义.国际石油经济.2008,(1):25~31
91 Robert K. Kaufmann,etc. Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior. Energy Economics.2008,30(2):333~351
92田丰.世界石油市场中期展望.北京工商大学学报(社会科学版). 2006,21(1):27~32
93孙永生.世界石油市场中影响国际油价变化的因素.石油化工动态.1993,(2):1~6
94 Manfred Horn. OPEC’s optimal crude oil price. Energy Policy. 2004,32(2):269~280
95 Roberto A. De Santis. Crude oil price fluctuations and Saudi Arabia’s behavior. Energy Economics. 2003,25(2):155~173
96刘明.主要产油国和消费国的石油政策.国际石油经济.2001, 9(1):25~27
97顾永康.国际油价,欧佩克“一减就灵”.中国石化.2007,(3):66~67
98张晓峒.计量经济学软件EVIEWS使用指南.南开大学出版社,2004:211~221
99张建华,涂涛涛.结构突变时间序列单位根的“伪检验”,数量经济技术经济研究.2007,(3):142~151
100张晓峒,白仲林.退势单位根检验小样本性质的比较.数量经济技术经济研究.2005,(5):40~49
101 Perron, Pierre. The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis. Econometric. 1989,57(6):1519~1554
102 Zivot,E.,D. Andrews. Further evidence on the great crash, the oil price shock and the unit-root hypothesis. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 1992,
10(5):251~270
103 Lunsdaine, R. L., D. Papell. Multiple trend breaks and the unit root test. Review of Economics & Statistics. 1997,80(2):355~385
104喻卫斌.基于不确定性视角的网络组织研究.西北大学博士论文.2006:23~35
105葛世龙.可耗竭资源市场中的不确定性研究综述.中国人口资源与环境.2007, 17(5):18~21
106泰勒尔.产业组织理论.中国人民大学出版社,1997:263~362
107牛晓帆.西方产业组织理论的深化与新发展.经济研究.2004,(3):116~123
108 A.F.Alhajji, David Huettner. OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison.Energy Policy. 2000,28:1151~1164
109王鸿雁.欧佩克的卡特尔行为研究综述.石油大学学报(社会科学版).2005,21(2):6~10
110张永安.试析影响油价的因素及油价的走势.兰州商学院学报.1989,(3):66~69
111韩文科.国际油价变化及对我国的影响.能源工程.2001,(1):1~3
112孙永生.国际石油市场能否走出高油价的困扰.中国石化.2006,(2):57~61
113肖汉平. 2007年国际油价影响因素探讨.石油化工技术经济.2007,23(1):19~27
114刘志彪.市场结构厂商行为与价格联盟的不稳定性.江苏行政学院学报.2004,(2):43~50
115谢识予.经济博弈论.2.复旦大学出版社,2002:145~150
116 Sel Dibooglu, Salim N. AlGudhea. All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC. Economic Systems.2007,31(3):292~310
117 Douglas B. Reynolds. Modeling OPEC behavior: theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions. Energy Policy. 1999, 27(15):901~912
118张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海人民出版社,1997:55~67
119蒲勇健.斯塔克伯格垄断——世界石油产量与价格变动之谜的一种理论解释.经济科学.1995,(6):69~74
120 Kathleen L Abdalla. The changing structure of the international oil industry. Energy Policy. 1995,37(2):871~877
121汪巍.高油价背景下的国际石油开发新特点.中国石油和化工经济分析.2007,(9):62~65
122 David R. Kamerschen. Market structure in the US electricity industry: A long-term perspective.Energy Economics.2005,27(5):731~751
123 Linda A. Toolsema. Competition in the Dutch consumer credit market. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2002,26(11):2215~2229
124 J.D.Liu, T.T.Lie. Measurement of conjectural variations in oligopoly electricity markets. Econometrica. 2006,42(5):947~966
125唐小我.两个生产厂商条件下的古诺模型研究.电子科技大学学报.1997,26(1):83~88
126 Fons Groot, Cees Withagen, Aart de Zeeuw. Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Conrol.2003,28(2):287~306
127李志强.对斯坦尔克伯格均衡存在性的质疑.中山大学学报(自然科学版).2000,39(2):119~121
128谢建国.不完全信息、信念与博弈均衡——伊拉克正品核查危机的一个博弈论解释.世界经济与政治.2003,(5):50~55
129孔颖.影响欧佩克发展的外部因素.西亚非洲.2003,(2):31~33
130吕志良.试论世界石油市场的“亚临界”状态.国际石油经济.2006,(12):9~13
131蒲勇健,唐小我.假冒伪劣产品与真品共存于市场的信号传递博弈模型.重庆大学学报(社会科学版).1999,(3):53~56
132 Sandeep Baliga. Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk. Journal of EconomicTheory.2002,105(2): 450~468
133 Rachel Croson, Terry Boles, J.Keith Murnighan. Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2003,51(2):143~159
134 Elchanan Ben-Porath. Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory. 2003,108(1):45~71
135陈杰,屠梅曾,孙大宁.生态供应链下绿色采购的信号博弈.系统工程学报.2004,19(2):202~206
136梁建英,李垣,廖貅武.信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型.中国管理科学.2007,15(1):99~105
137肖条军.两阶段基于信号博弈的声誉模型.管理科学学报.2003,6(1):27~31
138全林.通货膨胀的预期不确定性.上海交通大学学报.1999,33(10):1247~1250
139 Engle, R.F. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the variance of the United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica. 1982, 50(7):987~1007
140 Bollerslev, T. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics. 1986,31(4):307~328
141 Nelson, D. Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: a new approach. Econometrica.1991,59(3):347~370
2 Marie N. Fagan. Resource depletion and technical change: Effects on U.S. crude oil finding costs from 1977 to 1994. Energy Journal. 1995,18(4):91~95
3 Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, Armando Razo. When the law does not matter: the rise and decline of the Mexican oil industry. Journal of Economic History. 2003,63(1): 1~32
4 Engle. R. F., Granger.C.J.. Cointegration and error correction:Representation, estimation and testing. Econometrica. 1987,55:119~139
5冯春山,吴家春,蒋馥.国际石油市场的ARCH效应分析.石油大学学报(社会科学版). 2003,19(2):18~20
6 Granger C.W. Spurious regression in Econometrics. Journal of Econometrics. 1974,2(7):111~120
7 C.W.Yang, M.J.Hwang, B.N.Huang. An analysis of factors affecting price volatility of the US oil market.Energy Economics. 2002,24(2):107~119
8 Salant,S. Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: A Nash-Cournot approach to the world oil market. Journal of Political Economy.1976,84(10):1079~1093
9 Pindyck, R.S., Gains to producers from the cartelization of exhaustible resources. Review of Economic Statistics. 1978,60(2):238~251
10 Gately, D. OPEC: Retrospective and prospects 1972-1990. European Economic Review. 1983,21:313~331
11 Gately, D. A ten-year retrospective on OPEC and the world oil market. Journal of Economic Literature, 1984,22(3):1100~1114
12张宇燕,管清友.世界能源格局的演进、现状及其未来.中国远洋航务.2007,(8):32~34
13李纪建,管清友.石油双重属性与国际油价波动分析——一个国际政治经济的视角.国际石油经济.2007,(1):44~49
14陈新华.世界石油市场动荡不安.瞭望新闻周刊. 2002,25(2):35~36
15汤湘华.2000年以来世界石油市场供需综述.国际石油经济.2006,(9):11~15
16潘继平.全球石油供需状况与资源潜力.国际石油经济.2004,12(12):21~26
17 Kathleen L Abdalla. The changing structure of the international oil industry---Implications for OPEC. Energy policy. 1995,23(10): 871~877
18管清友.加入预期因素的多重均衡模型:市场结构与权力结构———国际市场油价波动的政治经济学分析.世界经济与政治.2007,(1):69~74
19朱起煌.非欧佩克产油国的生产能力及其与油价走势的关系.国际石油经济.2000,8(1):19~24
20王华.石油消费国与石油输出国的“博奕”.中国石油化工.2005,(10):24~27
21汪巍.欧佩克与国际石油市场发展趋势.对外经贸实务.2005,(10):35~36
22 Charles F. Mason, Stephen Polasky.What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels? The case of OPEC. Resource and Energy Economics.2005,27(4):321~342
23 Robert K. Kaufmann. Does OPEC matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices. the Energy Journal. 2005, 25(4):67~92
24 Stephane Dees, Pavols Karadeloglou, Robert K.Kaufmann, Marcelo Sanchez. Modelling the world oil market: Assessment of a quarterly econometric model. Energy Policy.2007,35(1):178~191
25齐中英,朱彬,鞠晓峰.欧佩克行为对石油价格波动的影响分析.哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版).2006,8(1):43~46
26单卫国.欧佩克对油价的影响力及其政策取向.国际石油经济.2000,8(1):25~29
27 Belton.B. OPEC can no longer make“people quake”. USA Today, March, 27, 1998.
28 Wilfrid L. Kohl. OPEC behavior, 1998-2001. the quarterly review of economics and finance,.2002,42(3):209~233
29 Jostein Tvedt. The effect of uncertainty and aggregate investments on crude oil price dynamics. Engergy Economics.2002,24(6):615~628
30 Griffin,J. OPEC and world oil prices: is the Genie back in the bottle?. Energy Studies Review.1992,4(1):27~39
31 Elin Berg et al. Gains from Cartelization in the oil market. Energy Policy. 1997,25(10):1075~1091
32 Griffin, J., Xiong, W., The incentive to cheat: an empirical analysis of OPEC. Journal of Law & Economics. 1997,40(2):289~316
33 Green,D. The world oil market: an examination using small scale models. The Energy Journal.1988,9(3):61~76
34 Griffin,J.M., OPEC behavior: a test of alternative hypotheses. AmericanEconomic Review.1985,75(5):954~963
35 Jones,C.T., OPEC behavior under falling prices: implications for cartel stability. Energy Journal. 1990,(7):117~134
36 Harri Ramcharran. Oil Production Responses to Price Changes: an Empirical Application of the Competitive Model to OPEC and Non-OPEC Countries. Energy Economics.2002,24(2):97~106
37 Alhajji,A.F. David Huettner. OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison. Energy Policy.2000,28(12):1151~1164
38 Johany. A.D. OPEC and the price of oil: cartelization or alteration of property rights. The Journal of Energy and Development.1979,5(1):72~80
39 Ezzati. A. Future OPEC price and production strategies as affected by its capacity to absorb oil revenues. European Economic Revies.1976,8(2):112~129
40 Griffin, J.M., Teece,D.J. OPEC behavior and world oil prices. International Journal of Middle East Studies.1985,5(7):120~122
41 Bohi, D.R.M.A.Toman. Energy security: externalities and policies.Energy Policy.1993,21(11):1093~1109
42 Loderer, C. The utility of wealth. Journal of Political Economy.1985,60:991~1008
43 Dahl,C. Yucel,M. Testing alternative hypotheses of oil producer behavior. The Energy Journal. 1991,12(10):117~138
44 Gulen.S.G. Is OPEC a cartel? Evidence from cointegration and causality tests. The Energy Journal.1996,17(1):43~57
45 A. F.Alhajji, David Huettner. OPEC and world crude oil markets from 1973 to 1994: cartel, oligopoly or competitive? Energy Journal. 2000,21(3):31~60
46 Adelman,M.A. Constraints on the world oil monopoly price. Resource Energy. 1978,1(1):3~19
47 Adelman, M.A.. Modelling world oil supply. Energy Journal. 1993,14:1-32
48 Danielsen, A. L. OPEC stability: an empirical assessment. Energy Economics. 1988,10(7):174~184
49 Antonio Spilimbergo. Testing the hypothesis of collusive behavior among OPEC members. Energy Economics. 2001,23:339~353
50 Mabro,R. OPEC and the price of oil. Energy Journal. 1991,13:1~17
51 Mabro,R. The world’s oil supply 1930-2050: a review article. Journal of Energy Literature. 1996,2:25~34
52 Erickson,N. Developments in the world oil market. In:Pachauri, R.(Ed.), International Energy Studies. Wiley, New York:115~132
53 Plaut,S. OPEC is not a cartel. Challenge. 1981,24:18~24
54 Singer,S.F. The price of world oil. Annual Review of Energy. 1983,8:97~116
55 M.A.Adelman. The genie out of the bottle. The MIT Press, 1995
56吉炳安.寡头垄断中的“囚徒困境”与卡特尔联盟分析.华中科技大学学报. 2001,29(4):33-35
57 J.Gault et al . OPEC production quotas and their application to non-OPEC countries, In proceedings of the 11th Annual IAEE Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, June1989:111~121
58 A.Alsalem et al. Fairness measures and importance weights for allocating quotas to OPEC member countries. The Energy Journal. 1997,18(4):1~21
59 Mabro,R. OPEC’s production policies: how do they work? Why don’t theywork? Baltimore: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
60 John Gault et al. How does OPEC allocate quotas?. Journal of Energy Finance and Development. 1999,4: 137~148
61 Salman, R. OPEC: time to move to production management. Middle East Economic Survey(3 May)1999:D6~D7
62刘慧宏等.合作竞争博弈及其求解.预测.2005,24(2):73~76
63龙勇,漆东,龙健.战略联盟中的诚信机制.工业技术经济.2004,23(3):56~58
64赵小惠.寡占理论与重复博弈.系统工程理论与实践.2001,(3):116~119
65 Porter R H. Optimal cartel trigger-price strategies. Journal Economy Theory.1983,29(4):313~338
66 Friedman, J., A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies.1971,38(1):1~12
67 Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica. 1986,54(5):533~556
68刘怀德.不确定性经济学研究.上海财经大学出版社,2001:82~141
69胡汉辉.不确定性与企业集团问题.东南大学出版社,2001:4~15
70凯温·胡佛.新古典主义宏观经济学.中国经济出版社,1991:306
71王荣江.经济学方法论的分水岭:如何认识和处理不确定性.南京财经大学学报,2004,(4):19~24
72 F.H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 191
73肖传亮.“不确定性”与现代经济学的发展.番禺职业技术学院学报.2006,5(3):11~15
74黄奕林,赵爱华.不确定性经济学的发展.经济学动态,1997,(9):15~18
75曹雷.不确定性:经济学的研究及社会管理.上海市经济管理干部学院学报.2004,2(3):25~29
76 Chris Manolis, Arne Nygaard, Bard Stillerud. Uncertainty and vertical control: an international investigation. International Business Review.1997,6(5):501~518
77 Donald D. Bergh. Product-Market Uncertainty, Portfolio Restructuring, and Performance: An Information-processing and Resource-based View. Journal of Mangement. 1998,24(2):135~155
78张培刚.微观经济学的产生和发展.湖南人民出版社,1997:347-358、467~474
79埃瑞克·菲吕博顿.新制度经济学.上海财经大学出版社,1998:76~77
80威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度.商务印书馆,2002
81樊纲.现代三大经济理论体系的比较与综合.上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994:291~293
82黄淳,何伟.信息经济学.经济科学出版社,1998:42~45
83秦合舫.传统思维对中国企业领导进行不确定性决策的影响.清华大学硕士论文.2005:6~15
84刘霞,潘晓良.不确定性问题解决策略研究及存在的问题分析.心理科学.1997,20(1):36~39
85张梅琳.不确定性分析在投资决策中的应用.安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版).1999,23(5):59~61
86王益谊.组织环境的不确定性研究综述.管理工程学报.2005,19(1):46~50
87胡晓薇.信息、不确定性与投资者选择行为研究.求索. 2006,(11):18~20
88 Eva Regnier. Oil and energy price volatility.Energy Economics. 2007,29(3):405~427
89 Paresh Kumar Narayan, Seema Narayan. Modelling oil price volatility. Energy Policy.2007,35(12):6549~6553
90管清友.国际油价波动的周期模型及其政策含义.国际石油经济.2008,(1):25~31
91 Robert K. Kaufmann,etc. Determinants of OPEC production: Implications for OPEC behavior. Energy Economics.2008,30(2):333~351
92田丰.世界石油市场中期展望.北京工商大学学报(社会科学版). 2006,21(1):27~32
93孙永生.世界石油市场中影响国际油价变化的因素.石油化工动态.1993,(2):1~6
94 Manfred Horn. OPEC’s optimal crude oil price. Energy Policy. 2004,32(2):269~280
95 Roberto A. De Santis. Crude oil price fluctuations and Saudi Arabia’s behavior. Energy Economics. 2003,25(2):155~173
96刘明.主要产油国和消费国的石油政策.国际石油经济.2001, 9(1):25~27
97顾永康.国际油价,欧佩克“一减就灵”.中国石化.2007,(3):66~67
98张晓峒.计量经济学软件EVIEWS使用指南.南开大学出版社,2004:211~221
99张建华,涂涛涛.结构突变时间序列单位根的“伪检验”,数量经济技术经济研究.2007,(3):142~151
100张晓峒,白仲林.退势单位根检验小样本性质的比较.数量经济技术经济研究.2005,(5):40~49
101 Perron, Pierre. The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis. Econometric. 1989,57(6):1519~1554
102 Zivot,E.,D. Andrews. Further evidence on the great crash, the oil price shock and the unit-root hypothesis. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. 1992,
10(5):251~270
103 Lunsdaine, R. L., D. Papell. Multiple trend breaks and the unit root test. Review of Economics & Statistics. 1997,80(2):355~385
104喻卫斌.基于不确定性视角的网络组织研究.西北大学博士论文.2006:23~35
105葛世龙.可耗竭资源市场中的不确定性研究综述.中国人口资源与环境.2007, 17(5):18~21
106泰勒尔.产业组织理论.中国人民大学出版社,1997:263~362
107牛晓帆.西方产业组织理论的深化与新发展.经济研究.2004,(3):116~123
108 A.F.Alhajji, David Huettner. OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison.Energy Policy. 2000,28:1151~1164
109王鸿雁.欧佩克的卡特尔行为研究综述.石油大学学报(社会科学版).2005,21(2):6~10
110张永安.试析影响油价的因素及油价的走势.兰州商学院学报.1989,(3):66~69
111韩文科.国际油价变化及对我国的影响.能源工程.2001,(1):1~3
112孙永生.国际石油市场能否走出高油价的困扰.中国石化.2006,(2):57~61
113肖汉平. 2007年国际油价影响因素探讨.石油化工技术经济.2007,23(1):19~27
114刘志彪.市场结构厂商行为与价格联盟的不稳定性.江苏行政学院学报.2004,(2):43~50
115谢识予.经济博弈论.2.复旦大学出版社,2002:145~150
116 Sel Dibooglu, Salim N. AlGudhea. All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC. Economic Systems.2007,31(3):292~310
117 Douglas B. Reynolds. Modeling OPEC behavior: theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions. Energy Policy. 1999, 27(15):901~912
118张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海人民出版社,1997:55~67
119蒲勇健.斯塔克伯格垄断——世界石油产量与价格变动之谜的一种理论解释.经济科学.1995,(6):69~74
120 Kathleen L Abdalla. The changing structure of the international oil industry. Energy Policy. 1995,37(2):871~877
121汪巍.高油价背景下的国际石油开发新特点.中国石油和化工经济分析.2007,(9):62~65
122 David R. Kamerschen. Market structure in the US electricity industry: A long-term perspective.Energy Economics.2005,27(5):731~751
123 Linda A. Toolsema. Competition in the Dutch consumer credit market. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2002,26(11):2215~2229
124 J.D.Liu, T.T.Lie. Measurement of conjectural variations in oligopoly electricity markets. Econometrica. 2006,42(5):947~966
125唐小我.两个生产厂商条件下的古诺模型研究.电子科技大学学报.1997,26(1):83~88
126 Fons Groot, Cees Withagen, Aart de Zeeuw. Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Conrol.2003,28(2):287~306
127李志强.对斯坦尔克伯格均衡存在性的质疑.中山大学学报(自然科学版).2000,39(2):119~121
128谢建国.不完全信息、信念与博弈均衡——伊拉克正品核查危机的一个博弈论解释.世界经济与政治.2003,(5):50~55
129孔颖.影响欧佩克发展的外部因素.西亚非洲.2003,(2):31~33
130吕志良.试论世界石油市场的“亚临界”状态.国际石油经济.2006,(12):9~13
131蒲勇健,唐小我.假冒伪劣产品与真品共存于市场的信号传递博弈模型.重庆大学学报(社会科学版).1999,(3):53~56
132 Sandeep Baliga. Coordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk. Journal of EconomicTheory.2002,105(2): 450~468
133 Rachel Croson, Terry Boles, J.Keith Murnighan. Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2003,51(2):143~159
134 Elchanan Ben-Porath. Cheap talk in games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory. 2003,108(1):45~71
135陈杰,屠梅曾,孙大宁.生态供应链下绿色采购的信号博弈.系统工程学报.2004,19(2):202~206
136梁建英,李垣,廖貅武.信号成本与服务外包供应商信号传递关系的博弈模型.中国管理科学.2007,15(1):99~105
137肖条军.两阶段基于信号博弈的声誉模型.管理科学学报.2003,6(1):27~31
138全林.通货膨胀的预期不确定性.上海交通大学学报.1999,33(10):1247~1250
139 Engle, R.F. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the variance of the United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica. 1982, 50(7):987~1007
140 Bollerslev, T. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics. 1986,31(4):307~328
141 Nelson, D. Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: a new approach. Econometrica.1991,59(3):347~370