基于供应链契约理论的联想手机售后服务链协调研究
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摘要
联想手机作为国产手机的代表,其市场份额占有率稳居整体第四、国产第一的领先位置。为了提高联想手机品牌的知名度,联想开始加强手机售后的服务链管理。
服务链是一种特殊的供应链,由不同利益主体构成的合作型系统,各利益主体在追求自身利润最大化的同时,往往与系统整体目标产生冲突,因此服务链和供应链一样,也是典型的、需要协调的系统。
本文首先对传统的供应链契约理论进行综述,为后面服务链建模打下基础;然后对联想手机售后服务链的构成及运行情况进行了具体研究;接着根据联想手机售后服务链的特点,借鉴传统产品供应链契约建模的思想,结合收入共享契约和退货契约建立了联合契约模型并进行求解;最后是案例分析,对比了新旧契约模型下服务链整体和各方利润,表明了联合契约模型优于现有契约模型。
As the representative of Chinese mobile, Lenovo's market share took the fourth place in total and took the first place in Chinese mobile. In order to improve the band of Lenovo mobile, Lenovo pays more attention to service chain management.
Like a supply chain, a service chain is made up of two or more parties with different benefits. Optimal service chain performance requires the execution of a precise set of actions. Unfortunately, those actions are not always in the best interest of the members in the service chain because the service chain members are primarily concerned with optimizing their own objectives. So service chain is also a typical system that needs to be coordinated.
Firstly, this paper surveys typical supply chain contracts and makes the foundation for the following model. Secondly, the embodied operational situations of the service chain are explored in Lenovo mobile industry. Thirdly, the paper provides a combined contract model for Lenovo mobile industry under thoughts of the existed contracts models of supply chain. At last, a mathematical example is provided, the profits for the whole service chain and the profits for every member have been compared with between in the new contract model and in the old contract model, and the results shows the new combined contract model is better.
服务链是一种特殊的供应链,由不同利益主体构成的合作型系统,各利益主体在追求自身利润最大化的同时,往往与系统整体目标产生冲突,因此服务链和供应链一样,也是典型的、需要协调的系统。
本文首先对传统的供应链契约理论进行综述,为后面服务链建模打下基础;然后对联想手机售后服务链的构成及运行情况进行了具体研究;接着根据联想手机售后服务链的特点,借鉴传统产品供应链契约建模的思想,结合收入共享契约和退货契约建立了联合契约模型并进行求解;最后是案例分析,对比了新旧契约模型下服务链整体和各方利润,表明了联合契约模型优于现有契约模型。
As the representative of Chinese mobile, Lenovo's market share took the fourth place in total and took the first place in Chinese mobile. In order to improve the band of Lenovo mobile, Lenovo pays more attention to service chain management.
Like a supply chain, a service chain is made up of two or more parties with different benefits. Optimal service chain performance requires the execution of a precise set of actions. Unfortunately, those actions are not always in the best interest of the members in the service chain because the service chain members are primarily concerned with optimizing their own objectives. So service chain is also a typical system that needs to be coordinated.
Firstly, this paper surveys typical supply chain contracts and makes the foundation for the following model. Secondly, the embodied operational situations of the service chain are explored in Lenovo mobile industry. Thirdly, the paper provides a combined contract model for Lenovo mobile industry under thoughts of the existed contracts models of supply chain. At last, a mathematical example is provided, the profits for the whole service chain and the profits for every member have been compared with between in the new contract model and in the old contract model, and the results shows the new combined contract model is better.
引文
[1]Christoph Schneeweiss,Kirstin Zimmer.Hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the supply chain.European Journal of Operational Research,2004,(153):687-703;
[2]Togar M Simatupang,Alan C Wright,Ramaswami Sridharan.The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration.Business Process Management Journal,2002,(8):289-308;
[3]Gerard P.Cachon.Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts.http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/～cachon;
[4]唐纳德·鲍尔索克斯,戴维厂克芳斯.物流管理:供应链过程的一体化.北京:机械工业出版社,1999;
[5]Wen Zhao,Yunzeng Wang.Coordination of joint pricing-production decisions in a supply chain,IIE Transactions,2002,34(8):701-715;
[6]安德鲁·坎贝尔.战略协调.北京:机械工业出版社,2000;
[7]M.E.PorteR.竞争优势.北京:华夏出版社,1997;
[8]薛继安.动态竞争下企业管理模式的最佳选择—供应链管理.企业经济,2002,(1):70-71;
[9]Theodore H.Clark,Ho Guen Lee.Performance,interdependence and coordination in business-to-business electronic commerce and supply chain management.Information Technology and Management,2000,(1):85-105;
[10]曾忠禄.从企业价值链看战略联盟优势.当代财经,2001,(1):25-28;
[11]Andrew S.Patrick.Media lessons from the National Capital Free Net.Communications of the ACM,1997,40(7):74-80;
[12]王刚天.从竞争优势到竞争优势群.南开管理评论,2001,(1):32-35;
[13]Xianghua Gan,Suresh P Sethi,Houmin Yan.Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Agents.Production and Operations Management,2004,13(2):135-149;
[14]Yeong Ling Y.Profit sharinging and standard setting in production and procurement management.Applied Economics,1994,(2):95-105;
[15]Spengler,J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy.Journal of Polilical Economy,1950,(3):347-352;
[16] Forrester, J. W. Industrial Dynamics. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1961;
[17] D.J. Wu. Software agents for knowledge management: coordination in multi-agent supply chains and auctions. Expert Systems with Applications,2001, (20): 30-38;
[18] Geoffrion A.M., Graves G.W.Multi-commodity distribution system design by Enders decomposition. Management Science, 1974, (5): 822—844;
[19] Towill, D., M. Nairn and J. Wikner. Industrial dynamics simulation models in the design of supply chain. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 1992, (5): 3—13;
[20] Horscroft, P. The supply chain. Logistics Information Management, 1993,(3): 46-48;
[21] Lee L. H., Padmanabhan, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain:the bullwhip effect. Management Science, 1997, (4): 546—558;
[22] Parunak, H.V. D., Savit, R. L. and Clark, S. J. DASCH: Dynamic Analysis of Supply Chains. DASCH Final Report, 1999;
[23] B.A. Pasternack. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science, 1985, 4: 166—176;
[24] J.P. Monahan. A quantitative discount pricing model to increase vendor profits,Management Science, 1984, 30: 720—726;
[25] M.J. Rosenblatt and H.L. Lee. Improving profitability with quantity discounts under fixed demand IIE Transactions, 1985, 17 (4): 388-395;
[26] M.Khouja. The newsboy problem with multiple discounts offered by suppliers and retailers.Decision Sciences. 1996, 27: 589—599;
[27] M.Khouja. A multi-product constrained newsboy problem with progressive multiple discounts. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 1996, 30 (1): 95—101;
[28] C.J.Corbett, X. Groote. A supplier's optimal quantity discounts policy under asymmetric information. Management science, 2000, 46 (3) : 444—450;
[29] G. Haresh. A study of quantity discount pricing models with different ordering structures: order coordination, order consolidation, and multi-tier order hierarchy. International journal of production economics, 2001, 72(2) : 203—225;
[30] A.Burnetas, S.M.Gilbert and C.Smith. Quantity discount in single period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. Http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/man/gilberts/ Papers Qdisc.pdf,2004;
[31] Liu Bin, Liu Sifeng and Chen Jian, et al. Supply chain coordination with quantity discounts under the uncertain demand. Proceeding of 2005 IEEE on Networking, Sensing and Control. Tucson, Arizona, March, 2005: 976—981;
[32] E. Kandel. The right to return, Journal of Law and Economics, 1996, 39:329-356;
[33] H. Emmons and S.M. Gilbert. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science, 1998, 44(2): 276—283;
[34] A. Tsay. Managing retail channel overstock: markdown money and return policies. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 457—492;
[35] Ding Ding, Jian Chen. Research on return polices in a three level supply chain. International Conference on Global Supply Chain Management of 2002,Beijing, 189-193;
[36] Q.Wang, Z.Wu. Improving a supplier's quantity discount gain from many different buyers. IIE transactions. 2000, 32 (11) : 1071 — 1079;
[37] H.L.Lee, V.Padmanabhan, T.A.Taylor, et al. Price protection in the personal computer industry. Management Science. 2000, 46 (4) : 467—482;
[38] C.X. Wang. A General Framework of Supply Chain Contract Models, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 2002, 7 (5) : 302—310;
[39] A.Tsay. Quantity-flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives.Management science, 1999, 45 (10) : 1339—1358;
[40] A. Tsay & W. Lovejoy. Quantity-flexibility contracts and supply chain performance. Manufacturing and service operations management, 1999, 1(2):89-111;
[41] Jianghua Wu. Quantity flexibility contracts under Bayesian updating. Computer and Operations Research. Article in press , Available online at www.sciencedirect.com.
[42] J.H. Mortimer. The effects of revenue-sharing contracts on welfare in vertically separated markets: evidence from the video rental industry. University of California at Los Angeles working paper. Los Angeles, CA. 2000;
[43] G. Cachon & M. Lariviere. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing: strengths and limitations.University of Pennsylvania working paper,2000;
[44]Y.Gerchak and Y.Wang.Revenue-Sharing vs.Wholesale-Price Contracts in Assembly Systems with Random Demand University of Waterloo working paper,2000;
[45]I.Giannoccaro and P.Pontrandolfo.Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts.International Journal of Production Economics,2004,89:131-139;
[46]G.Eppen & A.Iyer.Backup agreements in fashion buying-the value of upstream flexibility.Management science,1997,43(11):1469-1684;
[47]M.Harris and A.Raviv.Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information.Journal of Economic Theory,1979,2(3):231-259;
[48]I.Macho-Stadler and J.D.Perez-Castrflo.An introduction to the economics of information:incentives and contracts.Oxford University Press,2001;
[49]M.R.Frascatore and F.Mahmoodi.Long-Tern and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand.Clarkson University working paper,Potsdam,NY,2003;
[50]王玮,汪定伟,柴跃廷.准时化分布需求计划方法.控制与决策,2000,15(5):565-568;
[51]C.Schneeweiss and K.Zimmer.Hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the supply chain.European Journal of Operational Research,2004,153:687-703;
[52]S.Starbird.Penalties,rewards,and inspection:provisions for quality in supply chain contracts.Journal of the Operational Research Society,2001,52:109-115;
[53]张翠华,黄小原.非对称信息对供应链质量成本决策的影响.东北大学学报(自然科学版),2003,24(3):30-305;
[54]C.Zarley.Vendors' volume-based incentives,Computer Reseller News(June 16),1997,333;
[55]M.Kanellos.Novell regroups,Computer Reseller News(Sep 9),1996,127;
[56]Edmunds.1999,http://www.edmunds.com/edweb/incentives.html
[57]E.Gerstner,J.D.Hess,D.M.Holthausen.Price discrimination through a distribution channel:Theory and evidence.American Economic Review,1994,84(5):1437-1445.
[58]Z.J.Zhang,A.Krishna,S.K.Dhar.The optimal choice of promotion vehicles: Front-loaded or rear-loaded incentives.Management Science,2000,46(3):348-362;
[59]A.K.Basu,R.Lal,V.Srinivasan,R.Staelin.Sales force compensation plans:An agency theoretic perspective.Marketing Science,1985,4(4):267-291;
[60]R.C.Rao.Compensating heterogeneous salesforces:Some explicit solutions.Marketing Science,1990,9(4):319-341;
[61]J.Raju,V.Srinivasan.Quota-based compensation plans for multi-territory heterogeneous salesforces.Management Scitnce,1996,42(10):1454-1462;
[62]E.Porteus,S.Whang.On manufacturing/marketing incentives.Management Science,1991,37(9):1166-1181;
[63]F.Chen.Sales-force incentives and inventory management.Manufacturing &Service Operations Management.2000,2(2):186-202;
[64]T.A.Taylor.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects,Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007;
[65]H.Krishnan,R.Kapuscinski and D.Butz.Coordinating contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort.Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63;
[66]李大华.中国汽车售后服务现状分析.现代汽车,2004,12:28-28
[67]张国方.汽车服务工程.北京:电子工业出版社,2004:51-53
[68]佚名.我国机电产品在马耳他售后服务情况[EB/OL].http://www.mofcom.gov.cn,2003
[69]刘云,苏秦.对企业售后服务的探讨.现代企业,2002,4:48-51
[70]谢强,周良,丁秋林.基于web的产品售后服务研究.计算机应用研究,2002,9:24-26
[71]王东勃,朱名锉.基于网络的智能化售后服务系统.计算机工程与应用,2003,12:221-223
[72]杨立军等.基于产品服务的供应链管理.经济师,2003,(7):153
[73]高峻,李成严.基于供应链的销售管理.北方经贸,2003,(7):117-118
[74]徐颖.制造业企业中供应链管理的优化.制造业自动化,2000,22(6):54-56
[75]王一凡.中国企业供应链管理现状调查分析——销售与售后服务.管理科学学报,1998,1(3):83-89
[76]Petruzzi N.,M.Data.Pricing and the newsvendor problem:a review with extensions.Operations Research,1999,47:183-194
[77]Yao,L.Supply chain modeling:pricing,contracts and coordination[D].Division of SEEM,Chinese University of Hong Kong,2002
[2]Togar M Simatupang,Alan C Wright,Ramaswami Sridharan.The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration.Business Process Management Journal,2002,(8):289-308;
[3]Gerard P.Cachon.Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts.http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/～cachon;
[4]唐纳德·鲍尔索克斯,戴维厂克芳斯.物流管理:供应链过程的一体化.北京:机械工业出版社,1999;
[5]Wen Zhao,Yunzeng Wang.Coordination of joint pricing-production decisions in a supply chain,IIE Transactions,2002,34(8):701-715;
[6]安德鲁·坎贝尔.战略协调.北京:机械工业出版社,2000;
[7]M.E.PorteR.竞争优势.北京:华夏出版社,1997;
[8]薛继安.动态竞争下企业管理模式的最佳选择—供应链管理.企业经济,2002,(1):70-71;
[9]Theodore H.Clark,Ho Guen Lee.Performance,interdependence and coordination in business-to-business electronic commerce and supply chain management.Information Technology and Management,2000,(1):85-105;
[10]曾忠禄.从企业价值链看战略联盟优势.当代财经,2001,(1):25-28;
[11]Andrew S.Patrick.Media lessons from the National Capital Free Net.Communications of the ACM,1997,40(7):74-80;
[12]王刚天.从竞争优势到竞争优势群.南开管理评论,2001,(1):32-35;
[13]Xianghua Gan,Suresh P Sethi,Houmin Yan.Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk-Averse Agents.Production and Operations Management,2004,13(2):135-149;
[14]Yeong Ling Y.Profit sharinging and standard setting in production and procurement management.Applied Economics,1994,(2):95-105;
[15]Spengler,J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy.Journal of Polilical Economy,1950,(3):347-352;
[16] Forrester, J. W. Industrial Dynamics. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1961;
[17] D.J. Wu. Software agents for knowledge management: coordination in multi-agent supply chains and auctions. Expert Systems with Applications,2001, (20): 30-38;
[18] Geoffrion A.M., Graves G.W.Multi-commodity distribution system design by Enders decomposition. Management Science, 1974, (5): 822—844;
[19] Towill, D., M. Nairn and J. Wikner. Industrial dynamics simulation models in the design of supply chain. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 1992, (5): 3—13;
[20] Horscroft, P. The supply chain. Logistics Information Management, 1993,(3): 46-48;
[21] Lee L. H., Padmanabhan, Whang S. Information distortion in a supply chain:the bullwhip effect. Management Science, 1997, (4): 546—558;
[22] Parunak, H.V. D., Savit, R. L. and Clark, S. J. DASCH: Dynamic Analysis of Supply Chains. DASCH Final Report, 1999;
[23] B.A. Pasternack. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science, 1985, 4: 166—176;
[24] J.P. Monahan. A quantitative discount pricing model to increase vendor profits,Management Science, 1984, 30: 720—726;
[25] M.J. Rosenblatt and H.L. Lee. Improving profitability with quantity discounts under fixed demand IIE Transactions, 1985, 17 (4): 388-395;
[26] M.Khouja. The newsboy problem with multiple discounts offered by suppliers and retailers.Decision Sciences. 1996, 27: 589—599;
[27] M.Khouja. A multi-product constrained newsboy problem with progressive multiple discounts. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 1996, 30 (1): 95—101;
[28] C.J.Corbett, X. Groote. A supplier's optimal quantity discounts policy under asymmetric information. Management science, 2000, 46 (3) : 444—450;
[29] G. Haresh. A study of quantity discount pricing models with different ordering structures: order coordination, order consolidation, and multi-tier order hierarchy. International journal of production economics, 2001, 72(2) : 203—225;
[30] A.Burnetas, S.M.Gilbert and C.Smith. Quantity discount in single period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. Http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/man/gilberts/ Papers Qdisc.pdf,2004;
[31] Liu Bin, Liu Sifeng and Chen Jian, et al. Supply chain coordination with quantity discounts under the uncertain demand. Proceeding of 2005 IEEE on Networking, Sensing and Control. Tucson, Arizona, March, 2005: 976—981;
[32] E. Kandel. The right to return, Journal of Law and Economics, 1996, 39:329-356;
[33] H. Emmons and S.M. Gilbert. Returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science, 1998, 44(2): 276—283;
[34] A. Tsay. Managing retail channel overstock: markdown money and return policies. Journal of Retailing, 2001, 77: 457—492;
[35] Ding Ding, Jian Chen. Research on return polices in a three level supply chain. International Conference on Global Supply Chain Management of 2002,Beijing, 189-193;
[36] Q.Wang, Z.Wu. Improving a supplier's quantity discount gain from many different buyers. IIE transactions. 2000, 32 (11) : 1071 — 1079;
[37] H.L.Lee, V.Padmanabhan, T.A.Taylor, et al. Price protection in the personal computer industry. Management Science. 2000, 46 (4) : 467—482;
[38] C.X. Wang. A General Framework of Supply Chain Contract Models, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 2002, 7 (5) : 302—310;
[39] A.Tsay. Quantity-flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives.Management science, 1999, 45 (10) : 1339—1358;
[40] A. Tsay & W. Lovejoy. Quantity-flexibility contracts and supply chain performance. Manufacturing and service operations management, 1999, 1(2):89-111;
[41] Jianghua Wu. Quantity flexibility contracts under Bayesian updating. Computer and Operations Research. Article in press , Available online at www.sciencedirect.com.
[42] J.H. Mortimer. The effects of revenue-sharing contracts on welfare in vertically separated markets: evidence from the video rental industry. University of California at Los Angeles working paper. Los Angeles, CA. 2000;
[43] G. Cachon & M. Lariviere. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing: strengths and limitations.University of Pennsylvania working paper,2000;
[44]Y.Gerchak and Y.Wang.Revenue-Sharing vs.Wholesale-Price Contracts in Assembly Systems with Random Demand University of Waterloo working paper,2000;
[45]I.Giannoccaro and P.Pontrandolfo.Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts.International Journal of Production Economics,2004,89:131-139;
[46]G.Eppen & A.Iyer.Backup agreements in fashion buying-the value of upstream flexibility.Management science,1997,43(11):1469-1684;
[47]M.Harris and A.Raviv.Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information.Journal of Economic Theory,1979,2(3):231-259;
[48]I.Macho-Stadler and J.D.Perez-Castrflo.An introduction to the economics of information:incentives and contracts.Oxford University Press,2001;
[49]M.R.Frascatore and F.Mahmoodi.Long-Tern and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand.Clarkson University working paper,Potsdam,NY,2003;
[50]王玮,汪定伟,柴跃廷.准时化分布需求计划方法.控制与决策,2000,15(5):565-568;
[51]C.Schneeweiss and K.Zimmer.Hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the supply chain.European Journal of Operational Research,2004,153:687-703;
[52]S.Starbird.Penalties,rewards,and inspection:provisions for quality in supply chain contracts.Journal of the Operational Research Society,2001,52:109-115;
[53]张翠华,黄小原.非对称信息对供应链质量成本决策的影响.东北大学学报(自然科学版),2003,24(3):30-305;
[54]C.Zarley.Vendors' volume-based incentives,Computer Reseller News(June 16),1997,333;
[55]M.Kanellos.Novell regroups,Computer Reseller News(Sep 9),1996,127;
[56]Edmunds.1999,http://www.edmunds.com/edweb/incentives.html
[57]E.Gerstner,J.D.Hess,D.M.Holthausen.Price discrimination through a distribution channel:Theory and evidence.American Economic Review,1994,84(5):1437-1445.
[58]Z.J.Zhang,A.Krishna,S.K.Dhar.The optimal choice of promotion vehicles: Front-loaded or rear-loaded incentives.Management Science,2000,46(3):348-362;
[59]A.K.Basu,R.Lal,V.Srinivasan,R.Staelin.Sales force compensation plans:An agency theoretic perspective.Marketing Science,1985,4(4):267-291;
[60]R.C.Rao.Compensating heterogeneous salesforces:Some explicit solutions.Marketing Science,1990,9(4):319-341;
[61]J.Raju,V.Srinivasan.Quota-based compensation plans for multi-territory heterogeneous salesforces.Management Scitnce,1996,42(10):1454-1462;
[62]E.Porteus,S.Whang.On manufacturing/marketing incentives.Management Science,1991,37(9):1166-1181;
[63]F.Chen.Sales-force incentives and inventory management.Manufacturing &Service Operations Management.2000,2(2):186-202;
[64]T.A.Taylor.Supply chain coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effects,Management Science,2002,48(8):992-1007;
[65]H.Krishnan,R.Kapuscinski and D.Butz.Coordinating contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort.Management Science,2004,50(1):48-63;
[66]李大华.中国汽车售后服务现状分析.现代汽车,2004,12:28-28
[67]张国方.汽车服务工程.北京:电子工业出版社,2004:51-53
[68]佚名.我国机电产品在马耳他售后服务情况[EB/OL].http://www.mofcom.gov.cn,2003
[69]刘云,苏秦.对企业售后服务的探讨.现代企业,2002,4:48-51
[70]谢强,周良,丁秋林.基于web的产品售后服务研究.计算机应用研究,2002,9:24-26
[71]王东勃,朱名锉.基于网络的智能化售后服务系统.计算机工程与应用,2003,12:221-223
[72]杨立军等.基于产品服务的供应链管理.经济师,2003,(7):153
[73]高峻,李成严.基于供应链的销售管理.北方经贸,2003,(7):117-118
[74]徐颖.制造业企业中供应链管理的优化.制造业自动化,2000,22(6):54-56
[75]王一凡.中国企业供应链管理现状调查分析——销售与售后服务.管理科学学报,1998,1(3):83-89
[76]Petruzzi N.,M.Data.Pricing and the newsvendor problem:a review with extensions.Operations Research,1999,47:183-194
[77]Yao,L.Supply chain modeling:pricing,contracts and coordination[D].Division of SEEM,Chinese University of Hong Kong,2002