东元发展公司职工内部持股动作与管理
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摘要
在规范的现代企业制度下，企业内部的一切权利都源于产权。只有产权明晰，各主体因利益的驱动，才能从追求自身利益出发提高效率，也只有产权清晰才能保护和协调各方利益，营造产权的效率机制。而产权清晰，最主要的是产权的各种权利在分解条件下的界定清晰和产权利益主体的权能和利益界定清晰。而企业产权清晰在很大的程度上取决于企业的产权结构。
企业产权结构分为两种模式：一种是一元化产权结构，即企业的投资主体只有一个；另一种是多元化产权结构，即企业的投资主体有多个。从现代经济的发展趋势来看，除少数国有独资企业外，只有形成多元化的产权结构，才能建立现代企业产权制度，使企业充满活力。
从电力行业来说，国有电力公司多经企业经营效益差、经营活力差、资源配置效率低的问题到目前为止，仍未根本解决。这些问题产生和蔓延的原因，细究起来是“人人有责”但又“无人负责”，这充分说明，表面上的管理不善、竞争不够，病根其实在于“产权不清、权责不明”，即产权安排出了问题。没有符合现代企业制度要求的产权安排，也就谈不上企业内部所有权对经营权的激励和监督，为搞活企业而采取的加强内部管理的各种做法也注定难以取得根本的成效。既然目前存在的种种问题，最初都根源于“产权不清、权责不明”的产权制度缺陷，那么，把产权改革作为企业综合改革的突破口，可以说是符合实际情况的选择。
作为一种新的产权制度，员工持股计划(Employee Stock Ownership Plan，以下简称ESOP)自美国1974年开始实施ESOP以来，受到出资者、公司员工、政府的欢迎和支持，短短几十年间获得了广泛的发展。继美国之后，德、法、英、日等发达国家也纷纷把ESOP作为重新安排产权的一项重要措施加以实施。日本在实施ESOP过程中，较早建立起了完备的组织机构，组建了职工持股会。目前，日本上市公司中的绝大部分实行了员工持股制度。迄今为止，世界上已有50多个国家推行ESOP，ESOP的国际化趋势日益明显。
本文以产权结构多元化为切入点对东元公司的产权改革进行了实证研究。东元发展公司作为东北电网建立现代企业制度、转变企业经营机制的试点单位，它在产权改革中遇到的问题具有一定的普遍性，它的产权多元化模式及实现途径的研究也将对其他电力企业的现代产权制度改革提供一定的借鉴意义。
Ownership of Real Estate is the source of right of enterprise inner under the modern enterprise system. The principal parts of enterprise chase to increase efficiency on account of distinct ownership of real estate. Distinct ownership of real estate can protect and coordinate efficiency for every part.So it is important that limits ownership of real estate. To a certain extent, the structure of ownership of real estate is basis of limiting ownership of real estate.
The structure of ownership of real estate has two kinds of models. The one is single principal part, the other is diversify principal parts. Enterprise will not be full of vitality, but for carry out diversify principal parts.
At present, many enterprises belong for the electric power trade have mishaps. For instance, low level management efficiency, low level management vitality ,low level resources allocation. It is the root cause for these problems that enterprise has not distinct ownership of real estate. On account of existing these problems, we can think the reform of ownership of real estate is the key for reform of enterprise. It is in accordance with real conditions now.
As a new structure, Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is carry out in American from 1974 to now. It is practiced in many countries. For example German ,English, France, Japan and so on. In these countries, ESOP has been as a measure to reform the structure of ownership of real estate. In Japan ,at large listed enterprises have practiced ESOP. At present, over 50 countries have carried out ESOP. Internationalization of ESOP is becoming evident.
This paper tried to find ways to reform of ownership of real estate of Dong Yuan Ltd. on the basis of the multiple structure of ownership of real estate. Dong Yuan Ltd. is as typify for Dong Bei Electric Fence, existing problems are typical for others. So it can offer important referential value for other enterprises that study to the multiple structure of ownership of real estate of Dong Yuan Ltd..
企业产权结构分为两种模式：一种是一元化产权结构，即企业的投资主体只有一个；另一种是多元化产权结构，即企业的投资主体有多个。从现代经济的发展趋势来看，除少数国有独资企业外，只有形成多元化的产权结构，才能建立现代企业产权制度，使企业充满活力。
从电力行业来说，国有电力公司多经企业经营效益差、经营活力差、资源配置效率低的问题到目前为止，仍未根本解决。这些问题产生和蔓延的原因，细究起来是“人人有责”但又“无人负责”，这充分说明，表面上的管理不善、竞争不够，病根其实在于“产权不清、权责不明”，即产权安排出了问题。没有符合现代企业制度要求的产权安排，也就谈不上企业内部所有权对经营权的激励和监督，为搞活企业而采取的加强内部管理的各种做法也注定难以取得根本的成效。既然目前存在的种种问题，最初都根源于“产权不清、权责不明”的产权制度缺陷，那么，把产权改革作为企业综合改革的突破口，可以说是符合实际情况的选择。
作为一种新的产权制度，员工持股计划(Employee Stock Ownership Plan，以下简称ESOP)自美国1974年开始实施ESOP以来，受到出资者、公司员工、政府的欢迎和支持，短短几十年间获得了广泛的发展。继美国之后，德、法、英、日等发达国家也纷纷把ESOP作为重新安排产权的一项重要措施加以实施。日本在实施ESOP过程中，较早建立起了完备的组织机构，组建了职工持股会。目前，日本上市公司中的绝大部分实行了员工持股制度。迄今为止，世界上已有50多个国家推行ESOP，ESOP的国际化趋势日益明显。
本文以产权结构多元化为切入点对东元公司的产权改革进行了实证研究。东元发展公司作为东北电网建立现代企业制度、转变企业经营机制的试点单位，它在产权改革中遇到的问题具有一定的普遍性，它的产权多元化模式及实现途径的研究也将对其他电力企业的现代产权制度改革提供一定的借鉴意义。
Ownership of Real Estate is the source of right of enterprise inner under the modern enterprise system. The principal parts of enterprise chase to increase efficiency on account of distinct ownership of real estate. Distinct ownership of real estate can protect and coordinate efficiency for every part.So it is important that limits ownership of real estate. To a certain extent, the structure of ownership of real estate is basis of limiting ownership of real estate.
The structure of ownership of real estate has two kinds of models. The one is single principal part, the other is diversify principal parts. Enterprise will not be full of vitality, but for carry out diversify principal parts.
At present, many enterprises belong for the electric power trade have mishaps. For instance, low level management efficiency, low level management vitality ,low level resources allocation. It is the root cause for these problems that enterprise has not distinct ownership of real estate. On account of existing these problems, we can think the reform of ownership of real estate is the key for reform of enterprise. It is in accordance with real conditions now.
As a new structure, Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is carry out in American from 1974 to now. It is practiced in many countries. For example German ,English, France, Japan and so on. In these countries, ESOP has been as a measure to reform the structure of ownership of real estate. In Japan ,at large listed enterprises have practiced ESOP. At present, over 50 countries have carried out ESOP. Internationalization of ESOP is becoming evident.
This paper tried to find ways to reform of ownership of real estate of Dong Yuan Ltd. on the basis of the multiple structure of ownership of real estate. Dong Yuan Ltd. is as typify for Dong Bei Electric Fence, existing problems are typical for others. So it can offer important referential value for other enterprises that study to the multiple structure of ownership of real estate of Dong Yuan Ltd..
引文
[1] Davidse, W.P.; McEwan, L.V.; Vestergaard, N. Property rights in fishing: from state property towards private property?: A case study of three EU countries. Marine Policy Volume: 23, Issue: 6, November, 1999, pp. 537-547
[2] Bell, Duran. The structure of rights in the context of private property. The Journal of Socioeconomics Volume: 24, Issue: 4, Index, Winter, 1995, pp. 607-622
[3] Barnes, Andrew. Property, power, and the presidency: ownership policy reform and Russian executive-legislative relations, 1990-1999. Communist and Post-Communist Studies Volume: 34, Issue: Ⅰ, March, 2001, pp. 39-61
[4] Chaplinsky, Susan; Niehaus, Greg; Van de Gucht, Linda. Employee buyouts: causes, structure, and consequences. Journal of Financial Economics Volume: 48, Issue: 3, June 1, 1998, pp. 283-332
[5] Hiltzik, Michael A(1986). Do ESOPs aid workers or managers? [J]. Los Angels Times, May 25,1986. Part Ⅳ, ppl6.
[6] Zundel, Alan. Kelso's binary economy as social ethics. The Journal of Socioeconomics Volume: 29, Issue: 6, November 12, 2000, pp. 565-578
[7] Aoke, M. (1984). The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm[M].Oxford University Press.
[8] 贺小刚，试论我国上市公司职工持股计划的建立．改革[J]，2000，(3)
[9] 高闯，员工持股确立职工主体地位的重要途径．经济体制改革[J]，1996(3)
[10] 迟福林．中国职工持股规范运作与制度设计．中国经济出版社，2000
[11] 曹凤岐．股份经济论．北京大学出版社
[12] Aoki,M (1988). Information,incentive, and Bargaining in the. Japanese Economy (M) Carbridge University Press
[13] Gamble, John E. Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration. Journal of Business Venturing Volume: 15, Issue: 5-6, September-November, 2000, pp. 433-447
[14] 徐小松．公司法与国有企业改革研究．北京：法律出版社
[15] [美] 刘恒中．让工人集体作为企业所有者．改革，2000-1
[16] 吴叔平，虞俊建著．股权激励实务．上海远东出版社
[17] 汪伟农著．期股(权)激励方案策划与设计
[18] 高约里斯·范·鲁塞弗尔达特．欧洲劳资关系．世界知识出版社
[19] 高峰．发达资本主义国家的所有制研究．清华大学出版社
[20] [美]弗雷得里克．D．李普曼．员工持股计划实施指南
[2] Bell, Duran. The structure of rights in the context of private property. The Journal of Socioeconomics Volume: 24, Issue: 4, Index, Winter, 1995, pp. 607-622
[3] Barnes, Andrew. Property, power, and the presidency: ownership policy reform and Russian executive-legislative relations, 1990-1999. Communist and Post-Communist Studies Volume: 34, Issue: Ⅰ, March, 2001, pp. 39-61
[4] Chaplinsky, Susan; Niehaus, Greg; Van de Gucht, Linda. Employee buyouts: causes, structure, and consequences. Journal of Financial Economics Volume: 48, Issue: 3, June 1, 1998, pp. 283-332
[5] Hiltzik, Michael A(1986). Do ESOPs aid workers or managers? [J]. Los Angels Times, May 25,1986. Part Ⅳ, ppl6.
[6] Zundel, Alan. Kelso's binary economy as social ethics. The Journal of Socioeconomics Volume: 29, Issue: 6, November 12, 2000, pp. 565-578
[7] Aoke, M. (1984). The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm[M].Oxford University Press.
[8] 贺小刚，试论我国上市公司职工持股计划的建立．改革[J]，2000，(3)
[9] 高闯，员工持股确立职工主体地位的重要途径．经济体制改革[J]，1996(3)
[10] 迟福林．中国职工持股规范运作与制度设计．中国经济出版社，2000
[11] 曹凤岐．股份经济论．北京大学出版社
[12] Aoki,M (1988). Information,incentive, and Bargaining in the. Japanese Economy (M) Carbridge University Press
[13] Gamble, John E. Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration. Journal of Business Venturing Volume: 15, Issue: 5-6, September-November, 2000, pp. 433-447
[14] 徐小松．公司法与国有企业改革研究．北京：法律出版社
[15] [美] 刘恒中．让工人集体作为企业所有者．改革，2000-1
[16] 吴叔平，虞俊建著．股权激励实务．上海远东出版社
[17] 汪伟农著．期股(权)激励方案策划与设计
[18] 高约里斯·范·鲁塞弗尔达特．欧洲劳资关系．世界知识出版社
[19] 高峰．发达资本主义国家的所有制研究．清华大学出版社
[20] [美]弗雷得里克．D．李普曼．员工持股计划实施指南