中国国有企业资本结构“债权股权互换”研究
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摘要
债权与股权融资本来已经有许多结论：如由于税盾与风险贴水，债务融资优于股票融资；融资顺序理论等。但显然在我国经济运行中许多这种结论被否定，好像是出现了无效率。当然这并非证明结论真正有误，而是其前提假设中有些假设被违反，我们的目的就是找出这种约束条件以解释中国的经济现象，待理论成熟后并可以指导经济实践与政策制定。由于我国国有资产中许多不良资产的存在，引发了有规模的债权股权转换，这为我们的研究提供了绝佳的受控试验，我们希望能在这场试验中发现可以解释出现这种现象的经济规律，为企业理论做出一点贡献。“债权股权互换”是在金融资产管理公司依法处理银行原有不良资产时，把部分企业对银行的债务转变成以金融资产管理公司为投资主体的股权。也就是把原来银行与企业间的债权债务关系，转变为金融资产管理公司与企业间的持股与被持股或控股与被控股的关系，原来的还本付息转变为控股分红。“债权股权互换”是国家为了改善国有银行资产质量和帮助国有企业摆脱困境而实行的一项重大措施。它是一个特定概念，是国家在特定历史条件下为同时兼顾防范金融风险和搞活国有企业而采取的一项特殊政策。本文从公司金融理论中M-M定理与资本结构的无关性以及其拓展出发，认为国有企业与国有银行的产权主体不清晰，行使剩余控制权的政府官员与拥有剩余索取权国家并不是同一个人，由于产权不清晰，导致大规模的产权侵犯与寻租行为，进而引发租值消散与财富掠夺现象(不良资产)，导致企业效率低下。在隐藏信息的遮蔽与国家信誉保证下还不会引发投资者的退出进而导致社会福利的降低，不过事物都有两面性，这又鼓励了产权侵犯，可保证收入得不到保障，寻租行为变本加厉，今后由于技术进步与人们知识的提高，加上加入WTO而导致的外部竞争产生的信息揭示与传递作用可能对隐藏信息的遮蔽与国家信誉保证产生较大影响，届时大规模的退出权寻求可能对经济乃至国家产生较大冲击(危机)。不过在博弈规则不变的条件下，在竞争压力下各方会为获取剩余而缔结减少租值消散的合约，债权股权互换就是其中一种制度安排。债权股权互换对于目前我国处于改革攻坚阶段的国有企业、国有银行、及其他经济主体之间的利益协调有重要作用，是在各种约束条件下折衷各种扭曲后的交易费用较低的一种各方合约选择，属于帕累托次优或者退一步说是卡尔多意义上的社会福利提高，可以进一步推动改革进程。当然债权股权互换还存在一些问题，如企业、银行、金融资产管理公司之间合约选择中的逆向选择与道德风险问题，这些都需要设计制度规则加以约束改进。当然最重要的问题是债权股权互换后国有企业股权结构的改进，产权主体的清晰，从而能够带动治理效率的提高。
There are a lot of conclusions yet in debt financing and stock financing: for example debt financing is superior to stock financing because of the existence of tax shield and risk premium, but obviously many this kind of conclusions are overthrown during our country's economical operation. Certainly these conclusions are not wrong but because some supposes are violated. Our purpose is to find out the restraint condition to explain the economic phenomenon of china, and it can be used to direct the practice and policy making when the theory is perfect.
A lot of bad assets in the state-run assets of our country caused the exchange of debt to stock in large scale. It provide a better controlled test to ours research. We hope to find the economic law that can interpret the phenomenon and make a little contribution to the enterprise theory.
This paper begins with the M-M theory and its expansion. It thinks that, the property subject of state-owned enterprise and bank is not clear, the government official who have residual control rights and the country that has residual reclaim rights is not the same person. The unclear of property leads to rent dissipation and wealth reallocation (bad assets). On the condition that the game rule is unchanged the institute that all agents want to reduce rent dissipation 畐ill be taken under the pressure of competition. The swap is one that is included. The change from debt to stock has an important effect on the interest coordination of state-owned enterprise, state-run banks and other agents. It is a contract choice that trade-off all kinds of distortion (save transaction cost) at present. It belongs to the welfare improvement in Kaldor meaning 產nd can drive the reform process further. There are some problems about the swap from debt to stock such as the Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the contract choice which need to be restrained and improved. Of course the most important problem is the property structure of state-owned enterprise after the swap and the clear of proper subject and the improvement of the govern efficiency.
There are a lot of conclusions yet in debt financing and stock financing: for example debt financing is superior to stock financing because of the existence of tax shield and risk premium, but obviously many this kind of conclusions are overthrown during our country's economical operation. Certainly these conclusions are not wrong but because some supposes are violated. Our purpose is to find out the restraint condition to explain the economic phenomenon of china, and it can be used to direct the practice and policy making when the theory is perfect.
A lot of bad assets in the state-run assets of our country caused the exchange of debt to stock in large scale. It provide a better controlled test to ours research. We hope to find the economic law that can interpret the phenomenon and make a little contribution to the enterprise theory.
This paper begins with the M-M theory and its expansion. It thinks that, the property subject of state-owned enterprise and bank is not clear, the government official who have residual control rights and the country that has residual reclaim rights is not the same person. The unclear of property leads to rent dissipation and wealth reallocation (bad assets). On the condition that the game rule is unchanged the institute that all agents want to reduce rent dissipation 畐ill be taken under the pressure of competition. The swap is one that is included. The change from debt to stock has an important effect on the interest coordination of state-owned enterprise, state-run banks and other agents. It is a contract choice that trade-off all kinds of distortion (save transaction cost) at present. It belongs to the welfare improvement in Kaldor meaning 產nd can drive the reform process further. There are some problems about the swap from debt to stock such as the Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the contract choice which need to be restrained and improved. Of course the most important problem is the property structure of state-owned enterprise after the swap and the clear of proper subject and the improvement of the govern efficiency.
引文
[1] Aghion, Philippe and Bolton,Patrick, 1992, "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting", Review of Economic Studies,59:473-494.
[2] Aghion, Philippe and Tirole, Jean, 1994, "Formal and Real Authority in Organization",mimeo.
[3] Alchian, Armen and Demsetz, Harold, 1972, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review, 62(50), pp. 777-795.
[4] Cheung, Steven N.S.,1983, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26(1), 1—21
[5] Coase, Ronald. H., 1937, "The Nature of Firm", Economica, Ⅳ, pp. 368-405.
[6] Coase, Ronald. H., 1960, "The Problem of social costs", Journal of Law and Economics,3(1), 1-44.
[7] Diamond, D. W., 1989, "Reputation acquisition in debt markets", Journal of Political Economy 97:828-862.
[8] Fama, Eugene, 1980, "Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88:288-307.
[9] Gale, D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, "Incentive compatibal debt contract: the one-period problem", Review of Economic Studies, L Ⅱ, 647-663.
[10] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1983, "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem",Econometrica 51: 7-45.
[11] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94.
[12] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1988, "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
[13] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "Corporate control contests and capital structure",Journal of Financial Economies, 20:55-86.
[14] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "Corporate Governance: voting rights and majority rules", Journal of Financial Economics, 20:203-235.
[15] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "The Design of Securities", Journal of Finance, Vol.XLVI, No.1, 297-355.
[16] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1989, "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt", Working Paper, MIT, August.
[17] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1990a, "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the seniority of Claims", Working Paper No. 560, MIT.
[18] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1990b, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm",Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98.
[19] Holmstrom, Begnt, 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics,74-91
[20] Holmstrom, Begnt and Milgrom, Paul, 1987, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7(Spring), 24-52.
[21] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
[22] Klein, B. Crawford, R. and Alchian, A., 1978, "Vertical Intigration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, 21:297-326
[23] Laffont and Tirole, 1986, "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political Economy, 94,614-641.
[24] Leland, Hayne and David Pyle, 1977, "Information Asymmetry, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation", The Journal of Finance, 32:371-388.
[25] Modigliani, Franco and H. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment", American Economies Review 48:261-297.
[26] Myers, Stewart C. and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have", Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.
[27] Stiglitz, Joseph E. "A reexamination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem", American Economics Review Vol. LIX, No.5 79-493.
[28] Tirole, Jean, 1986, "Procurement and Renegotiation", Journal of Political Economy, 94,235-259.
[29] Williamson, O. E., 1983, "Organization form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control",Journal of Law and Economics, 26:351-366.
[30] 曹正汉，“传统公有制经济中的产权界定规则：控制权界定产权”，《经济科学》，1998(3)。
[31] 费方域，“控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究”，《经济研究》，1996(6)。
[32] 林毅夫等，《充分信息与国有企业改革》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1997。
[33] 刘芍佳、李骥，“超产权论与企业业绩”，《经济研究》，1998(8)。
[34] 青木昌彦、钱颖一主编，《转轨经济中的公司治理结构》，中国经济出版社，1995。
[35] 吴敬琏，《大中型企业改革：建立现代企业制度》，天津人民出版社，1993。
[36] 张春霖，《企业组织与市场体制》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1997。
[37] 张维迎，《企业的企业家——契约理论》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1995。
[38] 张维迎，《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1996。
[39] 郑红亮，“公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革”，《经济研究》，1998(10)。
[40] 周其仁，“市场中的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别契约”，《经济研究》，1996(6)。
[41] 周其仁，“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”——“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究，《经济研究》，1997(5)。
[42] [法]泰勒尔，《产业组织理论》，中国人民大学出版社，1997。
[43] [美]德姆塞茨，《竞争的经济、法律和政治维度》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1992。
[44] [美]哈特，《企业、合同与财务结构》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1998。
[45] 汪兴益，《金融大举措与市场新机遇》，中国经济出版社，2001。
[46] 杨瑞龙，《面对制度之规》，中国发展出版社，2000。
[47] 林毅夫，“国有资本市场化：国有投资公司参与‘债转股’进程的设想”，《资本市场》，2001(5)
[48] 钟伟，“‘债转股’中的道德风险及其防范”，《中国软科学》，2000年(12)。
[50] 刘新建，“四大金融资产管理公司对外业务难点剖析”，《中国信息报》，2002年5月29日。
[2] Aghion, Philippe and Tirole, Jean, 1994, "Formal and Real Authority in Organization",mimeo.
[3] Alchian, Armen and Demsetz, Harold, 1972, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", American Economic Review, 62(50), pp. 777-795.
[4] Cheung, Steven N.S.,1983, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26(1), 1—21
[5] Coase, Ronald. H., 1937, "The Nature of Firm", Economica, Ⅳ, pp. 368-405.
[6] Coase, Ronald. H., 1960, "The Problem of social costs", Journal of Law and Economics,3(1), 1-44.
[7] Diamond, D. W., 1989, "Reputation acquisition in debt markets", Journal of Political Economy 97:828-862.
[8] Fama, Eugene, 1980, "Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88:288-307.
[9] Gale, D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, "Incentive compatibal debt contract: the one-period problem", Review of Economic Studies, L Ⅱ, 647-663.
[10] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1983, "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem",Econometrica 51: 7-45.
[11] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94.
[12] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart, 1988, "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control", Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
[13] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "Corporate control contests and capital structure",Journal of Financial Economies, 20:55-86.
[14] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "Corporate Governance: voting rights and majority rules", Journal of Financial Economics, 20:203-235.
[15] Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, 1988a, "The Design of Securities", Journal of Finance, Vol.XLVI, No.1, 297-355.
[16] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1989, "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt", Working Paper, MIT, August.
[17] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1990a, "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the seniority of Claims", Working Paper No. 560, MIT.
[18] Hart, Oliver and Moore, John, 1990b, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm",Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98.
[19] Holmstrom, Begnt, 1979, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics,74-91
[20] Holmstrom, Begnt and Milgrom, Paul, 1987, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis:Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7(Spring), 24-52.
[21] Jensen, Michael C. and William Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,3:305-360.
[22] Klein, B. Crawford, R. and Alchian, A., 1978, "Vertical Intigration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, 21:297-326
[23] Laffont and Tirole, 1986, "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political Economy, 94,614-641.
[24] Leland, Hayne and David Pyle, 1977, "Information Asymmetry, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation", The Journal of Finance, 32:371-388.
[25] Modigliani, Franco and H. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment", American Economies Review 48:261-297.
[26] Myers, Stewart C. and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have", Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.
[27] Stiglitz, Joseph E. "A reexamination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem", American Economics Review Vol. LIX, No.5 79-493.
[28] Tirole, Jean, 1986, "Procurement and Renegotiation", Journal of Political Economy, 94,235-259.
[29] Williamson, O. E., 1983, "Organization form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control",Journal of Law and Economics, 26:351-366.
[30] 曹正汉，“传统公有制经济中的产权界定规则：控制权界定产权”，《经济科学》，1998(3)。
[31] 费方域，“控制内部人控制——国企改革中的治理机制研究”，《经济研究》，1996(6)。
[32] 林毅夫等，《充分信息与国有企业改革》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1997。
[33] 刘芍佳、李骥，“超产权论与企业业绩”，《经济研究》，1998(8)。
[34] 青木昌彦、钱颖一主编，《转轨经济中的公司治理结构》，中国经济出版社，1995。
[35] 吴敬琏，《大中型企业改革：建立现代企业制度》，天津人民出版社，1993。
[36] 张春霖，《企业组织与市场体制》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1997。
[37] 张维迎，《企业的企业家——契约理论》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1995。
[38] 张维迎，《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1996。
[39] 郑红亮，“公司治理理论与中国国有企业改革”，《经济研究》，1998(10)。
[40] 周其仁，“市场中的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别契约”，《经济研究》，1996(6)。
[41] 周其仁，“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”——“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究，《经济研究》，1997(5)。
[42] [法]泰勒尔，《产业组织理论》，中国人民大学出版社，1997。
[43] [美]德姆塞茨，《竞争的经济、法律和政治维度》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1992。
[44] [美]哈特，《企业、合同与财务结构》，上海三联书店上海人民出版社，1998。
[45] 汪兴益，《金融大举措与市场新机遇》，中国经济出版社，2001。
[46] 杨瑞龙，《面对制度之规》，中国发展出版社，2000。
[47] 林毅夫，“国有资本市场化：国有投资公司参与‘债转股’进程的设想”，《资本市场》，2001(5)
[48] 钟伟，“‘债转股’中的道德风险及其防范”，《中国软科学》，2000年(12)。
[50] 刘新建，“四大金融资产管理公司对外业务难点剖析”，《中国信息报》，2002年5月29日。