中国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的有效性及其影响因素
|
摘要
中国证券市场建立二十年以来,上市公司控股股东违规现象一直屡禁不止。据本文统计,截止2012年7月,因控股股东违规而受到证券监管机构处罚的上市公司总数有162家,约占所有被处罚的违规上市公司总数的三分之(32.27%),对中小股东的利益造成了非常严重地侵害。因此,挖掘和研究导致控股股东违规屡禁不止的原因及其影响因素,具有重要的现实意义。
20世纪末兴起的法学与金融学的交叉研究,将法律制度的因素引入公司治理,强调了法律制度对中小股东保护的作用。本文正是在法与金融交叉研究的背景下,对控股股东违规行为屡禁不止的原因及其影响因素展开讨论。
从控股股东利己主义的行为与动机出发,通过理论分析可以发现,控股股东违规行为的发生与证券监管机构对控股股东行为法律规制的水平密切相关。而控股股东行为法律规制水平,又受制于法律规制的完善性和有效性。基于此,本文针对中国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的现象,实证检验了中国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的完善性和有效性,认为导致我国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的最根本的制度原因是,我国上市公司控股股东行为的法律规制弱有效。
影响控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素有多方面。对于不同的国家和地区,既有共性因素,也有个性因素。对此,本文分别立足于国际视角和中国视角,实证研究影响我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素。与此同时,考虑到针对同一规制措施,控股股东行为不同,规制措施的成效也不同。因此,本文在立足于中国视角进行研究时,特别按第三章对控股股东行为的分类,从市场和监管两个角度,规范分析、比较分析和实证检验了影响我国上市公司控股股东各类行为法律规制有效性的因素。
本文采用“提出问题—分析问题产生的原因一解决问题”层层递进式的逻辑框架,展开研究。全文总共分为七章,具体的结构安排如下：
第一章为导论。主要阐明了本文的研究背景、目的和意义,研究方法与可能的贡献和原创,以及研究思路及内容结构安排。
第二章为文献综述。主要介绍关于控股股东对公司治理的影响,以及控股股东行为规制相关文献综述。
第三章根据控股股东违规媒介的不同,对控股股东的违规行为进行了分类,并据此研究了中国证券市场建立伊始至今,控股股东违规行为的特征、变化趋势及影响,主要结论为,控股股东违规的代价是惨痛的：对于广大中小股东而言,会造成证券市场的虚假繁荣,诱使广大中小股东盲目地买进或卖出,最终遭受损失；对于上市公司而言,会导致经营业绩下滑、质量下降、融资困难；对于证券市场而言,会破坏参与者通过竞争机制达到优胜劣汰、体现适者生存的制度,从而使市场竞争机制难以发挥秋极作用,使以价值规律为基础的市场不能发挥应有的配置资源的作用,使上市公司和中小股东深受其害；对于一国或地区而言,都可能促成、加深或延长社会经济危机的发生。
第四章从控股股东利己主义的行为与动机出发,通过理论分析发现,控股股东违规行为的发生与证券监管机构对控股股东行为法律规制的水平密切相关；而控股股东行为法律规制水平,又受制于法律规制的完善性和有效性。因此,立足于国际视角,首先构建综合评价一国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制完善性的指标体系,通过对指标的量化处理,以及指标权重的确定,得出我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制已经基本完善的结论。然后,再通过考察中国对控股股东违规的控制力水平与上市公司控股股东行为法律规制完善性的匹配关系,得出结论：导致我国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的最重要的制度原因,不是法律规制的完善性,而是法律规制的有效性。
第五章分别立足于国际视角和中国视角,规范分析、比较分析和实证研究影响我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素。结果表明：(1)政府腐败程度、经济发展水平、社会道德水平和控股股东性质4个因素,都对一国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的有效性,具有显著的影响,而股权结构、所有权集中度和公司治理结构3个因素,并不是法律规制有效性的决定因素,但却是对控股股东行为法律规制的有效补充。(2)通过规范分析和实证检验可以发现,市场化水平仅对控股股东的3类行为,即信息披露行为、二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,产生了显著影响,而对剩余的2类行为,即资金占用类行为和业绩粉饰行为,没有明显的影响。其中,市场化总水平和非国有经济发展方面的市场化水平,对控股股东的信息披露行为,具有显著的制约效应；而对控股股东的二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,具有显著的促进效应。与此同时,市场中介组织发育及法律制度环境方面的市场化水平仅对控股股东的二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,具有显著的促进效应。另外,市场化水平对于控股股东各类行为的规制作用,还存在着地域差异。综上得出,并非加快推进,而是稳步推进地方市场化进程,才能实现对控股股东行为的有效规制。(3)打破前人重点研究控股股东违规处罚力度的局限,本文通过分组比较研究控股股东违规处罚办法的异同之处发现,对于控股股东的信息披露行为、业绩粉饰行为、二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,证券监管机构目前所采取的处罚办法,缺乏一定的合理性,并且处罚种类比较单一；另外,对于控股股东的资金占用类行为,证券交易所的自律性监管尚且薄弱,是导致这种行为屡禁不止的主要原因。
第六章比较研究世界主要国家的证券执法依据、调查体制、处罚体制,以及国际间的合作机制,发现与世界主要国家相比,我国目前的证券执法还存在着许多的不足。
第七章对全文进行了总结,并为提高我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的有效性,提出了具有针对性的政策意见和建议。
Since the establishment of Chinese Stock Market twenty years ago, it's often seen the illegal activities of controlling shareholders despite of legal control. According to the statistics of this paper, there are162public companies were punished by securities regulatory institution due to the illegal behavior of controlling shareholders. This number counts for32.27%of all public companies which were punished by security regulatory institution, which caused severe damage for the benefits of minority shareholders. Therefore, there is an important practical significance to study the reason of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders and its influencing factors.
The Interdisciplinary Research between laws and finance which raised at the end of20th centuries introduced the factors of legal system into corporation management, and emphasized the protective function of legal system for the minority shareholders. This study is based on such interdisciplinary research of law and finance to discuss the reason of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders and its influencing factors.
Proceed from the controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors and motivations, through theoretical analysis, it can be found the violation behaviors of controlling shareholders have close relationship with the level of legal regulations for controlling shareholders' behaviors by the securities regulatory institution. And the level of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors have be determined by its completeness and effectiveness. Based on such hypothesis, in response to the phenomenon of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders of Chinese listed company, this study empirical evaluated the completeness and effectiveness of related legal regulations, and concluded the most fundamental systemic cause of violation behaviors is the Chinese legal regulation system which supervises behaviors of controlling shareholders is weakly effective.
There are many factors impacted the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders'behaviors. There are both Common factors and individual factors for the different countries and areas. Therefore, this paper respectively based on international views and domestic view, to empirical study the factors which influence the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies. At the same time, by considering the different reactions of shareholders for the identical legal regulation, the result of regulation would be different as well. Therefore, when this paper studied the classification of shareholders' behaviors based on China's domestic views, especially in Chapter3, from both viewpoints of market and supervision, normative analysis, comparative analysis, and empirical evaluated the impact factors of the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies.
This paper based on the progressive logic framework,"raise question-analyze reason-solve problem" to develop research. There are seven chapters in this paper, the detailed constructive arrangement is as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter mainly elaborate the research background, objectives, and significance of the study; and introduce the research methodology, innovative thoughts and content structure arrangement
The chapter two is literature review, which mainly introduce the influence of corporate governance by controlling shareholders, and the study of regulation of behavior of controlling shareholders.
The chapter three classified the illegal behaviors of controlling shareholders based on the difference of controlling shareholders' violation media, and further study the illegal behavior characteristics of controlling shareholders, the variation trends and influences since the establishment of the China securities market based on such classification. It concluded that the price of violation behavior is painful. For the large number of minority shareholders, it would cause the false prosperity of the security market, and lead the minority shareholders to blindly buy and sell, and eventually lead to loss. For the listed companies, it would cause the decline of business performance, quality reduction, and financing difficulty. For the security market, it may destroy the system of fair competition. If the market competition system cannot play its positive role, the market based on value principle would not express the function of resources configuration, and the listed companies and minority shareholders would be damaged for that. For a whole country or a region, such behavior would cause, deepen, and prolong the happening of social economic crisis.
The chapter four proceed from the controlling shareholders" self-interested behaviors and motivations, according to the theoretical analysis, found that the violation behaviors of controlling shareholders have close relationship with the level of legal regulations for supervising controlling shareholders' behaviors by the securities regulatory institution. And the level of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors have be determined by its completeness and effectiveness. Therefore, based on international view, it should be firstly established an index system to evaluate the completeness of legal regulation of supervising controlling shareholders' behavior in certain country's listed companies. By quantitative processing of parameters, and determination of index weight, it can conclude that China's legal regulation system which regulates the behavior of controlling shareholders is nearly perfective. However, by evaluation of the matching relationship between the control level of violation behaviors of controlling shareholders and the completeness of legal regulation for behaviors of controlling shareholders in China, it can conclude that the leading institutional factor for the continuous violation behaviors of China's controlling shareholders despite repeated prohibitions is not the completeness of legal regulation, but its effectiveness.
The Chapter5respectively based on the international and domestic view, by empirical evaluation, normative analysis, and comparative analysis to study the impact factors of the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies.
The results demonstrated that (1) the degree of government corruption, the level of economy development, the standard of social morality, and the property of controlling shareholders have remarkable influence for the effectiveness of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of certain country's listed companies. However, ownership structure, Ownership concentration, and corporate governance structure are not the determining factor of effectiveness of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors, but the effective supplements.
(2) according to the normative analysis and empirical test, it can be found that the marketization level only caused remarkable influence on three types of behaviors of controlling shareholders, which are information disclosure behavior, secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior; and it has not obvious impacts on the rest two types of behaviors, which are occupation of funds behavior and misrepresentation of balance sheet behavior. In detail, the overall marketization level and the marketization of development of non-state economy have remarkable restrict effects for the controlling shareholders' information disclosure behavior, but have obvious stimulate effects on controlling shareholders' secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior. At the same time, the growth of market intermediary organizations and the marketization level of the legal system environment only have significant facilitate effects on controlling shareholders' secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior. On the other hand, the regional disparity was demonstrated in the marketization level's regulatory role in controlling shareholders' all types of behaviors. In conclusion, not the accelerated, but steady promoting regional marketization is able to achieve the effective regulation of controlling shareholders' behaviors.
(3)Beside breaking the limitation of previous focusing on study of the intensity of punishment for the controlling shareholders' violation behaviors, this paper studied the similarities and differences of punishment approaches by comparative analysis and found that for the controlling shareholders' information disclosure behavior, secondary stock market behavior, and restructure of capital behavior, the punishment approaches applied by securities regulatory institution are lack of certain rationality and certain varieties. Furthermore, the reason that leads to the banned but widely practiced occupation of funds by controlling shareholders is the weak self-supervision of securities exchange
The chapter six comparatively studied the basis of securities law enforcement, survey system, and international corporation system of major countries worldwide, and found that there are many inadequate factors existed in China's current securities law enforcement activities when comparing with other major countries.
The Chapter seven summarized the whole full contents in this paper, and proposed the specific policy opinions and suggestions to improve the effectiveness of legal regulation for behaviors of controlling shareholders of China's listed companies.
20世纪末兴起的法学与金融学的交叉研究,将法律制度的因素引入公司治理,强调了法律制度对中小股东保护的作用。本文正是在法与金融交叉研究的背景下,对控股股东违规行为屡禁不止的原因及其影响因素展开讨论。
从控股股东利己主义的行为与动机出发,通过理论分析可以发现,控股股东违规行为的发生与证券监管机构对控股股东行为法律规制的水平密切相关。而控股股东行为法律规制水平,又受制于法律规制的完善性和有效性。基于此,本文针对中国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的现象,实证检验了中国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的完善性和有效性,认为导致我国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的最根本的制度原因是,我国上市公司控股股东行为的法律规制弱有效。
影响控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素有多方面。对于不同的国家和地区,既有共性因素,也有个性因素。对此,本文分别立足于国际视角和中国视角,实证研究影响我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素。与此同时,考虑到针对同一规制措施,控股股东行为不同,规制措施的成效也不同。因此,本文在立足于中国视角进行研究时,特别按第三章对控股股东行为的分类,从市场和监管两个角度,规范分析、比较分析和实证检验了影响我国上市公司控股股东各类行为法律规制有效性的因素。
本文采用“提出问题—分析问题产生的原因一解决问题”层层递进式的逻辑框架,展开研究。全文总共分为七章,具体的结构安排如下：
第一章为导论。主要阐明了本文的研究背景、目的和意义,研究方法与可能的贡献和原创,以及研究思路及内容结构安排。
第二章为文献综述。主要介绍关于控股股东对公司治理的影响,以及控股股东行为规制相关文献综述。
第三章根据控股股东违规媒介的不同,对控股股东的违规行为进行了分类,并据此研究了中国证券市场建立伊始至今,控股股东违规行为的特征、变化趋势及影响,主要结论为,控股股东违规的代价是惨痛的：对于广大中小股东而言,会造成证券市场的虚假繁荣,诱使广大中小股东盲目地买进或卖出,最终遭受损失；对于上市公司而言,会导致经营业绩下滑、质量下降、融资困难；对于证券市场而言,会破坏参与者通过竞争机制达到优胜劣汰、体现适者生存的制度,从而使市场竞争机制难以发挥秋极作用,使以价值规律为基础的市场不能发挥应有的配置资源的作用,使上市公司和中小股东深受其害；对于一国或地区而言,都可能促成、加深或延长社会经济危机的发生。
第四章从控股股东利己主义的行为与动机出发,通过理论分析发现,控股股东违规行为的发生与证券监管机构对控股股东行为法律规制的水平密切相关；而控股股东行为法律规制水平,又受制于法律规制的完善性和有效性。因此,立足于国际视角,首先构建综合评价一国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制完善性的指标体系,通过对指标的量化处理,以及指标权重的确定,得出我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制已经基本完善的结论。然后,再通过考察中国对控股股东违规的控制力水平与上市公司控股股东行为法律规制完善性的匹配关系,得出结论：导致我国上市公司控股股东违规屡禁不止的最重要的制度原因,不是法律规制的完善性,而是法律规制的有效性。
第五章分别立足于国际视角和中国视角,规范分析、比较分析和实证研究影响我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制有效性的因素。结果表明：(1)政府腐败程度、经济发展水平、社会道德水平和控股股东性质4个因素,都对一国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的有效性,具有显著的影响,而股权结构、所有权集中度和公司治理结构3个因素,并不是法律规制有效性的决定因素,但却是对控股股东行为法律规制的有效补充。(2)通过规范分析和实证检验可以发现,市场化水平仅对控股股东的3类行为,即信息披露行为、二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,产生了显著影响,而对剩余的2类行为,即资金占用类行为和业绩粉饰行为,没有明显的影响。其中,市场化总水平和非国有经济发展方面的市场化水平,对控股股东的信息披露行为,具有显著的制约效应；而对控股股东的二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,具有显著的促进效应。与此同时,市场中介组织发育及法律制度环境方面的市场化水平仅对控股股东的二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,具有显著的促进效应。另外,市场化水平对于控股股东各类行为的规制作用,还存在着地域差异。综上得出,并非加快推进,而是稳步推进地方市场化进程,才能实现对控股股东行为的有效规制。(3)打破前人重点研究控股股东违规处罚力度的局限,本文通过分组比较研究控股股东违规处罚办法的异同之处发现,对于控股股东的信息披露行为、业绩粉饰行为、二级市场行为和资产重组类行为,证券监管机构目前所采取的处罚办法,缺乏一定的合理性,并且处罚种类比较单一；另外,对于控股股东的资金占用类行为,证券交易所的自律性监管尚且薄弱,是导致这种行为屡禁不止的主要原因。
第六章比较研究世界主要国家的证券执法依据、调查体制、处罚体制,以及国际间的合作机制,发现与世界主要国家相比,我国目前的证券执法还存在着许多的不足。
第七章对全文进行了总结,并为提高我国上市公司控股股东行为法律规制的有效性,提出了具有针对性的政策意见和建议。
Since the establishment of Chinese Stock Market twenty years ago, it's often seen the illegal activities of controlling shareholders despite of legal control. According to the statistics of this paper, there are162public companies were punished by securities regulatory institution due to the illegal behavior of controlling shareholders. This number counts for32.27%of all public companies which were punished by security regulatory institution, which caused severe damage for the benefits of minority shareholders. Therefore, there is an important practical significance to study the reason of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders and its influencing factors.
The Interdisciplinary Research between laws and finance which raised at the end of20th centuries introduced the factors of legal system into corporation management, and emphasized the protective function of legal system for the minority shareholders. This study is based on such interdisciplinary research of law and finance to discuss the reason of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders and its influencing factors.
Proceed from the controlling shareholders' self-interested behaviors and motivations, through theoretical analysis, it can be found the violation behaviors of controlling shareholders have close relationship with the level of legal regulations for controlling shareholders' behaviors by the securities regulatory institution. And the level of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors have be determined by its completeness and effectiveness. Based on such hypothesis, in response to the phenomenon of banned but widely practiced violation behaviors by the controlling shareholders of Chinese listed company, this study empirical evaluated the completeness and effectiveness of related legal regulations, and concluded the most fundamental systemic cause of violation behaviors is the Chinese legal regulation system which supervises behaviors of controlling shareholders is weakly effective.
There are many factors impacted the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders'behaviors. There are both Common factors and individual factors for the different countries and areas. Therefore, this paper respectively based on international views and domestic view, to empirical study the factors which influence the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies. At the same time, by considering the different reactions of shareholders for the identical legal regulation, the result of regulation would be different as well. Therefore, when this paper studied the classification of shareholders' behaviors based on China's domestic views, especially in Chapter3, from both viewpoints of market and supervision, normative analysis, comparative analysis, and empirical evaluated the impact factors of the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies.
This paper based on the progressive logic framework,"raise question-analyze reason-solve problem" to develop research. There are seven chapters in this paper, the detailed constructive arrangement is as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter mainly elaborate the research background, objectives, and significance of the study; and introduce the research methodology, innovative thoughts and content structure arrangement
The chapter two is literature review, which mainly introduce the influence of corporate governance by controlling shareholders, and the study of regulation of behavior of controlling shareholders.
The chapter three classified the illegal behaviors of controlling shareholders based on the difference of controlling shareholders' violation media, and further study the illegal behavior characteristics of controlling shareholders, the variation trends and influences since the establishment of the China securities market based on such classification. It concluded that the price of violation behavior is painful. For the large number of minority shareholders, it would cause the false prosperity of the security market, and lead the minority shareholders to blindly buy and sell, and eventually lead to loss. For the listed companies, it would cause the decline of business performance, quality reduction, and financing difficulty. For the security market, it may destroy the system of fair competition. If the market competition system cannot play its positive role, the market based on value principle would not express the function of resources configuration, and the listed companies and minority shareholders would be damaged for that. For a whole country or a region, such behavior would cause, deepen, and prolong the happening of social economic crisis.
The chapter four proceed from the controlling shareholders" self-interested behaviors and motivations, according to the theoretical analysis, found that the violation behaviors of controlling shareholders have close relationship with the level of legal regulations for supervising controlling shareholders' behaviors by the securities regulatory institution. And the level of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors have be determined by its completeness and effectiveness. Therefore, based on international view, it should be firstly established an index system to evaluate the completeness of legal regulation of supervising controlling shareholders' behavior in certain country's listed companies. By quantitative processing of parameters, and determination of index weight, it can conclude that China's legal regulation system which regulates the behavior of controlling shareholders is nearly perfective. However, by evaluation of the matching relationship between the control level of violation behaviors of controlling shareholders and the completeness of legal regulation for behaviors of controlling shareholders in China, it can conclude that the leading institutional factor for the continuous violation behaviors of China's controlling shareholders despite repeated prohibitions is not the completeness of legal regulation, but its effectiveness.
The Chapter5respectively based on the international and domestic view, by empirical evaluation, normative analysis, and comparative analysis to study the impact factors of the effectiveness of the legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of China's listed companies.
The results demonstrated that (1) the degree of government corruption, the level of economy development, the standard of social morality, and the property of controlling shareholders have remarkable influence for the effectiveness of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors of certain country's listed companies. However, ownership structure, Ownership concentration, and corporate governance structure are not the determining factor of effectiveness of legal regulations for supervision of controlling shareholders' behaviors, but the effective supplements.
(2) according to the normative analysis and empirical test, it can be found that the marketization level only caused remarkable influence on three types of behaviors of controlling shareholders, which are information disclosure behavior, secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior; and it has not obvious impacts on the rest two types of behaviors, which are occupation of funds behavior and misrepresentation of balance sheet behavior. In detail, the overall marketization level and the marketization of development of non-state economy have remarkable restrict effects for the controlling shareholders' information disclosure behavior, but have obvious stimulate effects on controlling shareholders' secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior. At the same time, the growth of market intermediary organizations and the marketization level of the legal system environment only have significant facilitate effects on controlling shareholders' secondary stock market behavior and restructure of capital behavior. On the other hand, the regional disparity was demonstrated in the marketization level's regulatory role in controlling shareholders' all types of behaviors. In conclusion, not the accelerated, but steady promoting regional marketization is able to achieve the effective regulation of controlling shareholders' behaviors.
(3)Beside breaking the limitation of previous focusing on study of the intensity of punishment for the controlling shareholders' violation behaviors, this paper studied the similarities and differences of punishment approaches by comparative analysis and found that for the controlling shareholders' information disclosure behavior, secondary stock market behavior, and restructure of capital behavior, the punishment approaches applied by securities regulatory institution are lack of certain rationality and certain varieties. Furthermore, the reason that leads to the banned but widely practiced occupation of funds by controlling shareholders is the weak self-supervision of securities exchange
The chapter six comparatively studied the basis of securities law enforcement, survey system, and international corporation system of major countries worldwide, and found that there are many inadequate factors existed in China's current securities law enforcement activities when comparing with other major countries.
The Chapter seven summarized the whole full contents in this paper, and proposed the specific policy opinions and suggestions to improve the effectiveness of legal regulation for behaviors of controlling shareholders of China's listed companies.
引文
6 吴晓求,中国证券市场典型案例[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002。
7 黄玉学,上市公司财务报表粉饰行为案例分析[J],产业与科技论坛,2010, (9)：141-142。
[1]Allen F., J. Qian, and M. Qian. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:57-116.
[2]Bai, Chong-en, Qiao Liu, Frank Song. Value of Corporate Control:Evidence from China's Distressed Firms. First draft,2002.
[3]Barca, Fabrizio. On Corporate Governance in Italy:Issues, Facts, and Agency, [Z] Manuscript, Bank of Italy, Rome,1995.
[4]Bebchuk, L.A. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control [R]. Working Paper, NBER No.W7203,1999.
[5]Becht, M., P. Bolton, and A. Roell. Corporate Governance and Control [R].Working Paper,ECGI Finance No.02,2002.
[6]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law, Politics, and Finance [J]. Working Paper, World Bank,2001.
[7]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law, endowments, and Finance[J]. Working Paper, World Bank,2002.
[8]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law and Firms' Access to Finance [R]. Working Paper, World Bank,2004.
[9]Beneish, M.D.. Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate GAAP [J]. The Accounting Review,1999,74 (4):425-457.
[10]Bennedsen, M., D. Wolfenson. The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporation [J] Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1):113-139.
[11]Berglof? Eric,and Enrico Perotti. The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial keiretsu [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36 (2): 259-284.
[12]Bertrand, M., P. Mehta,and S. Mullainathan. Ferreting out Tunneling:An Application to Indian Business Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117 (1):121-148.
[13]Bloch F., Hege U.. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [R]. HEC School of Management Working Paper,2001.
[14]Claessens S,Djankov S,Fan L.H.P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57 (6):2741-2771.
[15]Claessens, Stijn., S.Djankov, J.Fan, L.H.P.Lang. Expropriation of minority shareholders:evidence from East Asia [R]. Policy Research paper 2088, World Bank,Washington DC,1999.
[16]Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):81-112.
[17]Claessens, Stijn, and Joseph P.H.Fan. Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey [J]. International Review of Finance,2002,3 (2):71-103.
[18]Coffee, J.. Privatization and Corporate Governance:The Lessons from Securities Market Failure[R]. Working Paper,2000.
[19]Coffee, J.. Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Examination of Private Benefits of Control[R]. Working Paper,2001.
[20]Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93 (6) 1155-1177.
[21]Demsetz, H., and Villaonga, B. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance [J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(3):209-233.
[22]Denis, D., and J.McConnell. International Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38 (1):1-36.
[23]Dyck, A., Zingales L. Private benefits of Control:An International comparison [J]. Journal of Finance,2004, (2):537-600.
[24]Ehrlich, Isaac, and R. A. Posner. An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking [J].1974,3 (1):257-286.
[25]Erickson, M. and S. W. Wang. Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in Stock for Stock Mergers[J]. Journal of Accounting Earnings,1999,27(2): 146-176.
[26]Faccio, M. and L.H.P. Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[27]Fama,E.. Agency problems and the theory of the firm [J] Journal of Political Economics,1980,88(2):288-307
[28]Feroz, E.H., K. Park, and VS. Pastena. The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29:107-148.
[29]Friedman, Eric, Simon Johnson, and Todd Mitton. Propping and Tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31 (4):732-750.
[30]Gomes, AR.., and W. Novaes. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism [R]. PIER Working Paper No.01-029,2005.
[31]Grossman, S., and O. Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, 94:691-719.
[32]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation [J].Bell Journal of Economics,1980, 11(1):42-64.
[33]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20): 175-202.
[34]Hanouna Paul, Atulya Sarin, Alan C. Shapiro. Value of corporate control:Some international evidence[R]. Working paper 01-4, University of Southern California,2001.
[35]Hayek, F. A.. Economics and Knowledge [J]. Economica,1937,4:33-54.
[36]Holderness. Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20):317-346.
[37]Holderness, Clifford, Randall Kroszner, and Dennis Sheehan. Were the good old days that good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression [J]. Journal of Finance,1999.54 (2):435-469.
[38]Holderness, Clifford G. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic Policy Review,2003,9 (1):51-64.
[39]Holmen, Martin, John D. Knopf. Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2004,39:167-191.
[40]Jian, Ming, and T. J. Wong. Tunneling and earnings management through related party transactions:evidence from Chinese corporate groups [R]. Working Paper, HKUST,2003.
[41]Jian, M., and T. J. Wong. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups [R]. Working paper,2004.
[42]Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach and E. Friedman. Corporate Governance in the Asia Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):141-186.
[43]Johnson, S., R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review,2000,90 (2):22-21.
[44]Kang, Jun-Koo, and Anil Shivdasani. Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,38 (1):29-58.
[45]Karpoff, J., J. R. Lott. JR.. The Repuatational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1993, (36):757-802.
[46]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106 (6):1113-1155.
[47]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54 (2): 471-518.
[48]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):3-27.
[49]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world [J]. Journal of Finance,2000,55 (1):1-33.
[50]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57 (3): 1147-1170.
[51]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. What Works in Securities Laws? [J]. The Journal of Finance,2006, LXI (1):1-32.
[52]Livingston, J.. Management Borne Costs of Fraudulent and Misleading Reporting [R]. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Rochester.
[53]Maury B., Pajuste A. Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,7 (29):1813-1834.
[54]McConnell, J.J. and H. Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27 (2): 595-612.
[55]Mitton, T.. A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 64:215-241.
[56]Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, (20):293-315.
[57]Morck, R., Y. Bernard, Y. Wayne. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):215-260.
[58]Murphy,A.,and K.Topyan. Corporate Governance:A Critical Survey of Key Concepts, Issues, and Recent Reforms in the US [J]. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal.2005.17 (2):75-89.
[59]Nenova, T. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:A Cross-Country Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68 (3):325-351.
[60]Nourayi, M.N.. Stock Price Responses to the SEC's Enforcement Actions [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1994,13 (4)
[61]Odegaard, B. A., and O.Bohren. Governance and Performance Revisited [R].Working Paper, ECGI Finance No.28,2003.
[62]Pistor, Katharina, Martin Raiser, Stanislaw Gelfer. Law and Finance in Transition Economies [J]. The Economics of Transition,2000,8 (2) 325-368.
[63]Polanyi, M.. Personal Knowledge. Routledge & Kegan paul,1958.
[64]Prowse, Stephen. The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan [J]. Journal of Finance,1992,47 (3):1121-1140.
[65]Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson. The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,1983 (11), P439-471.
[66]Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson. The market value of differential voting rights in closely held corporations. The Journal of Business,1984 (57)
[67]Siegel, Jordan. Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-listings for Emerging-economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2009,40 (7):1171-1191.
[68]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Finance,1986,94 (3):461-488.
[69]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. A survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1997,52 (2):737-783.
[70]Shleifer,A.,and D.Wolfenzon. Investor protection and equity markets [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66 (1):3-27.
[71]Srinivasan, S.. Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,43:291-334.
[72]Volpin, P.F.. Governance with Poor Investor Protection:Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 64 (1):61-90.
[73]Williamson, O. E.. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. New York: Free Press,1985.
[74]Wurgler, J.. Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (2):187-214.
[75]XiaonianXu, WangYan. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies [J].China Economic Review,1999,10 (1): 75-98.
[76]Yafeh, Yishay, and Oved Yosha. Large Shareholders and Banks:Who Monitors and how?[Z]. Manuscript, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel,1996.
[77]Zingales, Luigi. The Value of the Voting Right:A study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience. Review of Financial Studies,1994 (7):125-148.
[1]蔡宁、魏明海,政府管制放松与投资者保护变迁[J],中山大学学报(社会科学版),2008,48(1)：142-148。
[2]曹廷求、杨秀丽,孙宇光.股权结构和公司绩效的度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007,(10)：126-137。
[3]曹征,论中国上市公司治理中的违法违规问题——基于法律环境的视角[D],南开大学,2009年6月。
[4]陈工孟、高宁,我国证券监管有效性的实证研究[J],管理世界,2005,(7)：40-47。
[5]陈国进、林辉、王磊,公司治理、声誉机制和上市公司违法违规行为分析[J],南开管理评论,2005,8(6)：35-40。
[6]陈国进、赵向琴、林辉,上市公司违法违规处罚和投资者利益保护效果[J],财经研究,2005,31(8)：48-58。
[7]楚天舒,中外上市公司年报信息披露模式比较研究[R],深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2006年3月29日。
[8]陈炜、孔翔、许年行,我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验[J],中国工业经济,2008(1)：24-31。
[9]陈晓、王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革--来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J],经济研究,2005,(4)：77-86。
[10]陈信元、陈冬华、时旭,公司治理与现金股利：基于佛山照明的案例研究[J],管理世界,2003,(8)：118-126。
[11]陈郁,制度变迁、市场演进与私人契约安排——1986-1990年上市股票交易的案例分析[J],经济研究,1995,(7)：53-60。
[12]戴治勇,上市公司虚假信息披露的执法分析[D],浙江大学,2006年9月。
[13]邓建平、曾勇,大股东控制和控制权私人收益研究[J],中国软科学,2004,(10)：50-58。
[14]杜莹、刘立国,股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J],管理世界,2002,(11)：124-13。
[15]樊纲、王小鲁、马光荣,中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J],经济研究,2011,(9)：4-16。
[16]樊纲、王小鲁,中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[M],经济科学出版社,2011。
[17]高雷、宋顺林,掏空、财富效应与投资者保护——基于上市公司关联担保的经验证据[J],中国会计评论,2007,(1)：21-42。
[18]郭升选,我国证券监管的效率改进研究[D],西北大学,2010。
[19]哈耶克,自由秩序原理[M],北京,三联书店,1997。
[20]哈耶克,法律、立法与自由(第一卷)[M],中国大百科全书出版社,2000。
[21]郝旭光、范红岗、周智丽,我国证券监管政策有效性的判断——一个基于超额收益和市场波动率的事后标准[J],财经科学,2010,(7)：33-38。
[22]何基报、徐洪涛,市场操纵行政执法体制比较研究[R],深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2006。
[23]胡延平、陈超,上市公司信息披露违规处罚分析[J],南方金融,2004,(2)：41-42。
[24]胡海峰、李忠,我国资本市场投资者利益保护与上市公司价值研究[J],数量经济技术经济研究,2009,(7)：120-133。
[25]黄娟娟、沈艺峰,上市公司的股利政策究竟迎合了谁的需要--来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J],会计研究,2007,(8)：36-43。
[26]江晓薇,关于证券市场监管的探索[J],中国人民大学学报,1999,(4)：19-24。
[27]卡塔琳娜·皮斯托、许成钢,比较：不完备法律——一种概念性分析框架及其在金融市场监管发展中的应用[M],北京,立信出版社,2002(3)：111-136。
[28]蓝发钦、陈杰,股权分置改革后中国上市公司大股东的行为特征研究[J],华东师范大学学报,2008(4),P77。
[29]李爱勇、秦江萍、连艺菲,上市公司控制权私有收益测度方法的相关研究综述[J],北方经济,2009(9)：49-50。
[30]李汉军、张俊喜,上市企业治理与绩效间的内生性程度[J],管理世界,2006,(5)：121-135。
[31]李玲玲,违规的代价[M],中国人民大学出版社,2007。
[32]李香丽、孙绍荣,中国证监会的监管与上市公司违规概率分析[J],金融理论与实践,2010,(8)：81-82。
[33]李心丹、宋素荣、卢斌、查晓磊,证券市场内幕交易的行为动机研究[J],经济研究,2008,(10)：65-79。
[34]李增泉、孙铮、王志伟,“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J],会计研究,2004,(12)：3-13。
[35]林朝南、刘星、郝颖,行业特征与控制权私利：来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],经济科学,2006(3)。
[36]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海,控制权、业绩与利益输送--基于五粮液的案例研究[J],管理世界,2004,(8)：102-110。
[37]刘峰、贺建刚,股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[J],中国会计评论,2004(2)：141-158。
[38]刘峰、钟瑞庆、金天,弱法律风险下的上市公司控制权转移与“抢劫”[J],管理世界,2007,(12)：106-116。
[39]刘国亮、王加胜,上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J],经济理论与经济管理,2000,(3)：40-45。
[40]刘睿智、王向阳,我国上市公司控制权私有收益的规模研究[J],华中科技大学学报社会科学版,2003(3)：86-90。
[41]刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全,终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J],经济研究,2003,(3)：51-62。
[42]马磊、徐向艺,中国上市公司控制权私有收益实证研究[J],中国工业经济,2007(5)。
[43]马骁,控股股东侵害行为形成机制与实证研究[D],中国矿业大学,2009年11月。
[44]马小芳,中外政府证券市场管理比较研究[M],国家行政学院出版社,2011。南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,中国上市公司治理评价研究报告[M],商务印书馆,20011。
[45]诺思,制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M],上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,1994。
[46]朴哲范,上市公司金融效率与监管机制研究[M],经济管理出版社,2011。
[47]沈艺峰、许年行、杨熠,我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验[J],经济研究,2004,(9)：90-100。
[48]施东晖,上市公司控制权价值的实证研究[J],经济科学,2003(5)：83-89。
[49]苏启林、朱文,上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J],经济研究,2003,(8)：36-45。
[50]孙永祥、黄祖辉,上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J],经济研究,1999,(9)：23-30。
[51]汤欣,控股股东法律规制比较研究[M],法律出版社,2006。
[52]唐跃军、谢仍明,大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应-来自1999-2003中国上市公司的证据[J],南开经济研究,2006,(1)：60-78。
[53]唐英凯、唐继东,我国公司控制权私有收益问题研究综述[J],经济纵横,2006(7)。
[54]唐宗明,蒋位,中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J],经济研究,2002,(4)：44-50。
[55]唐宗明、奚俊芳、蒋位,大股东侵害小股东利益的原因及影响因素分析[J],上海交通大学学报,2003,(4)：596-599。
[56]田利辉,国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J],经济研究,2005,(10)：48-58.
[57]王世权,监事会治理的有效性研究[M],中国人民大学出版社,2011。
[58]宋川、赖亦然,监管力度与上市公司信息违规披露实证研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J],财会通讯,2012,(11)：72-74。
[59]王宗正,论股东大会通讯表决的方式[J],求索,2010,(4)：150-152。
[60]文守逊、杨武,上市公司违规信息披露处罚效果的研究[J],重庆大学学报,2002,25(11)：83-86。
[61]吴敏晓,基于市场交易视角的中国上市公司大股东行为研究[D],华东师范大学,2011年4月。
[62]夏冬林、钱苹,搭便车与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析[J],经济科学,2000,(4)：14-20。
[63]许年行,中国上市公司股权分置改革的理论与实证研究[M],北京大学出版社,2010。
[64]肖松,中小投资者法律保护与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验研究[J],经济科学,2010,(2)：104-115。
[65]肖松,中小投资者保护法律制度研究[M],北京师范大学出版集团,2012。
[66]肖星、陈晓、王永胜,政府与市场为什么失灵——蓝田股份引发的思考[J],管理世界,2004,(8)：137-138。
[67]颜旭若,上市公司监管的经济学分析[D],浙江大学,2005年4月。
[68]杨晓维,产权、政府与经济市场化——成都自发股票交易市场的案例[J],中国社会科学季刊,1996(冬季号)。
[69]易丹辉,数据分析与EViews应用[M],中国人民大学出版社,2008。
[70]尹希果,计量经济学原理与操作[M],重庆大学出版社,2009。
[71]余明桂、夏新平、潘红波,控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题：来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],管理评论,2007,(4)：3-12。
[72]曾昭灶、李善民、陈玉罡,我国控制权转移与投资者保护关系的实证研究[J],管理学报,2012,9(7)：960-967。
[73]张弘,上市公司违规特征及处罚有效性研究[N],上海证券报,2006年3月31日第C06版。
[74]张维迎,企业的企业家——契约理论[M],上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,1995。
[75]张红军,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J],经济科学,2000,(4)：34-44。
[76]张媛春、李善民,强制要约制度与中小投资者保护[J],经济管理,2009,(6)：77-82。
[77]张宗新、朱伟骅,证券监管、执法效率与投资者保护——基于国际经验的一种实证分析[J],财贸经济,2007,(11)：3-9。
[78]周黎安、陶婧,政府规模、市场化与地区腐败问题研究[J],经济研究,2009,(1)：57-69。
[79]周业安,中国制度变迁的演进论解释[J],经济研究,2000,(5)：3-11。
[80]周中胜、陈俊,大股东资金占用与盈余管理财贸研究[J],财贸研究,2006,(3)：128-135。
[81]周中胜,治理环境、政府干预与大股东利益输送[J],山西财经大学学报,2007,(4)：62-70。
[82]朱红军、何贤杰、陈信元,定向增发“盛宴”背后的利益输送现象：理论根源与制度成因--基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究[J],管理世界,2008,(6)136-147。
[83]朱武祥、宋勇,股权结构与企业价值-对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J],经济研究,2001,(12)：66—92。
[84]邹平、付莹,我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离-理论研究与实证检验[J],财经研究,2007,(9)：135-143。
7 黄玉学,上市公司财务报表粉饰行为案例分析[J],产业与科技论坛,2010, (9)：141-142。
[1]Allen F., J. Qian, and M. Qian. Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77:57-116.
[2]Bai, Chong-en, Qiao Liu, Frank Song. Value of Corporate Control:Evidence from China's Distressed Firms. First draft,2002.
[3]Barca, Fabrizio. On Corporate Governance in Italy:Issues, Facts, and Agency, [Z] Manuscript, Bank of Italy, Rome,1995.
[4]Bebchuk, L.A. A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control [R]. Working Paper, NBER No.W7203,1999.
[5]Becht, M., P. Bolton, and A. Roell. Corporate Governance and Control [R].Working Paper,ECGI Finance No.02,2002.
[6]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law, Politics, and Finance [J]. Working Paper, World Bank,2001.
[7]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law, endowments, and Finance[J]. Working Paper, World Bank,2002.
[8]Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine. Law and Firms' Access to Finance [R]. Working Paper, World Bank,2004.
[9]Beneish, M.D.. Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate GAAP [J]. The Accounting Review,1999,74 (4):425-457.
[10]Bennedsen, M., D. Wolfenson. The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporation [J] Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1):113-139.
[11]Berglof? Eric,and Enrico Perotti. The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial keiretsu [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36 (2): 259-284.
[12]Bertrand, M., P. Mehta,and S. Mullainathan. Ferreting out Tunneling:An Application to Indian Business Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002,117 (1):121-148.
[13]Bloch F., Hege U.. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [R]. HEC School of Management Working Paper,2001.
[14]Claessens S,Djankov S,Fan L.H.P. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57 (6):2741-2771.
[15]Claessens, Stijn., S.Djankov, J.Fan, L.H.P.Lang. Expropriation of minority shareholders:evidence from East Asia [R]. Policy Research paper 2088, World Bank,Washington DC,1999.
[16]Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Larry Lang. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):81-112.
[17]Claessens, Stijn, and Joseph P.H.Fan. Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey [J]. International Review of Finance,2002,3 (2):71-103.
[18]Coffee, J.. Privatization and Corporate Governance:The Lessons from Securities Market Failure[R]. Working Paper,2000.
[19]Coffee, J.. Do Norms Matter? A Cross-country Examination of Private Benefits of Control[R]. Working Paper,2001.
[20]Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93 (6) 1155-1177.
[21]Demsetz, H., and Villaonga, B. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance [J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(3):209-233.
[22]Denis, D., and J.McConnell. International Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38 (1):1-36.
[23]Dyck, A., Zingales L. Private benefits of Control:An International comparison [J]. Journal of Finance,2004, (2):537-600.
[24]Ehrlich, Isaac, and R. A. Posner. An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking [J].1974,3 (1):257-286.
[25]Erickson, M. and S. W. Wang. Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in Stock for Stock Mergers[J]. Journal of Accounting Earnings,1999,27(2): 146-176.
[26]Faccio, M. and L.H.P. Lang. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[27]Fama,E.. Agency problems and the theory of the firm [J] Journal of Political Economics,1980,88(2):288-307
[28]Feroz, E.H., K. Park, and VS. Pastena. The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29:107-148.
[29]Friedman, Eric, Simon Johnson, and Todd Mitton. Propping and Tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003,31 (4):732-750.
[30]Gomes, AR.., and W. Novaes. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism [R]. PIER Working Paper No.01-029,2005.
[31]Grossman, S., and O. Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, 94:691-719.
[32]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation [J].Bell Journal of Economics,1980, 11(1):42-64.
[33]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20): 175-202.
[34]Hanouna Paul, Atulya Sarin, Alan C. Shapiro. Value of corporate control:Some international evidence[R]. Working paper 01-4, University of Southern California,2001.
[35]Hayek, F. A.. Economics and Knowledge [J]. Economica,1937,4:33-54.
[36]Holderness. Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20):317-346.
[37]Holderness, Clifford, Randall Kroszner, and Dennis Sheehan. Were the good old days that good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression [J]. Journal of Finance,1999.54 (2):435-469.
[38]Holderness, Clifford G. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control [J]. Economic Policy Review,2003,9 (1):51-64.
[39]Holmen, Martin, John D. Knopf. Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2004,39:167-191.
[40]Jian, Ming, and T. J. Wong. Tunneling and earnings management through related party transactions:evidence from Chinese corporate groups [R]. Working Paper, HKUST,2003.
[41]Jian, M., and T. J. Wong. Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups [R]. Working paper,2004.
[42]Johnson, S., P. Boone, A. Breach and E. Friedman. Corporate Governance in the Asia Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):141-186.
[43]Johnson, S., R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. Tunneling [J]. American Economic Review,2000,90 (2):22-21.
[44]Kang, Jun-Koo, and Anil Shivdasani. Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,38 (1):29-58.
[45]Karpoff, J., J. R. Lott. JR.. The Repuatational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1993, (36):757-802.
[46]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106 (6):1113-1155.
[47]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54 (2): 471-518.
[48]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):3-27.
[49]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world [J]. Journal of Finance,2000,55 (1):1-33.
[50]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57 (3): 1147-1170.
[51]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. What Works in Securities Laws? [J]. The Journal of Finance,2006, LXI (1):1-32.
[52]Livingston, J.. Management Borne Costs of Fraudulent and Misleading Reporting [R]. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Rochester.
[53]Maury B., Pajuste A. Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,7 (29):1813-1834.
[54]McConnell, J.J. and H. Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27 (2): 595-612.
[55]Mitton, T.. A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 64:215-241.
[56]Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, (20):293-315.
[57]Morck, R., Y. Bernard, Y. Wayne. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (1-2):215-260.
[58]Murphy,A.,and K.Topyan. Corporate Governance:A Critical Survey of Key Concepts, Issues, and Recent Reforms in the US [J]. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal.2005.17 (2):75-89.
[59]Nenova, T. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:A Cross-Country Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68 (3):325-351.
[60]Nourayi, M.N.. Stock Price Responses to the SEC's Enforcement Actions [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,1994,13 (4)
[61]Odegaard, B. A., and O.Bohren. Governance and Performance Revisited [R].Working Paper, ECGI Finance No.28,2003.
[62]Pistor, Katharina, Martin Raiser, Stanislaw Gelfer. Law and Finance in Transition Economies [J]. The Economics of Transition,2000,8 (2) 325-368.
[63]Polanyi, M.. Personal Knowledge. Routledge & Kegan paul,1958.
[64]Prowse, Stephen. The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan [J]. Journal of Finance,1992,47 (3):1121-1140.
[65]Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson. The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,1983 (11), P439-471.
[66]Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson. The market value of differential voting rights in closely held corporations. The Journal of Business,1984 (57)
[67]Siegel, Jordan. Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-listings for Emerging-economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico [J]. Journal of International Business Studies,2009,40 (7):1171-1191.
[68]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Finance,1986,94 (3):461-488.
[69]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. A survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1997,52 (2):737-783.
[70]Shleifer,A.,and D.Wolfenzon. Investor protection and equity markets [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,66 (1):3-27.
[71]Srinivasan, S.. Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,43:291-334.
[72]Volpin, P.F.. Governance with Poor Investor Protection:Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 64 (1):61-90.
[73]Williamson, O. E.. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. New York: Free Press,1985.
[74]Wurgler, J.. Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58 (2):187-214.
[75]XiaonianXu, WangYan. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies [J].China Economic Review,1999,10 (1): 75-98.
[76]Yafeh, Yishay, and Oved Yosha. Large Shareholders and Banks:Who Monitors and how?[Z]. Manuscript, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel,1996.
[77]Zingales, Luigi. The Value of the Voting Right:A study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience. Review of Financial Studies,1994 (7):125-148.
[1]蔡宁、魏明海,政府管制放松与投资者保护变迁[J],中山大学学报(社会科学版),2008,48(1)：142-148。
[2]曹廷求、杨秀丽,孙宇光.股权结构和公司绩效的度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007,(10)：126-137。
[3]曹征,论中国上市公司治理中的违法违规问题——基于法律环境的视角[D],南开大学,2009年6月。
[4]陈工孟、高宁,我国证券监管有效性的实证研究[J],管理世界,2005,(7)：40-47。
[5]陈国进、林辉、王磊,公司治理、声誉机制和上市公司违法违规行为分析[J],南开管理评论,2005,8(6)：35-40。
[6]陈国进、赵向琴、林辉,上市公司违法违规处罚和投资者利益保护效果[J],财经研究,2005,31(8)：48-58。
[7]楚天舒,中外上市公司年报信息披露模式比较研究[R],深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2006年3月29日。
[8]陈炜、孔翔、许年行,我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验[J],中国工业经济,2008(1)：24-31。
[9]陈晓、王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革--来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J],经济研究,2005,(4)：77-86。
[10]陈信元、陈冬华、时旭,公司治理与现金股利：基于佛山照明的案例研究[J],管理世界,2003,(8)：118-126。
[11]陈郁,制度变迁、市场演进与私人契约安排——1986-1990年上市股票交易的案例分析[J],经济研究,1995,(7)：53-60。
[12]戴治勇,上市公司虚假信息披露的执法分析[D],浙江大学,2006年9月。
[13]邓建平、曾勇,大股东控制和控制权私人收益研究[J],中国软科学,2004,(10)：50-58。
[14]杜莹、刘立国,股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J],管理世界,2002,(11)：124-13。
[15]樊纲、王小鲁、马光荣,中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J],经济研究,2011,(9)：4-16。
[16]樊纲、王小鲁,中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[M],经济科学出版社,2011。
[17]高雷、宋顺林,掏空、财富效应与投资者保护——基于上市公司关联担保的经验证据[J],中国会计评论,2007,(1)：21-42。
[18]郭升选,我国证券监管的效率改进研究[D],西北大学,2010。
[19]哈耶克,自由秩序原理[M],北京,三联书店,1997。
[20]哈耶克,法律、立法与自由(第一卷)[M],中国大百科全书出版社,2000。
[21]郝旭光、范红岗、周智丽,我国证券监管政策有效性的判断——一个基于超额收益和市场波动率的事后标准[J],财经科学,2010,(7)：33-38。
[22]何基报、徐洪涛,市场操纵行政执法体制比较研究[R],深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2006。
[23]胡延平、陈超,上市公司信息披露违规处罚分析[J],南方金融,2004,(2)：41-42。
[24]胡海峰、李忠,我国资本市场投资者利益保护与上市公司价值研究[J],数量经济技术经济研究,2009,(7)：120-133。
[25]黄娟娟、沈艺峰,上市公司的股利政策究竟迎合了谁的需要--来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J],会计研究,2007,(8)：36-43。
[26]江晓薇,关于证券市场监管的探索[J],中国人民大学学报,1999,(4)：19-24。
[27]卡塔琳娜·皮斯托、许成钢,比较：不完备法律——一种概念性分析框架及其在金融市场监管发展中的应用[M],北京,立信出版社,2002(3)：111-136。
[28]蓝发钦、陈杰,股权分置改革后中国上市公司大股东的行为特征研究[J],华东师范大学学报,2008(4),P77。
[29]李爱勇、秦江萍、连艺菲,上市公司控制权私有收益测度方法的相关研究综述[J],北方经济,2009(9)：49-50。
[30]李汉军、张俊喜,上市企业治理与绩效间的内生性程度[J],管理世界,2006,(5)：121-135。
[31]李玲玲,违规的代价[M],中国人民大学出版社,2007。
[32]李香丽、孙绍荣,中国证监会的监管与上市公司违规概率分析[J],金融理论与实践,2010,(8)：81-82。
[33]李心丹、宋素荣、卢斌、查晓磊,证券市场内幕交易的行为动机研究[J],经济研究,2008,(10)：65-79。
[34]李增泉、孙铮、王志伟,“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J],会计研究,2004,(12)：3-13。
[35]林朝南、刘星、郝颖,行业特征与控制权私利：来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],经济科学,2006(3)。
[36]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海,控制权、业绩与利益输送--基于五粮液的案例研究[J],管理世界,2004,(8)：102-110。
[37]刘峰、贺建刚,股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[J],中国会计评论,2004(2)：141-158。
[38]刘峰、钟瑞庆、金天,弱法律风险下的上市公司控制权转移与“抢劫”[J],管理世界,2007,(12)：106-116。
[39]刘国亮、王加胜,上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J],经济理论与经济管理,2000,(3)：40-45。
[40]刘睿智、王向阳,我国上市公司控制权私有收益的规模研究[J],华中科技大学学报社会科学版,2003(3)：86-90。
[41]刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全,终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J],经济研究,2003,(3)：51-62。
[42]马磊、徐向艺,中国上市公司控制权私有收益实证研究[J],中国工业经济,2007(5)。
[43]马骁,控股股东侵害行为形成机制与实证研究[D],中国矿业大学,2009年11月。
[44]马小芳,中外政府证券市场管理比较研究[M],国家行政学院出版社,2011。南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组,中国上市公司治理评价研究报告[M],商务印书馆,20011。
[45]诺思,制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M],上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,1994。
[46]朴哲范,上市公司金融效率与监管机制研究[M],经济管理出版社,2011。
[47]沈艺峰、许年行、杨熠,我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验[J],经济研究,2004,(9)：90-100。
[48]施东晖,上市公司控制权价值的实证研究[J],经济科学,2003(5)：83-89。
[49]苏启林、朱文,上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J],经济研究,2003,(8)：36-45。
[50]孙永祥、黄祖辉,上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J],经济研究,1999,(9)：23-30。
[51]汤欣,控股股东法律规制比较研究[M],法律出版社,2006。
[52]唐跃军、谢仍明,大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应-来自1999-2003中国上市公司的证据[J],南开经济研究,2006,(1)：60-78。
[53]唐英凯、唐继东,我国公司控制权私有收益问题研究综述[J],经济纵横,2006(7)。
[54]唐宗明,蒋位,中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J],经济研究,2002,(4)：44-50。
[55]唐宗明、奚俊芳、蒋位,大股东侵害小股东利益的原因及影响因素分析[J],上海交通大学学报,2003,(4)：596-599。
[56]田利辉,国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J],经济研究,2005,(10)：48-58.
[57]王世权,监事会治理的有效性研究[M],中国人民大学出版社,2011。
[58]宋川、赖亦然,监管力度与上市公司信息违规披露实证研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J],财会通讯,2012,(11)：72-74。
[59]王宗正,论股东大会通讯表决的方式[J],求索,2010,(4)：150-152。
[60]文守逊、杨武,上市公司违规信息披露处罚效果的研究[J],重庆大学学报,2002,25(11)：83-86。
[61]吴敏晓,基于市场交易视角的中国上市公司大股东行为研究[D],华东师范大学,2011年4月。
[62]夏冬林、钱苹,搭便车与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析[J],经济科学,2000,(4)：14-20。
[63]许年行,中国上市公司股权分置改革的理论与实证研究[M],北京大学出版社,2010。
[64]肖松,中小投资者法律保护与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验研究[J],经济科学,2010,(2)：104-115。
[65]肖松,中小投资者保护法律制度研究[M],北京师范大学出版集团,2012。
[66]肖星、陈晓、王永胜,政府与市场为什么失灵——蓝田股份引发的思考[J],管理世界,2004,(8)：137-138。
[67]颜旭若,上市公司监管的经济学分析[D],浙江大学,2005年4月。
[68]杨晓维,产权、政府与经济市场化——成都自发股票交易市场的案例[J],中国社会科学季刊,1996(冬季号)。
[69]易丹辉,数据分析与EViews应用[M],中国人民大学出版社,2008。
[70]尹希果,计量经济学原理与操作[M],重庆大学出版社,2009。
[71]余明桂、夏新平、潘红波,控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题：来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],管理评论,2007,(4)：3-12。
[72]曾昭灶、李善民、陈玉罡,我国控制权转移与投资者保护关系的实证研究[J],管理学报,2012,9(7)：960-967。
[73]张弘,上市公司违规特征及处罚有效性研究[N],上海证券报,2006年3月31日第C06版。
[74]张维迎,企业的企业家——契约理论[M],上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,1995。
[75]张红军,中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J],经济科学,2000,(4)：34-44。
[76]张媛春、李善民,强制要约制度与中小投资者保护[J],经济管理,2009,(6)：77-82。
[77]张宗新、朱伟骅,证券监管、执法效率与投资者保护——基于国际经验的一种实证分析[J],财贸经济,2007,(11)：3-9。
[78]周黎安、陶婧,政府规模、市场化与地区腐败问题研究[J],经济研究,2009,(1)：57-69。
[79]周业安,中国制度变迁的演进论解释[J],经济研究,2000,(5)：3-11。
[80]周中胜、陈俊,大股东资金占用与盈余管理财贸研究[J],财贸研究,2006,(3)：128-135。
[81]周中胜,治理环境、政府干预与大股东利益输送[J],山西财经大学学报,2007,(4)：62-70。
[82]朱红军、何贤杰、陈信元,定向增发“盛宴”背后的利益输送现象：理论根源与制度成因--基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究[J],管理世界,2008,(6)136-147。
[83]朱武祥、宋勇,股权结构与企业价值-对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J],经济研究,2001,(12)：66—92。
[84]邹平、付莹,我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离-理论研究与实证检验[J],财经研究,2007,(9)：135-143。