中国农村小额信贷发展研究
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摘要
20世纪70年代以来,一种旨在为农村中低收入客户提供微型金融服务的机构——小额信贷机构不断涌现。在政府信贷项目陷入困境、农村正规金融市场几近关闭的情况下,小额信贷机构为发展中国家的农业信贷带来了新的曙光。小额信贷机构有效地为农村贫困人口提供小额贷款与其他金融产品,解决了农村金融的困境。我国作为发展中大国,长期以来,农民贷款难问题一直困扰着理论界以及实践者。1993年,中国社会科学院农发所率先设立专业的小额信贷机构,开始了中国农村小额信贷制度的实践。本论文集中分析小额信贷制度的发展,剖析困扰我国农村小额信贷制度发展的种种因素,寻找小额信贷制度发展的技术与制度支撑,为我国农村小额信贷的进一步发展创造条件。论文研究、归纳小额信贷制度建立以及发展的一般规律,探讨小额信贷的制度条件;探究我国农村小额信贷发展的历程,分析中国农村小额信贷制度演进的路径;从总体上评估我国农村小额信贷制度发展的绩效。本论文分为七章,具体研究内容如下:
第一章,导论。本章在小额信贷实践的基础上,确立了论文的研究主题。通过国内外研究综述,明确了论文的研究思路、研究内容以及研究方法,对于论文的可能创新之处做了说明。
第二章,小额信贷的理论基础。本章对小额信贷研究所依据的理论基础,诸如委托——代理理论、制度变迁理论以及社会资本理论进行了介绍。这些理论为以后的分析奠定了理论基础。
第三章,小额信贷发展的国际经验。以发放小额贷款为特征的小额信贷制度有着较为久远的历史。爱尔兰的贷款基金等制度实践,曾经在较长一段时期中,起到了积极作用,这为我们提供了重要的思想资源。在实践中,小额信贷已面临着新阶段的一系列问题,各国的经验比较也可以为小额信贷的发展提供新的思路。本部分将观察的视角,进一步拓展到近代小额信贷的发展中。同时,作为一种比较性介绍,我们关注现代的孟加拉格莱敏银行以及玻利维亚阳光银行,试图在更长的历史线条中来探讨小额信贷制度的国际经验与主要问题。最后,总结了小额信贷发展的国际经验与启示。
第四章,中国农村小额信贷的发展历程及面临的问题。本章主要介绍了我国农村小额信贷发展的四个阶段。1993年,中国社科院扶贫社成立,标志着小额信贷实践在我国正式展开,该阶段以NGO形式为主。1996年,我国政策机构和农业银行(中国农业发展银行)主导的“政策性小额信贷扶贫项目”开始发展起来。2000年,我国农村合作金融机构(农村信用社、农村商业银行和农村合作银行)在人民银行支农再贷款的支持下,开始发展小额信用贷款和五户联保贷款,标志着我国农村金融机构开始大规模介入小额信贷领域。2005年,我国在山西、四川、内蒙古、贵州、陕西展开了商业性小额信贷试点。从小额信贷的发展历程来看,我国农村小额信贷制度面临一些现实的挑战。
第五章,小额信贷机制的约束因素。在实践中,由于利率管制、借款人人力资本状况、民间金融等因素的约束,小额信贷机制以及绩效难免会受到影响。本章在扩展的逆向选择与道德风险模型中,分析了有关因素对于小额信贷机制效率的影响。这种分析进一步将小额信贷机制置入更加现实的经济环境中来综合考虑影响偿还率的重要因素。同时,这种分析还可以对农业产业化发展、利率市场化改革、民间金融治理等政策的溢出效应进行解释。
第六章,中国农村小额信贷发展绩效评价。从国际农发基金最早在中国开展的小额信贷活动,直至2005年商业化小额信贷公司的产生,我国农村小额信贷制度经历了约二十年的发展历程。在这一发展过程中中国农村小额信贷在机构、产品等方面都体现出与世界各国不同的特征。从总体上对小额信贷发展状况进行评价,可以了解我国农村小额信贷发展的总体状况。从而,可以对中国农村小额信贷的绩效进行量化考评,并为下一步改革提供依据。
第七章,完善我国农村小额信贷制度的政策建议。在前几章分析的基础上,本章对于农村信用社小额信贷业务的发展、商业性小额信贷改革以及扶贫性小额信贷问题提出了政策建议。
A kind of financial organization, which aims at offering microfinance services to low-and-middle income customers, springs out in 1970’s. The new microfinance organizations bring hope for agriculture in the developing countries under the conditions that the governments-directed credit project went into troubles, and the formal financial market hardly went into close. The microfinance organizations effectively offer microcredit for the poor in countryside, and solve the trouble of credit. The trouble of farmer credit toilets theorists and practioners as China is one of the biggest developing countries. The first specialized microfinance organization was founded by the development institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1993. This thesis concentrates on the development of Chinese microfinance institution; analysises the factors that trouble it, in order to finds the technical and institutional supports and creats conditions for the development of the microfinance institution. The study of microfinance aims are as followings:⑴concluding the common rules of the foundation and development of microfinance, and reviewing the institutional conditions of microfinance;⑵investigating the special trail of the development of Chinese microfinance, and analyzing the evolution path of Chinese microfinance institution; and⑶evaluating overall the institution efficiency of Chinese microfinance institution Content of each chapter and possible innovation point see as below.
Chapter 1. introduction. Based on microfinance practice, this chapter offers the research theme. The clue of research thought, research content and research methods are determined after review of literatures home and abroad. This chapter also offers the possible innovations.
Chaper 2. foundamental of microfinance institution. This chapter introduces the foundamental of microfinance institution. The theory of principal-agent, institution change and social capital are retrospected as the foundamental of microfinance institution. This offers the foundation for the analysis afterward.
Chapter 3. international experimence of the microfinance development. There is a long history worldwide of microfinance institution, which characterized by offer microloan. For example, the loan fund in Ireland and the cooperatives in German, had been effectively operated for a long periods, which offers important ideas resource. New thought can be found after the contrastion of difference countries because a serial of problems arised in current practice of a new era. This chapter explores the development of mordern microfiance, which broadens the view of survey. As a comparative introduction, we concentrate the Gremeen Bank in Bangdelash and Banscol in Bolivia in order to review the international experimences and the main issues of microfinance in the history.
Chapter 4. the development course and problems of microfiance in rural China. This chapter introduces the four phases of the development of Chinese microfinance. The foundation of FPC of Chinese Academy of Social Science suggests a new era of microfinance, which mainly focus on NGO. In 1996, poverty alleviation projects by policy-directed microfinance organized by policy organizations and Agricultural Bank arise. Rural cooperatives financial organizations, supported by refund loan of agriculture by the Peoples Bank of China, started to offer credit loan and joint-liability loan in 2000, which is a signal of the grand intervene of rural financial organizations in microfinance. Commercial microfinance experimences was started in Shanxi, Sichuan, Inner Mogolia, Guizhou and Shaanxi in 2005.
Chapter 5. factors restricting microfinance mechanism. In practice, the performance of microfinance mechanism inevitabily is affected because of these factors, such as interest regulation, human capital of borrower and informal finance. In this chapter, we analyze the effect of some factors to repayment rates based on an expansion of models of adverse selection and moral hazard. This analysis considers comprehensively the important factors to repayment rate after putting microfinance mechanism into practical economic environment. At the same time, this analysis can explain the overflow effect by the development of agriculture industry, the reform of market-based interest, and the solution of informal finance in order to solve the restriction of microfiance mechanism.
Chapter 6. an evaluation of development of microfinance performences in rural China. The microfinance organizations in China have characteristics in organizations and productions different from the countries all over the world. The gross evalution of the development of Chinese microfinance can understand the achivements performence of Chinese microfinance. This can conclude the conditions of rural microfiance in China, and offer thoughts to further reform.
Chapter 7. policy accomodations to the perfection of microfinance in rural China.Based on previous chapters, this chapter offers policy accomodations for the the development of microfinance operation in RCC, the reform of commercial microfinance, and poverty-oriented microfiance.
第一章,导论。本章在小额信贷实践的基础上,确立了论文的研究主题。通过国内外研究综述,明确了论文的研究思路、研究内容以及研究方法,对于论文的可能创新之处做了说明。
第二章,小额信贷的理论基础。本章对小额信贷研究所依据的理论基础,诸如委托——代理理论、制度变迁理论以及社会资本理论进行了介绍。这些理论为以后的分析奠定了理论基础。
第三章,小额信贷发展的国际经验。以发放小额贷款为特征的小额信贷制度有着较为久远的历史。爱尔兰的贷款基金等制度实践,曾经在较长一段时期中,起到了积极作用,这为我们提供了重要的思想资源。在实践中,小额信贷已面临着新阶段的一系列问题,各国的经验比较也可以为小额信贷的发展提供新的思路。本部分将观察的视角,进一步拓展到近代小额信贷的发展中。同时,作为一种比较性介绍,我们关注现代的孟加拉格莱敏银行以及玻利维亚阳光银行,试图在更长的历史线条中来探讨小额信贷制度的国际经验与主要问题。最后,总结了小额信贷发展的国际经验与启示。
第四章,中国农村小额信贷的发展历程及面临的问题。本章主要介绍了我国农村小额信贷发展的四个阶段。1993年,中国社科院扶贫社成立,标志着小额信贷实践在我国正式展开,该阶段以NGO形式为主。1996年,我国政策机构和农业银行(中国农业发展银行)主导的“政策性小额信贷扶贫项目”开始发展起来。2000年,我国农村合作金融机构(农村信用社、农村商业银行和农村合作银行)在人民银行支农再贷款的支持下,开始发展小额信用贷款和五户联保贷款,标志着我国农村金融机构开始大规模介入小额信贷领域。2005年,我国在山西、四川、内蒙古、贵州、陕西展开了商业性小额信贷试点。从小额信贷的发展历程来看,我国农村小额信贷制度面临一些现实的挑战。
第五章,小额信贷机制的约束因素。在实践中,由于利率管制、借款人人力资本状况、民间金融等因素的约束,小额信贷机制以及绩效难免会受到影响。本章在扩展的逆向选择与道德风险模型中,分析了有关因素对于小额信贷机制效率的影响。这种分析进一步将小额信贷机制置入更加现实的经济环境中来综合考虑影响偿还率的重要因素。同时,这种分析还可以对农业产业化发展、利率市场化改革、民间金融治理等政策的溢出效应进行解释。
第六章,中国农村小额信贷发展绩效评价。从国际农发基金最早在中国开展的小额信贷活动,直至2005年商业化小额信贷公司的产生,我国农村小额信贷制度经历了约二十年的发展历程。在这一发展过程中中国农村小额信贷在机构、产品等方面都体现出与世界各国不同的特征。从总体上对小额信贷发展状况进行评价,可以了解我国农村小额信贷发展的总体状况。从而,可以对中国农村小额信贷的绩效进行量化考评,并为下一步改革提供依据。
第七章,完善我国农村小额信贷制度的政策建议。在前几章分析的基础上,本章对于农村信用社小额信贷业务的发展、商业性小额信贷改革以及扶贫性小额信贷问题提出了政策建议。
A kind of financial organization, which aims at offering microfinance services to low-and-middle income customers, springs out in 1970’s. The new microfinance organizations bring hope for agriculture in the developing countries under the conditions that the governments-directed credit project went into troubles, and the formal financial market hardly went into close. The microfinance organizations effectively offer microcredit for the poor in countryside, and solve the trouble of credit. The trouble of farmer credit toilets theorists and practioners as China is one of the biggest developing countries. The first specialized microfinance organization was founded by the development institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1993. This thesis concentrates on the development of Chinese microfinance institution; analysises the factors that trouble it, in order to finds the technical and institutional supports and creats conditions for the development of the microfinance institution. The study of microfinance aims are as followings:⑴concluding the common rules of the foundation and development of microfinance, and reviewing the institutional conditions of microfinance;⑵investigating the special trail of the development of Chinese microfinance, and analyzing the evolution path of Chinese microfinance institution; and⑶evaluating overall the institution efficiency of Chinese microfinance institution Content of each chapter and possible innovation point see as below.
Chapter 1. introduction. Based on microfinance practice, this chapter offers the research theme. The clue of research thought, research content and research methods are determined after review of literatures home and abroad. This chapter also offers the possible innovations.
Chaper 2. foundamental of microfinance institution. This chapter introduces the foundamental of microfinance institution. The theory of principal-agent, institution change and social capital are retrospected as the foundamental of microfinance institution. This offers the foundation for the analysis afterward.
Chapter 3. international experimence of the microfinance development. There is a long history worldwide of microfinance institution, which characterized by offer microloan. For example, the loan fund in Ireland and the cooperatives in German, had been effectively operated for a long periods, which offers important ideas resource. New thought can be found after the contrastion of difference countries because a serial of problems arised in current practice of a new era. This chapter explores the development of mordern microfiance, which broadens the view of survey. As a comparative introduction, we concentrate the Gremeen Bank in Bangdelash and Banscol in Bolivia in order to review the international experimences and the main issues of microfinance in the history.
Chapter 4. the development course and problems of microfiance in rural China. This chapter introduces the four phases of the development of Chinese microfinance. The foundation of FPC of Chinese Academy of Social Science suggests a new era of microfinance, which mainly focus on NGO. In 1996, poverty alleviation projects by policy-directed microfinance organized by policy organizations and Agricultural Bank arise. Rural cooperatives financial organizations, supported by refund loan of agriculture by the Peoples Bank of China, started to offer credit loan and joint-liability loan in 2000, which is a signal of the grand intervene of rural financial organizations in microfinance. Commercial microfinance experimences was started in Shanxi, Sichuan, Inner Mogolia, Guizhou and Shaanxi in 2005.
Chapter 5. factors restricting microfinance mechanism. In practice, the performance of microfinance mechanism inevitabily is affected because of these factors, such as interest regulation, human capital of borrower and informal finance. In this chapter, we analyze the effect of some factors to repayment rates based on an expansion of models of adverse selection and moral hazard. This analysis considers comprehensively the important factors to repayment rate after putting microfinance mechanism into practical economic environment. At the same time, this analysis can explain the overflow effect by the development of agriculture industry, the reform of market-based interest, and the solution of informal finance in order to solve the restriction of microfiance mechanism.
Chapter 6. an evaluation of development of microfinance performences in rural China. The microfinance organizations in China have characteristics in organizations and productions different from the countries all over the world. The gross evalution of the development of Chinese microfinance can understand the achivements performence of Chinese microfinance. This can conclude the conditions of rural microfiance in China, and offer thoughts to further reform.
Chapter 7. policy accomodations to the perfection of microfinance in rural China.Based on previous chapters, this chapter offers policy accomodations for the the development of microfinance operation in RCC, the reform of commercial microfinance, and poverty-oriented microfiance.
引文
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