国际经济制裁及其对国家发展的影响
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摘要
美国总统伍德罗·威尔逊在1919年曾经指出：“被禁运的国家即是将投降的国家。此经济纠正手段（即经济制裁）是和平的、致命的且无声的。没有任何使用暴力的必要。”
任何一位世界舞台的观察者都能在不费吹灰之力的情况下，察觉到国际经济制裁在决定国际关系、影响国际政策上所发挥的越来越重要的作用。回顾经济制裁频发的权力冲突中心，西起古巴东至朝鲜，包括利比亚、苏丹及非洲诸国、伊拉克、伊朗、东欧国家（如前南斯拉夫）以及我的祖国——叙利亚，制裁行为都对相关国家产生了巨大影响。这使人们能够清楚地看到国际经济制裁所造成的世界性的改变，及其在改变过程中所发挥的导向性意义。
本文希望能够通过对国际经济制裁这一现象的研究，特别是对叙利亚所受经济制裁个案的研究，对国际经济制裁的发展、机制、影响，特别是美国对叙利亚经济制裁的多方面经济影响进行全面深入的分析。与过去相比，特别是前苏联解体后，随着全球化进程的进一步推进、跨国公司对国际市场的统治，使得经济制裁的后果变得愈加有效并具危险性。基于上述原因，本研究详细回顾了经济制裁的现象，并就经济制裁对国家发展所产的影响给予回答。研究基于下列五个假设，我们将通过事实加以证明：
一、在当今时代，经济制裁业已成为对敌国施加压力、迫使其做出行为改变的政治手段之一。
二、政治、经济、地理、自然和人口学等一系列因素是构成经济制裁的基本因素，对经济制裁具有重要影响。因此，由于上述因素的差异，经济制裁的个案也是不尽相同的。
三、经济制裁未必会对国家的发展造成必然的不良影响。相反，一些国家不但利用经济制裁拉动了国民经济的增长，还激发了创造力和自力更生的能力。
四、经济制裁加剧了目标国家腐败现象的增多与蔓延。
五、自上世纪八十年代以来，叙利亚一直处于经济制裁之下。这使得叙利亚对经济制裁逐渐免疫，并能够灵活面对当前的制裁。然而，这种“灵活面对”的思想变迁背后，却并没有相应的能够减轻制裁的预防措施相随。
本文研究的结果证明第一个、第四个和第五个假设是正确的；第二个假设部分成立；而第三个假设不成立。
本文共由五章构成，其中第二、三、四章为论文主体，此外还包括绪论及结论与建议。第一章绪论介绍了研究的总体结构，包括研究对象、要解决的问题及为什么针对这些问题、研究的重要性、研究的过程，及研究的创新与不足。然后，第二章旨在总体介绍与分析当今的国际经济制裁，讨论了国际经济制裁的内涵与历史进程，在此基础上，进一步分析了经济制裁作为一种国际政策工具的运行机制，以及新的国际形势下经济制裁的主体与内容出现的新变化。最后，本章提出了一个博弈论模型用以分析国际经济制裁的进程、效应与影响，为国际经济制裁分析初步搭建了一个理论框架。
第三章通过对两个国家（伊拉克和伊朗）的比较研究来具体考察国际经济制裁的不同模式及其影响。首先对制裁的进程与具体措施进行了详细的讨论。接下来，分别对伊拉克和伊朗所受制裁带来的各方面影响进行了深入分析和评价，总结了制裁的总体效应和所导致的最重要的结果。第四章是本文个案研究的核心部分，在系统介绍叙利亚所受经济制裁的发展及其内容的基础上，详细探讨了制裁对叙利亚各关键经济领域，包括技术转移、运输部门、商业部门、投资、金融和银行业部门、能源部门、卫生部门等各方面所产生的影响，并进而通过归纳总结以及与伊拉克、伊朗个案的比较，揭示出经济制裁对被制裁国家发展造成的总体负面作用。
本研究得出了一系列结果。其中对叙利亚特别具有针对性的结论是，美国制裁叙利亚的目的并非是要孤立叙利亚或对其实施禁运，而是旨在对其施压及实行限制。为了应对制裁，叙利亚不得不与黑市和中介公司交易，尽管这样做花费成本高而收获质量低，且具危险性。这导致了地下经济的衍生。叙利亚所采取的上述措施不过是在与制裁周旋，但并未克服制裁所带来的伤害。对叙利亚的制裁所采用的特殊模式，眼下可被称作为“爬行制裁体系”。在初始阶段，制裁的目的并非伤害或恐吓目标国家，相反，它试图实现以下目的：第一、试图分散目标国家的注意力；第二、尽可能诱使受制裁国无视所承受的制裁；第三、使受制裁国显露出“无所谓”的态度；与此同时，该爬行制裁体系不动声色地建立了包括法律、法规、规程在内的综合的结构网络，以便借此在未来施行更加严厉的制裁。因此，制裁方没有必要急于求成或追求立竿见影的效果，而只是要确保制裁的循序渐进，同时保持观察与分析；在此基础之上，再对制裁进一步加码以期在未来获得更加综合的效果。而到了最终那一时刻，制裁的效果才会最终显露出来，制裁的目的便可一举实现。
这使我们认识到，制裁的本身并不是美国对叙利亚实施制裁的目的。因此，单纯地应对制裁也不应该也是叙利亚的目标。无论是施加制裁还是单纯地应对制裁，不过都是双方为达到各自的目的而采取的手段。在这个意义上，叙利亚不应着眼于仅仅打破制裁，而是应完全消除现有制裁及潜在的伤害，以避免遭受进一步的制裁。
真正的困难是，批准《叙利亚责任法案》的立法机关也是唯一能够取消它的权威机构。该立法机构将立法程序与法案取消程序紧密地结合在一起，即只有国会参众两院能够取消该法案。因此，未经国会的审批。任何美国部门都无法取消《叙利亚责任法案》，美国其他的政府部门只具备关闭法案的一些项目及执行程序的权利。
因此，对叙利亚而言，可行的克服制裁的办法是将制裁转化为刺激因素，通过采用不同的防御性策略、加强自身建设、吸收先进技术使自身变得强大。此外，应给予遭受制裁的目标部门特别的关注，使其能够应对当前和未来的制裁。而完全消除制裁的方法则是利用手中已有的筹码。叙利亚可在谈判中利用这些筹码以达到取消制裁的目的，尽管有时这样做要付出相当沉重、甚至是难以承受的代价。
在研究的结尾，我们提出了一些建议，以期为国际经济制裁的研究人员及相关的决策者就理解经济制裁现象、正确应对经济制裁等方面提供一点帮助。
第一，在任何情况下，都不应该等到制裁措施已经付诸实施才开始启动应对机制。加强经济部门的建设使之有能力应对经济制裁，这是非常重要的。营造适当的、能够应对制裁环境尤为必要，甚至应在得知制裁之前便如此着手。免受制裁伤害的最有效方法并非应对制裁，而是阻止制裁的发生。
第二，情报因素在经济制裁中发挥着战略作用，因此必须具备能够打入制裁决策权利圈的渠道，利用这些渠道尽可能预知未来的制裁。
第三，邻国及地域环境对绕过、打破制裁决定具有重要作用，因此应加强同邻国的关系建设、与区域国家建立经济网络，以便遭受制裁时能够远离勒索和剥削，能够以较低的价格实现业务管理、找到解决制裁的方法。这可通过在邻国建立公司得以实现。这些公司作为支持性的备份力量，将在制裁发出方无可挑剔的情况下打破制裁（如伊朗在迪拜的众多公司）。
第四，制裁发出方利用深谙制裁管理体系及发展方向的专家来对制裁进行管理。因此，受制裁方也应具备管理智囊团来应对制裁。该管理智囊团应发挥行政组织或专门委员会的作用，其工作应基于以下三点：（一）对未来制裁的限制计划；（二）瓦解制裁及最大限度降低制裁影响的计划；（三）努力消除制裁；同时，还应观察、记录制裁的后果，对各国涌现出的积极响应制裁、损害国家利益的个人及政党团体进行数据收集。应明确媒体政策具有十分重要的作用。掌握集中而可靠的信息来源可以帮助受制裁国的决策者在每个阶段都能在恰当的时间里采用恰当的政策。
第五，一些经济部门是制裁的重点打击对象，因此应予以额外的关注，并付出双倍努力来控制制裁对其产生的影响，其中最重要的是汇率和外汇储备。此外，还包括与人民的日常生活息息相关的各个方面，如食品、医疗保健、教育和居住条件等。必须对腐败加以遏制，尤其应抵制以公谋私的行为。也应重视稳定人民的精神状态，避免制裁可能引发的心理伤害，如可能出现的市场混乱或社会动荡等现象。
第六，在致力于解除制裁的同时，叙利亚也应充分意识到制裁对各个方面的影响。除致力于废除《叙利亚责任法案》，还应努力将叙利亚及其国家利益从美国的制裁名单上移除。下面我们列出这一方面最为关键的美国法律：《国际安全行为和减少武器出口法》；1979年《出口管理法案》；1986年《公共外交安全与反恐法案》；1986年《综合预算协调法案》；1986年《反毒品滥用法案》；1986年《公共外交安全与反恐法案》、《国际裁军法修正案》；1981年获批的《援助草案》，剥夺了叙利亚获得美国援助的权利；1991年《外贸经营法案》、《出口交流工商名录及其他相关项目法案》，是依照法律规定延长有效期的法律，规定禁止以任何形式同包括叙利亚在内的八个国家开展贸易活动；《叙利亚责任法案》和相关的行政命令，及美国财政部的系列决议；2006年美国政府决定扩大对叙利亚的制裁，2007年该决议得到重申，且以“贪污”为由将叙利亚官员纳入制裁范围之内。
第七，经济制裁最重要的目标是通过各种手段削弱目标国家的结构、打击其建设机制和自我发展能力。因此，处于向市场经济过渡的叙利亚，应注意加强发挥政府职能，使未来的制裁无机可乘。
President Woodrow Wilson said in1919:―The nation which is embargoed is anation about to surrender, use this economic remedy, which is peaceful, fatal, and silent,without any need to use violence or power‖.
Any observer of the world scene needs little efforts to realize the increasing roleof the international economic sanctions in directing the relations between the countriesand in drawing the international policy as well. A quick look on the centers ofconflicting powers, starting from Cuba in the far West to Libya and Sudan anddifferent countries in Africa, even in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Eastern Europeancountries (Yugoslavia) till the farthest East in North Korea, this look can give a clearidea about the role of the economic sanctions in making the international changes andin directing them.
We aspire to produce a research material that can serve the status quo in Syriaconcerning the successive economic sanctions, which were opposed in the eighteenthof the twentieth century and are still increasing till now. The economic sanctions`aftermath become more dangerous and more effective than before especially after thecollapse of the Soviet Union, Globalization and its consequences, and the dominationof the multi-national companies on the international markets. For these reasons, thisstudy offers a detailed look on the economic sanctions phenomena, and it answers thequestions about the consequences of the economic sanctions on the developing process.The research is based on five assumptions that form as a whole the facts which weseek to prove, these assumptions are the following:
1-The policy of the economic sanctions becomesin our age one of the ways toexert a pressure on the enemy state and push it to change its behavior.
2-The economic sanctions are controlled by a series of political, economic,geographical, natural and demographical factors. Knowing these factors forms the firststage in the structure of these sanctions, in this meaning; the economic sanctions arenot the same.
3-It is not necessary that the economic sanctions`aftermath causes negativeconsequences on the developing process; there are some countries which have used thesanctions to upgrade their national economy and to encourage creativity andself-dependence.
4-The economic sanctions contribute in spreading and increasing the corruptionin the target state.
5-Syria has been under economic sanctions since the eighteenth of the lastcentury; these sanctions immunized Syria and made it more flexible in facing thecurrent sanctions. However, the developing of the mind behind these sanctions was notfollowed by precautionary procedures that can ease the sanctions imposed by the USA.
The target of our research is to prove that the first and fourth and fifthassumptions are correct, the second assumptions were partly proven while the thirdassumption was dismissed.
The structure of the research was built to form three chapters; the introductorychapter shows the general structure of the research: its objects, the problems it tacklesand why the research faced these problems, the importance of the research, theprocedure followed in its undergoing, and the difficulties it had to counter. Then, thesecond chapter is dedicated to describe and present the economic sanctions, and thiswill be the intellectual gate to have a full idea about the international economicsanctions. This idea will help in moving to the third chapter. This chapter studies thefour patterns we chose in our comparative study. The systems and stages of thesanctions were analyzed in details in each pattern. Then, the study shows the mostimportant results of the sanctions, and it evaluates the consequences of the sanctions atthe end of the analysis of each pattern. Based on what we said before, we move to thefourth chapter. The chapter sheds light on the consequences of the economic sanctionsand their influence on the development process through focusing on the Syrianeconomy. We try our best to define these consequences and estimate their effect.
Our study led to a group of results. The most important one is that the U.S.sanctions on Syria do not aim to isolate or embargo Syria but to exert pressure andrestrictions. In an attempt to manipulate these sanctions, we cooperate with the blackmarket and the mediator companies though these procedures cost more and give lowerquality plus they are dangerous.Above all, they also contribute in forming the ShadowEconomy. All these procedures are just kind of maneuver around the U.S. sanction, butthey do not succeed inovercoming these sanctions. This special pattern of sanctionsagainst Syria can be called, at this stage, as Creeping Sanctions System. This systemdoes not aim to hurt or intimidate the victim in the first stage; on the contrary, it tries todo the following:
1-It tries to distract the attention of the target.
2-Itpushes the victim as much as possible to be careless about the sanctions.
3-It gets the no-matter attitude out of the victim.
Meanwhile and behind the scenes, thiscreeping sanctions system establishes astructure and network of manifold procedures, laws and legislations through whichfuture and harsher sanctions can be imposed firmly. Therefore, there is no need tohurry and get quick results. All what it needs is to have different entries in consecutivestages and keep watching and analyzing. Based on the results, other sanctions areimposed and they wait for future resultswhich will be more aggregative. At that time,the sanctions will be fruitful and it will achieve what they were made for in one strike.
This leads us to conclude that the U.S. sanctions against Syria are not the targetfor the USA. Thus manipulating the sanctions should not also beour target. All of theseare only means to achieve the goals which both sides look for. In this meaning,breaking the sanctions should not be our ambition, but rather to remove the sanctionscompletely and get over any potential harm in case of increasing the sanctions.
The real difficult part is that the legislator authority which approved SyriaAccountability Act is the only authority that can cancel it. This legislator hasconnected the cancelation of the act with legislator procedures similar to thosedone inapproving it.Meaning, the cancelation of the Act should be issued only by the twohouses of the Congress: the House of Representatives and the Senates. Thus any USADepartment will not be able to cancel Syria Accountability Act without the approval ofthe Congress, all USA Department can do is just to deactivate some of its items andexecutive procedures.
So the only way to overcome the sanctions isthrough making these sanctions astimulating factor that motivates different defensive strategies likeenhancingself-building, localization of technology,in addition to paying special attention ondeveloping the targeted sectorsandmaking them able to cope with current and futuresanctions. Another way of overcoming the sanctions is by eliminating the sanctionscompletely through the different playing cards Syria has. Syria can play these cards inthe negotiations to cancel the sanctions, though sometimes the price can be veryexpensive or even impossible to afford.
At the end of our study, we recommend some points which can help the researchersand decision makers in their attempt to understand the economic sanctions phenomenaand dealing with it in the proper way. Some of the most important recommendations:
First: We cannot, at any case, wait till the sanctions are imposedto start activatingour procedures and overcome the sanctions. It is very important to fortify the economicsectors so they can handle any sanctions, it is essential to get prepared and create the proper environment to face the sanctions even before knowing that they will be imposed.Being protected against the sanctions has the biggest effect not only to overcome thembut also to avoid and deter its activation in the first place.
Second: The intelligence factor plays a strategic role in the economic sanctionissue, thus there must be channels that pave the road to have an access to the circlesresponsible of making the decision, and it is important to penetrate these channels asmuch as possible to pre-estimate any future decision.
Third: The neighbor and regional countries play a major role in breaking anysanctions and manipulating them easily. Thus it is very important to have goodrelations with them and to establish different economic networks with the surroundingcountries; this can help in running the business and manipulating the sanctions withoutpaying high costor involving in any blackmailing or exploitation. This can happenthrough founding local companies in the surrounding countries that can form the backgate to break any sanctions without arousing any suspicion (this is the case of theIranian companies in Dubai)
Fourth: The side which imposes the sa nctions runs these sanctions throughspecialists who manage the sanction systems and develop them. So this makes itunavoidable for the objected side which will suffer from the sanctions to have a wisemanagement that overcome the sanctions like a demonstrative body or a specializedcommittees depend in their work on the three following axes:
1-Planning to preserve of future sanctions.
2-Planning to penetrate the sanctions and minimize their effects.
3-Working on to eliminate the sanctions.
4-Observing and documenting the aftermath of the sanctions, and preparing dataabout governmental and private worldwide sides which responded to the Americansanctions and applied procedures that can harm the Syrian benefits and interests.
Of course it is good to mention the importance of preparing a clear media policyand to have intensive credible sources of information that can help the decision makersin finding out the proper thing to do at each stage in the proper time.
Fifth: Some economic sectors are hyper-critical, and they need an intensive careto overcome the sanctions. It is a must to do double efforts to control the aftermath ofsanctions on these sectors, the most important sectors are the Exchange Rate and theReserve of the Foreign Exchange. In addition to every side that affects the daily life ofthe citizen like food, healthcare, education and habitation. The escalating of corruptionmust be stopped, especially when some sides try to take advantage of the sanctions forpersonal benefits. Besides focusing andraising the spirits of people to avoid the psychological harms that the sanctions cause, like causing chaos in the market ordestabilize the society.
Sixth: While working on eliminating the sanctions, we must realize well theirbranches and their side effectson different establishments. So the efforts should not beonly based on deactivating Syria Accountability Act, but also concentrating ondeleting the name of Syria and the Syrian interests harmed by the sanctions from theAmerican lists. The most important lists are:
The international Disarmament and International Security Law.
The Export Administration Act of1979.
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of1986.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of1986.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of1986.
The amendment of1986of Antiterrorism Act and The international DisarmamentLaw.
Legal Aid Law approved in1981, which includes a special item depriving Syriaof having the USA aids.
Foreign Business Operation Act and Export Exchange Directory and theconnected Program Accreditation of1991which was extended according to thecontinuation of legislation, in one of its items, it bands the monitoring or changing thecredit of eight countries (mentioned in their names) including Syria.
Syria Accountability Act and the executive orders which followed and theconsecutive decisions of the USA Treasury Department.
The USA Department decides to expand the sanctions against Syria in2006, andenhancing them in2007against Syrian officials the USA accused of―corruption‖.
Seventh: The most important object of the economic sanctions in their differentpatterns is to weaken the infrastructure and self-development, thus Syria is at the stageof turning to the Social Market Economy, we should be aware of enhancing the role ofthe state and being protected against the future sanctions.
任何一位世界舞台的观察者都能在不费吹灰之力的情况下，察觉到国际经济制裁在决定国际关系、影响国际政策上所发挥的越来越重要的作用。回顾经济制裁频发的权力冲突中心，西起古巴东至朝鲜，包括利比亚、苏丹及非洲诸国、伊拉克、伊朗、东欧国家（如前南斯拉夫）以及我的祖国——叙利亚，制裁行为都对相关国家产生了巨大影响。这使人们能够清楚地看到国际经济制裁所造成的世界性的改变，及其在改变过程中所发挥的导向性意义。
本文希望能够通过对国际经济制裁这一现象的研究，特别是对叙利亚所受经济制裁个案的研究，对国际经济制裁的发展、机制、影响，特别是美国对叙利亚经济制裁的多方面经济影响进行全面深入的分析。与过去相比，特别是前苏联解体后，随着全球化进程的进一步推进、跨国公司对国际市场的统治，使得经济制裁的后果变得愈加有效并具危险性。基于上述原因，本研究详细回顾了经济制裁的现象，并就经济制裁对国家发展所产的影响给予回答。研究基于下列五个假设，我们将通过事实加以证明：
一、在当今时代，经济制裁业已成为对敌国施加压力、迫使其做出行为改变的政治手段之一。
二、政治、经济、地理、自然和人口学等一系列因素是构成经济制裁的基本因素，对经济制裁具有重要影响。因此，由于上述因素的差异，经济制裁的个案也是不尽相同的。
三、经济制裁未必会对国家的发展造成必然的不良影响。相反，一些国家不但利用经济制裁拉动了国民经济的增长，还激发了创造力和自力更生的能力。
四、经济制裁加剧了目标国家腐败现象的增多与蔓延。
五、自上世纪八十年代以来，叙利亚一直处于经济制裁之下。这使得叙利亚对经济制裁逐渐免疫，并能够灵活面对当前的制裁。然而，这种“灵活面对”的思想变迁背后，却并没有相应的能够减轻制裁的预防措施相随。
本文研究的结果证明第一个、第四个和第五个假设是正确的；第二个假设部分成立；而第三个假设不成立。
本文共由五章构成，其中第二、三、四章为论文主体，此外还包括绪论及结论与建议。第一章绪论介绍了研究的总体结构，包括研究对象、要解决的问题及为什么针对这些问题、研究的重要性、研究的过程，及研究的创新与不足。然后，第二章旨在总体介绍与分析当今的国际经济制裁，讨论了国际经济制裁的内涵与历史进程，在此基础上，进一步分析了经济制裁作为一种国际政策工具的运行机制，以及新的国际形势下经济制裁的主体与内容出现的新变化。最后，本章提出了一个博弈论模型用以分析国际经济制裁的进程、效应与影响，为国际经济制裁分析初步搭建了一个理论框架。
第三章通过对两个国家（伊拉克和伊朗）的比较研究来具体考察国际经济制裁的不同模式及其影响。首先对制裁的进程与具体措施进行了详细的讨论。接下来，分别对伊拉克和伊朗所受制裁带来的各方面影响进行了深入分析和评价，总结了制裁的总体效应和所导致的最重要的结果。第四章是本文个案研究的核心部分，在系统介绍叙利亚所受经济制裁的发展及其内容的基础上，详细探讨了制裁对叙利亚各关键经济领域，包括技术转移、运输部门、商业部门、投资、金融和银行业部门、能源部门、卫生部门等各方面所产生的影响，并进而通过归纳总结以及与伊拉克、伊朗个案的比较，揭示出经济制裁对被制裁国家发展造成的总体负面作用。
本研究得出了一系列结果。其中对叙利亚特别具有针对性的结论是，美国制裁叙利亚的目的并非是要孤立叙利亚或对其实施禁运，而是旨在对其施压及实行限制。为了应对制裁，叙利亚不得不与黑市和中介公司交易，尽管这样做花费成本高而收获质量低，且具危险性。这导致了地下经济的衍生。叙利亚所采取的上述措施不过是在与制裁周旋，但并未克服制裁所带来的伤害。对叙利亚的制裁所采用的特殊模式，眼下可被称作为“爬行制裁体系”。在初始阶段，制裁的目的并非伤害或恐吓目标国家，相反，它试图实现以下目的：第一、试图分散目标国家的注意力；第二、尽可能诱使受制裁国无视所承受的制裁；第三、使受制裁国显露出“无所谓”的态度；与此同时，该爬行制裁体系不动声色地建立了包括法律、法规、规程在内的综合的结构网络，以便借此在未来施行更加严厉的制裁。因此，制裁方没有必要急于求成或追求立竿见影的效果，而只是要确保制裁的循序渐进，同时保持观察与分析；在此基础之上，再对制裁进一步加码以期在未来获得更加综合的效果。而到了最终那一时刻，制裁的效果才会最终显露出来，制裁的目的便可一举实现。
这使我们认识到，制裁的本身并不是美国对叙利亚实施制裁的目的。因此，单纯地应对制裁也不应该也是叙利亚的目标。无论是施加制裁还是单纯地应对制裁，不过都是双方为达到各自的目的而采取的手段。在这个意义上，叙利亚不应着眼于仅仅打破制裁，而是应完全消除现有制裁及潜在的伤害，以避免遭受进一步的制裁。
真正的困难是，批准《叙利亚责任法案》的立法机关也是唯一能够取消它的权威机构。该立法机构将立法程序与法案取消程序紧密地结合在一起，即只有国会参众两院能够取消该法案。因此，未经国会的审批。任何美国部门都无法取消《叙利亚责任法案》，美国其他的政府部门只具备关闭法案的一些项目及执行程序的权利。
因此，对叙利亚而言，可行的克服制裁的办法是将制裁转化为刺激因素，通过采用不同的防御性策略、加强自身建设、吸收先进技术使自身变得强大。此外，应给予遭受制裁的目标部门特别的关注，使其能够应对当前和未来的制裁。而完全消除制裁的方法则是利用手中已有的筹码。叙利亚可在谈判中利用这些筹码以达到取消制裁的目的，尽管有时这样做要付出相当沉重、甚至是难以承受的代价。
在研究的结尾，我们提出了一些建议，以期为国际经济制裁的研究人员及相关的决策者就理解经济制裁现象、正确应对经济制裁等方面提供一点帮助。
第一，在任何情况下，都不应该等到制裁措施已经付诸实施才开始启动应对机制。加强经济部门的建设使之有能力应对经济制裁，这是非常重要的。营造适当的、能够应对制裁环境尤为必要，甚至应在得知制裁之前便如此着手。免受制裁伤害的最有效方法并非应对制裁，而是阻止制裁的发生。
第二，情报因素在经济制裁中发挥着战略作用，因此必须具备能够打入制裁决策权利圈的渠道，利用这些渠道尽可能预知未来的制裁。
第三，邻国及地域环境对绕过、打破制裁决定具有重要作用，因此应加强同邻国的关系建设、与区域国家建立经济网络，以便遭受制裁时能够远离勒索和剥削，能够以较低的价格实现业务管理、找到解决制裁的方法。这可通过在邻国建立公司得以实现。这些公司作为支持性的备份力量，将在制裁发出方无可挑剔的情况下打破制裁（如伊朗在迪拜的众多公司）。
第四，制裁发出方利用深谙制裁管理体系及发展方向的专家来对制裁进行管理。因此，受制裁方也应具备管理智囊团来应对制裁。该管理智囊团应发挥行政组织或专门委员会的作用，其工作应基于以下三点：（一）对未来制裁的限制计划；（二）瓦解制裁及最大限度降低制裁影响的计划；（三）努力消除制裁；同时，还应观察、记录制裁的后果，对各国涌现出的积极响应制裁、损害国家利益的个人及政党团体进行数据收集。应明确媒体政策具有十分重要的作用。掌握集中而可靠的信息来源可以帮助受制裁国的决策者在每个阶段都能在恰当的时间里采用恰当的政策。
第五，一些经济部门是制裁的重点打击对象，因此应予以额外的关注，并付出双倍努力来控制制裁对其产生的影响，其中最重要的是汇率和外汇储备。此外，还包括与人民的日常生活息息相关的各个方面，如食品、医疗保健、教育和居住条件等。必须对腐败加以遏制，尤其应抵制以公谋私的行为。也应重视稳定人民的精神状态，避免制裁可能引发的心理伤害，如可能出现的市场混乱或社会动荡等现象。
第六，在致力于解除制裁的同时，叙利亚也应充分意识到制裁对各个方面的影响。除致力于废除《叙利亚责任法案》，还应努力将叙利亚及其国家利益从美国的制裁名单上移除。下面我们列出这一方面最为关键的美国法律：《国际安全行为和减少武器出口法》；1979年《出口管理法案》；1986年《公共外交安全与反恐法案》；1986年《综合预算协调法案》；1986年《反毒品滥用法案》；1986年《公共外交安全与反恐法案》、《国际裁军法修正案》；1981年获批的《援助草案》，剥夺了叙利亚获得美国援助的权利；1991年《外贸经营法案》、《出口交流工商名录及其他相关项目法案》，是依照法律规定延长有效期的法律，规定禁止以任何形式同包括叙利亚在内的八个国家开展贸易活动；《叙利亚责任法案》和相关的行政命令，及美国财政部的系列决议；2006年美国政府决定扩大对叙利亚的制裁，2007年该决议得到重申，且以“贪污”为由将叙利亚官员纳入制裁范围之内。
第七，经济制裁最重要的目标是通过各种手段削弱目标国家的结构、打击其建设机制和自我发展能力。因此，处于向市场经济过渡的叙利亚，应注意加强发挥政府职能，使未来的制裁无机可乘。
President Woodrow Wilson said in1919:―The nation which is embargoed is anation about to surrender, use this economic remedy, which is peaceful, fatal, and silent,without any need to use violence or power‖.
Any observer of the world scene needs little efforts to realize the increasing roleof the international economic sanctions in directing the relations between the countriesand in drawing the international policy as well. A quick look on the centers ofconflicting powers, starting from Cuba in the far West to Libya and Sudan anddifferent countries in Africa, even in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Eastern Europeancountries (Yugoslavia) till the farthest East in North Korea, this look can give a clearidea about the role of the economic sanctions in making the international changes andin directing them.
We aspire to produce a research material that can serve the status quo in Syriaconcerning the successive economic sanctions, which were opposed in the eighteenthof the twentieth century and are still increasing till now. The economic sanctions`aftermath become more dangerous and more effective than before especially after thecollapse of the Soviet Union, Globalization and its consequences, and the dominationof the multi-national companies on the international markets. For these reasons, thisstudy offers a detailed look on the economic sanctions phenomena, and it answers thequestions about the consequences of the economic sanctions on the developing process.The research is based on five assumptions that form as a whole the facts which weseek to prove, these assumptions are the following:
1-The policy of the economic sanctions becomesin our age one of the ways toexert a pressure on the enemy state and push it to change its behavior.
2-The economic sanctions are controlled by a series of political, economic,geographical, natural and demographical factors. Knowing these factors forms the firststage in the structure of these sanctions, in this meaning; the economic sanctions arenot the same.
3-It is not necessary that the economic sanctions`aftermath causes negativeconsequences on the developing process; there are some countries which have used thesanctions to upgrade their national economy and to encourage creativity andself-dependence.
4-The economic sanctions contribute in spreading and increasing the corruptionin the target state.
5-Syria has been under economic sanctions since the eighteenth of the lastcentury; these sanctions immunized Syria and made it more flexible in facing thecurrent sanctions. However, the developing of the mind behind these sanctions was notfollowed by precautionary procedures that can ease the sanctions imposed by the USA.
The target of our research is to prove that the first and fourth and fifthassumptions are correct, the second assumptions were partly proven while the thirdassumption was dismissed.
The structure of the research was built to form three chapters; the introductorychapter shows the general structure of the research: its objects, the problems it tacklesand why the research faced these problems, the importance of the research, theprocedure followed in its undergoing, and the difficulties it had to counter. Then, thesecond chapter is dedicated to describe and present the economic sanctions, and thiswill be the intellectual gate to have a full idea about the international economicsanctions. This idea will help in moving to the third chapter. This chapter studies thefour patterns we chose in our comparative study. The systems and stages of thesanctions were analyzed in details in each pattern. Then, the study shows the mostimportant results of the sanctions, and it evaluates the consequences of the sanctions atthe end of the analysis of each pattern. Based on what we said before, we move to thefourth chapter. The chapter sheds light on the consequences of the economic sanctionsand their influence on the development process through focusing on the Syrianeconomy. We try our best to define these consequences and estimate their effect.
Our study led to a group of results. The most important one is that the U.S.sanctions on Syria do not aim to isolate or embargo Syria but to exert pressure andrestrictions. In an attempt to manipulate these sanctions, we cooperate with the blackmarket and the mediator companies though these procedures cost more and give lowerquality plus they are dangerous.Above all, they also contribute in forming the ShadowEconomy. All these procedures are just kind of maneuver around the U.S. sanction, butthey do not succeed inovercoming these sanctions. This special pattern of sanctionsagainst Syria can be called, at this stage, as Creeping Sanctions System. This systemdoes not aim to hurt or intimidate the victim in the first stage; on the contrary, it tries todo the following:
1-It tries to distract the attention of the target.
2-Itpushes the victim as much as possible to be careless about the sanctions.
3-It gets the no-matter attitude out of the victim.
Meanwhile and behind the scenes, thiscreeping sanctions system establishes astructure and network of manifold procedures, laws and legislations through whichfuture and harsher sanctions can be imposed firmly. Therefore, there is no need tohurry and get quick results. All what it needs is to have different entries in consecutivestages and keep watching and analyzing. Based on the results, other sanctions areimposed and they wait for future resultswhich will be more aggregative. At that time,the sanctions will be fruitful and it will achieve what they were made for in one strike.
This leads us to conclude that the U.S. sanctions against Syria are not the targetfor the USA. Thus manipulating the sanctions should not also beour target. All of theseare only means to achieve the goals which both sides look for. In this meaning,breaking the sanctions should not be our ambition, but rather to remove the sanctionscompletely and get over any potential harm in case of increasing the sanctions.
The real difficult part is that the legislator authority which approved SyriaAccountability Act is the only authority that can cancel it. This legislator hasconnected the cancelation of the act with legislator procedures similar to thosedone inapproving it.Meaning, the cancelation of the Act should be issued only by the twohouses of the Congress: the House of Representatives and the Senates. Thus any USADepartment will not be able to cancel Syria Accountability Act without the approval ofthe Congress, all USA Department can do is just to deactivate some of its items andexecutive procedures.
So the only way to overcome the sanctions isthrough making these sanctions astimulating factor that motivates different defensive strategies likeenhancingself-building, localization of technology,in addition to paying special attention ondeveloping the targeted sectorsandmaking them able to cope with current and futuresanctions. Another way of overcoming the sanctions is by eliminating the sanctionscompletely through the different playing cards Syria has. Syria can play these cards inthe negotiations to cancel the sanctions, though sometimes the price can be veryexpensive or even impossible to afford.
At the end of our study, we recommend some points which can help the researchersand decision makers in their attempt to understand the economic sanctions phenomenaand dealing with it in the proper way. Some of the most important recommendations:
First: We cannot, at any case, wait till the sanctions are imposedto start activatingour procedures and overcome the sanctions. It is very important to fortify the economicsectors so they can handle any sanctions, it is essential to get prepared and create the proper environment to face the sanctions even before knowing that they will be imposed.Being protected against the sanctions has the biggest effect not only to overcome thembut also to avoid and deter its activation in the first place.
Second: The intelligence factor plays a strategic role in the economic sanctionissue, thus there must be channels that pave the road to have an access to the circlesresponsible of making the decision, and it is important to penetrate these channels asmuch as possible to pre-estimate any future decision.
Third: The neighbor and regional countries play a major role in breaking anysanctions and manipulating them easily. Thus it is very important to have goodrelations with them and to establish different economic networks with the surroundingcountries; this can help in running the business and manipulating the sanctions withoutpaying high costor involving in any blackmailing or exploitation. This can happenthrough founding local companies in the surrounding countries that can form the backgate to break any sanctions without arousing any suspicion (this is the case of theIranian companies in Dubai)
Fourth: The side which imposes the sa nctions runs these sanctions throughspecialists who manage the sanction systems and develop them. So this makes itunavoidable for the objected side which will suffer from the sanctions to have a wisemanagement that overcome the sanctions like a demonstrative body or a specializedcommittees depend in their work on the three following axes:
1-Planning to preserve of future sanctions.
2-Planning to penetrate the sanctions and minimize their effects.
3-Working on to eliminate the sanctions.
4-Observing and documenting the aftermath of the sanctions, and preparing dataabout governmental and private worldwide sides which responded to the Americansanctions and applied procedures that can harm the Syrian benefits and interests.
Of course it is good to mention the importance of preparing a clear media policyand to have intensive credible sources of information that can help the decision makersin finding out the proper thing to do at each stage in the proper time.
Fifth: Some economic sectors are hyper-critical, and they need an intensive careto overcome the sanctions. It is a must to do double efforts to control the aftermath ofsanctions on these sectors, the most important sectors are the Exchange Rate and theReserve of the Foreign Exchange. In addition to every side that affects the daily life ofthe citizen like food, healthcare, education and habitation. The escalating of corruptionmust be stopped, especially when some sides try to take advantage of the sanctions forpersonal benefits. Besides focusing andraising the spirits of people to avoid the psychological harms that the sanctions cause, like causing chaos in the market ordestabilize the society.
Sixth: While working on eliminating the sanctions, we must realize well theirbranches and their side effectson different establishments. So the efforts should not beonly based on deactivating Syria Accountability Act, but also concentrating ondeleting the name of Syria and the Syrian interests harmed by the sanctions from theAmerican lists. The most important lists are:
The international Disarmament and International Security Law.
The Export Administration Act of1979.
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of1986.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of1986.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of1986.
The amendment of1986of Antiterrorism Act and The international DisarmamentLaw.
Legal Aid Law approved in1981, which includes a special item depriving Syriaof having the USA aids.
Foreign Business Operation Act and Export Exchange Directory and theconnected Program Accreditation of1991which was extended according to thecontinuation of legislation, in one of its items, it bands the monitoring or changing thecredit of eight countries (mentioned in their names) including Syria.
Syria Accountability Act and the executive orders which followed and theconsecutive decisions of the USA Treasury Department.
The USA Department decides to expand the sanctions against Syria in2006, andenhancing them in2007against Syrian officials the USA accused of―corruption‖.
Seventh: The most important object of the economic sanctions in their differentpatterns is to weaken the infrastructure and self-development, thus Syria is at the stageof turning to the Social Market Economy, we should be aware of enhancing the role ofthe state and being protected against the future sanctions.
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