地方政府土地违法行为的治理研究
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摘要
随着我国经济社会的快速发展、城镇化的不断推进和土地供需矛盾的日益凸显,地方政府默许、纵容和主导下的土地违法问题时有发生,极大地弱化中央政府土地调控的政策效力,已成为我国土地管理和社会发展面临的严峻问题,亟待有效治理。随着治理力度的不断加强,地方政府的土地违法行为有所抑制,但总体形势依然严峻。在此背景下,本文界定地方政府土地违法治理的涵义,从治理主体的多样化需求、治理对象的行为动机导向、治理手段的多样化选择三个方面分析了地方政府土地违法行为及治理的理论依据,建构地方政府土地违法治理的综合分析框架,从治理主体、治理对象和治理手段三个方面进行深入探讨。
本论文主要结论包括：
(1)随着治理力度的逐渐加大,地方政府土地违法行为的数量规模有所减少,发生频率不断降低,但反弹压力较大,形势依然严峻。地方政府土地违法行为的空间分布总体较为分散,局部存在聚集效应。结构分布以县乡一级基层政府为主,存在逐渐下移的倾向。本文运用1999-2010年中国30个省级面板数据构建时空动态面板模型,考察现行制度背景下地方政府土地违法行为的主要影响因素。对地方政府土地违法行为的治理不仅要考虑本地区当期的经济、财政、制度、法律等一般影响因素,还应通过加大前期土地违法案件的查处力度、惩处力度、完善信息披露机制、建立合理的政绩考核体系、营造良性的社会环境等措施抑制负面的传染效应。
(2)地方政府土地违法的治理主体包括中央政府、省级政府、市县级政府及其组成部门和非政府主体等类型。治理主体结构存在政府治理与社会治理失衡、主体结构与权力结构不对称等缺陷,从而影响治理效果。因此,应从两个方面优化治理主体结构：第一,发挥现有主体的优势禀赋,探索新形式的治理主体,加大非政府主体参与监督的力度,丰富对治理主体的有效监督形式,增强治理主体的主动治理意识,以实现治理主体多元化；第二,加强治理主体目标联系,调整治理主体权力结构关系,以形成主体间的有效协作。本文采用博弈方法分析主要治理主体之间的关系,表明中央政府应加大监督、查处和惩罚力度,对地方政府土地违法行为严加治理。非政府主体的参与也十分必要,既能降低中央政府的治理成本,又能给中央政府施加一定压力,敦促其严加治理。
(3)地方政府土地违法的治理对象包括违法征地、违法批地、低价出让土地和其他违法违规行为,具有不确定性和隐蔽性。本文采用微观调研数据,构建结构方程模型并进行实证检验,分析当前地方政府土地违法治理对象的行为动机。研究结果表明：一方面,治理对象在判断标准和时间上的不确定性会弱化地方政府对治理力度的感知,应通过法律明确界定地方政府土地违法行为的治理对象。另一方面,地方政府土地违法行为的治理对象以土地违法行为为主,仅针对“行为”本身进行治理具有局限性,在一定程度上影响治理效果。应考虑地方政府土地违法行为的行为动机,将地方政府的政绩考核标准、财政分权制度、土地审批程序、土地规划体制、地方政府土地违法产生的社会环境、地方政府工作人员法律意识和道德观、地方官员的土地腐败等作为治理对象进行综合治理。
(4)地方政府土地违法的治理手段主要包括土地督察、土地问责、调节经济利益关系和其他手段等,以行政和法律手段为主,其他手段相对欠缺,以事中监督和事后惩罚为主,事前预防不足。本文基于中国30个省的数据构建地方政府土地违法治理的系统动力学模型,拟定不同的治理方案并进行仿真模拟,评价不同类型手段的治理效果。研究结果表明：不同类型的治理手段对地方政府土地违法均具有一定的遏制作用,但单一的治理手段具有一定的局限性,需要在事前预防、事中监督和事后惩处方面三管齐下,采用多样化综合治理手段,才能有效提高地方政府土地违法的治理效果。
Along with the rapid economic and social development, continuous advancing of urbanization and increasingly prominent contradiction between land supply and demand in our country, local governments' land law violations are emergeing in an endless stream. It has greatly weakened the effect of the central government on land control policies and has become a serious problem to be governed effectively for land administration and social development. The local governments' land law violations have been gotten under control to certain extent with the continuous strengthening of governing; however, the overall situation is still rigorous. By applying governance theory, public choice theory and principal-agent theory, the study defines the concept of the governance of local governments'land law violations, constructs a comprehensive analytical framework and makes a further discussion in three aspects including the subject, object and means of governance.
Main conclusions are generalized as follows:
(1) Although the quantity and size of local governments'land law violations have lessened to a certain extent and the frequency has been decreasing, the situation is still rigorous. The overall spatial distribution is relatively decentralized while there is partial building-up effect. The structural distribution is mainly concentrated on county and township basic-level government, with a downward moving trend. This dissertation has constructed the spatiotemporal dynamic panel model based on the panel data of30Chinese provinces over the period1999to2010and made an empirical research on the main affecting factors of local governments' land law violations under the background of current system. For governance of local governments' land law violations, not only the general affecting factors including local economy, finance, system and law in current period shall be taken into account, but also the influence of the present and previous illegal activities on land by the adjacent governments in this region shall be taken into account. It can be achieved by strengthening the detection and punishment force for past illegal land behaviors, improving the information disclosure mechanism, establishing a rational political performance evaluation system and developing a healthy social environment.
(2) The governing subject include the central government, the provincial government, the municipal government and the county government, farmers, nonprofit organization, public opinion and other individuals and so on. It has been approved that there exist defects in governance structure such as the imbalance between governmental control and social control and the asymmetry of main body structure and power structure, which affects the control effects. So the subjects can be optimized from the following two aspects: first, bring the advantageous gifts of the existing subjects into play, bring the social subjects including the farmers, nonprofit organizations, network and media into play in participation in control, probe into the new type of the subjects and enhance the control consciousness of the parties concerned to form multiple subjects controlling the local governments'land law violations; second, form the effective contact among the control subjects through perfecting the land system and information sharing system. This study analyzed the relationship between local government system and all stakeholders with the method of game theory. It is shown by the findings that the central government shall set down the rigorous systems and policies and increase the supervision, investigation and punishment of the illegal land use by the local government and the land use enterprises to deter the legal land use; the participation of the farmers in the supervision and maintenance of the legal rights is also very necessary, as can broaden the supervision channel, reduce the control cost of the central government and exert a certain pressure on the central government as well to urge it to rigorously control the land law violations.
(3) The governing objects including illegal land requisition, illegal land use approval, low-price land transfer and other illegal behaviors, focus on "behaviors" and have invisibility and uncertainty. By means of the micro survey data, this dissertation established a structural equation model for verification and to analyze the behavioral motive of the control objects of local governments'land law violations at present. It is indicated by the findings:on the one hand, the uncertainty of the control objects in the standard of judgment and time would weaken the perception of the local government and decrease the strength of controlling, so it is necessary to clearly define the control objects of the local governments'land law violations by strengthening the laws; on the other hand, the control objects are mainly the behaviors of illegal land use, so the control over the "behaviors" is limited, affecting the control effects to some extent. It is necessary to take into consideration the behavioral motive of the local governments'land law violations and regard the assessment criterion for governmental achievements of the local governments, the system of financial decentralization, land approval procedure, land planning system, the social environment, the legal consciousness and morality of the working personnel in the local government as well as the corruption in land by the local officials as the control objects for comprehensive control.
(4) The governing means mainly include land supervision and inspection, land accountability, economic means and other means. The administrative and legal means play an important role while other means are in relative shortage, meanwhile, the supervision in process and the ex post punishment play an important role while the prior prevention is still in shortage. This study based on the data from30provinces in China, establishes the system dynamics model for the control over the local governments' land law violations, studies out the different control schemes and carries out the analog simulation and evaluates the control effects of the different types of the means. It is shown by the findings that the different types of the control means play a certain role in holding back the local governments' land law violations, however, the simple control has a certain limitation. So it is necessary to do well in prior prevention, supervision in process and ex post punishment concurrently and take multiple comprehensive control means to effectively improve the effects of control over the local governments'land law violations.
本论文主要结论包括：
(1)随着治理力度的逐渐加大,地方政府土地违法行为的数量规模有所减少,发生频率不断降低,但反弹压力较大,形势依然严峻。地方政府土地违法行为的空间分布总体较为分散,局部存在聚集效应。结构分布以县乡一级基层政府为主,存在逐渐下移的倾向。本文运用1999-2010年中国30个省级面板数据构建时空动态面板模型,考察现行制度背景下地方政府土地违法行为的主要影响因素。对地方政府土地违法行为的治理不仅要考虑本地区当期的经济、财政、制度、法律等一般影响因素,还应通过加大前期土地违法案件的查处力度、惩处力度、完善信息披露机制、建立合理的政绩考核体系、营造良性的社会环境等措施抑制负面的传染效应。
(2)地方政府土地违法的治理主体包括中央政府、省级政府、市县级政府及其组成部门和非政府主体等类型。治理主体结构存在政府治理与社会治理失衡、主体结构与权力结构不对称等缺陷,从而影响治理效果。因此,应从两个方面优化治理主体结构：第一,发挥现有主体的优势禀赋,探索新形式的治理主体,加大非政府主体参与监督的力度,丰富对治理主体的有效监督形式,增强治理主体的主动治理意识,以实现治理主体多元化；第二,加强治理主体目标联系,调整治理主体权力结构关系,以形成主体间的有效协作。本文采用博弈方法分析主要治理主体之间的关系,表明中央政府应加大监督、查处和惩罚力度,对地方政府土地违法行为严加治理。非政府主体的参与也十分必要,既能降低中央政府的治理成本,又能给中央政府施加一定压力,敦促其严加治理。
(3)地方政府土地违法的治理对象包括违法征地、违法批地、低价出让土地和其他违法违规行为,具有不确定性和隐蔽性。本文采用微观调研数据,构建结构方程模型并进行实证检验,分析当前地方政府土地违法治理对象的行为动机。研究结果表明：一方面,治理对象在判断标准和时间上的不确定性会弱化地方政府对治理力度的感知,应通过法律明确界定地方政府土地违法行为的治理对象。另一方面,地方政府土地违法行为的治理对象以土地违法行为为主,仅针对“行为”本身进行治理具有局限性,在一定程度上影响治理效果。应考虑地方政府土地违法行为的行为动机,将地方政府的政绩考核标准、财政分权制度、土地审批程序、土地规划体制、地方政府土地违法产生的社会环境、地方政府工作人员法律意识和道德观、地方官员的土地腐败等作为治理对象进行综合治理。
(4)地方政府土地违法的治理手段主要包括土地督察、土地问责、调节经济利益关系和其他手段等,以行政和法律手段为主,其他手段相对欠缺,以事中监督和事后惩罚为主,事前预防不足。本文基于中国30个省的数据构建地方政府土地违法治理的系统动力学模型,拟定不同的治理方案并进行仿真模拟,评价不同类型手段的治理效果。研究结果表明：不同类型的治理手段对地方政府土地违法均具有一定的遏制作用,但单一的治理手段具有一定的局限性,需要在事前预防、事中监督和事后惩处方面三管齐下,采用多样化综合治理手段,才能有效提高地方政府土地违法的治理效果。
Along with the rapid economic and social development, continuous advancing of urbanization and increasingly prominent contradiction between land supply and demand in our country, local governments' land law violations are emergeing in an endless stream. It has greatly weakened the effect of the central government on land control policies and has become a serious problem to be governed effectively for land administration and social development. The local governments' land law violations have been gotten under control to certain extent with the continuous strengthening of governing; however, the overall situation is still rigorous. By applying governance theory, public choice theory and principal-agent theory, the study defines the concept of the governance of local governments'land law violations, constructs a comprehensive analytical framework and makes a further discussion in three aspects including the subject, object and means of governance.
Main conclusions are generalized as follows:
(1) Although the quantity and size of local governments'land law violations have lessened to a certain extent and the frequency has been decreasing, the situation is still rigorous. The overall spatial distribution is relatively decentralized while there is partial building-up effect. The structural distribution is mainly concentrated on county and township basic-level government, with a downward moving trend. This dissertation has constructed the spatiotemporal dynamic panel model based on the panel data of30Chinese provinces over the period1999to2010and made an empirical research on the main affecting factors of local governments' land law violations under the background of current system. For governance of local governments' land law violations, not only the general affecting factors including local economy, finance, system and law in current period shall be taken into account, but also the influence of the present and previous illegal activities on land by the adjacent governments in this region shall be taken into account. It can be achieved by strengthening the detection and punishment force for past illegal land behaviors, improving the information disclosure mechanism, establishing a rational political performance evaluation system and developing a healthy social environment.
(2) The governing subject include the central government, the provincial government, the municipal government and the county government, farmers, nonprofit organization, public opinion and other individuals and so on. It has been approved that there exist defects in governance structure such as the imbalance between governmental control and social control and the asymmetry of main body structure and power structure, which affects the control effects. So the subjects can be optimized from the following two aspects: first, bring the advantageous gifts of the existing subjects into play, bring the social subjects including the farmers, nonprofit organizations, network and media into play in participation in control, probe into the new type of the subjects and enhance the control consciousness of the parties concerned to form multiple subjects controlling the local governments'land law violations; second, form the effective contact among the control subjects through perfecting the land system and information sharing system. This study analyzed the relationship between local government system and all stakeholders with the method of game theory. It is shown by the findings that the central government shall set down the rigorous systems and policies and increase the supervision, investigation and punishment of the illegal land use by the local government and the land use enterprises to deter the legal land use; the participation of the farmers in the supervision and maintenance of the legal rights is also very necessary, as can broaden the supervision channel, reduce the control cost of the central government and exert a certain pressure on the central government as well to urge it to rigorously control the land law violations.
(3) The governing objects including illegal land requisition, illegal land use approval, low-price land transfer and other illegal behaviors, focus on "behaviors" and have invisibility and uncertainty. By means of the micro survey data, this dissertation established a structural equation model for verification and to analyze the behavioral motive of the control objects of local governments'land law violations at present. It is indicated by the findings:on the one hand, the uncertainty of the control objects in the standard of judgment and time would weaken the perception of the local government and decrease the strength of controlling, so it is necessary to clearly define the control objects of the local governments'land law violations by strengthening the laws; on the other hand, the control objects are mainly the behaviors of illegal land use, so the control over the "behaviors" is limited, affecting the control effects to some extent. It is necessary to take into consideration the behavioral motive of the local governments'land law violations and regard the assessment criterion for governmental achievements of the local governments, the system of financial decentralization, land approval procedure, land planning system, the social environment, the legal consciousness and morality of the working personnel in the local government as well as the corruption in land by the local officials as the control objects for comprehensive control.
(4) The governing means mainly include land supervision and inspection, land accountability, economic means and other means. The administrative and legal means play an important role while other means are in relative shortage, meanwhile, the supervision in process and the ex post punishment play an important role while the prior prevention is still in shortage. This study based on the data from30provinces in China, establishes the system dynamics model for the control over the local governments' land law violations, studies out the different control schemes and carries out the analog simulation and evaluates the control effects of the different types of the means. It is shown by the findings that the different types of the control means play a certain role in holding back the local governments' land law violations, however, the simple control has a certain limitation. So it is necessary to do well in prior prevention, supervision in process and ex post punishment concurrently and take multiple comprehensive control means to effectively improve the effects of control over the local governments'land law violations.
引文
④ 资料来源：中央电视台“焦点访谈：目无禁令的高尔夫球场”,2011-05-14.
① 资料来源：羊城晚报“塘厦四村地块被指量体裁衣虚假出让”,2011-12-07.
① 资料来源：中央电视台“焦点访谈：云南曲靖违法占用基本农田事件调查”,2007-04-17.
② 资料来源：中国青年报“基本农田被谎报为坟地和未利用地——对一起侵占基本农田事件的调查”,2005-04-11.
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① 资料来源：中央电视台“焦点访谈：云南曲靖违法占用基本农田事件调查”,2007-04-17.
② 资料来源：中国青年报“基本农田被谎报为坟地和未利用地——对一起侵占基本农田事件的调查”,2005-04-11.
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