农地整理过程中利益协调机制研究
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摘要
农地整理不仅是实现耕地总量动态平衡、保障粮食和生态安全的重要手段,还是转变土地利用方式、城乡统筹发展和建设社会主义新农村的内在要求。由于目前农地整理资金供不应求,在农地整理过程中,相关利益主体之间存在一定的利益矛盾。这种利益矛盾若处理不好,不仅会影响到农地整理项目的实施进度、农地整理项目的工程质量、农地整理项目的功能发挥、农地整理资金的配置效率,而且会影响到基层的党群干群关系和社会稳定。因此,研究农地整理过程中利益协调机制具有重要的学术价值和现实意义。本文在分析农地整理过程中的利益相关者及其诉求的基础上,揭示目前农地整理过程中的利益矛盾及其原因,然后分析农地整理每个阶段利益协调的内在机理,并构建农地整理每个阶段的利益协调机制,最后提出相应的政策建议。
本文共分为9章,论文结构与主要结论如下：
第1章为导论部分,介绍本文研究的背景与意义,对现有的相关研究文献进行梳理和评述；在此基础上,提出本文的研究内容、研究思路和技术路线、研究方法和研究区域,最后对本文的创新点进行总结。
第2章分析了农地整理过程中的利益相关者及其利益诉求。运用利益相关者理论分析农地整理项目申报立项阶段、规划设计阶段、施工建设阶段和后期管护阶段的利益相关者、核心利益相关者及其利益诉求。
第3章分析了农地整理过程中的利益矛盾及其原因。在分析农地整理过程中的利益相关者及其诉求的基础上,本章揭示目前农地整理项目各个阶段的利益矛盾及其原因。(1)申报立项阶段。目前,农地整理项目立项决策评价是政府主导的,没有充分考虑农民对农地整理项目的急需度,没有全面考虑农地整理项目区的综合整治潜力。在农地整理资金供不应求的情况下,申报立项阶段的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：农民对农地整理项目急需度越高的区域并没有优先纳入整理范围,而农民对农地整理项目急需度较低的区域反而优先纳入整理范围,致使有限的农地整理资金这一公共资源没有发挥更大的作用,资源配置效率受到损失。(2)规划设计阶段。目前,农地整理项目规划设计方案评价也是政府主导的,农民参与规划设计方案评价机制不够健全,农民在规划设计过程中的话语权和决策权不能得到充分实现。在这种情形下,规划设计阶段的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：规划设计方案不合理,农民对此意见很大。(3)施工建设阶段。1)目前广大受益农民被排除在工程质量监督之外,社会监督难以产生监督的效力；监理单位与施工单位在利润最大化目标的驱使下,与乡级政府和农民之间产生利益矛盾;该利益矛盾导致如下结果：农地整理项目工程质量低下,严重影响项目实施效果。2)当前农地整理项目实施中有关农民利益受损的补偿范围界定不准确；补偿程序不完善,对补偿款发放的监管不力；补偿标准不合理。在这种情况下,乡级政府与农民之间的矛盾会导致如下结果：农民的利益受损未得到合理的补偿,农民对此表示不满,影响农地整理项目的顺利实施。(4)后期管护阶段。农地整理项目后期管护服务具有公共物品属性,管护主体缺乏主动供给的积极性；且目前后期管护资金短缺,直接影响到管护措施的实施。在这种情况下,后期管护的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：工程设施后期管护缺失,严重影响项目功能的发挥。
第4章对农地整理项目申报立项阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目申报立项阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目申报立项阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,农地整理项目投资绩效受到农民对农地整理项目急需度的影响,农业自然灾害状况较差、农业基础设施状况较差、土地生产力潜力较大的地区,农民对农地整理项目的急需度较强,农地整理项目投资绩效较优。第二,从农业自然灾害状况、农业基础设施状况以及土地生产力潜力三个方面,来考察农民对农地整理项目的急需度,进而构建农地整理项目立项优先评判体系是切合实际的。第三,构建农地整理项目申报立项阶段利益协调机制,就是根据农民对农地整理项目急需度的高低来确定农地整理项目立项的优先序,以实现农地整理项目资金的最优配置,化解申报立项阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：编制农民对农地整理项目急需度的调查报告,完善现行的农地整理项目立项决策评价程序。
第5章对农地整理项目规划设计阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目规划设计阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,运用合作博弈模型提出政府鼓励、农民参与农地整理项目规划设计是帕累托最优选择,能保证规划设计方案的科学合理。第二,从农民参与规划设计意愿影响因素的角度来促进农民有效参与农地整理项目规划设计,进而构建农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调机制是切合实际的。第三,构建农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调机制,就是引导农民积极参与农地整理项目规划设计,以提高规划设计方案的科学合理性,化解规划设计阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：将农民意见调查报告纳入编制规划设计中；完善现行的农地整理项目规划设计评审制度。
第6章对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,专业监理可以遏制施工单位违规行为,但当违规成本低而收益高时,专业监理就会失去监督作用,甚至会出现与施工单位合谋的行为。因此,有必要引入社会公众特别是项目区农民参与施工监督,才能抑制监理单位与施工单位的合谋行为,从而提高农地整理项目的工程质量。第二,引入项目区农民参与施工监督从理论和现实上可行,能抑制监理单位和施工单位合谋行为,对提升农地整理项目工程质量有促进作用。第三,构建农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制,就是引入项目区农民参与施工监督,以提高项目的工程质量,化解施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：赋予农民参与农地整理项目施工监督的权力并提供相应的保障；完善现行的农地整理项目竣工验收评审制度。
第7章对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,农地整理过程中农户利益损失的原因是存在经济损失和主观损失。经济损失是由于目前的补偿标准低于市场价值造成的；而主观损失的原因源于禀赋效应引起的农户主观价值和市场价值的认知差异。第二,对农民的利益损失进行补偿时,应尊重农民的禀赋效应,根据禀赋效应的强弱针对不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略。第三,构建农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制,就是依据农民的禀赋效应对不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略,以建立科学合理的农民损失补偿标准,化解施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：完善农地整理项目农民损失补偿政策；针对农户不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略；加强对农户损失补偿资金的管理。
第8章对农地整理项目后期管护阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目后期管护阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目后期管护阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,交易效用的感知是农民对农地整理项目后期管护出资的重要原因。第二,提出了农地整理项目后期管护投资主体的最优出资配比：农民支付其参考价格,支付价格与参考价格的差额部分由其他投资主体承担,从而使农民感知到交易效用,农民才有动力对农地整理项目后期管护进行出资。第三,构建农地整理项目后期管护阶段利益协调机制,就是根据农民对交易效用的感知来确定农民对后期管护的出资额,解决工程设施后期管护的缺失问题,化解后期管护阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标：明确后期管护供给主体的责任及各供给主体的最优出资配比,特别是农民对后期管护的出资额；建立后期管护资金使用及监管制度。
第9章为结论部分。文章首先总结了全文的研究结论,然后提出了调处农地整理过程中利益矛盾的政策建议,最后对论文存在的不足之处进行了讨论。
Rural land consolidation is not only an important means of achieving total dynamic balance of cultivated land, guarantee food and ecological security, also the internal demand of changing land use pattern, developing urban-rural integration, and building a new socialist countryside. The short supply of rural land consolidation funds bring about interest contradictions between stakeholders in the process of rural land consolidation. If interest contradictions are not handled properly, those will not only affect the progress of implementation, the construction quality, the function, the funds' allocation efficiency of rural land consolidation projects, but also affect the relationship between Party and the masses and social stability. Therefore, study the mechanism of interest coordinations in the process of rural land consolidation has great significance in theory and practice. Based on the analysis of stakeholders and interest demands, the paper reveals the present interest contradictions and causes in the process of rural land consolidation, and analyses the internal mechanism of interest coordination in each stage of rural land consolidation projects, and creates interest coordination mechanism in each stage of rural land consolidation projects, and finally puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
This article is divided into nine chapters, and the structure and the main conclusions are as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research background and significance, and summarizes the existing literature and makes a literature review. On the basis of this, the research content, ideas, structure, and methods, as well as research areas are proposed. Finally, the innovations of this paper are summarized.
The second chapter analyses stakeholders and interest demands in the process of rural land consolidation. The stakeholder theory is used to analyse stakeholders, core stakeholders and their interest demands in project approval, planning, construction, and final management and maintenance stage of rural land consolidation projects.
The third chapter analyses interest contradictions and causes in the process of rural land consolidation. On the basis of the analysis of stakeholders and interest demands in the process of rural land consolidation, the chapter reveals the interest contradictions and causes in each stage of rural land consolidation projects.(1) Project approval stage. At present, the decision-making evaluation of rural land consolidation project is leading by government, not fully considers the farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project and rural land consolidation area's comprehensive improvement potential. In the case of shortage of funds for rural land consolidation, interest contradictions in approval stage lead to the result:areas where farmers' with high degree urgency to rural land consolidation projects haven't the priority to bring into rural land consolidation scope, while areas where farmers' with low degree urgency to rural land consolidation projects have the priority to bring into rural land consolidation scope, which give the result that limited rural land consolidation funds this a public resources doesn't play a greater role, the efficiency of resource allocation is loss.(2) Planning stage. At present, the planning evaluation of rural land consolidation project is leading by government, the mechanism of farmers' participate in the planning evaluation is not perfect, farmers' discourse right and decision-making right in the process of planning don't fully be realized. In this case, the interest contradictions in planning stage will lead to the result:planning is not reasonable to which farmers' have great views.(3) Constrcution stage.1) For farmers in rural land consolidation areas are excluded from construction quality supervision, so social supervision loss its validity. Because of contractor with the target of maximize profit seeking, contractor's illegal behavior seems certain in case professional supervision is not conscientious in the performance of its duties or both of them are all in collusion, interest contradictions in construction stage will lead to the result:project is generally of poor quality, which seriously weaken the performance of rural land consolidation project.2) The scope of rural land consolidation project's compensation for farmers' interest loss is not accurate, compensation procedure is not perfect, compensation payment short of supervision, and the standard of compensation is unreasonable. In this case, the interest contradictions will lead to the result: the farmers' interest loss did not receive reasonable compensation, the implementation of rural land consolidation project arouse discontent of local farmers.(4) Final management and maintenance stage. The engineering facilities of rural land consolidation project are public goods, so the main providers are lack of initiative; and final management and maintenance fund is shortage, which directly affect the implementation of management measures. In this case, the interest contradictions lead to the result:engineering facilities are lack of management and maintenance, which seriously affect the function of rural land consolidation projects.
The fourth chapter analyses project approval stage interest coordination mechanism. The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and establishes the interest coordination mechanism of project approval stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project influences investment performance of project. The poor condition of agricultural infrastructure resistance against natural disasters, the backwarder agricultural production conditions, the more potential land productivity areas where farmers have higher degree urgency for rural land consolidation project, which have better investment performance. Secondly, From three aspects that the condition of agricultural infrastructure resistance against natural disasters, the agricultural production conditions, the potential of land productivity areas to examine the degree of farmers' urgency, on which so as to built project priority evaluation system based is practical. Thirdly, creating project approval stage interest coordination mechanism should built project priority evaluation system based on the degree of farmers' urgency, which can defuse interest contradictions, greatly improve allocative efficiency. Fourthly, the formation of investigation report on farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project, and the perfection of the current decision-making evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The fifth chapter analyses planning stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of planning stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows: Firstly, cooperative game model is used to analyse government encourage and farmers participate in rural land consolidation planning that is Pareto optimal choices, which can ensure the scientific rationality of planning. Secondly, to analyze the factors which influence farmers' willingness to participate can enhance the scientific rationality of planning. Thirdly, creating planning stage interest coordination mechanism should encourage farmers' participate in planning, which can defuse interest contradictions, improve the scientific rationality of planning. Fourthly, the compilation of investigation report on farmers' suggestions in planning, and the perfection of the current planning evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The sixth chapter analyses project quality of construction stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of project quality of construction stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, professional supervision can curb the contractor's illegal behaviors, but when the violation cost low and profits high, professional supervision contractor's illegal behavior seems certain in case professional supervision not performs its duties or both of them are all in collusion. Farmers in rural land consolidation areas participate in supervision are reasonable in theory and in reality, which can restrain professional supervision from being in collusion with contractor, and can improve quality of rural land consolidation project. Secondly, Farmers in rural land consolidation area participate in supervision are reasonable in theory and in reality, which can restrain professional supervision from being in collusion with contractor, and can improve quality of rural land consolidation project. Thirdly, creating project quality of construction stage interest coordination mechanism should empower supervision rights to farmers, which can defuse interest contradictions, and improve the quality of rural land consolidation projects. Fourthly, empowering supervision rights to farmers, and perfecting the current construciton evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The seventh chapter analyses loss compensation of construction stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of loss compensation of construction stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, farmers have economic loss and subjective loss, and endowment effect is the cause of the difference between farmers' subjective loss and the potential market value. Secondly, to compensate the interest loss of farmers should consider farmers' endowment effect, giving special protect to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect. Thirdly, creating loss compensation of construction stage interest coordination mechanism should consider farmers' endowment effect, giving special protect to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect, which can defuse interest contradictions, give reasonable compensation to farmers' interest loss. Fourthly, perfecting the current loss compensation policy in rural land consolidation projects, making different strategies to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect, enhancing the farmers' loss compensation funds are the main works to achieve the goal.
The eighth chapter analyses final management and maintenance stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of final management and maintenance stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, the reason for farmers to invest is the perception of transaction utility. Secondly, the optimization investment proportion of fund sources are farmers pay reference price, the difference between the price paid and the reference price should be provided by other investment subjects, so as to let farmers' percept transaction utility, encourage farmers' investment. Thirdly, creating final management and maintenance stage interest coordination mechanism should consider farmers' investment based on transaction utility, which can defuse interest contradictions, enhance the sustainable use of utility facility. Fourthly, the optimization investment proportion of fund sources should be established based on transaction utility theory especially the farmers' invest, and establishment of the later maintenance fund use and supervision system are the main works to achieve the goal.
The ninth chapter is the research conclusion. Firstly, this article summarizes the conclusions of theoretical and empirical analyses. Secondly, based on the conclusions, it makes following policy recommendations, which provide policy basis for defusing interest contradictions in the process of rural land consolidation. Last but not the least, it analyzes the shortage of the paper.
本文共分为9章,论文结构与主要结论如下：
第1章为导论部分,介绍本文研究的背景与意义,对现有的相关研究文献进行梳理和评述；在此基础上,提出本文的研究内容、研究思路和技术路线、研究方法和研究区域,最后对本文的创新点进行总结。
第2章分析了农地整理过程中的利益相关者及其利益诉求。运用利益相关者理论分析农地整理项目申报立项阶段、规划设计阶段、施工建设阶段和后期管护阶段的利益相关者、核心利益相关者及其利益诉求。
第3章分析了农地整理过程中的利益矛盾及其原因。在分析农地整理过程中的利益相关者及其诉求的基础上,本章揭示目前农地整理项目各个阶段的利益矛盾及其原因。(1)申报立项阶段。目前,农地整理项目立项决策评价是政府主导的,没有充分考虑农民对农地整理项目的急需度,没有全面考虑农地整理项目区的综合整治潜力。在农地整理资金供不应求的情况下,申报立项阶段的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：农民对农地整理项目急需度越高的区域并没有优先纳入整理范围,而农民对农地整理项目急需度较低的区域反而优先纳入整理范围,致使有限的农地整理资金这一公共资源没有发挥更大的作用,资源配置效率受到损失。(2)规划设计阶段。目前,农地整理项目规划设计方案评价也是政府主导的,农民参与规划设计方案评价机制不够健全,农民在规划设计过程中的话语权和决策权不能得到充分实现。在这种情形下,规划设计阶段的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：规划设计方案不合理,农民对此意见很大。(3)施工建设阶段。1)目前广大受益农民被排除在工程质量监督之外,社会监督难以产生监督的效力；监理单位与施工单位在利润最大化目标的驱使下,与乡级政府和农民之间产生利益矛盾;该利益矛盾导致如下结果：农地整理项目工程质量低下,严重影响项目实施效果。2)当前农地整理项目实施中有关农民利益受损的补偿范围界定不准确；补偿程序不完善,对补偿款发放的监管不力；补偿标准不合理。在这种情况下,乡级政府与农民之间的矛盾会导致如下结果：农民的利益受损未得到合理的补偿,农民对此表示不满,影响农地整理项目的顺利实施。(4)后期管护阶段。农地整理项目后期管护服务具有公共物品属性,管护主体缺乏主动供给的积极性；且目前后期管护资金短缺,直接影响到管护措施的实施。在这种情况下,后期管护的利益矛盾会导致如下结果：工程设施后期管护缺失,严重影响项目功能的发挥。
第4章对农地整理项目申报立项阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目申报立项阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目申报立项阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,农地整理项目投资绩效受到农民对农地整理项目急需度的影响,农业自然灾害状况较差、农业基础设施状况较差、土地生产力潜力较大的地区,农民对农地整理项目的急需度较强,农地整理项目投资绩效较优。第二,从农业自然灾害状况、农业基础设施状况以及土地生产力潜力三个方面,来考察农民对农地整理项目的急需度,进而构建农地整理项目立项优先评判体系是切合实际的。第三,构建农地整理项目申报立项阶段利益协调机制,就是根据农民对农地整理项目急需度的高低来确定农地整理项目立项的优先序,以实现农地整理项目资金的最优配置,化解申报立项阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：编制农民对农地整理项目急需度的调查报告,完善现行的农地整理项目立项决策评价程序。
第5章对农地整理项目规划设计阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目规划设计阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,运用合作博弈模型提出政府鼓励、农民参与农地整理项目规划设计是帕累托最优选择,能保证规划设计方案的科学合理。第二,从农民参与规划设计意愿影响因素的角度来促进农民有效参与农地整理项目规划设计,进而构建农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调机制是切合实际的。第三,构建农地整理项目规划设计阶段利益协调机制,就是引导农民积极参与农地整理项目规划设计,以提高规划设计方案的科学合理性,化解规划设计阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：将农民意见调查报告纳入编制规划设计中；完善现行的农地整理项目规划设计评审制度。
第6章对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,专业监理可以遏制施工单位违规行为,但当违规成本低而收益高时,专业监理就会失去监督作用,甚至会出现与施工单位合谋的行为。因此,有必要引入社会公众特别是项目区农民参与施工监督,才能抑制监理单位与施工单位的合谋行为,从而提高农地整理项目的工程质量。第二,引入项目区农民参与施工监督从理论和现实上可行,能抑制监理单位和施工单位合谋行为,对提升农地整理项目工程质量有促进作用。第三,构建农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益协调机制,就是引入项目区农民参与施工监督,以提高项目的工程质量,化解施工建设阶段有关工程质量的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：赋予农民参与农地整理项目施工监督的权力并提供相应的保障；完善现行的农地整理项目竣工验收评审制度。
第7章对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,农地整理过程中农户利益损失的原因是存在经济损失和主观损失。经济损失是由于目前的补偿标准低于市场价值造成的；而主观损失的原因源于禀赋效应引起的农户主观价值和市场价值的认知差异。第二,对农民的利益损失进行补偿时,应尊重农民的禀赋效应,根据禀赋效应的强弱针对不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略。第三,构建农地整理项目施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益协调机制,就是依据农民的禀赋效应对不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略,以建立科学合理的农民损失补偿标准,化解施工建设阶段有关损失补偿的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标,目前应主要做好以下工作：完善农地整理项目农民损失补偿政策；针对农户不同的受损类型实行不同的补偿策略；加强对农户损失补偿资金的管理。
第8章对农地整理项目后期管护阶段的利益协调机制进行了分析。文章首先分析了农地整理项目后期管护阶段利益协调的内在机理,其次对农地整理项目后期管护阶段的利益协调机制进行初步设计。通过分析,本章得到如下研究结论：第一,交易效用的感知是农民对农地整理项目后期管护出资的重要原因。第二,提出了农地整理项目后期管护投资主体的最优出资配比：农民支付其参考价格,支付价格与参考价格的差额部分由其他投资主体承担,从而使农民感知到交易效用,农民才有动力对农地整理项目后期管护进行出资。第三,构建农地整理项目后期管护阶段利益协调机制,就是根据农民对交易效用的感知来确定农民对后期管护的出资额,解决工程设施后期管护的缺失问题,化解后期管护阶段的利益矛盾。第四,为了达到此目标：明确后期管护供给主体的责任及各供给主体的最优出资配比,特别是农民对后期管护的出资额；建立后期管护资金使用及监管制度。
第9章为结论部分。文章首先总结了全文的研究结论,然后提出了调处农地整理过程中利益矛盾的政策建议,最后对论文存在的不足之处进行了讨论。
Rural land consolidation is not only an important means of achieving total dynamic balance of cultivated land, guarantee food and ecological security, also the internal demand of changing land use pattern, developing urban-rural integration, and building a new socialist countryside. The short supply of rural land consolidation funds bring about interest contradictions between stakeholders in the process of rural land consolidation. If interest contradictions are not handled properly, those will not only affect the progress of implementation, the construction quality, the function, the funds' allocation efficiency of rural land consolidation projects, but also affect the relationship between Party and the masses and social stability. Therefore, study the mechanism of interest coordinations in the process of rural land consolidation has great significance in theory and practice. Based on the analysis of stakeholders and interest demands, the paper reveals the present interest contradictions and causes in the process of rural land consolidation, and analyses the internal mechanism of interest coordination in each stage of rural land consolidation projects, and creates interest coordination mechanism in each stage of rural land consolidation projects, and finally puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
This article is divided into nine chapters, and the structure and the main conclusions are as follows:
The first chapter introduces the research background and significance, and summarizes the existing literature and makes a literature review. On the basis of this, the research content, ideas, structure, and methods, as well as research areas are proposed. Finally, the innovations of this paper are summarized.
The second chapter analyses stakeholders and interest demands in the process of rural land consolidation. The stakeholder theory is used to analyse stakeholders, core stakeholders and their interest demands in project approval, planning, construction, and final management and maintenance stage of rural land consolidation projects.
The third chapter analyses interest contradictions and causes in the process of rural land consolidation. On the basis of the analysis of stakeholders and interest demands in the process of rural land consolidation, the chapter reveals the interest contradictions and causes in each stage of rural land consolidation projects.(1) Project approval stage. At present, the decision-making evaluation of rural land consolidation project is leading by government, not fully considers the farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project and rural land consolidation area's comprehensive improvement potential. In the case of shortage of funds for rural land consolidation, interest contradictions in approval stage lead to the result:areas where farmers' with high degree urgency to rural land consolidation projects haven't the priority to bring into rural land consolidation scope, while areas where farmers' with low degree urgency to rural land consolidation projects have the priority to bring into rural land consolidation scope, which give the result that limited rural land consolidation funds this a public resources doesn't play a greater role, the efficiency of resource allocation is loss.(2) Planning stage. At present, the planning evaluation of rural land consolidation project is leading by government, the mechanism of farmers' participate in the planning evaluation is not perfect, farmers' discourse right and decision-making right in the process of planning don't fully be realized. In this case, the interest contradictions in planning stage will lead to the result:planning is not reasonable to which farmers' have great views.(3) Constrcution stage.1) For farmers in rural land consolidation areas are excluded from construction quality supervision, so social supervision loss its validity. Because of contractor with the target of maximize profit seeking, contractor's illegal behavior seems certain in case professional supervision is not conscientious in the performance of its duties or both of them are all in collusion, interest contradictions in construction stage will lead to the result:project is generally of poor quality, which seriously weaken the performance of rural land consolidation project.2) The scope of rural land consolidation project's compensation for farmers' interest loss is not accurate, compensation procedure is not perfect, compensation payment short of supervision, and the standard of compensation is unreasonable. In this case, the interest contradictions will lead to the result: the farmers' interest loss did not receive reasonable compensation, the implementation of rural land consolidation project arouse discontent of local farmers.(4) Final management and maintenance stage. The engineering facilities of rural land consolidation project are public goods, so the main providers are lack of initiative; and final management and maintenance fund is shortage, which directly affect the implementation of management measures. In this case, the interest contradictions lead to the result:engineering facilities are lack of management and maintenance, which seriously affect the function of rural land consolidation projects.
The fourth chapter analyses project approval stage interest coordination mechanism. The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and establishes the interest coordination mechanism of project approval stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project influences investment performance of project. The poor condition of agricultural infrastructure resistance against natural disasters, the backwarder agricultural production conditions, the more potential land productivity areas where farmers have higher degree urgency for rural land consolidation project, which have better investment performance. Secondly, From three aspects that the condition of agricultural infrastructure resistance against natural disasters, the agricultural production conditions, the potential of land productivity areas to examine the degree of farmers' urgency, on which so as to built project priority evaluation system based is practical. Thirdly, creating project approval stage interest coordination mechanism should built project priority evaluation system based on the degree of farmers' urgency, which can defuse interest contradictions, greatly improve allocative efficiency. Fourthly, the formation of investigation report on farmers' urgency for rural land consolidation project, and the perfection of the current decision-making evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The fifth chapter analyses planning stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of planning stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows: Firstly, cooperative game model is used to analyse government encourage and farmers participate in rural land consolidation planning that is Pareto optimal choices, which can ensure the scientific rationality of planning. Secondly, to analyze the factors which influence farmers' willingness to participate can enhance the scientific rationality of planning. Thirdly, creating planning stage interest coordination mechanism should encourage farmers' participate in planning, which can defuse interest contradictions, improve the scientific rationality of planning. Fourthly, the compilation of investigation report on farmers' suggestions in planning, and the perfection of the current planning evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The sixth chapter analyses project quality of construction stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of project quality of construction stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, professional supervision can curb the contractor's illegal behaviors, but when the violation cost low and profits high, professional supervision contractor's illegal behavior seems certain in case professional supervision not performs its duties or both of them are all in collusion. Farmers in rural land consolidation areas participate in supervision are reasonable in theory and in reality, which can restrain professional supervision from being in collusion with contractor, and can improve quality of rural land consolidation project. Secondly, Farmers in rural land consolidation area participate in supervision are reasonable in theory and in reality, which can restrain professional supervision from being in collusion with contractor, and can improve quality of rural land consolidation project. Thirdly, creating project quality of construction stage interest coordination mechanism should empower supervision rights to farmers, which can defuse interest contradictions, and improve the quality of rural land consolidation projects. Fourthly, empowering supervision rights to farmers, and perfecting the current construciton evaluation procedure are the main works to achieve the goal.
The seventh chapter analyses loss compensation of construction stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of loss compensation of construction stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, farmers have economic loss and subjective loss, and endowment effect is the cause of the difference between farmers' subjective loss and the potential market value. Secondly, to compensate the interest loss of farmers should consider farmers' endowment effect, giving special protect to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect. Thirdly, creating loss compensation of construction stage interest coordination mechanism should consider farmers' endowment effect, giving special protect to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect, which can defuse interest contradictions, give reasonable compensation to farmers' interest loss. Fourthly, perfecting the current loss compensation policy in rural land consolidation projects, making different strategies to farmers' property of different nature based on the power degree of endowment effect, enhancing the farmers' loss compensation funds are the main works to achieve the goal.
The eighth chapter analyses final management and maintenance stage interest coordination mechanism.The paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviors, and the interest coordination mechanism of final management and maintenance stage in rural land consolidation project. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, the reason for farmers to invest is the perception of transaction utility. Secondly, the optimization investment proportion of fund sources are farmers pay reference price, the difference between the price paid and the reference price should be provided by other investment subjects, so as to let farmers' percept transaction utility, encourage farmers' investment. Thirdly, creating final management and maintenance stage interest coordination mechanism should consider farmers' investment based on transaction utility, which can defuse interest contradictions, enhance the sustainable use of utility facility. Fourthly, the optimization investment proportion of fund sources should be established based on transaction utility theory especially the farmers' invest, and establishment of the later maintenance fund use and supervision system are the main works to achieve the goal.
The ninth chapter is the research conclusion. Firstly, this article summarizes the conclusions of theoretical and empirical analyses. Secondly, based on the conclusions, it makes following policy recommendations, which provide policy basis for defusing interest contradictions in the process of rural land consolidation. Last but not the least, it analyzes the shortage of the paper.
引文
1 根据湖北国土资源厅项目报表(2001-2009)和2010-2011年国土厅网站上的相关数据估计得到。
2 《湖北省耕地开发专项资金征收和使用管理办法》鄂政发[1999]52号
3 数据来源：《当阳市重点工程建设用地和拆迁补偿标准》(当政办发(2003]97号)、《关于当阳市房屋拆迁安置方式及补偿标准》(当政办发[2009]61号)、《当阳市土地开发整理项目建设拆迁补偿管理暂行办法》(当土整办发[2009]3号)
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2 《湖北省耕地开发专项资金征收和使用管理办法》鄂政发[1999]52号
3 数据来源：《当阳市重点工程建设用地和拆迁补偿标准》(当政办发(2003]97号)、《关于当阳市房屋拆迁安置方式及补偿标准》(当政办发[2009]61号)、《当阳市土地开发整理项目建设拆迁补偿管理暂行办法》(当土整办发[2009]3号)
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