转户进城农民土地退出的影响因素和路径研究
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摘要
本文是关于中国工业化城镇化加速发展时期农民退出土地的实证研究。农民退出零碎、分散的土地,是实现工业化、城镇化和农业现代化协调发展的关键前提。现有研究主要从不同的视域研究了农民土地退出的必要性,但对它的影响因素作深入研究的文献较少。本研究主要从农民主体选择的角度论证农民土地退出的意愿和需求,研究所指的农民土地退出,是指在宪法框架下,坚持农村基本经营和产权制度稳定,农民自愿将土地承包经营权或宅基地使用权以不同形式退还给所在农村集体经济组织的行为。
一、问题提出
根据刘易斯-费景汉-拉尼斯模型,随着农民不断向城镇转移就业,最后必将使农业部门边际生产率和城镇非农部门边际生产率逐渐一致,这个过程实际上就是二元结构逐渐消失的过程。但我国实际情况是：随着大量农民转移进城,我国的二元结构不是逐渐消失,而是加深。这是因为：国外理论是建立在土地、资本要素自由流动的假设基础上的,而我国目前尚未具备这两个前置条件。因此,解决好土地、资本这两种基本生产要素的合理流动问题,是破解我国二元结构的两个重要理论前提。立足于土地要素的角度,本文对农民如何自愿退出土地这个城乡土地要素优化配置的必然前提进行专门研究。
本研究的关键问题是：1.农民自愿退出土地应该满足哪些条件?2.农民土地退出的影响因素有哪些?3.农民自愿退地与转户进城之间是否具备相关性?本研究主要运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,尝试对以上问题作出解答。
二、研究目标
本研究总目标致力于解决转户进城农民如何退出土地的问题。
研究的具体目标有三：1.对农民土地功能进行重新认识；2.弄清农民退出土地的条件和影响因素；3.重点对转户进城农民退地的路径进行研究。
研究思路是：在回顾经济学相关理论的基础上,确定研究的对象和内容；主要运用“行为经济学”理论,对农民土地退出的前置条件进行分析；运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,对农民土地退出的影响因素和需求状况进行分析；在对农民土地退出的内涵、外延界定的基础上,对具备退地条件的农民群体进行土地退出路径及保障设计。最后,形成政策建议。
三、研究内容
1.确立研究的问题、目的、方法和分析框架。
2.国外在历史上相似发展阶段的经验和教训。
3.对农民土地功能进行重新分析。对现行农民土地再配置的两种形式(国家征收农村土地和农村土地的自发流转)进行效率分析。
4.农民土地退出的前置条件分析。立足于行为经济学理论,从政府激励和农户决策,分析有利于农民退出土地的内、外部条件。
5.对重庆市经济较发达地区和经济欠发达地区12个代表性区县2261个农户进行退地意愿的实地调研和实证研究,分析农民土地退出的意愿及需求影响因素。
6.转户农民土地退出的路径设计。重点以农民自愿转户退地为前提,设计相应的土地退出方式和路径。
7.转户农民土地退出的可持续发展保障建设。结合“国家保障”、“集体保障”和“自我保障”三种方式,重点探讨建立转户退地农民可持续发展保障的机制。
四、研究结论和政策建议
研究结论：
1.在工业化城镇化加速发展时期,发挥政府鼓励农民土地退出的推动力和引导力,是破解工业化城镇化加速发展中小农经济不断逆向强化趋势的重要手段。借鉴其他国家和地区在工业化城镇化发展中农地处置方式的经验和教训,得出两点启示：一是政府要充分发挥引导农民退出零碎、分散土地以改造小农经济这只“看得见的手”的作用；二是实施适度农地资本化,在农民退地过程中,利用“土地”和“金融”的两极结合,发挥好市场优化配置资源的“稳定器”作用。
2.在农民土地权利之上,存在国家、地方政府和农民不同的利益需求,难以实现土地要素的优化配置和农民福利最优。造成这一要素配置失衡和农民福利减损的深层次原因在于：农村地权结构不稳定、土地承包权垄断、农民可持续发展保障缺乏这三个外部因素,以及农民将土地用于流转的动力不足这一内部因素,使农民在转移就业和土地要素配置行为的选择上,形成了“不充分转移”现象,即一方面向城镇提供剩余劳动力,但同时不愿意退出农村土地或不愿意对土地进行集中流转。这种要素配置的低效,是造成小农经济在工业化城镇化快速推进的同时不断逆向强化的根本原因。
3.农民土地使用权有序退出,是优化土地要素配置效率的核心。基于“有限理性”经济人假设,认为农民退出土地的决策-行为模式不仅基于自身经济利益最大化的目的,同时还受到政府决策模式的影响(尤其是地方政府)。归纳出优化农民退地决策-行为的六大条件：①明确、清晰的土地产权保护；②完善的公共产品供给；③政策性土地金融扶持；④农民就业-收入非农化程度稳定增长；⑤农民土地财产性收益超过农业耕作收益；⑥农民认知能力脱离“土地社保”。第①、②、③个条件可归结为外部条件；第④、⑤、⑥个条件是在满足前三个条件的基础上,农户基于自身价值判断,对退出土地这一决策-行为进行“有限理性选择”所遵循的主要依据。
4.从农民主体意愿选择这一微观角度,分析了农民土地退出的影响因素。对重庆市2261个农户的调研结果表明：个体因素(年龄、受教育程度)、家庭因素(赡养老人数量、抚养子女数量、拥有土地数量、在外务工情况、城镇购房情况、家庭经济收入)和对退出土地(房屋)的经济补偿预期是影响农民作出是否退地决策的三个内生因素。调查发现：存在大多数农民对自愿退出土地“有效需求不足”的现象；大部分转户进城农民具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”。要建立新的制度体系,对有退地需求的农民群体,建设鼓励主动退地的路径和保障体系；对退地尚未形成有效需求的农民群体,侧重于提供有利于其未来作出“退地”决策的外部公共产品。
5.大部分转户进城农民具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”,是土地退出的重点目标人群,政府应该适时加强制度供给,为其退地的路径和保障提供充分的公共服务。
政策建议：
1.推进农民转户退地前的准备条件建设。一是加强以“城镇就业”为导向的适龄退地农民的职业教育和技能培训,二是引导进城退地农民“自主创业、自由择业”,增加转户进城农民多样化的就业供给。
2.完善农民转户退地过程中的政策及措施。一是进一步使宅基地退出收益反哺农民的运行机制透明化、标准化,建立在一定通胀背景下自愿退出宅基地的农民享受稳定、持续的收益直补机制；二是在坚持农民土地承包关系长期稳定、不变的前提下,研究制定更加科学、合理的农民自愿退出承包地的经济补偿政策。积极探索退地信托、基金、债券以及宅基地退出收益反哺等多种“土地权益金融保障”形式,使退地农民能更有效获取工业化、城镇化、农业现代化过程中土地增值的当期收益和期权收益分配,尽可能规避通货膨胀对农民土地权益的影响。
3.建立可持续的转户退地农民保障体系。一是加快退地农民城镇住房保障制度建设。包括一定条件下农地产权置换城镇商品房、退地农民公共租(售)房安置制度及相应的激励措施等。二是对转户退地农民提供均质的养老、医疗、失业、工伤、生育等社会保险,重点是各类社会公共保险产品的衔接办法,确保转户居民享有同等市民待遇；三是引导建立转户退地农民的“自我保障”体系,建立面向特定人群的可持续发展基金,以市场金融手段实现未来发展风险的规避和资产的保值增值。
五、潜在创新点
1.论文尝试从土地要素流动的角度解释二元经济结构理论与中国实际相悖的成因,在自愿、有偿前提下,利用行为经济学有关理论,对农民土地退出的条件进行分析,并以土地权利束分离理论为基本依据,构建了农民土地退出的两种路径；
2.经过实地调研和实证研究,尝试归纳出农民土地退出的影响因素,即现阶段,大多数农民不愿意退出土地,但多数转户进城农民群体具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”。
3.进一步拓展了农民土地退出的政策研究视野。尝试提出了针对性的制度供给可以更有效地引导农民将退地的“潜在意愿”转化为“有效需求”的观点。以推进转户进城农民土地退出为重点,践行适度土地资本化,引导有条件的转户农民退出宅基地,同时适度保留“承包地”部分收益权能,促进农地规模经营；加强转户退地农民的公共保障产品(就业、教育、住房、社保)供给,完成农民市民化转变。
The dissertation is an emprical research on Chinese peasant's land usufruct abdication during the period of accelerating development of industrilization and urbanization. It is a key prerequisite to maintain harmonious development among industrilization, urbanlization and agriculture modernization that peasant would give back their fractional and scattered land to rural collective economic orgnization. Contemparary correlated researches elaborate the significance of peasant's land usufruct quittance, but documents which furtherly study its influential ingredients are relatively insufficient. The paper expounds, mainly on the prospect of peasant's own alternative, their real will and demands towards rural land quittance, which means in the Constitutional framework and with the principle of basic rural property and management system steady and fast, peasant voluntarily return their contracted land usufruct and residential land usufruct to rural collective economic orgnization.
ⅠQuestion Advance
According to the classical theoretical model of urban-rural dual structure initially established by A. Lewis in 1954 and amended by John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis in 1961, with peasants entering cities to pursue more job opportunities, the marginal agricultural productivity would be enhanced to the same level with the marginal non-agricultural productivity, and due to the inter-related influence, the gap between urban and rural area would be erased at last. However, it not occur in China that when peasant enter cities for better job chances, the gap between urban and rural area is enlarged, not shrinked. An explanation is:the theoritical model is based on the hypothesis on land and capital's freely flow and it is not suit for demestic real situation. Therefore, how to resovle the question on this two basic factors' free flow, are two necessary theoritical prerequirements to reduce the gap of Chinese uban and rural development. The essay, based on the peculiar prospect of land factor, focuses on how peasants voluntarily quit their wasted and scattered land which may be the necessary prerequirement to improve urban-rural land resources' use efficiency.
The core questions of the research include:If peasant voluntarily abdicate their land usufruct, is there any prerequisites? What on earth are factors to influence peasants' willingness to quit their lands? Is it exisiting any relationship between the behavior of peasant's land qittance and their agricultural census register abdication? To resovle the questions, the dissertation mainly use the methods of standard analysis as well as empirical analysis, ties to give a possible theoretical explanation.
ⅡResearch Objectives
The paper studies the issue how peasants who enter cities for non-agricultural activities abdicate their rural land usufruct.
The sub-objectives are included as following:Overall recognition of peasants'land functions; Finding out conditions and factors about peasants'quittance of their lands; An underlining research on patterns how peasants quit their lands.
The research route is:Based on look back on the correlated economic theories, the paper firstly definite its objects as well as contents; then mainly uses "behavior economy" theory, to analyze the prerequisites on peasants' land quittance; then uses the methods of standard analysis as well as empirical analysis, to analyze the factors which may influence peasants'willingness and demands on land qittance; then based on the definition of connotation and denotation on peasants' land quittance, to design a practical way as well as a sustainable development machanism for those who want to abdicate their land rights. Finally, the dissertation would give conculsions and suggestions.
ⅢResearch Contents
1.Definition of research'question, objective, methods as well as framework;
2.Overseas regions'similar experience and lessons in the similar development periods.
3.Overall analysis on peasants'land function. An critical analysis of contemporary forms on peasants'land re-distribution which are government's take over of peasants' land and peasant's land circulation in private.
4. Analysis of prerequisites on peasant's land quittance. Based on behavior economy, from the two aspects of government's stimulation and peasants'decision, the paper formulates the conditions which may give a positive influence on peasants'land quittance.
5. Based on the quiz of 2261 peasants which extract from 2500 samples in 65 villages,12 districts, in different rural areas in Chongqing, the paper ties to demonstrate ingredients which may influence peasants'willingness and demands on land quittance.
6. A design of practical ways on peasants who go into cities for non-agricultural activities want to give up their rural land rights. Based on peasants' authentic will and demands on land quittance, the paper formulates specific ways and means.
7.An extended discussion on peasants' sustainable development guarantee when they eventually give up their land rights. With combination of "state guarantee ", "rural collective organization guarantee" and " individual guarantee", the paper aims to establish a synthetic safeguarding mechanism for peasants who abandon their agricultural identity as well as rural land rights.
ⅣConclusions and Suggestions
Conclusions:
1. if government plays a positive role in guiding peasants to abdicate their land usufruct, it would be of great importance to resolve the dilemma that small-scale peasant economy reversely grows up during the period of industrialization and urbanization's accelerating development. To assimilate other counties'experiences and lessons on rural land issue in the similar phase in history, the paper concludes two enlightenments:One thing is that government should play a "visible hand" role to encourage peasants orderly return their fractional and scattered lands to rural collective economic organization; and the other thing is that adequate rural land capitalization would be necessary because it could better improve the resources use efficiency in the way of "two-polar combination" of land and finance.
2.The paper deduces that beyond peasants'private land rights, there are existing three different interest demands involved with central government, local government and peasants themselves, so rational distribution of land resources and peasants' maximum welfare is difficult to be accomplished. Furthermore, some profound reasons lies in:three external factors including unstable rural land property structure, monopoly of rural contracted land usufruct and impoverishment of peasants' sustainable development protection, as well as one internal factor which peasant will not transact their lands in private. Due to the reciprocity of factors above, the "inadequate transfer" phenomenon occurs in the behaviors of peasants' non-agricultural employment and attitudes toward their lands, in another word, when they obtain job offers in cities they don't want to quit their lands or transact them in market. The low efficiency of land resources' distribution, is the essential factor that small-scale peasant economy reversely grows up during the period of industrialization and urbanization's accelerating development.
3. The paper advocates that only when peasants orderly abdicate their land usufruct is the core factor to enhance the efficiency of land resources'distribution. Based on the hypothesis of "limited rational economic-man ",the dissertation deduced that peasants' attitude and behavior on land quittance is influenced not only by their own incentives to pursue maximum economic interests, but also by behaviors and decision made by government, especially by local government. The paper further derives six conditions to optimize peasants' decision and behavior on land quittance which include three external conditions:clear land property boundary and protection; well-established public product supply; support of policy-related rural land finance, as well as three internal conditions: steady increase of the level of peasants' non-agricultural employment and income; peasants' land property revenue beyond household output on land; peasants' cognitive competence breaking away "land insurance". The latter three conditions are based on the former three conditions, and if there are six conditions available, peasants could determine whether or not they will quit their scattered lands.
4. The essay analyzes the further ingredients on peasants' land quittance from a micro point of view on peasants' own wish and demands. The 2261 evidences in Chongqing shows:individual factor(age; education level), and family factor(amount of aged persons in family; amount of children in family; amount of lands usufructs; migrant working condition; urban house(apartment) purchase condition; average income of family), and peasants' expectation on economic compensation on land quittance are three determinative ingredients which influence peasants' decision whether or not they return their land usufruct to the rural collective economic organization. According to the investigation results:it is existing the phenomenon that "insufficient effectual demands on land quittance ", that is to say, most people do not want give up their own correlated land rights, but at the same time, most people who already enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor have a "substantial willingness on land quittance". Based on it, a reasonable way of encouraging people to quit their lands should be studied, as for those who have the real demands to quit their lands, and a new public product system on land quittance should be established which may be positive for those who have the substantial demands to quit their lands make the "Yes " decisions in future.
5. most peasants who have already enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor have a substantial willingness to quit their lands, so it is the main objective of policy making on rural lands' quittance, and government should increase institutional supply on it, to provide adequate services and insurance for those want to give up their land rights.
Suggestions:
1. Making first-phase preparation for those who enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor if they are willing to quit their rural lands. Primarily vocational education as well as skill training for rural workers in cities in the right age should be provided as public products, which would increase their ability and chances on employment. Posteriorly, in addition to this, government may encourage them to be self-employed by the means of varied facilitations.
2.Drawing up correct policies and measures in the process of peasants' rural land quittance. Firstly, the operational mechanism of peasants' residential lands' quittance should be standardized and demystified, which means peasants voluntarily quitted their lands could enjoy steady and sustaining revenues even if there be inflations in future; Secondly in the preretirement of insisting basic rural contracted land system not changed in a long term, government may try to make policies to compensate those who want to quit their contracted lands, such as land trusts, bonds and funds, to make sure that peasants given up their land titles could obtain both instant yields and option yields when land value appreciates in the process of industrialization and urbanization's rapid development.
3.Establishing sustainable insurance system for peasants in cities abandoned their rural land rights. Firstly government may speed up efforts in establishment of housing system for those in cities quitted their lands, which includes series of incentive measures such as rural-urban house exchange, public rental housing, and etc. Secondly government may provide peasants in cities quitted their lands with identical services on urban social security which includes old-age security, medical security, unemployment security and work-related injury security; Thirdly government could guide peasant in cities quitted their lands to establish their own " individual insurance " system, especially to design a sort of special fund only served for themselves, in order to avoid risks when they make livings in cities.
ⅤSubstantial innovation points
1. Based on the prospect of land transanction, the essay tries to explain the delimma that tradional dual-economy theory is not used in China, then applies behavior economy theory, analyzing conditions of peasants' land quittance, and then furtherly studies two ways of peasants' land quittance by using land property theory.
2. Based on the investigation and empirical studies, the paper tries to conclude factors on peasants' land quittance, and thinks that at the present, most peasants will not abandon their lands, but most peasants entered cities have a potential willingness to quit their lands.
3.The dissertation furtherly studies the policys on peasants' land quittance.The view explains:Peasants' substantial willingness on rural land quittance could be converted into real demands on rural land quittance if there is existing a pertinent "system supply" In order to accomplish this goal, government should focus on the very group that have a positive demand on both entering cities for non-agricultural endeavor and quitting their lands, to make policies which include two aspects:one thing is that government may encourage peasants totally to quit their wasted residential land and to reserve some rights on contracted lands in the purpose of rural and scale management, and the other thing is that government should provide them with series of public services and products including employment insurance, education, housing insurance, medical insurance and other related social insurance, to guide peasants quitted their lands to be real city residents.
一、问题提出
根据刘易斯-费景汉-拉尼斯模型,随着农民不断向城镇转移就业,最后必将使农业部门边际生产率和城镇非农部门边际生产率逐渐一致,这个过程实际上就是二元结构逐渐消失的过程。但我国实际情况是：随着大量农民转移进城,我国的二元结构不是逐渐消失,而是加深。这是因为：国外理论是建立在土地、资本要素自由流动的假设基础上的,而我国目前尚未具备这两个前置条件。因此,解决好土地、资本这两种基本生产要素的合理流动问题,是破解我国二元结构的两个重要理论前提。立足于土地要素的角度,本文对农民如何自愿退出土地这个城乡土地要素优化配置的必然前提进行专门研究。
本研究的关键问题是：1.农民自愿退出土地应该满足哪些条件?2.农民土地退出的影响因素有哪些?3.农民自愿退地与转户进城之间是否具备相关性?本研究主要运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,尝试对以上问题作出解答。
二、研究目标
本研究总目标致力于解决转户进城农民如何退出土地的问题。
研究的具体目标有三：1.对农民土地功能进行重新认识；2.弄清农民退出土地的条件和影响因素；3.重点对转户进城农民退地的路径进行研究。
研究思路是：在回顾经济学相关理论的基础上,确定研究的对象和内容；主要运用“行为经济学”理论,对农民土地退出的前置条件进行分析；运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,对农民土地退出的影响因素和需求状况进行分析；在对农民土地退出的内涵、外延界定的基础上,对具备退地条件的农民群体进行土地退出路径及保障设计。最后,形成政策建议。
三、研究内容
1.确立研究的问题、目的、方法和分析框架。
2.国外在历史上相似发展阶段的经验和教训。
3.对农民土地功能进行重新分析。对现行农民土地再配置的两种形式(国家征收农村土地和农村土地的自发流转)进行效率分析。
4.农民土地退出的前置条件分析。立足于行为经济学理论,从政府激励和农户决策,分析有利于农民退出土地的内、外部条件。
5.对重庆市经济较发达地区和经济欠发达地区12个代表性区县2261个农户进行退地意愿的实地调研和实证研究,分析农民土地退出的意愿及需求影响因素。
6.转户农民土地退出的路径设计。重点以农民自愿转户退地为前提,设计相应的土地退出方式和路径。
7.转户农民土地退出的可持续发展保障建设。结合“国家保障”、“集体保障”和“自我保障”三种方式,重点探讨建立转户退地农民可持续发展保障的机制。
四、研究结论和政策建议
研究结论：
1.在工业化城镇化加速发展时期,发挥政府鼓励农民土地退出的推动力和引导力,是破解工业化城镇化加速发展中小农经济不断逆向强化趋势的重要手段。借鉴其他国家和地区在工业化城镇化发展中农地处置方式的经验和教训,得出两点启示：一是政府要充分发挥引导农民退出零碎、分散土地以改造小农经济这只“看得见的手”的作用；二是实施适度农地资本化,在农民退地过程中,利用“土地”和“金融”的两极结合,发挥好市场优化配置资源的“稳定器”作用。
2.在农民土地权利之上,存在国家、地方政府和农民不同的利益需求,难以实现土地要素的优化配置和农民福利最优。造成这一要素配置失衡和农民福利减损的深层次原因在于：农村地权结构不稳定、土地承包权垄断、农民可持续发展保障缺乏这三个外部因素,以及农民将土地用于流转的动力不足这一内部因素,使农民在转移就业和土地要素配置行为的选择上,形成了“不充分转移”现象,即一方面向城镇提供剩余劳动力,但同时不愿意退出农村土地或不愿意对土地进行集中流转。这种要素配置的低效,是造成小农经济在工业化城镇化快速推进的同时不断逆向强化的根本原因。
3.农民土地使用权有序退出,是优化土地要素配置效率的核心。基于“有限理性”经济人假设,认为农民退出土地的决策-行为模式不仅基于自身经济利益最大化的目的,同时还受到政府决策模式的影响(尤其是地方政府)。归纳出优化农民退地决策-行为的六大条件：①明确、清晰的土地产权保护；②完善的公共产品供给；③政策性土地金融扶持；④农民就业-收入非农化程度稳定增长；⑤农民土地财产性收益超过农业耕作收益；⑥农民认知能力脱离“土地社保”。第①、②、③个条件可归结为外部条件；第④、⑤、⑥个条件是在满足前三个条件的基础上,农户基于自身价值判断,对退出土地这一决策-行为进行“有限理性选择”所遵循的主要依据。
4.从农民主体意愿选择这一微观角度,分析了农民土地退出的影响因素。对重庆市2261个农户的调研结果表明：个体因素(年龄、受教育程度)、家庭因素(赡养老人数量、抚养子女数量、拥有土地数量、在外务工情况、城镇购房情况、家庭经济收入)和对退出土地(房屋)的经济补偿预期是影响农民作出是否退地决策的三个内生因素。调查发现：存在大多数农民对自愿退出土地“有效需求不足”的现象；大部分转户进城农民具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”。要建立新的制度体系,对有退地需求的农民群体,建设鼓励主动退地的路径和保障体系；对退地尚未形成有效需求的农民群体,侧重于提供有利于其未来作出“退地”决策的外部公共产品。
5.大部分转户进城农民具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”,是土地退出的重点目标人群,政府应该适时加强制度供给,为其退地的路径和保障提供充分的公共服务。
政策建议：
1.推进农民转户退地前的准备条件建设。一是加强以“城镇就业”为导向的适龄退地农民的职业教育和技能培训,二是引导进城退地农民“自主创业、自由择业”,增加转户进城农民多样化的就业供给。
2.完善农民转户退地过程中的政策及措施。一是进一步使宅基地退出收益反哺农民的运行机制透明化、标准化,建立在一定通胀背景下自愿退出宅基地的农民享受稳定、持续的收益直补机制；二是在坚持农民土地承包关系长期稳定、不变的前提下,研究制定更加科学、合理的农民自愿退出承包地的经济补偿政策。积极探索退地信托、基金、债券以及宅基地退出收益反哺等多种“土地权益金融保障”形式,使退地农民能更有效获取工业化、城镇化、农业现代化过程中土地增值的当期收益和期权收益分配,尽可能规避通货膨胀对农民土地权益的影响。
3.建立可持续的转户退地农民保障体系。一是加快退地农民城镇住房保障制度建设。包括一定条件下农地产权置换城镇商品房、退地农民公共租(售)房安置制度及相应的激励措施等。二是对转户退地农民提供均质的养老、医疗、失业、工伤、生育等社会保险,重点是各类社会公共保险产品的衔接办法,确保转户居民享有同等市民待遇；三是引导建立转户退地农民的“自我保障”体系,建立面向特定人群的可持续发展基金,以市场金融手段实现未来发展风险的规避和资产的保值增值。
五、潜在创新点
1.论文尝试从土地要素流动的角度解释二元经济结构理论与中国实际相悖的成因,在自愿、有偿前提下,利用行为经济学有关理论,对农民土地退出的条件进行分析,并以土地权利束分离理论为基本依据,构建了农民土地退出的两种路径；
2.经过实地调研和实证研究,尝试归纳出农民土地退出的影响因素,即现阶段,大多数农民不愿意退出土地,但多数转户进城农民群体具备土地退出的“潜在意愿”。
3.进一步拓展了农民土地退出的政策研究视野。尝试提出了针对性的制度供给可以更有效地引导农民将退地的“潜在意愿”转化为“有效需求”的观点。以推进转户进城农民土地退出为重点,践行适度土地资本化,引导有条件的转户农民退出宅基地,同时适度保留“承包地”部分收益权能,促进农地规模经营；加强转户退地农民的公共保障产品(就业、教育、住房、社保)供给,完成农民市民化转变。
The dissertation is an emprical research on Chinese peasant's land usufruct abdication during the period of accelerating development of industrilization and urbanization. It is a key prerequisite to maintain harmonious development among industrilization, urbanlization and agriculture modernization that peasant would give back their fractional and scattered land to rural collective economic orgnization. Contemparary correlated researches elaborate the significance of peasant's land usufruct quittance, but documents which furtherly study its influential ingredients are relatively insufficient. The paper expounds, mainly on the prospect of peasant's own alternative, their real will and demands towards rural land quittance, which means in the Constitutional framework and with the principle of basic rural property and management system steady and fast, peasant voluntarily return their contracted land usufruct and residential land usufruct to rural collective economic orgnization.
ⅠQuestion Advance
According to the classical theoretical model of urban-rural dual structure initially established by A. Lewis in 1954 and amended by John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis in 1961, with peasants entering cities to pursue more job opportunities, the marginal agricultural productivity would be enhanced to the same level with the marginal non-agricultural productivity, and due to the inter-related influence, the gap between urban and rural area would be erased at last. However, it not occur in China that when peasant enter cities for better job chances, the gap between urban and rural area is enlarged, not shrinked. An explanation is:the theoritical model is based on the hypothesis on land and capital's freely flow and it is not suit for demestic real situation. Therefore, how to resovle the question on this two basic factors' free flow, are two necessary theoritical prerequirements to reduce the gap of Chinese uban and rural development. The essay, based on the peculiar prospect of land factor, focuses on how peasants voluntarily quit their wasted and scattered land which may be the necessary prerequirement to improve urban-rural land resources' use efficiency.
The core questions of the research include:If peasant voluntarily abdicate their land usufruct, is there any prerequisites? What on earth are factors to influence peasants' willingness to quit their lands? Is it exisiting any relationship between the behavior of peasant's land qittance and their agricultural census register abdication? To resovle the questions, the dissertation mainly use the methods of standard analysis as well as empirical analysis, ties to give a possible theoretical explanation.
ⅡResearch Objectives
The paper studies the issue how peasants who enter cities for non-agricultural activities abdicate their rural land usufruct.
The sub-objectives are included as following:Overall recognition of peasants'land functions; Finding out conditions and factors about peasants'quittance of their lands; An underlining research on patterns how peasants quit their lands.
The research route is:Based on look back on the correlated economic theories, the paper firstly definite its objects as well as contents; then mainly uses "behavior economy" theory, to analyze the prerequisites on peasants' land quittance; then uses the methods of standard analysis as well as empirical analysis, to analyze the factors which may influence peasants'willingness and demands on land qittance; then based on the definition of connotation and denotation on peasants' land quittance, to design a practical way as well as a sustainable development machanism for those who want to abdicate their land rights. Finally, the dissertation would give conculsions and suggestions.
ⅢResearch Contents
1.Definition of research'question, objective, methods as well as framework;
2.Overseas regions'similar experience and lessons in the similar development periods.
3.Overall analysis on peasants'land function. An critical analysis of contemporary forms on peasants'land re-distribution which are government's take over of peasants' land and peasant's land circulation in private.
4. Analysis of prerequisites on peasant's land quittance. Based on behavior economy, from the two aspects of government's stimulation and peasants'decision, the paper formulates the conditions which may give a positive influence on peasants'land quittance.
5. Based on the quiz of 2261 peasants which extract from 2500 samples in 65 villages,12 districts, in different rural areas in Chongqing, the paper ties to demonstrate ingredients which may influence peasants'willingness and demands on land quittance.
6. A design of practical ways on peasants who go into cities for non-agricultural activities want to give up their rural land rights. Based on peasants' authentic will and demands on land quittance, the paper formulates specific ways and means.
7.An extended discussion on peasants' sustainable development guarantee when they eventually give up their land rights. With combination of "state guarantee ", "rural collective organization guarantee" and " individual guarantee", the paper aims to establish a synthetic safeguarding mechanism for peasants who abandon their agricultural identity as well as rural land rights.
ⅣConclusions and Suggestions
Conclusions:
1. if government plays a positive role in guiding peasants to abdicate their land usufruct, it would be of great importance to resolve the dilemma that small-scale peasant economy reversely grows up during the period of industrialization and urbanization's accelerating development. To assimilate other counties'experiences and lessons on rural land issue in the similar phase in history, the paper concludes two enlightenments:One thing is that government should play a "visible hand" role to encourage peasants orderly return their fractional and scattered lands to rural collective economic organization; and the other thing is that adequate rural land capitalization would be necessary because it could better improve the resources use efficiency in the way of "two-polar combination" of land and finance.
2.The paper deduces that beyond peasants'private land rights, there are existing three different interest demands involved with central government, local government and peasants themselves, so rational distribution of land resources and peasants' maximum welfare is difficult to be accomplished. Furthermore, some profound reasons lies in:three external factors including unstable rural land property structure, monopoly of rural contracted land usufruct and impoverishment of peasants' sustainable development protection, as well as one internal factor which peasant will not transact their lands in private. Due to the reciprocity of factors above, the "inadequate transfer" phenomenon occurs in the behaviors of peasants' non-agricultural employment and attitudes toward their lands, in another word, when they obtain job offers in cities they don't want to quit their lands or transact them in market. The low efficiency of land resources' distribution, is the essential factor that small-scale peasant economy reversely grows up during the period of industrialization and urbanization's accelerating development.
3. The paper advocates that only when peasants orderly abdicate their land usufruct is the core factor to enhance the efficiency of land resources'distribution. Based on the hypothesis of "limited rational economic-man ",the dissertation deduced that peasants' attitude and behavior on land quittance is influenced not only by their own incentives to pursue maximum economic interests, but also by behaviors and decision made by government, especially by local government. The paper further derives six conditions to optimize peasants' decision and behavior on land quittance which include three external conditions:clear land property boundary and protection; well-established public product supply; support of policy-related rural land finance, as well as three internal conditions: steady increase of the level of peasants' non-agricultural employment and income; peasants' land property revenue beyond household output on land; peasants' cognitive competence breaking away "land insurance". The latter three conditions are based on the former three conditions, and if there are six conditions available, peasants could determine whether or not they will quit their scattered lands.
4. The essay analyzes the further ingredients on peasants' land quittance from a micro point of view on peasants' own wish and demands. The 2261 evidences in Chongqing shows:individual factor(age; education level), and family factor(amount of aged persons in family; amount of children in family; amount of lands usufructs; migrant working condition; urban house(apartment) purchase condition; average income of family), and peasants' expectation on economic compensation on land quittance are three determinative ingredients which influence peasants' decision whether or not they return their land usufruct to the rural collective economic organization. According to the investigation results:it is existing the phenomenon that "insufficient effectual demands on land quittance ", that is to say, most people do not want give up their own correlated land rights, but at the same time, most people who already enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor have a "substantial willingness on land quittance". Based on it, a reasonable way of encouraging people to quit their lands should be studied, as for those who have the real demands to quit their lands, and a new public product system on land quittance should be established which may be positive for those who have the substantial demands to quit their lands make the "Yes " decisions in future.
5. most peasants who have already enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor have a substantial willingness to quit their lands, so it is the main objective of policy making on rural lands' quittance, and government should increase institutional supply on it, to provide adequate services and insurance for those want to give up their land rights.
Suggestions:
1. Making first-phase preparation for those who enter cities for non-agricultural endeavor if they are willing to quit their rural lands. Primarily vocational education as well as skill training for rural workers in cities in the right age should be provided as public products, which would increase their ability and chances on employment. Posteriorly, in addition to this, government may encourage them to be self-employed by the means of varied facilitations.
2.Drawing up correct policies and measures in the process of peasants' rural land quittance. Firstly, the operational mechanism of peasants' residential lands' quittance should be standardized and demystified, which means peasants voluntarily quitted their lands could enjoy steady and sustaining revenues even if there be inflations in future; Secondly in the preretirement of insisting basic rural contracted land system not changed in a long term, government may try to make policies to compensate those who want to quit their contracted lands, such as land trusts, bonds and funds, to make sure that peasants given up their land titles could obtain both instant yields and option yields when land value appreciates in the process of industrialization and urbanization's rapid development.
3.Establishing sustainable insurance system for peasants in cities abandoned their rural land rights. Firstly government may speed up efforts in establishment of housing system for those in cities quitted their lands, which includes series of incentive measures such as rural-urban house exchange, public rental housing, and etc. Secondly government may provide peasants in cities quitted their lands with identical services on urban social security which includes old-age security, medical security, unemployment security and work-related injury security; Thirdly government could guide peasant in cities quitted their lands to establish their own " individual insurance " system, especially to design a sort of special fund only served for themselves, in order to avoid risks when they make livings in cities.
ⅤSubstantial innovation points
1. Based on the prospect of land transanction, the essay tries to explain the delimma that tradional dual-economy theory is not used in China, then applies behavior economy theory, analyzing conditions of peasants' land quittance, and then furtherly studies two ways of peasants' land quittance by using land property theory.
2. Based on the investigation and empirical studies, the paper tries to conclude factors on peasants' land quittance, and thinks that at the present, most peasants will not abandon their lands, but most peasants entered cities have a potential willingness to quit their lands.
3.The dissertation furtherly studies the policys on peasants' land quittance.The view explains:Peasants' substantial willingness on rural land quittance could be converted into real demands on rural land quittance if there is existing a pertinent "system supply" In order to accomplish this goal, government should focus on the very group that have a positive demand on both entering cities for non-agricultural endeavor and quitting their lands, to make policies which include two aspects:one thing is that government may encourage peasants totally to quit their wasted residential land and to reserve some rights on contracted lands in the purpose of rural and scale management, and the other thing is that government should provide them with series of public services and products including employment insurance, education, housing insurance, medical insurance and other related social insurance, to guide peasants quitted their lands to be real city residents.
引文
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[5]注：1597年虽因连续4年歉收而恢复反圈地法令,但在都铎王朝最后一次议会(1601)中,剥削阶级的舆论已倾向于最后废除反圈地法令。1607年中部各郡反圈地起义又迫使统治阶级继续采取反圈地措施。1640年资产阶级革命爆发后,剥削阶级已不再反对圈地。从1688年起,大地主掌权的政府逐渐改变政策,公开支持圈地。
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[27]注：所谓公共利益,一直缺乏界定,在实践中,政府的征地行为在很大程度上已经超过公共利益的范畴。
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[29]注：根据土地资源的稀缺性原理,土地供给具有较强的刚性,因此,在供给—需求曲线图表现为相对陡峭,为分析方便,假设土地的供给曲线无弹性。
[34]注：例如规定了土地补偿费和安置补助费两项之和最高不得超过平均亩产值的30倍,最低不得低于平均亩产值的16倍。
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[41]注：归纳起来大致有以西几种模式(童星,林闽钢,2011)：一是土地股份合作制为特征的“南海模式”,即把集体土地和农民十地承包经营权折价入股到使用农地的企业,农民按股份红：二是以十地换社保为特征的“嘉兴模式”,由政府统一征地、统一制定补偿政策、统一办理失地农民“农转非”和养老保险：三是以城乡统筹运行机制为特征的“成渝模式”：四是以农村建设用地入市为特征的“芜湖模式”,即乡镇既是土地流转的组织者,又作为中介人具体参与到流转中,农村居民按年分红；五是以加强对失地农民技能培训和办理养老保险为特征的“蓬莱模式”。
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[46]注：上海的农地流转频率偏低可能是因为上海的城镇化率比较高,农村城市化的进程加快所致。
[47]注：广东土地入股这种土地流转形式占比相对较高,占到流转十地总量的35.78,这可能是因为广东农村土地市场化的程度较高,且十地入股这种模式发源于广东,例如“南海模式”,有一定的推广基础和经验。
[48]注：《十地管理法》明确规定“土地承包期限为30年“,但由于农民十地所有权主体缺位,村民小组、行政村、乡(镇)集体经济组织等都可能成为十地所有权的事实主体。虽然《土地承包法》明确规定“十地转让权属于承包方(农户),而不是发包方”,但事实上很多村集体经济组织可以任意收回和调整土地。这种频繁的十地调整必然降低农户对土地投资的长期预期,因此,必然降低农地流转效率。(关于对十地承包的调查对参见叶剑平等,“2005年农村十地使用权调查研究—17省调查结果及政策建议”,《管理世界》,2006年第七期)
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[110]注：同注释126。
[111]注：1936年苏联宪法第120条规定了苏联人民在年老、患病及丧失劳动能力时,有享受物质保证的权利。而集体农庄庄员的正式养老保险是在1965年以后逐渐建立的。
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[5]注：1597年虽因连续4年歉收而恢复反圈地法令,但在都铎王朝最后一次议会(1601)中,剥削阶级的舆论已倾向于最后废除反圈地法令。1607年中部各郡反圈地起义又迫使统治阶级继续采取反圈地措施。1640年资产阶级革命爆发后,剥削阶级已不再反对圈地。从1688年起,大地主掌权的政府逐渐改变政策,公开支持圈地。
[6]参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第26卷,第163页。
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[9]注：如《宅地法》规定：凡忠于联邦的年满21周岁的美国公民或正在申请加入国籍的外国移民,只要交纳十美元的证件费,就可以在西部国有自由十地获得160英亩的荒地,并在该地耕种五年后.即取得这块十地的所有权。资料来源：周一良：《世界通史资料选辑》(近代部分,上册),北京：商务印书馆,1983,第360-361页,。
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[27]注：所谓公共利益,一直缺乏界定,在实践中,政府的征地行为在很大程度上已经超过公共利益的范畴。
[28]周其仁.“中国农村改革一国家和所有权关系的变化一一个经济制度变迁史的回顾(下)”,《管理世界》,1995年第四期。
[29]注：根据土地资源的稀缺性原理,土地供给具有较强的刚性,因此,在供给—需求曲线图表现为相对陡峭,为分析方便,假设土地的供给曲线无弹性。
[34]注：例如规定了土地补偿费和安置补助费两项之和最高不得超过平均亩产值的30倍,最低不得低于平均亩产值的16倍。
[35]汪振江：《农村土地产权与征收补偿问题研究》,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008,第52页
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[41]注：归纳起来大致有以西几种模式(童星,林闽钢,2011)：一是土地股份合作制为特征的“南海模式”,即把集体土地和农民十地承包经营权折价入股到使用农地的企业,农民按股份红：二是以十地换社保为特征的“嘉兴模式”,由政府统一征地、统一制定补偿政策、统一办理失地农民“农转非”和养老保险：三是以城乡统筹运行机制为特征的“成渝模式”：四是以农村建设用地入市为特征的“芜湖模式”,即乡镇既是土地流转的组织者,又作为中介人具体参与到流转中,农村居民按年分红；五是以加强对失地农民技能培训和办理养老保险为特征的“蓬莱模式”。
[42]孙永禄,杨一帆：“失地农民社会保障问题研究一基十重庆、成都两市的调查分析”,《农村经济》,2008年第二期。
[43]沈雅琴,《长期土地承租合约下农业产业及其绩效的经济学研究》,呼和浩特：内蒙古大学出版社,2005,第104页。
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[45]国土资源部土地整理中心,国土资源部十地整治重点实验室,中国农业大学编：《农用地定级估价与农地流转》.北京：中国大地出版社,2009,第242页。
[46]注：上海的农地流转频率偏低可能是因为上海的城镇化率比较高,农村城市化的进程加快所致。
[47]注：广东土地入股这种土地流转形式占比相对较高,占到流转十地总量的35.78,这可能是因为广东农村土地市场化的程度较高,且十地入股这种模式发源于广东,例如“南海模式”,有一定的推广基础和经验。
[48]注：《十地管理法》明确规定“土地承包期限为30年“,但由于农民十地所有权主体缺位,村民小组、行政村、乡(镇)集体经济组织等都可能成为十地所有权的事实主体。虽然《土地承包法》明确规定“十地转让权属于承包方(农户),而不是发包方”,但事实上很多村集体经济组织可以任意收回和调整土地。这种频繁的十地调整必然降低农户对土地投资的长期预期,因此,必然降低农地流转效率。(关于对十地承包的调查对参见叶剑平等,“2005年农村十地使用权调查研究—17省调查结果及政策建议”,《管理世界》,2006年第七期)
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[102]傅白水：“解决农民失地问题的浙江模式”,《中国改革》(农村版),2004年第七期,第21-23页。
[103]常进雄：“城市化进程中失地农民合理利益保障研究”,《中国软科学》,2004年第三期,第5-10页。
[104]蒋省三、刘守英：“土地资本化与农村工业化一广东佛山市南海经济发展调查”,《管理世界》,2003年第11期。
[105]陆福兴：“解读咸嘉模式”,《决策咨询》,2004年第十一期,第44-45贞
[106]吴次芳、鲍海君：“试谈现行征地安置的缺陷及未来改革设想”,《河南国十资源》,2003年第六期,第21-23页。
[107]张时飞、唐钧：“十地换保障：解决失地农民问题的唯一可行之策”,北京劳动保障网,2004年9月7日。
[108]宋斌文、荆玮：“城市化进程中失地农民社会保障问题研究”《理论探讨》,2004年第三期,第51-52页。
[109]吴文元、朱冬梅：“失地农民社会保障基金的设立与管理”,《财经科学》,2005年第二期,第176-180页。
[110]注：同注释126。
[111]注：1936年苏联宪法第120条规定了苏联人民在年老、患病及丧失劳动能力时,有享受物质保证的权利。而集体农庄庄员的正式养老保险是在1965年以后逐渐建立的。
[112]杨翠迎：《中国农村社会保障制度研究》,北京：中国农业出版礼,2003,第111-112页。
[113]宋士云：《中国农村社会保障制度结构域变迁(1949-2002)》,北京：人民出版社,2006,第250-254页。
[118]宋士云：《中国农村社会保障制度结构域变迁(1949-2002)》,北京：人民出版社,2006.第278-279页。
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