土地财政与住宅价格关系分析
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摘要
2010年“两会”期间温家宝总理《政府工作报告》指出要“大力整顿和规范房地产市场秩序,完善土地收入管理使用办法,抑制土地价格过快上涨”。事实上,有关土地财政与房价的问题一直以来是包括政府、房地产商、民众、专家学者和新闻媒体在内的社会各界广泛关注度的问题。
     早在1998年我国进行了房地产制度的改革,住房分配方式发生了根本的转变,原来计划经济条件下的福利分房制度转化以市场为基础的分配制度,但是由于配套政策的不完善,房地产市场出现了种种问题,其中房价过快增长是房地产市场问题的焦点。从1994年起,为了打破中央和地方各级财政同吃大锅饭、中央集权过度的局面,我国进行了分税制改革,其深度和广度都是建国来财政体制改革力度最大的一次,虽然没有能够从根本上突破“统一领导、分级管理”的财政体制,但是对原体制也有实质上的突破。在收入划分上引入了分税法,改变了以往企业按照行政隶属关系划分收入的方法,为真正实施分税分级式(分税制)财政管理体制积累了实践经验。
     新税种的设置直接改变了中央政府与地方政府间的财政分配关系,对地方政府的财政体制产生了直接影响,提高了中央财政在收入分配中的比重,而地方政府财政支出的责任却没有相应的减少,从而造成地方政府财权与事权的不匹配。正是在这种背景下,本文在理清土地财政的基本涵义及其诱因的基础上,结合分税制改革的问题,分析了土地财政与房产价格的关系。并运用北京市的相关数据进行了实证分析,分析了当前我国土地财政方面存在的主要问题。从转换政府职能,建立公共财政:优化各级政府的人事考核制度,合理改革中央政府和地方政府的财税体制,做到激励相容;规范土地出让收入管理,建立国有土地收益基金;合理确定土地供应量,理性引导储备土地供应价格;完善与土地有关的法律法规等方面提出了一些对策措施,使得本文的研究兼具理论意义与实践参考价值。
In2010, during the NPC and CPPCC, Premier Wen Jiabao's " government work report" pointed out the need to "vigorously rectify and order of normative estate market, perfect land revenue management approach, prevent the price of land from rising too fast", in fact, the land finance and real problem has been including the government, the real estate business, people, the expert scholar and news media, all sectors of the community concern problem.
     As early as in1998, China carried out the reform of real estate system, housing allocation means to produce fundamental change, the original planned economy under the conditions of the welfare housing distribution system transformation of market-based allocation system, but because the supporting policies of real estate market is not perfect, many problems have appeared, among them the excessive growth of house prices is the real estate market focus. In order to break out of the egalitarianism and statistician existing in financial departments at all levels, the government has promoted a program of Tax Distribution Reform since1994, which is the most significant measure both in the depth and extent. Although it didn't bring about a basic breakthrough in fiscal regime of unified leadership and classified management, its influence was also obvious and positive. Changing the idea that segment the income by executive affiliation.Tax Distribution Reform introduced a new principle to the division of revenue, which accumulated rich experience for promoting the new fiscal management system of Tax Distribution in future.
     The setting of new taxes changed the fiscal distribution relationship between central and local governments directly, exerting immediate influence over the latter'fiscal management system. It enhanced the proportion of the state treasury in income distribution, but the liability of fiscal expenditures wasn't reduced accordingly. As a result, the mismatch between the local governments'Public Administrative and Financial Power was formed. It is in this background, this article in the clear land finance basic meaning and causes on the basis of the reform of the tax system, combining with the problem, analysed land finance and real estate price relationship. And the use of Beijing's related data has carried on the empirical analysis, analysis of China's current land finance problems, from the conversion of government functions, the establishment of public finance; Optimize all levels of government personnel appraisal system rational reform the fiscal and taxation system of the central government and local government make incentive compatibility; normative land transfer income management, the establishment of state-owned land income fund; land supply to determine a reasonable volume, rational guidance of reserve land supply and land price; improve relevant laws and regulations and puts forward some countermeasures, so this thesis has both theoretical and practical reference value.
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