中国钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系研究
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摘要
钢铁素有“工业粮食”之称,所以,钢铁企业的经营绩效在一定程度上反映了我国国民经济的发展水平。近年来我国钢铁企业的兼并重组一方面扩大了钢铁企业的规模,同时也使其集团组织机构层次不断增多,集团风险控制难度也相应提高,这一情形恰恰反衬出钢铁企业公司治理结构与管理手段的滞后。在国有独资的产权背景下,董事会必然成为公司治理的核心,基于以上认识,我国在2004年6月颁布了《关于国有独资公司董事会建设的指导意见(试行)》,并确定了宝钢等几家企业作为国有独资公司董事会试点单位,宝钢成为第一家外部董事超过董事会成员半数的央企,同时宝钢新型董事会的建立也开启了钢铁企业董事会建设的序幕。事实证明宝钢依据“淡马锡模式”建立的新型董事会为其并购重组战略的实施和公司绩效的提升提供了强有力的管理支持和制度支持。所以,文章通过对钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的实证研究,总结出董事会特征与公司绩效的关系类型,以规范和推进钢铁行业上市公司董事会建设的进程,完善其公司治理结构,进而提高其公司绩效。
文章主要包括七章内容：
第一章为绪论,主要分析问题提出的背景、选题的理论意义及现实意义、介绍所采用的研究方法、思路、基本框架和本文的创新点。
第二章为文献综述,主要包括四个方面的内容,首先是国外关于董事会特征与公司绩效关系的理论研究,对于目前的研究成果进行重新归类和分析；其次是国内关于董事会特征与公司绩效关系研究领域的相关研究成果,分析研究成果的理论贡献及不足；第三是梳理关于钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的理论研究成果；第四是梳理关于公司绩效评价的相关研究,在借鉴和吸收前人研究成果的基础上构建文章的研究框架及思路。
第三章重点介绍董事会特征与公司绩效关系的相关概念和一般理论。首先界定了研究中的相关概念,如董事会特征、公司绩效等,并在第二章文献梳理的基础上构建了董事会特征指标体系和公司绩效评价的指标体系；其次介绍了董事会存在的理论基础：代理成本理论、资源依赖理论和内部人控制理论,进而指出董事会制度存在的必然性和必要性；最后详细分析了董事会特征对公司绩效的影响机理和表现,为第六章的实证研究构建理论框架。
第四章首先界定了董事会特征的描述变量,共六个维度二十个变量；然后以汽车业、有色金属业、石化业和物流业作为对比行业,使用非参数检验方法中的多独立样本单向方差秩检验和SPSS11.5统计软件对钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征的行业差异性进行判断；其次对2004至2008年钢铁行业上市公司董事会的特征变量进行描述性统计,指出钢铁行业上市公司董事会表现出结构偏大、职能部门设置全面、行为能力较弱、激励深度和广度较低、素质较高、稳定性较高等特征。最后作者对钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征指标体系进行了修正,指标体系由原来的六个维度二十个变量修正为五个维度十七个变量。
第五章对钢铁行业上市公司绩效进行了评价。该章在梳理现有公司绩效评价方法的基础上,选择了因子分析方法作为钢铁行业上市公司绩效评价的主要方法。文中选择了总资产利润率、每股收益(摊薄净利润)、资产收益率、净资产增长率、总资产增长率、营业收入增长率、营业利润增长率、流动比率、速动比率和市盈率等10个反映公司绩效的相关指标,通过因子分析提炼出4个公因子,分别将其命名为收益能力因子、成长能力因子、抗风险能力因子和市场评价能力因子,为第六章的深入研究做了数据准备。
第六章是钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的实证分析部分。首先介绍了变量的定义、样本选择、研究的方法和思路等问题；其次根据第三章的理论研究和实际调研及观察,提出了董事会特征与公司绩效关系的若干研究假设；第三分别以上市公司收益能力得分、成长能力得分、抗风险能力得分和市场评价能力得分为因变量,以董事会特征为自变量,构建了两者之间的线性和非线性方程,并对实证结果进行了归纳、整理和分析,对所提研究假设进行了实证检验。
第七章是研究结论与政策建议部分。在实证检验和经验分析的基础上得出了钢铁行业上市公司年度董事会会议次数与公司绩效正相关、年度内以通讯方式召开的董事会会议次数与公司绩效负相关等若干结论。然后有针对性地提出了改善钢铁行业上市公司董事会治理效率的建议,如确定与公司规模相适应的董事会规模、提高独立董事比例和激励水平、提倡董事长和总经理两职部分分离、全面提高董事会成员素质等若干对策与建议。最后指出了该项研究的局限性及需要进一步研究的问题,为后续研究提供方向。
Iron and steel known as "industrial food," So, the iron and steel enterprise performance reflects the level of development of our national economy to some extent. In recent years, the mergers and acquisitions of China's iron and steel enterprises augment the size of the iron and steel enterprises, also make the group organizations level increase at the same time, Group Risk Control is correspondingly more difficult as well, this situation reflects the iron and steel enterprise corporate governance structure and management tools lag. In the context of state-owned property, the Board is bound to become the core of corporate governance, based on the above understanding, in June 2004 China promulgated the "Board of Directors on the wholly state-owned construction guidance (Trial)", and identified Baosteel and others as a wholly state-owned enterprises Board of Directors pilot units, Baosteel become the first central enterprises which the outside director is more than half, while the establishment of Baosteel new board of directors has also opened the prelude to the construction of iron and steel board. The fact proved that Baosteel established a new board of directors based on "Temasek Model" would provide a strong support and institutional support to M & A strategy implementation and corporate performance promotion. Therefore, this article through the relationship research on board features and corporate performance of Iron and steel corporate,provides the policy recommendations for improving its corporate governance and regulating the construction of steel enterprises board, further improving their corporate performance.
This paper includes seven chapters:
Chapter one is a preface that mainly introduces the background issues, theoretical and practical significance of the topics; and also introduces the outline, content,conceptual framework and the proposed innovation points.
The chapter two is literature review, including the four aspects, the first is the literature review about foreign study on board characteristics and performance theory,the re-classification and analysis on the current research; second is for our own current situation on the board of directors and corporate performance relationship status field, mainly conducts analysis on the theoretical contributions of research and insufficient; third,sorts out the listed companies on the steel industry, board characteristics and corporate performance results of theoretical studies; fourth one sorts out the company performance evaluation studies, and constructs the framework and ideas based on the reference previous study.
The Chapter three focuses on the general theory and concepts on the relationship between the board characteristics and corporate performance. First, it introduces the concepts of the board characteristics and corporate performance; Second,it describes the theoretical basis of existing board system:the principal-agent theory, fiduciary duty theory, resource dependence theory, and then points out the existing board of directors system inevitability and necessity; Finally, it introduces the affect mechanism of the board characteristics on firm performance, constructs the theoretical framework for the empirical study.
Chapter four defines the board features variables at first, a total of six dimensions of 20 variables; then takes the automobile industry, the nonferrous metal industry, petrochemical industry and logistics industry as a comparison, using non-parametric test methods and SPSS11.5 statistical software judges the special characteristics of the industry of the listed iron and steel industry board; second,the paper conducts the characteristic variables descriptive statistics on board of directors of listed companies in the steel industry from 2004 to 2008, points out the iron and steel structure of listed companies characteristics including the board is too large, full functional department, performance is weak, the depth and breadth of motivation is lower, high-quality, higher stability and so on. Finally,the paper modifies the indicator system,the system was from the original target system "6 dimensions 20 variables" to "5 dimensions 17 variables".
The Chapter five evaluates the performance of the listed companies. In this chapter, based on the evaluation and sorting out the performance evaluation of existing companies, we choose the factor analysis as the main method of performance evaluation. The paper chooses 10 indicators including total assets profit margin, earnings per share (diluted net income), return on assets, net asset growth, total asset growth, revenue growth, operating profit growth rate, current ratio, quick ratio and price-earnings ratio, through factor analysis to extract the four common factors which are earnings capacity factor, growing capacity factor, anti-risk factors and market evaluation factors, so all the data preparation we do is for the depth study in Chapter six.
The Chapter six is an empirical analysis section about the relationship on board of directors and firm performance. First, the paper introduces the definition of variables, sample selection, research methods, approaches and other issues; Next, based on the third chapter of the theoretical study, practical research and observation, the paper put forward several assumptions about the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance; Third,the paper regards companies performance rates, corporate earnings capacity rate, Growth rates, risk-evaluation scores and market capacity as the dependent variable, board characteristics as the independent variable, constructs the linear and nonlinear equations between the dependent variable and independent variable, the empirical results are were induction, collation and analysis, the empirical test is done for the assumptions.
The Chapter seven is the part of conclusions and policy recommendations.On the basis of the empirical testing and experience analysis,we obtain several conclusions that the annual number of board meetings and corporate performance are positive correlation, the number of the board meetings of means of communication within one year and company performance negatively related to each other etc. Then the paper puts forward the proposals that improving the efficiency of listed company board governance in the iron and steel industry, such as, promoting the partly separation between chairman and general manager, improving age and increasing the proportion of independent board members and orther measures and suggestions. Final,the chapter tells us the limitations of this study and the problems which needs further study, provide direction for further study.
文章主要包括七章内容：
第一章为绪论,主要分析问题提出的背景、选题的理论意义及现实意义、介绍所采用的研究方法、思路、基本框架和本文的创新点。
第二章为文献综述,主要包括四个方面的内容,首先是国外关于董事会特征与公司绩效关系的理论研究,对于目前的研究成果进行重新归类和分析；其次是国内关于董事会特征与公司绩效关系研究领域的相关研究成果,分析研究成果的理论贡献及不足；第三是梳理关于钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的理论研究成果；第四是梳理关于公司绩效评价的相关研究,在借鉴和吸收前人研究成果的基础上构建文章的研究框架及思路。
第三章重点介绍董事会特征与公司绩效关系的相关概念和一般理论。首先界定了研究中的相关概念,如董事会特征、公司绩效等,并在第二章文献梳理的基础上构建了董事会特征指标体系和公司绩效评价的指标体系；其次介绍了董事会存在的理论基础：代理成本理论、资源依赖理论和内部人控制理论,进而指出董事会制度存在的必然性和必要性；最后详细分析了董事会特征对公司绩效的影响机理和表现,为第六章的实证研究构建理论框架。
第四章首先界定了董事会特征的描述变量,共六个维度二十个变量；然后以汽车业、有色金属业、石化业和物流业作为对比行业,使用非参数检验方法中的多独立样本单向方差秩检验和SPSS11.5统计软件对钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征的行业差异性进行判断；其次对2004至2008年钢铁行业上市公司董事会的特征变量进行描述性统计,指出钢铁行业上市公司董事会表现出结构偏大、职能部门设置全面、行为能力较弱、激励深度和广度较低、素质较高、稳定性较高等特征。最后作者对钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征指标体系进行了修正,指标体系由原来的六个维度二十个变量修正为五个维度十七个变量。
第五章对钢铁行业上市公司绩效进行了评价。该章在梳理现有公司绩效评价方法的基础上,选择了因子分析方法作为钢铁行业上市公司绩效评价的主要方法。文中选择了总资产利润率、每股收益(摊薄净利润)、资产收益率、净资产增长率、总资产增长率、营业收入增长率、营业利润增长率、流动比率、速动比率和市盈率等10个反映公司绩效的相关指标,通过因子分析提炼出4个公因子,分别将其命名为收益能力因子、成长能力因子、抗风险能力因子和市场评价能力因子,为第六章的深入研究做了数据准备。
第六章是钢铁行业上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效关系的实证分析部分。首先介绍了变量的定义、样本选择、研究的方法和思路等问题；其次根据第三章的理论研究和实际调研及观察,提出了董事会特征与公司绩效关系的若干研究假设；第三分别以上市公司收益能力得分、成长能力得分、抗风险能力得分和市场评价能力得分为因变量,以董事会特征为自变量,构建了两者之间的线性和非线性方程,并对实证结果进行了归纳、整理和分析,对所提研究假设进行了实证检验。
第七章是研究结论与政策建议部分。在实证检验和经验分析的基础上得出了钢铁行业上市公司年度董事会会议次数与公司绩效正相关、年度内以通讯方式召开的董事会会议次数与公司绩效负相关等若干结论。然后有针对性地提出了改善钢铁行业上市公司董事会治理效率的建议,如确定与公司规模相适应的董事会规模、提高独立董事比例和激励水平、提倡董事长和总经理两职部分分离、全面提高董事会成员素质等若干对策与建议。最后指出了该项研究的局限性及需要进一步研究的问题,为后续研究提供方向。
Iron and steel known as "industrial food," So, the iron and steel enterprise performance reflects the level of development of our national economy to some extent. In recent years, the mergers and acquisitions of China's iron and steel enterprises augment the size of the iron and steel enterprises, also make the group organizations level increase at the same time, Group Risk Control is correspondingly more difficult as well, this situation reflects the iron and steel enterprise corporate governance structure and management tools lag. In the context of state-owned property, the Board is bound to become the core of corporate governance, based on the above understanding, in June 2004 China promulgated the "Board of Directors on the wholly state-owned construction guidance (Trial)", and identified Baosteel and others as a wholly state-owned enterprises Board of Directors pilot units, Baosteel become the first central enterprises which the outside director is more than half, while the establishment of Baosteel new board of directors has also opened the prelude to the construction of iron and steel board. The fact proved that Baosteel established a new board of directors based on "Temasek Model" would provide a strong support and institutional support to M & A strategy implementation and corporate performance promotion. Therefore, this article through the relationship research on board features and corporate performance of Iron and steel corporate,provides the policy recommendations for improving its corporate governance and regulating the construction of steel enterprises board, further improving their corporate performance.
This paper includes seven chapters:
Chapter one is a preface that mainly introduces the background issues, theoretical and practical significance of the topics; and also introduces the outline, content,conceptual framework and the proposed innovation points.
The chapter two is literature review, including the four aspects, the first is the literature review about foreign study on board characteristics and performance theory,the re-classification and analysis on the current research; second is for our own current situation on the board of directors and corporate performance relationship status field, mainly conducts analysis on the theoretical contributions of research and insufficient; third,sorts out the listed companies on the steel industry, board characteristics and corporate performance results of theoretical studies; fourth one sorts out the company performance evaluation studies, and constructs the framework and ideas based on the reference previous study.
The Chapter three focuses on the general theory and concepts on the relationship between the board characteristics and corporate performance. First, it introduces the concepts of the board characteristics and corporate performance; Second,it describes the theoretical basis of existing board system:the principal-agent theory, fiduciary duty theory, resource dependence theory, and then points out the existing board of directors system inevitability and necessity; Finally, it introduces the affect mechanism of the board characteristics on firm performance, constructs the theoretical framework for the empirical study.
Chapter four defines the board features variables at first, a total of six dimensions of 20 variables; then takes the automobile industry, the nonferrous metal industry, petrochemical industry and logistics industry as a comparison, using non-parametric test methods and SPSS11.5 statistical software judges the special characteristics of the industry of the listed iron and steel industry board; second,the paper conducts the characteristic variables descriptive statistics on board of directors of listed companies in the steel industry from 2004 to 2008, points out the iron and steel structure of listed companies characteristics including the board is too large, full functional department, performance is weak, the depth and breadth of motivation is lower, high-quality, higher stability and so on. Finally,the paper modifies the indicator system,the system was from the original target system "6 dimensions 20 variables" to "5 dimensions 17 variables".
The Chapter five evaluates the performance of the listed companies. In this chapter, based on the evaluation and sorting out the performance evaluation of existing companies, we choose the factor analysis as the main method of performance evaluation. The paper chooses 10 indicators including total assets profit margin, earnings per share (diluted net income), return on assets, net asset growth, total asset growth, revenue growth, operating profit growth rate, current ratio, quick ratio and price-earnings ratio, through factor analysis to extract the four common factors which are earnings capacity factor, growing capacity factor, anti-risk factors and market evaluation factors, so all the data preparation we do is for the depth study in Chapter six.
The Chapter six is an empirical analysis section about the relationship on board of directors and firm performance. First, the paper introduces the definition of variables, sample selection, research methods, approaches and other issues; Next, based on the third chapter of the theoretical study, practical research and observation, the paper put forward several assumptions about the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance; Third,the paper regards companies performance rates, corporate earnings capacity rate, Growth rates, risk-evaluation scores and market capacity as the dependent variable, board characteristics as the independent variable, constructs the linear and nonlinear equations between the dependent variable and independent variable, the empirical results are were induction, collation and analysis, the empirical test is done for the assumptions.
The Chapter seven is the part of conclusions and policy recommendations.On the basis of the empirical testing and experience analysis,we obtain several conclusions that the annual number of board meetings and corporate performance are positive correlation, the number of the board meetings of means of communication within one year and company performance negatively related to each other etc. Then the paper puts forward the proposals that improving the efficiency of listed company board governance in the iron and steel industry, such as, promoting the partly separation between chairman and general manager, improving age and increasing the proportion of independent board members and orther measures and suggestions. Final,the chapter tells us the limitations of this study and the problems which needs further study, provide direction for further study.
引文
①许天戟,王用琪.面对WTO中国建筑业如何与国际接轨.西安交通大学学报(社会科学版),2001,21(1)：22-29
②中国政府网.钢铁产业调整和振兴规划[EB/OL].http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-03/20/content_ 1264318.html,2009.03.30
③凤凰网财经.08年钢铁业利润不足千亿[EB/OL].http://www.cctv32.com/992009226221015.html,2009.02.26
④《钢铁产业调整和振兴规划》在分析钢铁产业现状及当前形势的基础上,提出了6个目标和8个重点任务。6个目标分别是总量恢复到合理水平、淘汰落后产能有新突破、联合重组取得重大进展、技术进步得到较大提升、自主创新能力进一步增强、节能减排取得明显成效；8个重点任务分别是保持国内市场稳定,改善出口环境、严格控制钢铁总量,加快淘汰落后、促进企业重组,提高产业集中度、加大技术改造力度,推动技术进步、优化钢铁产业布局,统筹协调发展、调整钢材品种结构,提高产品质量、保持进口铁矿石资源稳定,整顿市场秩序、开发国内外两种资源,保障产业安全。
⑤周希增.钢铁业上市公司资产重组的回顾与展望[J].冶金管理,2002(3)：29-32
⑥陈舸,程帆.中国钢铁业并购重组分析[J].企业技术开发,2007(7)：71-73
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①根据中国证监会编制的《上市公司行业分类指引》(简称《指引》),本文将其C65项下的黑色金属冶炼及延展加工业确定为钢铁行业。从色诺芬公司治理数据库查的33家钢铁行业上市公司,除了南钢股份、大冶特钢等4家为民营公司外,其余29家均为国有控股。
②所谓“内部人控制”是指现代企业中的所有权与经营权(控制权)相分离的前提下形成的,由于所有者与经营者利益的不一致,由此导致了经营者控制公司,即“内部人控制”的现象。筹资权、投资权、人事权等都掌握在公司的经营者手中即内部人手中,股东很难对其行为进行有效的监督。股东利益与经营者利益在一定程度上存在冲突,如：经营者的短期行为、过度投资、过分的在职消费等,都在不同程度上损害了股东的长远利益,提高了代理成本。而权利的过分集中又使得“内部人”控制着会计信息的诚信程度,在经营者利益的驱动下势必会制造出诚信程度低的会计信息。
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⑤陈霞.宝钢集团新董事会结构分析[J].冶金管理.2006(9)：34-35
①刘丽.钢铁业上市公司董事会独立性分析[J].江苏科技信息,2010(1)：24-26
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①2001年8月21日,中国证监会发布了《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,标志着中国上市公司独立董事制度正式启动。详见鲁桐.独立董事制度的发展及其在中国的实践[J].世界经济.2002(6)：3-12
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①下文中各研究假设都按照公司绩效的四个维度分为四个分假设,为节约篇幅,下文不再赘述,特此说明。
②中国证监会.关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见[N].中国证券报,2001-8-22
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①这里的x1与 Y1之间的曲线形式是以10为底的对数关系,即Log函数。其余没有标注的Beta系数均表示因变量和自变量之间足线性关系。
②中国证券监督管理委员会,国家经济贸易委员会上市公司治理准则[EB/OL]. http://www.sse.com.cn/ sseportal/dmxh/gsjg_new_20070207b.pdf
①鞍钢股份有限公司.鞍钢股份有限公司2007年年报[R].15-16
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④《钢铁产业调整和振兴规划》在分析钢铁产业现状及当前形势的基础上,提出了6个目标和8个重点任务。6个目标分别是总量恢复到合理水平、淘汰落后产能有新突破、联合重组取得重大进展、技术进步得到较大提升、自主创新能力进一步增强、节能减排取得明显成效；8个重点任务分别是保持国内市场稳定,改善出口环境、严格控制钢铁总量,加快淘汰落后、促进企业重组,提高产业集中度、加大技术改造力度,推动技术进步、优化钢铁产业布局,统筹协调发展、调整钢材品种结构,提高产品质量、保持进口铁矿石资源稳定,整顿市场秩序、开发国内外两种资源,保障产业安全。
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①根据中国证监会编制的《上市公司行业分类指引》(简称《指引》),本文将其C65项下的黑色金属冶炼及延展加工业确定为钢铁行业。从色诺芬公司治理数据库查的33家钢铁行业上市公司,除了南钢股份、大冶特钢等4家为民营公司外,其余29家均为国有控股。
②所谓“内部人控制”是指现代企业中的所有权与经营权(控制权)相分离的前提下形成的,由于所有者与经营者利益的不一致,由此导致了经营者控制公司,即“内部人控制”的现象。筹资权、投资权、人事权等都掌握在公司的经营者手中即内部人手中,股东很难对其行为进行有效的监督。股东利益与经营者利益在一定程度上存在冲突,如：经营者的短期行为、过度投资、过分的在职消费等,都在不同程度上损害了股东的长远利益,提高了代理成本。而权利的过分集中又使得“内部人”控制着会计信息的诚信程度,在经营者利益的驱动下势必会制造出诚信程度低的会计信息。
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①刘丽.钢铁业上市公司董事会独立性分析[J].江苏科技信息,2010(1)：24-26
①百度百科.文献研究法[EB/OL].http://baike.baidu.com/view/1682460.htm?fr=ala0_1_1
①2001年8月21日,中国证监会发布了《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,标志着中国上市公司独立董事制度正式启动。详见鲁桐.独立董事制度的发展及其在中国的实践[J].世界经济.2002(6)：3-12
①中国社会科学院语言研究所词典编辑室.现代汉语词典[M].北京：商务印书馆,1992：1125
①陈前.基于我国上市公司经营业绩评价的实证分析[D].硕士学位论文,西南交通大学,2006
①下文中各研究假设都按照公司绩效的四个维度分为四个分假设,为节约篇幅,下文不再赘述,特此说明。
②中国证监会.关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见[N].中国证券报,2001-8-22
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①这里的x1与 Y1之间的曲线形式是以10为底的对数关系,即Log函数。其余没有标注的Beta系数均表示因变量和自变量之间足线性关系。
②中国证券监督管理委员会,国家经济贸易委员会上市公司治理准则[EB/OL]. http://www.sse.com.cn/ sseportal/dmxh/gsjg_new_20070207b.pdf
①鞍钢股份有限公司.鞍钢股份有限公司2007年年报[R].15-16
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