转轨期中国县级政府制度供给行为研究
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摘要
本论文从经济学角度研究中国转轨期县级政府制度供给行为。改革开放以来,中国面临着前所未有的经济与社会的双重转型,是当代世界最大的制度变迁试验场。理论上本是制度供给最优主体的县级政府,在制度供给实践中却步履蹒跚,表现出过多的无奈和彷徨。转轨期县级政府制度供给得力与否,将对中观县域经济社会的发展进程起决定性作用,也是宏观上发展中大国全面实现社会经济健康、稳定、和谐发展的重要基础。发挥县级政府在制度供给中的主观能动作用,既制定出合乎“天地人和”的县域经济发展制度规则,又建立防止县级政府“掠夺之手”“非理性之手”的异化行为的规范体系,是保障县级政府有效制度供给的必不可少的条件和前提。深入剖析转轨期县级政府制度供给行为的内部机理和外部影响因素,开启“内部黑箱”,使县级政府的制度供给“阳光操作”,是本研究的核心目的。
本论文主要研究三个问题:(1)为什么转轨期县级政府是制度供给的重要主体?(2)转轨期县级政府制度供给困境的根源是什么?(3)转轨期县级政府制度供给行为受哪些因素的影响?围绕上述问题,本论文在回顾和反思相关研究成果基础上,采用理论分析与实证研究相结合的方法,运用多种理论综合,构建了以行为经济学为核心的转轨期县级政府制度供给行为的理论框架,展开了对转轨期县级政府制度供给行为的经济分析。本论文的结构安排如下:
第1章即导论,旨在提出问题和介绍研究目的与内容。本章开篇指出转轨期县级政府正面临理论上的“内当家”和现实中的“小媳妇”矛盾境地。在客观评论与反思相关研究成果的基础上,本章认为理论界对转轨期县级政府制度供给行为微观运行机制缺乏深入研究,从而严重制约了目前对县级政府制度供给行为背后的根源的理解和突破思路的拓展。本章最后交代了研究方法、内容,以及可能的创新点和局限性。
第2章在研究的理论基础上构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为分析的理论框架。提出了本研究的基本假设,以此为逻辑起点,构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为分析的理论框架,交代了本研究的关键概念界定和研究程序。
第3章分析了转轨期县级政府制度供给的理论作用与地位。本章提出转轨期大国为什么需要制度供给这个基本问题,并给予理论解释,进而层层递进,论述了县级政府不仅是转轨期制度供给的主体,而且是最重要的主体。而事实也证明中国的经济增长奇迹与中央政府不断放权让利的渐进性改革过程高度相关。现在及未来相当长的一段时间内中国国情决定了制度供给的主体只能是县级政府,县级政府在制度供给过程中起着不可替代的关键性作用。
第4章分析了转轨期县级政府制度供给的初始条件。本章从宏观、中观和微观三个层面详细阐述了转轨期县级政府制度供给的初始条件,初始条件决定了县级政府制度供给的目的、速率和空间,对县级政府制度供给行为产生实质性的重大影响。
第5章论述了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为异化和非均衡性的根源,并提出了演化的可能路径。本章构建了一个县级政府制度供给的空间矩阵分析工具,利用该工具,分析了县级政府制度供给的多种可能选择集合,并探讨了转轨期制度供给异化和非均衡性的根本原因。在此分析的基础上,提出了具体可行的优化选择路径。
第6章从微观的视角构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为机理模型。本章从行为经济学的角度,构建了县级政府制度供给行为机理模型—ACM模型,提出了意愿(aspiration)、能力(capability)和策略(maneuver)三个方面对县级政府制度供给行为的影响。以ACM模型为基础,详尽分析了意愿和能力的影响因素模型和通用的三种制度供给策略选择。这章是本论文的核心重点。
第7章对转轨期县级政府制度供给的意愿进行了实证研究。本章以广东省调查的微观数据为基础,论证了县级政府制度供给意愿受感知收益、感知风险、创新氛围、外部竞争、社会舆论、群众上访等多种因素的影响。研究结果显示,感知收益是影响县级政府制度供给意愿的一个重要因素。外部市场变化对县级政府制度供给意愿具有明显影响。社会舆论会引导县级政府制度供给意愿的方向。而在转轨期现阶段社会团体是推动了而不是阻碍了县级政府制度供给的进程。
第8章从转轨期县级政府制度供给能力方面进行了实证分析。本章根据广东省的微观数据,实证分析了县级政府制度供给能力的影响因素,得出了转轨期县级政府制度供给能力包含三个维度:学习因子、实力因子和创新因子。其中学习因子是县级政府制度供给能力的第一重要影响因子,其次才是实力因子(包括权力和财力影响因素),最后才是创新因子(创新能力影响因素)。
第9章是转轨期县级政府制度供给策略的经验分析。本章以广东粤西徐闻县土地成片调整、东光“三县战略”、顺德企业产权三个制度供给案例为分析蓝本,总结出了县级政府三种不同的制度供给通用策略。通过进一步比较分析,提炼出了三种制度供给通用策略的核心机理,即都是把正式的制度安排和民众的潜在制度需求紧密结合起来,制度安排与环境变化相配套,将一种外生的制度安排转换为嵌入式的内生性制度。
第10章是一个综合性典型案例。以粤西徐闻农村经济制度供给行为作为案例,通过对徐闻农村经济制度变迁历程的系统考察,揭示徐闻县政府成功的制度供给行为的真正机理。
第11章为研究结论和政策建议。本章归纳了本研究的重要结论和观点,提出并论证了优化转轨期县级政府制度供给的发展方向和具体措旌,包括建立在广泛民意基础上的政府制度供给意愿观,提升县级政府制度供给的学习能力,合理调整中央与地方的关系,确立县级政府制度供给的法律主体地位等方面。
This dissertation researches institution supplying behaviors of county-level governments from economics point of view. Since reform policy implemented, China nowaday faces unprecedented double transitions in fields of economy and society, and it becomes one of the biggest proving grounds for institution reform in our modem world. Theoretically being a best principal parts of institution supply, county-level governments practice institution supplying behaviors slowly with more hesitations and oscillations. Whether the institution supply of county-level governments during transition period is powerful or not will dramatically determined the development process of county economy and society, and macroscopically becomes the important basis of healthy, stable and harmonious development of economy in a giant developing country. The necessary premises and conditions of ensuring effective institution supply from county-level governments are playing the functions of subjective initiative of county-level governments in institution supply, building institution regulations of county economic development according with "all factors in harmony ", and constructing a sound institution preventing behavior dissimilation by county-level governments with "snatching hands" and "unreasonable hands". The cores of this dissertation are thoroughly analyzing interior mechanism and exterior influential factors of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during transition period, and open the "interior black box" for "sunshine operation" of institution supply by county-level governments.
Three main issues will be researched by this dissertation: (1) Why are the county-level governments the principal parts of institution supply during transition period? (2) What is the rootstock of puzzledom of institution supply by county-level governments during the transition period? (3)What are the influential factors of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during the transition period? Based on above problems and reviewing relevant research productions, this dissertation builds a theoretical framework of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during the transition period with core contents of behavior economics, applying a method combining theoretical analysis with demonstration research and adopting overall multi-theories. The structure of this dissertation is presented as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction presents problems and research aim and contents. It introduces that during the transition period the county-level governments face contradictory circumstances of "big majordomo" in theory and "small daughter-in-law" in reality. Based on objective comments and reviewing relevant research results, this chapter proposes that less thorough investigation were done for microcosmic running mechanism of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period which results in severe restrictions of understanding the origin of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments and the extending of breakthrough thought. Finally chapter 1 introduces research methods, contents, innovations and limits.
Chapter 2 proposes an analytical theoretical framework for institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period based on relevant theoretical basis. The basic hypotheses are given and it becomes logical jumping-off point, then an analytical theoretical framework for institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period is built, key concepts are defined and research procedure is presented.
Chapter 3 analyzes the theoretical functions and status of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period. It presents why during transition period a giant country needs institution supply and corresponding theoretical explanations are given, then proposes that county-level governments are not only the principal parts of institution supply but also the most important parts. The practical facts prove that the miracle of Chinese economic growth is highly related to gradually reform process of discharging power and benefit by central governments for local governments. During a long period of time from now on, the principal parts of institution supply are county-level governments, it is decided by the situation of China. County-level governments play undisplaceable key roles in institution reform process.
Chapter 4 analyzes the initiative conditions of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period from macroscopical, middle, microcosmic point of view. Those initiative conditions determines the goal, speed and space of institution supply of county-level governments, and exert great material influences on institution supply behaviors of county-level governments.
Chapter 5 presents rootstock of behavior dissimilation and inequilibrium of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period and possible paths of evolution are discussed. An analytical tool of spacial matrix for institution supply of county-level governments is built and used for analyzing possible multi-sets of institution supply of county-level governments and the fundamental reasons for behavior dissimilation and inequilibrium of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period. Based on above analysis, concrete feasible optimized selective paths are proposed.
Chapter 6 constructs a mechanism model of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period from microcosmic point of view. This chapter builds an ACM model, i.e. a mechanism model of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments, from behavior economics point of view, and presents how aspiration, capability and maneuver influence the institution supply behaviors of county-level governments. Based on ACM model, influential factor model with aspiration and capability is analyzed in detail, and selections of three universal institution supply strategies are provided. This Chapter is the core of the dissertation.
Chapter 7 demonstrates the aspiration of institution supply of county governments being affected by factors such as apperception profit, apperception risk, supply atmosphere, exterior competition, public opinion, public appeal, and so on. Our research results show that apperception profit is an important factor influencing the aspiration of institution supply of county governments, and exterior market changes have obvious influence on it. If the uncertainty of institution supply is very high or there exists political risk, the aspiration of institution supply of county-level deputy will be less. Because of the unreasonable evaluation mechanism for public appeal nowadays in China, the influence by public appeal on aspiration of institution supply of county governments is negative. The public opinion will lead the direction of aspiration of institution supply of county governments. During the present transition period, the castes have promoted, not blocked the process of institution supply of county governments.
Chapter 8 presents a demonstration research on institution supply capability of county-level governments during transition period. Based on microcosmic data from Guangdong province, the influential factors of institution supply capability of county-level governments are analyzed with demonstration, and a conclusion is drawn that institution supply capability of county-level governments contain three dimensionalities: learning factor, strength factor and innovation factor. Learning factor is the first important influential factor of institution supply capability of county-level governments, the second is strength factor (including power and financial influential factors), the final is innovation factor (influential factor of innovation capability).
Chapter 9 is an experiential analysis for strategies of institution supply by county-level governments during the transition period. This chapter takes three institution supply cases of land-piecing adjustments in Xuwen county, "san xian strategies" in Dongguang and enterprise property in Shunde as original analyzing data, summarizes the general strategy for three different institution supply by county-level governments, namely executing principle, bringing principle and antecedent principle. Through further comparison and analysis, the core mechanism for the three institution supply is epurated, namely formal institution arrangements and the potential institution requirments of the mass are tightly combined together, institution arrangements match the environment changes, and a kind of exogenous institution arrangement is transformed to embeded endogenetic institution.
Chapter 10 presents a comprehensive typical case. Based on a case of rural economic institution supply behavior of Xuwen county in west of Guangdong province, the true mechanism of successful institution supply behavior by its government is revealed through institutionatical investigation of reform process of rural economic institution in Xuwen county. This chapter proposes that during the transition period county-level governments must plentifully learn and adopt civilian innovation intents for chasing benefits, actively lead, support and promote civilian inductive institution reform, and must play a good role in their own institution reform, find out the combination point with requirement of civilian inductive institution reform and finally promote the institution supply.
Chapter 11 contains research conclusions and policy suggestions. It summarizes the important conclusions and viewpoints of this dissertation, presents and proves the development directions and concrete measures for optimizing the institution supply of county-level governments during transition period, including aspiration of institution supply of county-level governments based on abroad public opinion, improving the learning capacity of institution supply of county-level governments, reasonably adjusting relations between central and local governments, confirming the legal status of principal parts of institution supply of county-level governments, and so on.
本论文主要研究三个问题:(1)为什么转轨期县级政府是制度供给的重要主体?(2)转轨期县级政府制度供给困境的根源是什么?(3)转轨期县级政府制度供给行为受哪些因素的影响?围绕上述问题,本论文在回顾和反思相关研究成果基础上,采用理论分析与实证研究相结合的方法,运用多种理论综合,构建了以行为经济学为核心的转轨期县级政府制度供给行为的理论框架,展开了对转轨期县级政府制度供给行为的经济分析。本论文的结构安排如下:
第1章即导论,旨在提出问题和介绍研究目的与内容。本章开篇指出转轨期县级政府正面临理论上的“内当家”和现实中的“小媳妇”矛盾境地。在客观评论与反思相关研究成果的基础上,本章认为理论界对转轨期县级政府制度供给行为微观运行机制缺乏深入研究,从而严重制约了目前对县级政府制度供给行为背后的根源的理解和突破思路的拓展。本章最后交代了研究方法、内容,以及可能的创新点和局限性。
第2章在研究的理论基础上构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为分析的理论框架。提出了本研究的基本假设,以此为逻辑起点,构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为分析的理论框架,交代了本研究的关键概念界定和研究程序。
第3章分析了转轨期县级政府制度供给的理论作用与地位。本章提出转轨期大国为什么需要制度供给这个基本问题,并给予理论解释,进而层层递进,论述了县级政府不仅是转轨期制度供给的主体,而且是最重要的主体。而事实也证明中国的经济增长奇迹与中央政府不断放权让利的渐进性改革过程高度相关。现在及未来相当长的一段时间内中国国情决定了制度供给的主体只能是县级政府,县级政府在制度供给过程中起着不可替代的关键性作用。
第4章分析了转轨期县级政府制度供给的初始条件。本章从宏观、中观和微观三个层面详细阐述了转轨期县级政府制度供给的初始条件,初始条件决定了县级政府制度供给的目的、速率和空间,对县级政府制度供给行为产生实质性的重大影响。
第5章论述了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为异化和非均衡性的根源,并提出了演化的可能路径。本章构建了一个县级政府制度供给的空间矩阵分析工具,利用该工具,分析了县级政府制度供给的多种可能选择集合,并探讨了转轨期制度供给异化和非均衡性的根本原因。在此分析的基础上,提出了具体可行的优化选择路径。
第6章从微观的视角构造了转轨期县级政府制度供给行为机理模型。本章从行为经济学的角度,构建了县级政府制度供给行为机理模型—ACM模型,提出了意愿(aspiration)、能力(capability)和策略(maneuver)三个方面对县级政府制度供给行为的影响。以ACM模型为基础,详尽分析了意愿和能力的影响因素模型和通用的三种制度供给策略选择。这章是本论文的核心重点。
第7章对转轨期县级政府制度供给的意愿进行了实证研究。本章以广东省调查的微观数据为基础,论证了县级政府制度供给意愿受感知收益、感知风险、创新氛围、外部竞争、社会舆论、群众上访等多种因素的影响。研究结果显示,感知收益是影响县级政府制度供给意愿的一个重要因素。外部市场变化对县级政府制度供给意愿具有明显影响。社会舆论会引导县级政府制度供给意愿的方向。而在转轨期现阶段社会团体是推动了而不是阻碍了县级政府制度供给的进程。
第8章从转轨期县级政府制度供给能力方面进行了实证分析。本章根据广东省的微观数据,实证分析了县级政府制度供给能力的影响因素,得出了转轨期县级政府制度供给能力包含三个维度:学习因子、实力因子和创新因子。其中学习因子是县级政府制度供给能力的第一重要影响因子,其次才是实力因子(包括权力和财力影响因素),最后才是创新因子(创新能力影响因素)。
第9章是转轨期县级政府制度供给策略的经验分析。本章以广东粤西徐闻县土地成片调整、东光“三县战略”、顺德企业产权三个制度供给案例为分析蓝本,总结出了县级政府三种不同的制度供给通用策略。通过进一步比较分析,提炼出了三种制度供给通用策略的核心机理,即都是把正式的制度安排和民众的潜在制度需求紧密结合起来,制度安排与环境变化相配套,将一种外生的制度安排转换为嵌入式的内生性制度。
第10章是一个综合性典型案例。以粤西徐闻农村经济制度供给行为作为案例,通过对徐闻农村经济制度变迁历程的系统考察,揭示徐闻县政府成功的制度供给行为的真正机理。
第11章为研究结论和政策建议。本章归纳了本研究的重要结论和观点,提出并论证了优化转轨期县级政府制度供给的发展方向和具体措旌,包括建立在广泛民意基础上的政府制度供给意愿观,提升县级政府制度供给的学习能力,合理调整中央与地方的关系,确立县级政府制度供给的法律主体地位等方面。
This dissertation researches institution supplying behaviors of county-level governments from economics point of view. Since reform policy implemented, China nowaday faces unprecedented double transitions in fields of economy and society, and it becomes one of the biggest proving grounds for institution reform in our modem world. Theoretically being a best principal parts of institution supply, county-level governments practice institution supplying behaviors slowly with more hesitations and oscillations. Whether the institution supply of county-level governments during transition period is powerful or not will dramatically determined the development process of county economy and society, and macroscopically becomes the important basis of healthy, stable and harmonious development of economy in a giant developing country. The necessary premises and conditions of ensuring effective institution supply from county-level governments are playing the functions of subjective initiative of county-level governments in institution supply, building institution regulations of county economic development according with "all factors in harmony ", and constructing a sound institution preventing behavior dissimilation by county-level governments with "snatching hands" and "unreasonable hands". The cores of this dissertation are thoroughly analyzing interior mechanism and exterior influential factors of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during transition period, and open the "interior black box" for "sunshine operation" of institution supply by county-level governments.
Three main issues will be researched by this dissertation: (1) Why are the county-level governments the principal parts of institution supply during transition period? (2) What is the rootstock of puzzledom of institution supply by county-level governments during the transition period? (3)What are the influential factors of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during the transition period? Based on above problems and reviewing relevant research productions, this dissertation builds a theoretical framework of institution supply behaviors by county-level governments during the transition period with core contents of behavior economics, applying a method combining theoretical analysis with demonstration research and adopting overall multi-theories. The structure of this dissertation is presented as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction presents problems and research aim and contents. It introduces that during the transition period the county-level governments face contradictory circumstances of "big majordomo" in theory and "small daughter-in-law" in reality. Based on objective comments and reviewing relevant research results, this chapter proposes that less thorough investigation were done for microcosmic running mechanism of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period which results in severe restrictions of understanding the origin of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments and the extending of breakthrough thought. Finally chapter 1 introduces research methods, contents, innovations and limits.
Chapter 2 proposes an analytical theoretical framework for institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period based on relevant theoretical basis. The basic hypotheses are given and it becomes logical jumping-off point, then an analytical theoretical framework for institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period is built, key concepts are defined and research procedure is presented.
Chapter 3 analyzes the theoretical functions and status of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period. It presents why during transition period a giant country needs institution supply and corresponding theoretical explanations are given, then proposes that county-level governments are not only the principal parts of institution supply but also the most important parts. The practical facts prove that the miracle of Chinese economic growth is highly related to gradually reform process of discharging power and benefit by central governments for local governments. During a long period of time from now on, the principal parts of institution supply are county-level governments, it is decided by the situation of China. County-level governments play undisplaceable key roles in institution reform process.
Chapter 4 analyzes the initiative conditions of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period from macroscopical, middle, microcosmic point of view. Those initiative conditions determines the goal, speed and space of institution supply of county-level governments, and exert great material influences on institution supply behaviors of county-level governments.
Chapter 5 presents rootstock of behavior dissimilation and inequilibrium of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period and possible paths of evolution are discussed. An analytical tool of spacial matrix for institution supply of county-level governments is built and used for analyzing possible multi-sets of institution supply of county-level governments and the fundamental reasons for behavior dissimilation and inequilibrium of institution supply of county-level governments during transition period. Based on above analysis, concrete feasible optimized selective paths are proposed.
Chapter 6 constructs a mechanism model of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments during transition period from microcosmic point of view. This chapter builds an ACM model, i.e. a mechanism model of institution supply behaviors of county-level governments, from behavior economics point of view, and presents how aspiration, capability and maneuver influence the institution supply behaviors of county-level governments. Based on ACM model, influential factor model with aspiration and capability is analyzed in detail, and selections of three universal institution supply strategies are provided. This Chapter is the core of the dissertation.
Chapter 7 demonstrates the aspiration of institution supply of county governments being affected by factors such as apperception profit, apperception risk, supply atmosphere, exterior competition, public opinion, public appeal, and so on. Our research results show that apperception profit is an important factor influencing the aspiration of institution supply of county governments, and exterior market changes have obvious influence on it. If the uncertainty of institution supply is very high or there exists political risk, the aspiration of institution supply of county-level deputy will be less. Because of the unreasonable evaluation mechanism for public appeal nowadays in China, the influence by public appeal on aspiration of institution supply of county governments is negative. The public opinion will lead the direction of aspiration of institution supply of county governments. During the present transition period, the castes have promoted, not blocked the process of institution supply of county governments.
Chapter 8 presents a demonstration research on institution supply capability of county-level governments during transition period. Based on microcosmic data from Guangdong province, the influential factors of institution supply capability of county-level governments are analyzed with demonstration, and a conclusion is drawn that institution supply capability of county-level governments contain three dimensionalities: learning factor, strength factor and innovation factor. Learning factor is the first important influential factor of institution supply capability of county-level governments, the second is strength factor (including power and financial influential factors), the final is innovation factor (influential factor of innovation capability).
Chapter 9 is an experiential analysis for strategies of institution supply by county-level governments during the transition period. This chapter takes three institution supply cases of land-piecing adjustments in Xuwen county, "san xian strategies" in Dongguang and enterprise property in Shunde as original analyzing data, summarizes the general strategy for three different institution supply by county-level governments, namely executing principle, bringing principle and antecedent principle. Through further comparison and analysis, the core mechanism for the three institution supply is epurated, namely formal institution arrangements and the potential institution requirments of the mass are tightly combined together, institution arrangements match the environment changes, and a kind of exogenous institution arrangement is transformed to embeded endogenetic institution.
Chapter 10 presents a comprehensive typical case. Based on a case of rural economic institution supply behavior of Xuwen county in west of Guangdong province, the true mechanism of successful institution supply behavior by its government is revealed through institutionatical investigation of reform process of rural economic institution in Xuwen county. This chapter proposes that during the transition period county-level governments must plentifully learn and adopt civilian innovation intents for chasing benefits, actively lead, support and promote civilian inductive institution reform, and must play a good role in their own institution reform, find out the combination point with requirement of civilian inductive institution reform and finally promote the institution supply.
Chapter 11 contains research conclusions and policy suggestions. It summarizes the important conclusions and viewpoints of this dissertation, presents and proves the development directions and concrete measures for optimizing the institution supply of county-level governments during transition period, including aspiration of institution supply of county-level governments based on abroad public opinion, improving the learning capacity of institution supply of county-level governments, reasonably adjusting relations between central and local governments, confirming the legal status of principal parts of institution supply of county-level governments, and so on.
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