财政转移支付政策效应研究
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摘要
作为一个单一制国家,中国中央财政所承担的两大职能—维护宏观经济稳定和实现收入分配公平—需要由地方各级政府去具体执行,而转移支付是体现中央政府财政意图的重要财政工具。从分税制改革以来,中央财政转移支付资金的规模不断增大,特别是近年来在一般性转移支付和专项转移支付方面的资金增长都非常迅速。本文要研究的正是这样一个问题,即中央的财政政策目标能在地方基层政府,即县级政府得到实现吗?县级政府是否会执行上级的财政政策?地方政府在执行上级政策时是真的“上有政策,下有对策”么?本文将通过主要的财政政策工具---转移支付的分配过程和支出去向来对此问题进行研究。主要采用嵌入式混合研究方法,以江西省为个案进行实证研究。
本文的分析框架是:“官本位”影响下的官员利益最大化理论。它的主要理论基础有三:公共选择理论、以行动者为中心的新制度主义理论、委托—代理理论。这一理论框架的主要内容是:官员作为一个理性人是追求个人利益最大化的,而官本位的传统意识及官员巨大的在职消费和自由裁量权,使得追求晋升或保持连任成为官员的最大利益。上级政府为了保证政策的实施会以绩效考核来考察官员,因此在追求预算最大化的同时,获取政绩和完成上级考核目标就会成为官员的直接追求。基于这一理论框架,根据中央财政政策的变化情况,本文要提出的理论假设是:在当前的制度约束下,出于追求晋升或寻求连任的需要,县级政府会执行上级的财政政策。
具体来说就是:2001年前,在中央政府强调“经济政绩”考核,提出“一要吃饭,二要建设”的要求下,县级政府对经济建设支出,行政管理支出、公共安全支出会极为重视;而对不能短期内体现政绩的教育支出、社会保障、医疗卫生等公共产品,县级政府只会满足其基本需求。
2002年以后,在中央政府转向重视公共服务,提出财政支出要“保工资、保运转、保稳定、保民生、保重点”的要求后,行政管理费、公共安全支出、卫生医疗支出和教育支出等公共支出会明显地受到重视,而经济建设支出作为“政绩”的重要体现,仍是政府支出的重点。
通过对江西省2001年、2005年截面数据和1996-2005年的面板数据的多元回归分析的结果表明:在2001年前,中央财政强调地方财政要做到“一要吃饭,二要建设”,2001年后,中央财政政策对地方财政的要求是“保工资、保运转、保稳定、保重点”。这些政策在财力性转移支付和专项转移支付的使用上得到了较好的体现。而各类财政资金对经济建设的一以贯之的重视,体现了县级政府“以经济建设为中心,发展是第一要务”的政绩观。
再次通过对江西省D县及其C乡的实地调研结果也表明:县级政府在分配财政资金时,对专项补助会基本做到专款专用,并会在财力允许的情况下,尽量留足相应的配套资金。而对其他资金的使用则是以“保工资、保运转”,即保证人员经费和公用经费为第一目标,所有的财政收入要首先确保人员工资和机构运转的需要。在确保这些基本的财政支出后,剩余的资金会被县里主要领导投入到市政建设等容易体现“政绩”的项目中去。在乡镇层面,对于那些财政困难的乡镇来说,财政支出主要依赖上级的补助,因而使得它们几乎成了县级政府的职能部门,“乡财县管乡用”的财政体制进一步强化了县级政府对乡镇的控制能力,乡级政府的财政支出自主权非常少。因此获得上级的额外财力支持就成为乡镇主要领导的重要工作内容。他们会尽量去争取各类财政资金,然后把它们用于满足乡镇“保工资、保运转”的需要。除此之外,出于“政绩”的需要,他们也会将有限的可支配财力用在有亮点的“政绩”工程中去,这些工程会在间接上对地方的经济发展和农民增收产生积极影响。
全文的结论是:在当前的政府体制下,上级的政策目标,包括中央政府的财政政策目标在地方政府,包括基层的县级政府层面都会得到较好的实施。当然在实施过程中会有一些变通或选择性执行的可能,但这些可能并不会改变中央政策得到执行的基本事实。在现有的制度框架下,为更好地实现中央的财政政策目标,特别是要充分发挥转移支付的作用,本文提出了如下政策建议:一是要完善政府间财政体制,解决好纵向政府间的“职责同构”问题;二是要扩大公民参与,完善预算管理体制。
本文的主要创新:研究方法上的创新,采用嵌入式研究方法将定量研究与定性研究混合起来,研究财政转移支付的效应。研究内容上的创新,以转移支付的影响效应为视角,来研究中央财政政策目标在基层政府的实现情况;并将转移支付分为两类,来分别考察它们对县级政府各类主要公共支出的影响。另外还通过实地调研方法,对乡政府的转移支付过程,即乡政府是如何获得转移支付资金,并如何使用的作了深入的研究,特别是较为全面地了解了乡政府在农业税取消前后的支出责任和财政收支状况,掌握了大量的第一手资料。理论上的创新,建立了一个“官本位”影响下的官员利益最大化理论的分析框架,以转移支付在县级政府的政策效应为视角,从经验层面上描述并解释了中央财政政策在县级层面上得到了基本实现的事实,有助于我们进一步深入地理解,为什么在财政支出分权程度非常高的当下中国,中央的政策能够在地方基层政府得到基本实现,中央政府仍然维持着它在地方上的权威。
China as one of unitary countries, the two major responsibilities of Centre government—maintaining macro-economy stability and achieving income distribution equality—need to be implemented by local governments at all levels. Fiscal transfers are one of the most important fiscal tools for reflecting the centre governmental financial targets. Since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, the fund size of fiscal transfers from center has been enlarged gradually. Then comes the question:how can the centre governmental fiscal policy target be realized at the grass—roots governments,i.e. county governments? Whether will the counties execute them? Whether are there really "the centre having its policies, but the local having their counter-strategies, (shang you Zhengce,xia you duice)",when the lower governments carry out the superior 's policies? The dissertation employs the nested analysis as a mixed—method strategy to study them through the distribution process and the expenditure orientation of fiscal transfers in Jiangxi Province.
What the main analysis framework is : bureaucratic interest maximization based on the official standard(guan benwei). Which founded on a basic of three kinds of main theories: Public Choice, Agency—Centered New Institutionalism, Principal—Agent theory. The framework main contents: official as an economic man will chase their self interest maximization. As an official in China governments, their maximum self interest is chasing promotion or another term of office, because of the traditional impact of official standard, the vast incumbent public money expenditures and the immense official discretions. In order to make sure of the policies will be carried out, the upper—level governments will assess the inferior officials' performances. So the latter have to work out policy performances(zhengji) and fulfill the assessment goals to enjoy their leaders, besides chasing the budgetary maximization.
Based on the theory framework, according to the changing of center fiscal policies, we can bring forward the article's hypothesis: for position promotion or chasing next official term, the county government main officials will implement the fiscal policies from upper—level governments.
To be more concrete, that means: before 2001, under the center requirement of "firstly assure having meals, secondly assure development"(yi yao chifan, er yao jianshe)",the centre government emphasized the assessment of "economic performance", So the county governments overvalued the expenditures on economical construction, administrative management, and public security. As to other public expenditures, which can not reflect short-term policy performances, such as public medicine service, compulsory education, social security, will only be met basic demands.
But started form 2002, the center have changed to emphasize public services, required the fiscal expenditures must "to make sure of salary, government operation, social stability, social welfare, key expenditures", then the county governments would emphasize the expenditures on administrative management, public security, medicine service, and compulsory education. Economic construction, as the important symbol of "policy performance", still was the expenditure priority.
The cross section data in 2001, 2005, and the panel data over the 1996—2005 period, those come from 80 counties in Jiangxi Province, were employed to test the hypothesis respectively. These models' estimate findings indicate that, before 2001, the center finance policies had emphasized that local fiscal must achieve "firstly assure having meals, secondly assure development"(yi yao chifan, er yao jianshe)",after then, its emphases turned to "make sure of salary, government operation, social stability, social welfare, key expenditures", which all had been fulfilled from the distribution anger of the block transfers and earmarked transfers(special transfers),and the counties' finance had always emphasized the expenditures on economic construction, reflecting the county governmental policy performances (zhengji)view of " economic construction is the central point, and development is the first task".
The field surveys from "D "County and its"C" township in Jiangxi Province also support these arguements. When the fiscal fund was distributed by the county governments, the special transfers basically were used to the appointed field. And the county governments also set aside corresponding matching fund under the circumstance of self finance is enough. As to other fiscal fund, they will be firstly used to make sure of salaries and governmental operation. That is, assuring the government employees' salaries and public fund is the preference purpose. Then, the remainders may be fund some programs which easier be appreciated by the superior leaders, such as urban infrastructures.
At the township level, especially the poverty ones, their expenditures depended heavily on the upper—level subsidies, which make them be an executive organizations of county governments, and the fiscal system of "township finance is managed by county but used by township(xiangcai xianguang xiangyong)", further strengthens the county's control to the township governments. So, the township governments have to try their best to apply for extra fiscal transfers from every upper-level governments. They make efforts to apply for all kinds of fiscal fund, then use them to meet the demands of "make sure of salary and governmental operation". In addition, they also use some of the "begged funds" to the "highlight dot (liangdian)" program, which can be appraised by their leaders, but these programs sometimes indirectly influence the local economic development and the peasant's income growth.
The dissertation concludes: in the current government system, the upper-level government policy targets, including the center fiscal policies' will gain good implementation at every level local governments, also including the grassroots levels, county governments. Certainly, during the process of implementing, there are some possibilities of alterative or elective enforcements, but they can not change the basic facts that the center policies have been enforced at the grassroots levels. Under the current system framework, in order to better realize the center government policy targets, especially make good use of the fiscal transfers, some suggestions are given: one, we should make the intergovernmental fiscal system better, solve the problem of "Isomorphic Responsibility"; two, enlarge the citizen involvements, and improve the budgetary management system.
The main innovation points in this dissertation:first of all, the research methodology innovation, the nested analysis methodology is employed to combine the qualitative research with the quantitative research, then to explore the effect of fiscal transfers. Second, the research content innovation, take the transfers' policy effect as a research angle, the paper studies the implementation status of the center fiscal policy targets at the local governments' levels, in order to do so, the fiscal transfers are divided into two halves to interpret their impacts on every kind of county governments' public expenditures respectively. In addition, in the way of field surveys, we explore the township governmental process of fiscal transfers, i.e. how the township gains its grants and uses them, and learn thoroughly the township government expenditure responsibilities and its current fiscal situation. Third, theoretic innovation, take the policy effect of fiscal transfers as a researching angle, a analysis framework—bureaucratic interest maximization based on the official standard(guan benwei) is constructed to explore and explain the facts that the center fiscal policies have been exerted at the county level, which helps us better understand, although the degree of fiscal decentralization is very high in China, as a unitary country, why the center government policies can be implemented at the grassroots levels, the center still holds the authority over the local governments.
本文的分析框架是:“官本位”影响下的官员利益最大化理论。它的主要理论基础有三:公共选择理论、以行动者为中心的新制度主义理论、委托—代理理论。这一理论框架的主要内容是:官员作为一个理性人是追求个人利益最大化的,而官本位的传统意识及官员巨大的在职消费和自由裁量权,使得追求晋升或保持连任成为官员的最大利益。上级政府为了保证政策的实施会以绩效考核来考察官员,因此在追求预算最大化的同时,获取政绩和完成上级考核目标就会成为官员的直接追求。基于这一理论框架,根据中央财政政策的变化情况,本文要提出的理论假设是:在当前的制度约束下,出于追求晋升或寻求连任的需要,县级政府会执行上级的财政政策。
具体来说就是:2001年前,在中央政府强调“经济政绩”考核,提出“一要吃饭,二要建设”的要求下,县级政府对经济建设支出,行政管理支出、公共安全支出会极为重视;而对不能短期内体现政绩的教育支出、社会保障、医疗卫生等公共产品,县级政府只会满足其基本需求。
2002年以后,在中央政府转向重视公共服务,提出财政支出要“保工资、保运转、保稳定、保民生、保重点”的要求后,行政管理费、公共安全支出、卫生医疗支出和教育支出等公共支出会明显地受到重视,而经济建设支出作为“政绩”的重要体现,仍是政府支出的重点。
通过对江西省2001年、2005年截面数据和1996-2005年的面板数据的多元回归分析的结果表明:在2001年前,中央财政强调地方财政要做到“一要吃饭,二要建设”,2001年后,中央财政政策对地方财政的要求是“保工资、保运转、保稳定、保重点”。这些政策在财力性转移支付和专项转移支付的使用上得到了较好的体现。而各类财政资金对经济建设的一以贯之的重视,体现了县级政府“以经济建设为中心,发展是第一要务”的政绩观。
再次通过对江西省D县及其C乡的实地调研结果也表明:县级政府在分配财政资金时,对专项补助会基本做到专款专用,并会在财力允许的情况下,尽量留足相应的配套资金。而对其他资金的使用则是以“保工资、保运转”,即保证人员经费和公用经费为第一目标,所有的财政收入要首先确保人员工资和机构运转的需要。在确保这些基本的财政支出后,剩余的资金会被县里主要领导投入到市政建设等容易体现“政绩”的项目中去。在乡镇层面,对于那些财政困难的乡镇来说,财政支出主要依赖上级的补助,因而使得它们几乎成了县级政府的职能部门,“乡财县管乡用”的财政体制进一步强化了县级政府对乡镇的控制能力,乡级政府的财政支出自主权非常少。因此获得上级的额外财力支持就成为乡镇主要领导的重要工作内容。他们会尽量去争取各类财政资金,然后把它们用于满足乡镇“保工资、保运转”的需要。除此之外,出于“政绩”的需要,他们也会将有限的可支配财力用在有亮点的“政绩”工程中去,这些工程会在间接上对地方的经济发展和农民增收产生积极影响。
全文的结论是:在当前的政府体制下,上级的政策目标,包括中央政府的财政政策目标在地方政府,包括基层的县级政府层面都会得到较好的实施。当然在实施过程中会有一些变通或选择性执行的可能,但这些可能并不会改变中央政策得到执行的基本事实。在现有的制度框架下,为更好地实现中央的财政政策目标,特别是要充分发挥转移支付的作用,本文提出了如下政策建议:一是要完善政府间财政体制,解决好纵向政府间的“职责同构”问题;二是要扩大公民参与,完善预算管理体制。
本文的主要创新:研究方法上的创新,采用嵌入式研究方法将定量研究与定性研究混合起来,研究财政转移支付的效应。研究内容上的创新,以转移支付的影响效应为视角,来研究中央财政政策目标在基层政府的实现情况;并将转移支付分为两类,来分别考察它们对县级政府各类主要公共支出的影响。另外还通过实地调研方法,对乡政府的转移支付过程,即乡政府是如何获得转移支付资金,并如何使用的作了深入的研究,特别是较为全面地了解了乡政府在农业税取消前后的支出责任和财政收支状况,掌握了大量的第一手资料。理论上的创新,建立了一个“官本位”影响下的官员利益最大化理论的分析框架,以转移支付在县级政府的政策效应为视角,从经验层面上描述并解释了中央财政政策在县级层面上得到了基本实现的事实,有助于我们进一步深入地理解,为什么在财政支出分权程度非常高的当下中国,中央的政策能够在地方基层政府得到基本实现,中央政府仍然维持着它在地方上的权威。
China as one of unitary countries, the two major responsibilities of Centre government—maintaining macro-economy stability and achieving income distribution equality—need to be implemented by local governments at all levels. Fiscal transfers are one of the most important fiscal tools for reflecting the centre governmental financial targets. Since the reform of tax-sharing system in 1994, the fund size of fiscal transfers from center has been enlarged gradually. Then comes the question:how can the centre governmental fiscal policy target be realized at the grass—roots governments,i.e. county governments? Whether will the counties execute them? Whether are there really "the centre having its policies, but the local having their counter-strategies, (shang you Zhengce,xia you duice)",when the lower governments carry out the superior 's policies? The dissertation employs the nested analysis as a mixed—method strategy to study them through the distribution process and the expenditure orientation of fiscal transfers in Jiangxi Province.
What the main analysis framework is : bureaucratic interest maximization based on the official standard(guan benwei). Which founded on a basic of three kinds of main theories: Public Choice, Agency—Centered New Institutionalism, Principal—Agent theory. The framework main contents: official as an economic man will chase their self interest maximization. As an official in China governments, their maximum self interest is chasing promotion or another term of office, because of the traditional impact of official standard, the vast incumbent public money expenditures and the immense official discretions. In order to make sure of the policies will be carried out, the upper—level governments will assess the inferior officials' performances. So the latter have to work out policy performances(zhengji) and fulfill the assessment goals to enjoy their leaders, besides chasing the budgetary maximization.
Based on the theory framework, according to the changing of center fiscal policies, we can bring forward the article's hypothesis: for position promotion or chasing next official term, the county government main officials will implement the fiscal policies from upper—level governments.
To be more concrete, that means: before 2001, under the center requirement of "firstly assure having meals, secondly assure development"(yi yao chifan, er yao jianshe)",the centre government emphasized the assessment of "economic performance", So the county governments overvalued the expenditures on economical construction, administrative management, and public security. As to other public expenditures, which can not reflect short-term policy performances, such as public medicine service, compulsory education, social security, will only be met basic demands.
But started form 2002, the center have changed to emphasize public services, required the fiscal expenditures must "to make sure of salary, government operation, social stability, social welfare, key expenditures", then the county governments would emphasize the expenditures on administrative management, public security, medicine service, and compulsory education. Economic construction, as the important symbol of "policy performance", still was the expenditure priority.
The cross section data in 2001, 2005, and the panel data over the 1996—2005 period, those come from 80 counties in Jiangxi Province, were employed to test the hypothesis respectively. These models' estimate findings indicate that, before 2001, the center finance policies had emphasized that local fiscal must achieve "firstly assure having meals, secondly assure development"(yi yao chifan, er yao jianshe)",after then, its emphases turned to "make sure of salary, government operation, social stability, social welfare, key expenditures", which all had been fulfilled from the distribution anger of the block transfers and earmarked transfers(special transfers),and the counties' finance had always emphasized the expenditures on economic construction, reflecting the county governmental policy performances (zhengji)view of " economic construction is the central point, and development is the first task".
The field surveys from "D "County and its"C" township in Jiangxi Province also support these arguements. When the fiscal fund was distributed by the county governments, the special transfers basically were used to the appointed field. And the county governments also set aside corresponding matching fund under the circumstance of self finance is enough. As to other fiscal fund, they will be firstly used to make sure of salaries and governmental operation. That is, assuring the government employees' salaries and public fund is the preference purpose. Then, the remainders may be fund some programs which easier be appreciated by the superior leaders, such as urban infrastructures.
At the township level, especially the poverty ones, their expenditures depended heavily on the upper—level subsidies, which make them be an executive organizations of county governments, and the fiscal system of "township finance is managed by county but used by township(xiangcai xianguang xiangyong)", further strengthens the county's control to the township governments. So, the township governments have to try their best to apply for extra fiscal transfers from every upper-level governments. They make efforts to apply for all kinds of fiscal fund, then use them to meet the demands of "make sure of salary and governmental operation". In addition, they also use some of the "begged funds" to the "highlight dot (liangdian)" program, which can be appraised by their leaders, but these programs sometimes indirectly influence the local economic development and the peasant's income growth.
The dissertation concludes: in the current government system, the upper-level government policy targets, including the center fiscal policies' will gain good implementation at every level local governments, also including the grassroots levels, county governments. Certainly, during the process of implementing, there are some possibilities of alterative or elective enforcements, but they can not change the basic facts that the center policies have been enforced at the grassroots levels. Under the current system framework, in order to better realize the center government policy targets, especially make good use of the fiscal transfers, some suggestions are given: one, we should make the intergovernmental fiscal system better, solve the problem of "Isomorphic Responsibility"; two, enlarge the citizen involvements, and improve the budgetary management system.
The main innovation points in this dissertation:first of all, the research methodology innovation, the nested analysis methodology is employed to combine the qualitative research with the quantitative research, then to explore the effect of fiscal transfers. Second, the research content innovation, take the transfers' policy effect as a research angle, the paper studies the implementation status of the center fiscal policy targets at the local governments' levels, in order to do so, the fiscal transfers are divided into two halves to interpret their impacts on every kind of county governments' public expenditures respectively. In addition, in the way of field surveys, we explore the township governmental process of fiscal transfers, i.e. how the township gains its grants and uses them, and learn thoroughly the township government expenditure responsibilities and its current fiscal situation. Third, theoretic innovation, take the policy effect of fiscal transfers as a researching angle, a analysis framework—bureaucratic interest maximization based on the official standard(guan benwei) is constructed to explore and explain the facts that the center fiscal policies have been exerted at the county level, which helps us better understand, although the degree of fiscal decentralization is very high in China, as a unitary country, why the center government policies can be implemented at the grassroots levels, the center still holds the authority over the local governments.
引文
[1]国家统计局编.中国统计年鉴[M].中国财政科学出版社2007
[2]具体可见《江苏省关于县分税制财政管理体制的实施办法》(苏政发[1994]58号)。
[1]数据来自国家统计局编的.中国财政年鉴-2006.中国统计出版社。
[2]由于制度外财力的不可预计性和数据的不可得,在这里我们忽略制度外财力和部分没有纳入预算内管理的预算外资金的影响。
[1]新华社.2006年中央对地方财政转移支付达到9143.55亿元.中华人民共和国中央人民政府网2007-6-28 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-06/28/content_664552.htm
[1]详见2005年11月14日的《中国青年报》。
[1]邓小平文选:第3卷.北京:人民出版社,1993:355。
[2]详见胡锦涛同志在中央纪委第七次全体会议上的讲话冲共中央办公厅通讯.2007(2):14
[3]李霖歌,四大直辖市市委书记:维护中央权威,《南方人物周刊》2007年6月9日。
[4]详见《解放日报》2008年1月23日的报道。
[1]Arthur F.Bentley.The process of Government:A Study of Social Pressures.Chicago[M].Chicago University Press.1908
[1]宣晓伟.重复建设的本质在于地方利益诉求[N].中国经济时报.2003年11月21日
[1]财政部预算司2006年8月编发的《政府收支分类改革方案》。
[2]笔者在与南昌大学来自江西省各县国税局的MPA学员谈话时发现,江西省各县政府都会对国税局的超收给予奖励。
[1]Oates.W.Fiscal Decentralization[M].Harcourt:Barce and Jovanovich.1972
[1]根据国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴-2005》中的相关数据计算得出。
[2]范先佐.构建“国家办学、分类承担”的农村义务教育财政体制[J].教育发展研究.2004(4):40
[3]资料来自笔者在江西省D市的调研。
[1]许祖华.陕西:把“两基”作为民生工程办人民满意教育[N].新华网2004年12月12日.www.xinhuanet.com
[2]社评.土地出让金改革的宏观经济效应.21世纪经济报道.2006-9-4第1版.
[1]中共河北省委党校课题组.河北省财政转移支付均等化效应的实证分析[J]经济研究参考.2006(90):13-30
[1]中央教育科学研究所.2001中国基础教育发展研究报告[M].北京:教育科学出版社.2002.:145
[1]参见1997年1月颁布的《中共中央、国务院关于卫生改革和发展的决定》。
[2]数据来自国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴-2005》中的有关数据,中国统计出版社.2005
[1]详见《人民日报》2007年4月19日,记者朱隽的报道《财政部:对种粮农民的直接补贴须确保发到农民手中》。
[1]人民论坛编者按:县委书记:权力大小及其运用[N].人民论坛.2006(20):1
[1]胡念飞.温岭试验乡镇治理新模式:民主催生公共预算[N].南方周末,2006-03-16
[1]Bentley,A.F.The process of Government:A Study of Social Pressures[M].Chicago:Chicago University Press.1908
[1]详见《人民日报》社论,2006年8月30日。
[2][美]查尔斯·沃尔夫著.谢旭译.市场或政府:权衡两种不完善的选择/兰德公司的一项研究[M].北京:中国发展出版社.1994:68
[1]谢志强.车连斌.影响干部职务升迁的主要因素-一项对地(厅)级干部的调查[J].中国行政管理.1999(2):21,29.
[2]我国干部任期制执行率仅1%,频繁调动使其失效[N].江南时报,2005,2,8
[1]温家宝:“深化行政管理体制改革加快实现政府管理创新”,《国家行政学院学报》,2004年第1期。
[2]国家税务总局:全面取消农业税惠及8亿中国农民,详见新华网2006年1月28日的报道。http://news.sohu.com/20060128/n241639984.shtml
[3]原文来自2006年的《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》。
[1]详见新华社消息2008年1月7日的消息:《2008年我国新型农村合作医疗将全面覆盖》http://news.sohu.com/20080107/n254507496.shtml
[2]具体见谢旭人在十一届全国人大一次会议上的答记者问《中央财政支持建立和完善农村最低生活保障制度》2008年3月6日。http://news.sohu.com/20080306/n255562870.shtml
[1]舒圣佑.“善于理财.”[A].舒圣佑.跟上时代-江西经济工作实践与探索.中共中央党校出版社.2000:443
[2]详见《江西省人民政府关于进一步改革财政管理体制的意见》,赣府发[2003]16号文件。
[3]具体见《江西年鉴2003》,方志出版社2003:222
[1]详见财政部预算司编《中国省以下财政体制2006》,中国财政出版社,2007.
[1]数据来自财政部编的《中国财政年鉴,2005》。
[1]国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴2006》[M].北京:中国统计出版社.2006
[1]本节关于江西省的资料均来自江西省统计局编的《江西统计年鉴,2006》.中国统计出版社.2006。
[1]前面四项数据来自江西省统计局编《江西省统计年鉴,2006》中国统计出版社,2006。
[2]地方财政收入用地方财政总收入减去上交中央收入得出(与统计中的地方财政收入数据一致)。
[3]净转移支付用财政合计支出减去地方财政收入。
[1]本表中的行政管理费包括了公、检、法、司、外交外事支出以及党派补助支出。
[2]为便于与地级市作区分,本文将D市改称为D县。
[1]原文来自江西省地方志编纂委员会编写的《江西省志,中国共产党江西省地方组织志》(内部发行):2004:359
[1]原文见《江西省人民政府关于进一步改革财政管理体制的意见》。
[1]王明美,江西社会发展50年江西人民出版社,2006:181
[1]数据根据财政部编《中国财政年鉴2005年》计算得出。
[1]Bachman,R.and Paternoster,R..Statistical Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice.New York:McGraw-Hill,1997.
[1]数据来自江西省2005年经济和社会发展统计公报。
[2]数据来源于江西省统计局编《2006江西统计年鉴》。
[3]郭文轩等.积极财政政策执行效果及隐忧问题研究--H 省执行情况个案分析.经济研究,2003(4):14
[4]江西农民人均收入居中部首位农村消费开始升温。新华网江西频道:http://www.cnhubei.com/200703/ca1300877.htm
[1]数据来自财政部编《中国财政年鉴,2005》。
[1]李萍.中国政府间财政关系图解.北京:中国财政经济出版社.2006:53
[1]详见《S市人民政府关于深化义务教育经费保障机制改革的实施意见》(S府发[2007号]。
[1]2009年12月12日财政局预算股长的谈话。
[2]同上。
[1]这一说法来自该乡乡长在2005年初乡人代会上的财政报告。
[2]数据见表2。
[3]数据来自C乡向乡人代会提交的这几年的财政预算执行情况财政预算草案的报告;2007年上解支出数据来自财政所提供的年终报表。
[4]2004年数根据2005年决算报告推断得出。
[5]常务副乡长的谈话。
[1]C乡财政所长的谈话。
[2]C乡常务副乡长的谈话。
[3]C乡常务副乡长的谈话。
[4]本表数据由C乡财政所提供。表中序号不完整是因为有些统计科目不适用该乡。但为统计方便方便,序号仍予以保留。
[1]在一些地方,政府甚至设立了专门的机构负责争取项目。见刘建平,刘文高.农村公共产品的项目式供给:基于社会资本的视角[J].中国行政管理,2007(1):52-55。
[2]县政府文件规定。
[1]World bank.Nanational development and sub-national finance-a review of provincial expenditures.Beijing:poverty reduction and economic management unit,East Asia and Pacific region,world bank,2002
[1]陶然,杨大利.收入激励与地方政府在中国转轨和增长中的角色.天益网,http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=22392
[1]详见《邓小平文选》,第3卷,第252页。
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134.张光.转移支付对县乡财政教育支出的影响-以浙江、湖北、陕西为例.教育与经济,2006[2]:29-32
135.张光,曾明.规模经济和分税制对政府雇员规模的影响:基于河北省分县数据的实证研 究.武汉大学学报,2008(1):49-55
136.张光.取消农业税:财政影响的不平衡和转移支付政策的调整.调研世界,2006(3):38-41
137.张军,傅勇,高远,张宏.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施.经济研究,2007(3):4-19
138.张劲松,金太军.多重博弈:税费改革后乡村基础设施投入面临的困境-以湖北鄂州市z乡东大堤维修为例.中国行政管理,2003(6):38-44
139.张金艳.委托代理关系、政府层级与农民负担[J].经济体制改革.2005(3):72-75
140.张永生.政府间事权与财权如何划分.经济社会体制比较,2008(2):71-76
141.张元红.财政政策与中国农业的周期性波动.中国农村观察,2000(4):2-11
142.张守凯.政府间转移支付方式的比较及选择.财贸经济,1999(1):58-60
143.周业安.地方政府竞争与经济增长.中国人民大学学报,2003(1):97-103
144.周业安.税费改革与乡镇财政民主建设.管理世界,2001(5):122-132
145.周黎安.晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作-兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因.经济研究,2004(6):33-40
146.周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,2007(7):36-50
147.周雪光.“逆向软预算约束”:一个政府行为的组织分析.中国社会科学,2005(2):132-143
148.邹璇.信息不对称条件下的区域经济中地方政府行为异质性.上海经济研究,2002(9):23-30
149.朱恒鹏.分权化改革、财政激励和公有制企业改制.世界经济,2004(12):14-24
150.朱玲.转移支付的效率与公平.管理世界,1997(3):30-35
151.朱光磊,张志红.“职责同构”批判.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(1):101-112
152.曾军平.政府间转移支付制度的财政平衡效应研究.经济研究,2000(6):27-32
153.曾明,张光.规模经济、转移支付与政府规模---以江西为例.江西社会科学,2008(9):213-218
154.中共河北省委党校课题组.河北省财政转移支付均等化效应的实证分析.经济研究参考,2006(90):13-30
155.[美]托尼·塞奇著.邵明阳译.盲人摸象:中国地方政府分析.经济社会体制比较,2006(4):96-104
156.[美]C.N.帕金森著.郭小马译.帕金森定律.企业管理,1999(3):55-56
157.[韩]周长焕.制度与行为者之间的关系-印第安纳学派的新制度主义.北京行政学院学报,2003(3):18-22
158.郭文轩等.积极财政政策执行效果及隐忧问题研究--H 省执行情况个案分析.经济研究,2003(4):13-21
1.江西省行政区划志编委会.江西省志:江西省行政区划志.北京:方志出版社.2005
2.江西省民政厅.江西省行政区划和地名学研究会,江西省行政区划简册2003.(内部发行)
3.江西年鉴编委会编.江西年鉴2002-2007,北京:方志出版社
4.江西年鉴编委会编.江西省财政志,南昌:江西人民出版社1999:
5.江西省人民政府志编纂委员会编.江西省志·江西省人民政府志.南昌:江西人民出版社, 2002
6.中国财政年鉴编纂委员会编.历年的中国财政年鉴.中国财政出版社
7.国家统计局编,历年的中国统计年鉴,中国统计出版社
8.国家统计局编.历年的全国市县社会经济统计年鉴,中国统计出版社
9.财政部编,历年的全国地市县财政统计年鉴(资料),中国财政经济出版社
10.教育部发展规划司编.历年中国教育统计年鉴.人民教育出版社
11.教育部和国家统计局合编.历年中国教育经费统计年鉴.中国统计出版社
12.江西省统计局编历年江西省统计年鉴.中国统计出版社
[2]具体可见《江苏省关于县分税制财政管理体制的实施办法》(苏政发[1994]58号)。
[1]数据来自国家统计局编的.中国财政年鉴-2006.中国统计出版社。
[2]由于制度外财力的不可预计性和数据的不可得,在这里我们忽略制度外财力和部分没有纳入预算内管理的预算外资金的影响。
[1]新华社.2006年中央对地方财政转移支付达到9143.55亿元.中华人民共和国中央人民政府网2007-6-28 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-06/28/content_664552.htm
[1]详见2005年11月14日的《中国青年报》。
[1]邓小平文选:第3卷.北京:人民出版社,1993:355。
[2]详见胡锦涛同志在中央纪委第七次全体会议上的讲话冲共中央办公厅通讯.2007(2):14
[3]李霖歌,四大直辖市市委书记:维护中央权威,《南方人物周刊》2007年6月9日。
[4]详见《解放日报》2008年1月23日的报道。
[1]Arthur F.Bentley.The process of Government:A Study of Social Pressures.Chicago[M].Chicago University Press.1908
[1]宣晓伟.重复建设的本质在于地方利益诉求[N].中国经济时报.2003年11月21日
[1]财政部预算司2006年8月编发的《政府收支分类改革方案》。
[2]笔者在与南昌大学来自江西省各县国税局的MPA学员谈话时发现,江西省各县政府都会对国税局的超收给予奖励。
[1]Oates.W.Fiscal Decentralization[M].Harcourt:Barce and Jovanovich.1972
[1]根据国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴-2005》中的相关数据计算得出。
[2]范先佐.构建“国家办学、分类承担”的农村义务教育财政体制[J].教育发展研究.2004(4):40
[3]资料来自笔者在江西省D市的调研。
[1]许祖华.陕西:把“两基”作为民生工程办人民满意教育[N].新华网2004年12月12日.www.xinhuanet.com
[2]社评.土地出让金改革的宏观经济效应.21世纪经济报道.2006-9-4第1版.
[1]中共河北省委党校课题组.河北省财政转移支付均等化效应的实证分析[J]经济研究参考.2006(90):13-30
[1]中央教育科学研究所.2001中国基础教育发展研究报告[M].北京:教育科学出版社.2002.:145
[1]参见1997年1月颁布的《中共中央、国务院关于卫生改革和发展的决定》。
[2]数据来自国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴-2005》中的有关数据,中国统计出版社.2005
[1]详见《人民日报》2007年4月19日,记者朱隽的报道《财政部:对种粮农民的直接补贴须确保发到农民手中》。
[1]人民论坛编者按:县委书记:权力大小及其运用[N].人民论坛.2006(20):1
[1]胡念飞.温岭试验乡镇治理新模式:民主催生公共预算[N].南方周末,2006-03-16
[1]Bentley,A.F.The process of Government:A Study of Social Pressures[M].Chicago:Chicago University Press.1908
[1]详见《人民日报》社论,2006年8月30日。
[2][美]查尔斯·沃尔夫著.谢旭译.市场或政府:权衡两种不完善的选择/兰德公司的一项研究[M].北京:中国发展出版社.1994:68
[1]谢志强.车连斌.影响干部职务升迁的主要因素-一项对地(厅)级干部的调查[J].中国行政管理.1999(2):21,29.
[2]我国干部任期制执行率仅1%,频繁调动使其失效[N].江南时报,2005,2,8
[1]温家宝:“深化行政管理体制改革加快实现政府管理创新”,《国家行政学院学报》,2004年第1期。
[2]国家税务总局:全面取消农业税惠及8亿中国农民,详见新华网2006年1月28日的报道。http://news.sohu.com/20060128/n241639984.shtml
[3]原文来自2006年的《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》。
[1]详见新华社消息2008年1月7日的消息:《2008年我国新型农村合作医疗将全面覆盖》http://news.sohu.com/20080107/n254507496.shtml
[2]具体见谢旭人在十一届全国人大一次会议上的答记者问《中央财政支持建立和完善农村最低生活保障制度》2008年3月6日。http://news.sohu.com/20080306/n255562870.shtml
[1]舒圣佑.“善于理财.”[A].舒圣佑.跟上时代-江西经济工作实践与探索.中共中央党校出版社.2000:443
[2]详见《江西省人民政府关于进一步改革财政管理体制的意见》,赣府发[2003]16号文件。
[3]具体见《江西年鉴2003》,方志出版社2003:222
[1]详见财政部预算司编《中国省以下财政体制2006》,中国财政出版社,2007.
[1]数据来自财政部编的《中国财政年鉴,2005》。
[1]国家统计局编《中国统计年鉴2006》[M].北京:中国统计出版社.2006
[1]本节关于江西省的资料均来自江西省统计局编的《江西统计年鉴,2006》.中国统计出版社.2006。
[1]前面四项数据来自江西省统计局编《江西省统计年鉴,2006》中国统计出版社,2006。
[2]地方财政收入用地方财政总收入减去上交中央收入得出(与统计中的地方财政收入数据一致)。
[3]净转移支付用财政合计支出减去地方财政收入。
[1]本表中的行政管理费包括了公、检、法、司、外交外事支出以及党派补助支出。
[2]为便于与地级市作区分,本文将D市改称为D县。
[1]原文来自江西省地方志编纂委员会编写的《江西省志,中国共产党江西省地方组织志》(内部发行):2004:359
[1]原文见《江西省人民政府关于进一步改革财政管理体制的意见》。
[1]王明美,江西社会发展50年江西人民出版社,2006:181
[1]数据根据财政部编《中国财政年鉴2005年》计算得出。
[1]Bachman,R.and Paternoster,R..Statistical Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice.New York:McGraw-Hill,1997.
[1]数据来自江西省2005年经济和社会发展统计公报。
[2]数据来源于江西省统计局编《2006江西统计年鉴》。
[3]郭文轩等.积极财政政策执行效果及隐忧问题研究--H 省执行情况个案分析.经济研究,2003(4):14
[4]江西农民人均收入居中部首位农村消费开始升温。新华网江西频道:http://www.cnhubei.com/200703/ca1300877.htm
[1]数据来自财政部编《中国财政年鉴,2005》。
[1]李萍.中国政府间财政关系图解.北京:中国财政经济出版社.2006:53
[1]详见《S市人民政府关于深化义务教育经费保障机制改革的实施意见》(S府发[2007号]。
[1]2009年12月12日财政局预算股长的谈话。
[2]同上。
[1]这一说法来自该乡乡长在2005年初乡人代会上的财政报告。
[2]数据见表2。
[3]数据来自C乡向乡人代会提交的这几年的财政预算执行情况财政预算草案的报告;2007年上解支出数据来自财政所提供的年终报表。
[4]2004年数根据2005年决算报告推断得出。
[5]常务副乡长的谈话。
[1]C乡财政所长的谈话。
[2]C乡常务副乡长的谈话。
[3]C乡常务副乡长的谈话。
[4]本表数据由C乡财政所提供。表中序号不完整是因为有些统计科目不适用该乡。但为统计方便方便,序号仍予以保留。
[1]在一些地方,政府甚至设立了专门的机构负责争取项目。见刘建平,刘文高.农村公共产品的项目式供给:基于社会资本的视角[J].中国行政管理,2007(1):52-55。
[2]县政府文件规定。
[1]World bank.Nanational development and sub-national finance-a review of provincial expenditures.Beijing:poverty reduction and economic management unit,East Asia and Pacific region,world bank,2002
[1]陶然,杨大利.收入激励与地方政府在中国转轨和增长中的角色.天益网,http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=22392
[1]详见《邓小平文选》,第3卷,第252页。
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