国际竞争中企业市场势力与创新的互动研究
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摘要
在当前的国际竞争中,我国企业在全球垂直专业化分工格局中,面临着低端锁定、利益扭曲、技术依赖等不利问题,本文认为我国企业若能形成市场势力与创新的良性互动,则可扭转被动局面。市场势力是企业通过对产品价格的影响与控制所体现出的市场支配力量,它能够提供创新动力、防止创新成果被迅速模仿,并保证创新利益的实现;同时,市场势力的获得也离不开创新,整合全球经济要素的创新无疑是企业获得并维持市场势力的主要手段。因此,实现市场势力与创新的良性互动,正是国际竞争中成功企业的“秘诀”。基于以上背景,本文对市场势力与创新的互动进行理论探讨,揭示市场势力具有“创新效率”;并在全球垂直专业化分工的背景下,深入分析基于创新的市场势力形成机制。本文以我国电子信息业为例,通过实证研究反映我国电子信息企业市场势力的特征事实,并在前述理论研究的基础上,提出实现我国电子信息企业市场势力与创新互动的总体思路与具体对策。
本文在对国内外已有的市场势力相关研究进行梳理的基础上,指出国内现有研究大都停留在静态竞争理论的分析框架,更未能系统分析企业市场势力与创新之间的互动机制。进而,本文比较了市场势力的静态与动态分析视角,阐释了市场势力的“创新效率”及其具体体现,进而研究了市场势力有利于创新激励的条件。本文对市场势力“创新效率”的分析,揭示了国际竞争中企业培育市场势力的积极意义和迫切性。
通过选取我国电子信息业为考察对象,本文对我国电子信息企业的市场势力现状进行了实证分析。研究从市场集中度、进出口价格等多个角度揭示出我国电子信息企业市场势力严重缺失的特征事实,本文还运用Goldberg & Knetter(1999)的剩余需求弹性模型,对我国SITC(Rev.3)76222产品的国际市场势力进行经验检验,结果表明出口企业并未取得与该产品国际市场份额相应的贸易利益和价格加成能力。
针对国际竞争中我国电子信息企业市场势力的缺失,文章通过把握电子信息业全球垂直专业化分工体系的特点,分别从纵向和横向维度切入,剖析了“基于创新的市场势力形成机制”。在纵向维度,本文拓展了产业组织理论中的“垂直预占”概念,揭示了跨国公司凭借对价值链上下游关键环节的垂直预占,形成了强大的市场势力;发展中国家的制造企业应向全球价值链的上下游两端拓展,通过反垂直预占来扭转这种不利的局面。应以下游渠道整合为突破,依靠下游创新价值实现反促上游创新能力的提升;并通过上游创新能力的提升,保证下游创新价值的实现。在横向维度,本文根据创新类型的差异,深入解构了“以过程创新实现成本领先”、“以产品和市场创新形成差异化”和“以组织创新实现网络化”三类横向维度的市场势力形成机制。进而,本文研究了纵向与横向维度市场势力的不同组合与企业所处国际分工地位的内在关系,探讨了纵向与横向维度市场势力与创新的互动关系。以上分析使得创新在企业市场势力形成中的作用机理得以清晰浮现。
最后,全文凝练出我国电子信息企业在国际竞争中实现市场势力与创新互动的总体思路,即“整合全球经济要素,促进纵向与横向维度市场势力的互动:培育企业家主体,实现企业市场势力与创新的良性互动”。并在此基础上,提出了“整合渠道、实施品牌战略”、“把握市场小生境、创造差异化优势”等对策建议。
In current global competition, Chinese enterprises faces disadvantages such as low end locking, benefit distortion and technology dependence on vertical specialization. The paper put forward that this situation could be reversed if domestic companies could form virtuous interaction between market power and innovation. Market power was enterprises' dominative ability to influence and control the price of product. It could drive enterprises to innovate, avoiding the innovation being simulated soon and ensuring innovation profit being realized. At the same time, the innovation was indispensable for acquiring the market power. It was undoubted that the innovation of integrating the global economic factors was the main instrument to acquire and maintain market power for enterprises. So those successful enterprises' trick was realizing the virtuous interaction between market power and innovation. On the basis of the above backgrounds, this paper discussed the theory of interaction between market power and innovation, uncovering that market power had innovation efficiency. And on the background of global vertical specialization, analyze market power forming mechanism based on innovation. From the ICT industry, the empirical study reflected the fact of the character of domestic ICT companies' market power. And on the basis of above theoretic study, this dissertation brought forward general idea and methods to realize the interaction between domestic ICT companies' market power and innovation.
Firstly, based on reviewing home and abroad existing relevant study on market power, this paper pointed out that domestic existing study almost stop on the analysis of static competitive theory, let alone systematic analyzing interaction between market power and innovation. And then, comparing the static and dynamic visual angle of marker power analysis, explain out market power's innovation efficiency and its materialization. Moreover, though mathematical analysis, research on market power's advantage conditions which can drive to innovate. The paper's analysis on market power' innovation efficiency uncovered the positive function and urgency of cultivating companies' market power in global competition.
This dissertation selected domestic ICT industry as the object to review and make an empirical analysis of actuality of domestic ICT companies' market power. Study uncovered the fact that domestic ICT companies were be severely lack of market power from several angles such as market concentration, import and export price, etc. The dissertation applied Goldberg & Knetter's surplus demand elasticity model (1999) to examine domestic SITC (Rev.3)76222 products' global market power. The result indicated that our export corporations did not gain trade benefit and price-plus ability relevant to the international market share of this product.
Aiming at the absence of domestic ICT companies' market power in global competition, the paper analyzed "the market power forming mechanism based on innovation" from vertical and horizontal dimension by holding the character of ICT industry's vertical specialization system. on the vertical dimension, the paper expanded the concept of "Vertical Foreclosure" in the theory of industrial organization, pointing out that MNCs shaped strong market power depending on vertical foreclosure in the key taches of value chain' up-stream and down-stream. And then, though mathematically analyzing, this paper testified the forming mechanism of developing countries' vertical market power based on innovation, that is, "anti-vertical foreclosure". Taking channel integration as the breakthrough, they should extend to both up-stream and down-stream, depending on the realization of innovation value in down-stream to upgrade the innovation ability in up-stream in reverse, and upgrading the innovation ability in up-stream to ensure the realization of innovation value in down-stream. On the horizontal dimension, the dissertation divided the forming mechanism into "Cost-leading mechanism by process innovation", "Differentiation mechanism by product and market innovation" and "Network mechanism by organization innovation" based on the difference of innovative type. And then, the paper studied the relation between the combination of vertical-horizontal market power and the status where the companies were in global specialization system, it also analyzed the interaction between vertical-horizontal market power and innovation. This makes the function of innovation to the forming of companies' market power clear.
At last, the dissertation pointed out the general idea how to make domestic CIT companies realized the interaction of market power and innovation in global competition, that is, "Integrating the global factors to realize interaction between vertical and horizontal market power; cultivating the entrepreneur to impulse the interaction between market power and innovation". On the basis of this, the dissertation brought out some countermeasure such as "Integrating channel, enforcing brand strategy" and "Finding market niche, creating differentiation advantage" etc.
本文在对国内外已有的市场势力相关研究进行梳理的基础上,指出国内现有研究大都停留在静态竞争理论的分析框架,更未能系统分析企业市场势力与创新之间的互动机制。进而,本文比较了市场势力的静态与动态分析视角,阐释了市场势力的“创新效率”及其具体体现,进而研究了市场势力有利于创新激励的条件。本文对市场势力“创新效率”的分析,揭示了国际竞争中企业培育市场势力的积极意义和迫切性。
通过选取我国电子信息业为考察对象,本文对我国电子信息企业的市场势力现状进行了实证分析。研究从市场集中度、进出口价格等多个角度揭示出我国电子信息企业市场势力严重缺失的特征事实,本文还运用Goldberg & Knetter(1999)的剩余需求弹性模型,对我国SITC(Rev.3)76222产品的国际市场势力进行经验检验,结果表明出口企业并未取得与该产品国际市场份额相应的贸易利益和价格加成能力。
针对国际竞争中我国电子信息企业市场势力的缺失,文章通过把握电子信息业全球垂直专业化分工体系的特点,分别从纵向和横向维度切入,剖析了“基于创新的市场势力形成机制”。在纵向维度,本文拓展了产业组织理论中的“垂直预占”概念,揭示了跨国公司凭借对价值链上下游关键环节的垂直预占,形成了强大的市场势力;发展中国家的制造企业应向全球价值链的上下游两端拓展,通过反垂直预占来扭转这种不利的局面。应以下游渠道整合为突破,依靠下游创新价值实现反促上游创新能力的提升;并通过上游创新能力的提升,保证下游创新价值的实现。在横向维度,本文根据创新类型的差异,深入解构了“以过程创新实现成本领先”、“以产品和市场创新形成差异化”和“以组织创新实现网络化”三类横向维度的市场势力形成机制。进而,本文研究了纵向与横向维度市场势力的不同组合与企业所处国际分工地位的内在关系,探讨了纵向与横向维度市场势力与创新的互动关系。以上分析使得创新在企业市场势力形成中的作用机理得以清晰浮现。
最后,全文凝练出我国电子信息企业在国际竞争中实现市场势力与创新互动的总体思路,即“整合全球经济要素,促进纵向与横向维度市场势力的互动:培育企业家主体,实现企业市场势力与创新的良性互动”。并在此基础上,提出了“整合渠道、实施品牌战略”、“把握市场小生境、创造差异化优势”等对策建议。
In current global competition, Chinese enterprises faces disadvantages such as low end locking, benefit distortion and technology dependence on vertical specialization. The paper put forward that this situation could be reversed if domestic companies could form virtuous interaction between market power and innovation. Market power was enterprises' dominative ability to influence and control the price of product. It could drive enterprises to innovate, avoiding the innovation being simulated soon and ensuring innovation profit being realized. At the same time, the innovation was indispensable for acquiring the market power. It was undoubted that the innovation of integrating the global economic factors was the main instrument to acquire and maintain market power for enterprises. So those successful enterprises' trick was realizing the virtuous interaction between market power and innovation. On the basis of the above backgrounds, this paper discussed the theory of interaction between market power and innovation, uncovering that market power had innovation efficiency. And on the background of global vertical specialization, analyze market power forming mechanism based on innovation. From the ICT industry, the empirical study reflected the fact of the character of domestic ICT companies' market power. And on the basis of above theoretic study, this dissertation brought forward general idea and methods to realize the interaction between domestic ICT companies' market power and innovation.
Firstly, based on reviewing home and abroad existing relevant study on market power, this paper pointed out that domestic existing study almost stop on the analysis of static competitive theory, let alone systematic analyzing interaction between market power and innovation. And then, comparing the static and dynamic visual angle of marker power analysis, explain out market power's innovation efficiency and its materialization. Moreover, though mathematical analysis, research on market power's advantage conditions which can drive to innovate. The paper's analysis on market power' innovation efficiency uncovered the positive function and urgency of cultivating companies' market power in global competition.
This dissertation selected domestic ICT industry as the object to review and make an empirical analysis of actuality of domestic ICT companies' market power. Study uncovered the fact that domestic ICT companies were be severely lack of market power from several angles such as market concentration, import and export price, etc. The dissertation applied Goldberg & Knetter's surplus demand elasticity model (1999) to examine domestic SITC (Rev.3)76222 products' global market power. The result indicated that our export corporations did not gain trade benefit and price-plus ability relevant to the international market share of this product.
Aiming at the absence of domestic ICT companies' market power in global competition, the paper analyzed "the market power forming mechanism based on innovation" from vertical and horizontal dimension by holding the character of ICT industry's vertical specialization system. on the vertical dimension, the paper expanded the concept of "Vertical Foreclosure" in the theory of industrial organization, pointing out that MNCs shaped strong market power depending on vertical foreclosure in the key taches of value chain' up-stream and down-stream. And then, though mathematically analyzing, this paper testified the forming mechanism of developing countries' vertical market power based on innovation, that is, "anti-vertical foreclosure". Taking channel integration as the breakthrough, they should extend to both up-stream and down-stream, depending on the realization of innovation value in down-stream to upgrade the innovation ability in up-stream in reverse, and upgrading the innovation ability in up-stream to ensure the realization of innovation value in down-stream. On the horizontal dimension, the dissertation divided the forming mechanism into "Cost-leading mechanism by process innovation", "Differentiation mechanism by product and market innovation" and "Network mechanism by organization innovation" based on the difference of innovative type. And then, the paper studied the relation between the combination of vertical-horizontal market power and the status where the companies were in global specialization system, it also analyzed the interaction between vertical-horizontal market power and innovation. This makes the function of innovation to the forming of companies' market power clear.
At last, the dissertation pointed out the general idea how to make domestic CIT companies realized the interaction of market power and innovation in global competition, that is, "Integrating the global factors to realize interaction between vertical and horizontal market power; cultivating the entrepreneur to impulse the interaction between market power and innovation". On the basis of this, the dissertation brought out some countermeasure such as "Integrating channel, enforcing brand strategy" and "Finding market niche, creating differentiation advantage" etc.
引文
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48 EIU即Economist Intelligence Unit,受汤姆森集团(Thomson Scientific&Healthcare)委托,EIU于2006年4至5月间对亚太地区165名公司高管(其中37%的受访者来自中国)进行有关研发活动的调研,并发表了题为<智慧思考:中国研发与创新》的调研报告。参见EIU.智慧思考:中国研发与创新.[EB/OL].http://www.thomsonscientific.com.cn 2006.05.18
49 专利联盟(Patent Pool)亦称为专利池,是指多个专利拥有者为能够分享彼此间的专利技术或者统一对外进行专利许可而结成的联盟组织(李玉剑、宣国良,2004)。
50 当两个以上的专利所涉及的技术彼此相辅相成,使用其中一个专利技术将使另一些专利技术更有价值时,这些专利就是互补性专利。
51 此处的“过度惰性”是指,由于现存标准具有强大的外部性,使社会对于从旧标准向新标准转换表现出过度的不情愿(Farrell & saloner,1986)。
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3 Houck过程最早由Tweemn&Quance(1969)提出,并经Wolffram(1971)和Houck(1977)的改进,因此也被称为Wolffram-Houck不对称模型。
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11 参考了Shaked&Sutton(1983),Romano(1987),Shaked&Sutton(1990) 的研究。
22 Bain,J.S.The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics 55,1941.2:271-293植草益.产业组织论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1988.
32 联合国Comtrade数据库http://comtrade.un.org/db
33 从另一角度看,该产品世界最大进口国美、日等国由于使用“原产地”贸易统计原则,其进口贸易统计将中国产品经由香港转口,算作从中国的进口。例如,2006年由美国统计的SITC(Rev.3)76222产品进口自中国的份额高达94%,进口自香港的份额只有1%;由日本统计的该产品进口自中国的份额高达92%,进口自香港的只有1%。但由于并未扣除香港从转口贸易中取得的附加价值即转出口加价,因此高估了来自我国的进口贸易额。
34 冯国钊,刘遵义.对美中贸易平衡的新估算[J].国际经济评论,1999,5:10-20
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36 在Comtradc数据库里,有关中国该产品的相关数据起始时间为1992年。
37 香港特别行政区政府统计处http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/homc/indcx_tc.jsp
38 国际金融统计数据库http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/logon.aspx
39 国际劳工组织统计局http://laborsta.ilo.org/
42 可参见彭绍仲,李海舰,曾繁华.全球商品链的内部化与价格均衡机制[J].中国工业经济,2005,(9):50-59
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46 商务部.中国外商投资报告2006[EB/OL].http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
47 Hakanson&Nobel(1993)把跨国公司海外R&D机构分为:技术监测单位(Technology Listening Units)、生产支持单位(Production Support Units)、市场导向单位(Market-Oriented Units)、政策动机单位(Politically Motivated Units)和多元动机单位(Multi-motive Units)五类。
48 EIU即Economist Intelligence Unit,受汤姆森集团(Thomson Scientific&Healthcare)委托,EIU于2006年4至5月间对亚太地区165名公司高管(其中37%的受访者来自中国)进行有关研发活动的调研,并发表了题为<智慧思考:中国研发与创新》的调研报告。参见EIU.智慧思考:中国研发与创新.[EB/OL].http://www.thomsonscientific.com.cn 2006.05.18
49 专利联盟(Patent Pool)亦称为专利池,是指多个专利拥有者为能够分享彼此间的专利技术或者统一对外进行专利许可而结成的联盟组织(李玉剑、宣国良,2004)。
50 当两个以上的专利所涉及的技术彼此相辅相成,使用其中一个专利技术将使另一些专利技术更有价值时,这些专利就是互补性专利。
51 此处的“过度惰性”是指,由于现存标准具有强大的外部性,使社会对于从旧标准向新标准转换表现出过度的不情愿(Farrell & saloner,1986)。
52 张弘,寇宗来.自主创新能力,专利许可与市场结构[J].产业经济研究,2006.5:1-7
58 张晔.论买方垄断势力下跨国公司对当地配套企业的纵向压榨[J].中国工业经济,2006.12:29-36
59 陈柳,刘志彪.代工生产、自主品牌与内生激励[J].财经论丛,2006.5:8-13
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75 钱德勒最早提出“速度经济”,其原意指迅速地满足客户需求、追求从生产到流通的速度能带来经济性。参见小艾尔弗雷德.钱德勒.看得见的手[M].北京:商务印书馆,1987,P272-273,324-325
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87 李忱,田杨萌(2001)指出,协同效应的产生,需要网络组织内部成员相互配合,克服非协同状态可能产生的负面影响,提高网络成员在协同工作中的效能,产生互补效应进而放大系统功能,产生整体大于部分之和的效应。
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92 如第五章5.3节的分析表明,企业的研发能力必须达到一定阀值。才能有助于实施反垂直预占,拓展纵向维度的市场势力。
93 杜群阳,朱勤.中国企业技术获取型海外直接投资理论与实践[J].国际贸易问题,2004,11:66-69
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