中国垄断行业公平规制问题研究
|
摘要
上世纪九十年代中后期开始,中国对垄断行业实施了大规模以提高效率为目标,以引入竞争为主题的改革。多数垄断行业实现了政企分开、主体多元、绩效提升、规模扩大的改革效果。但与此同时,中国民众对垄断行业的不满却日益增加。垄断行业产品市场普遍服务的缺失和劳动力市场不合理高收入屡屡成为大众的关注焦点。公众对垄断行业的不满源于垄断行业公平规制的缺失,而公平规制缺失形成的利益集团又成为垄断行业进一步改革的羁绊。事实上,垄断行业产品在消费上的必需品特性催生了其产品市场上的公平规制要求；在生产上的自然垄断特性所导致的产品市场规制派生出其要素市场公平规制的需求。中国垄断行业公平规制的“供需”失衡促发了本文的研究。本文的研究主题是垄断行业公平规制问题,总体研究思路是在熟悉现状和相关理论的基础之上将其分解为产品市场和劳动力市场两个部分来分别展开研究。
本文首先在回顾中国垄断行业改革历程的基础上,重点对垄断行业公平规制的现状和理论基础进行了梳理,以期为后面章节的分析提供一个现实背景和理论参照。通过概览垄断行业公平规制的历史和现状,我们不难发现,公平规制是垄断行业的一项基本规制要求,随着改革的推进,垄断行业公平规制越来越显重要。对垄断行业产品市场公平规制理论基础的考察表明,政府可能会基于网络外部性、收入再分配、公共品、区域规划和利益集团等原因而对垄断行业产品市场进行公平规制；Atkinson和Stiglitz定理的前提假定在现实垄断行业难以成立,因而以扭曲垄断行业产品相对价格的方式来实现公平规制对垄断行业而言是适宜的。对垄断行业劳动力市场公平规制理论基础的考察表明,中国垄断行业产品市场的垄断和规制失灵带来的高利润构成了垄断行业高收入之源；国有产权的所有者缺位和中国劳动力市场的非竞争性开辟了垄断利润流入员工腰包的闸门；对垄断行业劳动力市场进行公平规制离不开行业产品市场结构、企业产权结构以及劳动力市场特性的考量。
垄断行业产品市场公平规制的目标是普遍服务,核心问题是普遍服务的实现机制。本文先分析了垄断行业引入竞争后,其传统交叉补贴机制面临的“撇脂现象”,而后从融资和分配两个方面分析了竞争环境下的普遍服务实现机制问题。这部分研究所采用的主要研究方法是博弈论。在传统垄断时期,垄断行业运营商通过交叉补贴来维持普遍服务。市场开放后,新的市场进入者会基于利润最大化服务于低成本地区而不进入高成本地区。本文通过构建数理模型来对这一“撇脂现象”进行了理论解读。传统垄断时期的内部交叉补贴机制在引入竞争后受到挑战,竞争环境下的普遍服务融资需要新机制。财政补贴、分片包干和普遍服务基金是三种选择。本文在保证企业不亏损的前提下,通过市场价格和财政补贴支出两个纬度来作为三种机制优劣的评价标准,通过建模比较分析财政补贴、分片包干和普遍服务基金三种普遍服务融资方式。内生市场结构普遍服务拍卖结合了传统的代理模型和一般拍卖的优点,既可以通过事前竞争产生准确的补贴额,又保留了事后竞争以增进市场效率。本文在对普遍服务分配机制的讨论中,重点研究了这一新的分配机制。本文首先给出了内生市场结构拍卖的基本模型,而后给出不同情形下的最优市场结构的成本条件并提出一个修正的第二价格拍卖来内生实现不完全信息下的最优市场结构。
垄断行业劳动力市场公平规制主要是针对垄断行业员工收入而言的。本文将垄断行业收入问题置于整个行业收入的视野之下来对此展开研究。先全方位地考察中国行业收入差距的演化状况；然后测算了行业垄断对行业收入差距的贡献；最后再分析垄断行业和非垄断行业收入决定机制的差异并得出相关的政策建议。这部分研究所采用的主要方法是统计测算和计量经济分析。本文运用《中国统计年鉴》门类行业和细分行业职工平均工资数据,采用多种不平等指数,从静态和动态两个方面全方位刻画了改革以来中国行业收入差距的演化特征。静态角度主要是通过不平等指数和核密度估计两种方法来进行刻画,动态角度主要是通过收入转换矩阵和收入流动性指数来对行业收入流动性进行刻画。本文将所有行业的不平等指数分解为垄断行业与非垄断行业组内的不平等指数和两类行业之间的不平等指数,以两类行业之间的不平等来测度垄断对行业收入差距的贡献。本文采用中国健康与养老追踪调查数据,以Mincer工资方程为基础,借助于Oaxaca-Blinder分解和Melly(2006)分解方法,从均值收入和分布收入角度考察了中国垄断行业和非垄断行业收入决定机制的差异。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)普遍服务约束下的垄断行业在引入竞争后的市场出现了“撇脂现象”,若继续沿用传统内部交叉补贴的融资方式为普遍服务融资的话,则产品市场会有价格上涨的压力；引入竞争对在位者总体上是不利的,对消费者总体上是有利的,但竞争的好处更多地被低成本的城市消费者所获得,高成本的农村消费者则没有分享到改革的成果。
(2)分片包干是一种较财政补贴和普遍服务基金更优的普遍服务融资机制,它相对财政补贴而言具有低成本的优势,相对普遍服务基金而言又具有低价格的优势。
(3)当两企业成本均较低时,最优市场结构为双寡头共同生产；当两企业成本均较高时,最优市场结构为不生产；当两企业成本适中时,社会最优为由成本相对较低的企业垄断生产。不完全信息相对完全信息而言,双寡头生产的区域变小,而不生产的区域变大。对于不完全信息下的最优市场结构,可以通过修正的第二价格拍卖内生实现。
(4)中国行业收入差距在上世纪八十年代下降后自九十年代开始上升至今,呈现出高者愈高、低者愈低的行业马太效应,收入增长更多地集中在高收入行业；中国行业收入流动性越来越弱。
(5)垄断对门类行业收入差距的贡献份额在上世纪八十年代和九十年代前期处于低位,而在上世纪九十年代中期之后,则一直处于高位。垄断对细分行业收入差距的贡献份额在2003年之前处于波动状态,自2003年之后则呈逐渐上升态势。上世纪九十年代以来,垄断行业组内收入差距和非垄断行业组内收入差距均随时间演进而增加。
(6)中国垄断行业存在着较为明显的“共享式”收入决定特征,其在性别和地区差异的平衡上有积极作用,但其过度的“论资排辈”拉高了工资分布高端的工资溢价；对于垄断行业的收入规制,对象应是工资分布高端人群,措施应是减少论资排辈而实施更具激励性的工资决定机制。
From the late nineties of last century, China has implemented a large-scale reform in monopoly industries through introducing competition to improve efficiency. Most monopoly industries have achieved the reform effect with separation between enterprise and government, diversity subject, performance improvement and scale expanding. But at the same time, Chinese people have growing discontent with monopoly industries. The lack of universal service in product market and unreasonable high income in labor market often become public focus. The public's dissatisfaction with monopoly industries stems from the lack of fair regulation. Interest group which was formed by the lack of fair regulation has become fetters of further reform of monopoly industries. In fact, the characteristic of necessities has given birth to a fair regulatory requirement in product market. The product market regulation because of natural monopoly characteristic in production has given birth to a fair regulatory requirement in factor market. The imbalance supply and demand of fair regulation in China monopoly industries stimulates this study. The research them of this paper is the issue of fair regulation in monopoly industries. The overall idea is to decompose the question into product market and labor market to research respectively based on the familiar with current situation and relevant theory.
This paper first reviews the history of the reform of China monopoly industries, and then investigates the current situation and theoretical basis in order to provide a practical background and theoretical reference for later chapters. Through overview the history and current situation of fair regulation in monopoly industries, we can easily find that fair regulation is an essential requirement in monopoly industries and it has become more and more important with the reform. After investigate the theoretic basis of fair regulation on product market of monopoly industries, we learn that the government may enforce fair regulation on monopoly industries based on network externalities, income redistribution, public goods, interest groups, regional planning and other reasons. The assumptions of Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem are difficult to set up in real monopoly industries, so distorting the relative price of the product of monopoly industries to achieve a fair way to regulate the monopoly industries is appropriate. After investigate the theoretic basis of fair regulation on labor market of monopoly industries, we learn that the high monopoly profits from monopoly and regulatory failures constitute a source of high-income in monopoly industries, absence of state property owners and non-competition in Chinese labor market open the door for monopoly profits going into the pockets of the staff. The fair regulation on monopoly industries must consider product market structure, ownership structure and characteristics of the labor market.
Product market fair regulation on monopoly industries aims to achieve universal service. The core issue is the realization mechanism. This paper first analyzes the skimming phenomenon faced by traditional cross-subsidy mechanism after the introduction of competition in monopoly industries, and then analyzes the realization mechanism of universal service under competition environment from financing and distribution. The main research method of this part is game theory. In the traditional monopoly period, the monopoly operator maintains universal service through cross-subsidies. After market liberalization, new market entrants will service in the low-cost region rather than access to high-cost areas to maximize profits. This paper builds a mathematical model to interpret this "skimming phenomenon" theoretically. The traditional internal cross-subsidy mechanism in monopoly period is challenged after the introduction of competition. The universal service under competitive environment requires new mechanism. Financial subsidies, area divided and universal service fund are three options. Ensuring no loss of business, this paper uses market prices and financial subsidies as the evaluation criteria of those three mechanisms and builds model to compare them. Endogenous market structure auction for universal service combines the merit of the traditional agency model and the general auction. It both generates accurate subsidy pre-competition and retains post-competition to improve market efficiency. This paper puts this new distribution mechanism as focal point to discuss. This paper first gives the model of endogenous market structure auction, secondly gives the optimal cost conditions of market structure under different circumstances and then gives a modified second-price auction to achieve the optimal market structure endogenously with incomplete information.
Fair regulation on labor market of monopoly industries is mainly aimed at employees'income. This issue will be placed on the view of industry income differentials to research. This paper firstly studies the evolution of Chinese industry income differentials, secondly measures industry monopoly's contribution to income inequality, and finally analyzes the different decision mechanism between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. The main research methods of this part are statistical estimates and econometric analysis. In this paper, average salary data of big industries and small industries in "China Statistical Yearbook" and various inequality indices are used to measure the evolution characteristics of Chinese industry income differentials from static and dynamic aspect since the reform and opening up. The static perspective mainly uses inequality indexes and kernel density estimation; the dynamic perspective mainly uses the income transformation matrix and income mobility indexes. This paper decomposes the inequality index of all industries into the intra-group index and the inter-group index between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. The inter-group index is used to measure the monopoly's contribution to industry income differentials. In this paper, the CHARLS data and the Mincer wage equation with Oaxaca-Blinder and Melly(2006) methods are used to study the wage decision mechanism differential between Chinese monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries from the perspective of average revenue and distribution revenue.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Monopoly industries with the constraint of universal service appear "skimming phenomenon" after the introduction of competition. If the traditional internal cross subsidy of financing for universal service is continued to used, the product market will face the pressure of prices rising. Introducing competition is not good for the existing firm but it's good for consumers in the overall. The benefits of competition are owned by the urban consumers with low cost and are not shared to the rural consumers with high cost.
(2) The method of area divided is a better financing mechanism than financial subsidies and universal service fund. It has lower lost than financing subsidies and lower price than universal service fund.
(3) The optimal market structure is duopoly when both firms'costs are low. There is no production when both firms'costs are high. The optimal market structure is monopoly by the firm with lower lost when both firms'costs are medium. Compared to complete information, the duopoly production area becomes smaller and non-production area becomes larger under incomplete information circumstance. The optimal market structure with incomplete information can be endogenously realized by a modified second price auction
(4) China industry income differentials declined in the1980s and have been up to now from1990s. They have appeared Matthew effect with higher than higher and lower than lower. Income growth is focused on high income industries. The income mobility of China industries is become weaker and weaker.
(5) The monopoly's contribution to big industries was low in1980s and early stage of1990s. It has been high since the middle of1990s. The monopoly's contribution to small industries fluctuated before2003and it's being rising gradually since2003. Since1990s, both the income gaps of monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries become larger.
(6) Chinese monopoly industries have obvious sharing type income decision characteristic. It has positive role on the balance of sex and regional disparity. But its excessive ranking pulled the wages premium on the high-end wages distribution. The policy implication is that we should focus on the high-end wages crowd and implement more incentive wage decision mechanism.
本文首先在回顾中国垄断行业改革历程的基础上,重点对垄断行业公平规制的现状和理论基础进行了梳理,以期为后面章节的分析提供一个现实背景和理论参照。通过概览垄断行业公平规制的历史和现状,我们不难发现,公平规制是垄断行业的一项基本规制要求,随着改革的推进,垄断行业公平规制越来越显重要。对垄断行业产品市场公平规制理论基础的考察表明,政府可能会基于网络外部性、收入再分配、公共品、区域规划和利益集团等原因而对垄断行业产品市场进行公平规制；Atkinson和Stiglitz定理的前提假定在现实垄断行业难以成立,因而以扭曲垄断行业产品相对价格的方式来实现公平规制对垄断行业而言是适宜的。对垄断行业劳动力市场公平规制理论基础的考察表明,中国垄断行业产品市场的垄断和规制失灵带来的高利润构成了垄断行业高收入之源；国有产权的所有者缺位和中国劳动力市场的非竞争性开辟了垄断利润流入员工腰包的闸门；对垄断行业劳动力市场进行公平规制离不开行业产品市场结构、企业产权结构以及劳动力市场特性的考量。
垄断行业产品市场公平规制的目标是普遍服务,核心问题是普遍服务的实现机制。本文先分析了垄断行业引入竞争后,其传统交叉补贴机制面临的“撇脂现象”,而后从融资和分配两个方面分析了竞争环境下的普遍服务实现机制问题。这部分研究所采用的主要研究方法是博弈论。在传统垄断时期,垄断行业运营商通过交叉补贴来维持普遍服务。市场开放后,新的市场进入者会基于利润最大化服务于低成本地区而不进入高成本地区。本文通过构建数理模型来对这一“撇脂现象”进行了理论解读。传统垄断时期的内部交叉补贴机制在引入竞争后受到挑战,竞争环境下的普遍服务融资需要新机制。财政补贴、分片包干和普遍服务基金是三种选择。本文在保证企业不亏损的前提下,通过市场价格和财政补贴支出两个纬度来作为三种机制优劣的评价标准,通过建模比较分析财政补贴、分片包干和普遍服务基金三种普遍服务融资方式。内生市场结构普遍服务拍卖结合了传统的代理模型和一般拍卖的优点,既可以通过事前竞争产生准确的补贴额,又保留了事后竞争以增进市场效率。本文在对普遍服务分配机制的讨论中,重点研究了这一新的分配机制。本文首先给出了内生市场结构拍卖的基本模型,而后给出不同情形下的最优市场结构的成本条件并提出一个修正的第二价格拍卖来内生实现不完全信息下的最优市场结构。
垄断行业劳动力市场公平规制主要是针对垄断行业员工收入而言的。本文将垄断行业收入问题置于整个行业收入的视野之下来对此展开研究。先全方位地考察中国行业收入差距的演化状况；然后测算了行业垄断对行业收入差距的贡献；最后再分析垄断行业和非垄断行业收入决定机制的差异并得出相关的政策建议。这部分研究所采用的主要方法是统计测算和计量经济分析。本文运用《中国统计年鉴》门类行业和细分行业职工平均工资数据,采用多种不平等指数,从静态和动态两个方面全方位刻画了改革以来中国行业收入差距的演化特征。静态角度主要是通过不平等指数和核密度估计两种方法来进行刻画,动态角度主要是通过收入转换矩阵和收入流动性指数来对行业收入流动性进行刻画。本文将所有行业的不平等指数分解为垄断行业与非垄断行业组内的不平等指数和两类行业之间的不平等指数,以两类行业之间的不平等来测度垄断对行业收入差距的贡献。本文采用中国健康与养老追踪调查数据,以Mincer工资方程为基础,借助于Oaxaca-Blinder分解和Melly(2006)分解方法,从均值收入和分布收入角度考察了中国垄断行业和非垄断行业收入决定机制的差异。
本文的主要研究结论如下：
(1)普遍服务约束下的垄断行业在引入竞争后的市场出现了“撇脂现象”,若继续沿用传统内部交叉补贴的融资方式为普遍服务融资的话,则产品市场会有价格上涨的压力；引入竞争对在位者总体上是不利的,对消费者总体上是有利的,但竞争的好处更多地被低成本的城市消费者所获得,高成本的农村消费者则没有分享到改革的成果。
(2)分片包干是一种较财政补贴和普遍服务基金更优的普遍服务融资机制,它相对财政补贴而言具有低成本的优势,相对普遍服务基金而言又具有低价格的优势。
(3)当两企业成本均较低时,最优市场结构为双寡头共同生产；当两企业成本均较高时,最优市场结构为不生产；当两企业成本适中时,社会最优为由成本相对较低的企业垄断生产。不完全信息相对完全信息而言,双寡头生产的区域变小,而不生产的区域变大。对于不完全信息下的最优市场结构,可以通过修正的第二价格拍卖内生实现。
(4)中国行业收入差距在上世纪八十年代下降后自九十年代开始上升至今,呈现出高者愈高、低者愈低的行业马太效应,收入增长更多地集中在高收入行业；中国行业收入流动性越来越弱。
(5)垄断对门类行业收入差距的贡献份额在上世纪八十年代和九十年代前期处于低位,而在上世纪九十年代中期之后,则一直处于高位。垄断对细分行业收入差距的贡献份额在2003年之前处于波动状态,自2003年之后则呈逐渐上升态势。上世纪九十年代以来,垄断行业组内收入差距和非垄断行业组内收入差距均随时间演进而增加。
(6)中国垄断行业存在着较为明显的“共享式”收入决定特征,其在性别和地区差异的平衡上有积极作用,但其过度的“论资排辈”拉高了工资分布高端的工资溢价；对于垄断行业的收入规制,对象应是工资分布高端人群,措施应是减少论资排辈而实施更具激励性的工资决定机制。
From the late nineties of last century, China has implemented a large-scale reform in monopoly industries through introducing competition to improve efficiency. Most monopoly industries have achieved the reform effect with separation between enterprise and government, diversity subject, performance improvement and scale expanding. But at the same time, Chinese people have growing discontent with monopoly industries. The lack of universal service in product market and unreasonable high income in labor market often become public focus. The public's dissatisfaction with monopoly industries stems from the lack of fair regulation. Interest group which was formed by the lack of fair regulation has become fetters of further reform of monopoly industries. In fact, the characteristic of necessities has given birth to a fair regulatory requirement in product market. The product market regulation because of natural monopoly characteristic in production has given birth to a fair regulatory requirement in factor market. The imbalance supply and demand of fair regulation in China monopoly industries stimulates this study. The research them of this paper is the issue of fair regulation in monopoly industries. The overall idea is to decompose the question into product market and labor market to research respectively based on the familiar with current situation and relevant theory.
This paper first reviews the history of the reform of China monopoly industries, and then investigates the current situation and theoretical basis in order to provide a practical background and theoretical reference for later chapters. Through overview the history and current situation of fair regulation in monopoly industries, we can easily find that fair regulation is an essential requirement in monopoly industries and it has become more and more important with the reform. After investigate the theoretic basis of fair regulation on product market of monopoly industries, we learn that the government may enforce fair regulation on monopoly industries based on network externalities, income redistribution, public goods, interest groups, regional planning and other reasons. The assumptions of Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem are difficult to set up in real monopoly industries, so distorting the relative price of the product of monopoly industries to achieve a fair way to regulate the monopoly industries is appropriate. After investigate the theoretic basis of fair regulation on labor market of monopoly industries, we learn that the high monopoly profits from monopoly and regulatory failures constitute a source of high-income in monopoly industries, absence of state property owners and non-competition in Chinese labor market open the door for monopoly profits going into the pockets of the staff. The fair regulation on monopoly industries must consider product market structure, ownership structure and characteristics of the labor market.
Product market fair regulation on monopoly industries aims to achieve universal service. The core issue is the realization mechanism. This paper first analyzes the skimming phenomenon faced by traditional cross-subsidy mechanism after the introduction of competition in monopoly industries, and then analyzes the realization mechanism of universal service under competition environment from financing and distribution. The main research method of this part is game theory. In the traditional monopoly period, the monopoly operator maintains universal service through cross-subsidies. After market liberalization, new market entrants will service in the low-cost region rather than access to high-cost areas to maximize profits. This paper builds a mathematical model to interpret this "skimming phenomenon" theoretically. The traditional internal cross-subsidy mechanism in monopoly period is challenged after the introduction of competition. The universal service under competitive environment requires new mechanism. Financial subsidies, area divided and universal service fund are three options. Ensuring no loss of business, this paper uses market prices and financial subsidies as the evaluation criteria of those three mechanisms and builds model to compare them. Endogenous market structure auction for universal service combines the merit of the traditional agency model and the general auction. It both generates accurate subsidy pre-competition and retains post-competition to improve market efficiency. This paper puts this new distribution mechanism as focal point to discuss. This paper first gives the model of endogenous market structure auction, secondly gives the optimal cost conditions of market structure under different circumstances and then gives a modified second-price auction to achieve the optimal market structure endogenously with incomplete information.
Fair regulation on labor market of monopoly industries is mainly aimed at employees'income. This issue will be placed on the view of industry income differentials to research. This paper firstly studies the evolution of Chinese industry income differentials, secondly measures industry monopoly's contribution to income inequality, and finally analyzes the different decision mechanism between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. The main research methods of this part are statistical estimates and econometric analysis. In this paper, average salary data of big industries and small industries in "China Statistical Yearbook" and various inequality indices are used to measure the evolution characteristics of Chinese industry income differentials from static and dynamic aspect since the reform and opening up. The static perspective mainly uses inequality indexes and kernel density estimation; the dynamic perspective mainly uses the income transformation matrix and income mobility indexes. This paper decomposes the inequality index of all industries into the intra-group index and the inter-group index between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. The inter-group index is used to measure the monopoly's contribution to industry income differentials. In this paper, the CHARLS data and the Mincer wage equation with Oaxaca-Blinder and Melly(2006) methods are used to study the wage decision mechanism differential between Chinese monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries from the perspective of average revenue and distribution revenue.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Monopoly industries with the constraint of universal service appear "skimming phenomenon" after the introduction of competition. If the traditional internal cross subsidy of financing for universal service is continued to used, the product market will face the pressure of prices rising. Introducing competition is not good for the existing firm but it's good for consumers in the overall. The benefits of competition are owned by the urban consumers with low cost and are not shared to the rural consumers with high cost.
(2) The method of area divided is a better financing mechanism than financial subsidies and universal service fund. It has lower lost than financing subsidies and lower price than universal service fund.
(3) The optimal market structure is duopoly when both firms'costs are low. There is no production when both firms'costs are high. The optimal market structure is monopoly by the firm with lower lost when both firms'costs are medium. Compared to complete information, the duopoly production area becomes smaller and non-production area becomes larger under incomplete information circumstance. The optimal market structure with incomplete information can be endogenously realized by a modified second price auction
(4) China industry income differentials declined in the1980s and have been up to now from1990s. They have appeared Matthew effect with higher than higher and lower than lower. Income growth is focused on high income industries. The income mobility of China industries is become weaker and weaker.
(5) The monopoly's contribution to big industries was low in1980s and early stage of1990s. It has been high since the middle of1990s. The monopoly's contribution to small industries fluctuated before2003and it's being rising gradually since2003. Since1990s, both the income gaps of monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries become larger.
(6) Chinese monopoly industries have obvious sharing type income decision characteristic. It has positive role on the balance of sex and regional disparity. But its excessive ranking pulled the wages premium on the high-end wages distribution. The policy implication is that we should focus on the high-end wages crowd and implement more incentive wage decision mechanism.
引文
[1]蔡昉、都阳、王美艳.中国劳动力市场转型与发育[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[2]陈纯.竞争环境下我国电信普遍服务问题研究[D].暨南大学硕士学位论文,2008.
[3]陈剑、夏大慰.规制促减贫：以公用事业改革为视角[J].中国工业经济,2010,(2)：26-35.
[4]陈弋、Sylvie、Martin.中国企业的工资差异和所有制结构[J].世界经济文汇,2005,(6)
[5]陈钊、陆铭、佐藤宏.谁进入了高收入行业?关系、户籍与生产率的作用[J].经济研究,2009,(10).
[6]陈钊、万广华和陆铭.行业间不平等：日益重要的城镇收入差距成因——基于回归方程的分解[J].中国社会科学,2010,(3).
[7]程永宏.改革以来全国总体基尼系数的演变及其城乡分解[J].中国社会科学,2007,(4).
[8]迟楠楠、赵会茹、李春杰.我国实施电力普遍服务基金机制的成本与时机分析[J].技术经济,2008,(3)：78-82.
[9]杜鑫.中国垄断性行业与竞争性行业的收入差距：基于北京市微观数据的研究[J].南开经济研究,2010,(5).
[10]范瑛、平新乔.工资合约、灰色收入和职业生涯考虑[J].经济学(季刊),2004,(4)
[11]傅娟.中国垄断行业的高收入及其原因：基于整个收入分布的经验研究[J].世界经济,2008,(7).
[12]伏帅、龚志民.中国行业收入差距的成因及其经济增长效应[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,(12).
[13]顾严、冯银虎.我国行业收入分配发生两极分化了吗——来自非参数Kernel密度估计的证据[J].经济评论,2008,(4).
[14]郭继强、陆利丽.工资差异均值分解的一种改进[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(4).
[15]郭娜、祁怀锦.中国行业收入差距的度量及其对经济增长的效应分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,(3).
[16]胡汉辉、刘怀德.产业开放背景下的普遍服务问题之我见[J].东南大学学报,2002,(3)：70-77.
[17]姜付秀、余晖.我国行政性垄断的危害——市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2007,(10)：71-78.
[18]江劲松.国有企业工资制度研究[D].湖南农业大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[19]金玉国.行业属性对劳动报酬的边际效应及其细部特征——基于分位数回归模型的实证研究[J].财经研究,2008,(7).
[20]拉丰、张昕竹.发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析[J].当代财经,2004,(1)：5-13.
[21]廖进球、吴昌南.我国电力产业运营模式变迁下电力普遍服务的主体及补贴机制[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：126-130.
[22]罗楚亮.垄断企业内部的工资收入分配[J].中国人口科学,2006,(1).
[23]罗孜婧.我国邮政普遍服务财政补偿机制研究[D].北京邮电大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[24]吕志勇、陈宏民.定价约束、社会福利与电信普遍服务机制设计[J].上海交通大学学报,2005,(3)：492-495.
[25]彭征波.企业规模、所有制与工资[J].山西财经大学学报,2006,(12).
[26]齐良书.国有部门劳动力工资制度改革对教育收益率的影响——对1988-1999年中国城市教育收益率的实证研究[J].教育与经济,2005,(4).
[27]齐新宇.普遍服务与电力零售竞争[J].财经研究,2004,(1)：96-103.
[28]阙光辉.我国电力普遍服务问题研究[J].电力技术经济,2006,(5)：7-17.
[29]任重、周云波.垄断对我国行业收入差距的影响到底有多大[J].经济理论与经济管理,2009,(4).
[30]史先诚.行业间工资差异和垄断租金分享[J].中央财经大学学报,2007,(2).
[31]王瑾.建立中国电信普遍服务机制的经济学分析[D].清华大学硕士学位论文,2005.
[32]王珺.我国邮政普遍服务政府规制研究[D].天津大学硕士学位论文,2009.
[33]王俊、昌忠泽.社会普遍服务的建立：来自中国的经验分析[J].经济研究,2007,(12)：34-45.
[34]王俊豪.我国电信普遍服务面临的问题与对策[J].经济管理,2002,(9)：72-74.
[35]王俊豪.我国电信产业民营化改革与政府管制政策[J].财经论丛,2004,(1)：15-23.
[36]王俊豪.中国垄断性产业普遍服务政策探讨——以电信、电力产业为例[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：120-125.
[37]王丽萍、李新武、谢维、张验科.一种激励相容的电力普遍服务实现机制[J].工业技术经济,2009,(11)：85-87.
[38]王书生.电力普遍服务问题初探[J].中国电力教育,2006,(2).
[39]王天夫、王丰.中国城市收入分配中的集团因素：1986-1995[J].社会学研究,2005,(3).
[40]王晓颖.国有企业利润分配问题研究[D].山西财经大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[41]吴洪、张晓铁.电信普遍服务研究[M].人民邮电出版社,2004.
[42]吴绪亮、于左.中国基础领域反垄断与弱势群体福利变迁[J].当代财经,2005,(5)：5-10.
[43]武鹏、周云波.行业收入差距细分与演进轨迹：1990-2008[J],改革,2011,(1).
[44]谢露露.中国工业行业的工资集聚与互动：观察和解释[D].复旦大学硕士学位论文,2011.
[45]刑春冰.不同所有制企业的工资决定机制考察[J].经济研究,2005,(6).
[46]刑春冰.中国不同所有制部门的工资决定与教育回报：分位回归的证据[J].世界经济文汇,2006,(4).
[47]叶林祥、李实、罗楚亮.效率工资、租金分享与企业工资收入差距——基于第一次全国经济普查工业企业数据的实证研究[J],财经研究,2011,(3).
[48]杨瑞龙、周业安、张玉仁.国有企业双层分配合约下的效率工资假说及其检验—对”工资侵蚀利润”命题的质疑[J].管理世界,1998,(1).
[49]姚先国、李晓华.工资不平等的上升：结构效应与价格效应[J].中国人口科学,2007,(1).
[50]岳昌君、吴淑娇.人力资本的外部性与行业收入差异[J].北京大学教育评论,2005,(10)：31-37.
[51]岳希明、李实、史泰丽.垄断行业高收入问题探讨[J],中国社会科学,2010,(3).
[52]张少华.我国国有企业收入分配制度改革研究[D].广东商学院硕士学位论文,2011.
[53]张原、陈建奇.非工资性收入分配：国有部门收入调控的新视角[J].中国工业经济,2007,(8).
[54]张原、陈建奇.人力资本还是行业特征：行业间工资回报差异成因分析[J].世界经济,2008,(5).
[55]赵会茹、迟楠楠、崔博.电力普遍服务社会效益量化研究[J].工业技术经济[J].工业技术经济,2009,(5)：102-105.
[56]赵会茹、李春杰、李泓泽.电力市场环境下的电力普遍服务[M].中国电力出版社,2009.
[57]Abowd, J. and F. Kramarz,1999, "Econometrics Analysis of Linked Employer-Employee Data", Labour Economics, Vol.6, No.1, PP53-74.
[58]Abowd, J., F. Kramarz and D.N.Margolis,1999, "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms", Econometrica, Vol.67, No.2, PP251-333.
[59]Abowd, J. and T. Lemieux,1993, "The Effect of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements:The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108, No.4, PP983-1014.
[60]Albrecht, J. and S. Vroman,1998, "Nash Equilibrium Efficiency Wage Distributions", International Economic Review, Vol.39, No.1, PP183-203.
[61]Ambrosini, X., F. Boldron and B.Roy,2006, "Universal Service Obligations in the Postal Sector:Economic Learnings from Cross-country Comparisons", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer(eds), Progress towards Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, New York:Springer.
[62]Anton, J., J. Vander Weide and N. Vettas,2002, "Entry Auctions and Strategic Behavior under Cross-Market Price Constraints", International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol.20, PP611-629.
[63]Arai, M.,2003, "Wages, Profits and Capital Intensity:Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.21, No.3, PP593-618.
[64]Armstrong, M.,2001, "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service", American Economic Review, Vol.91, No.2, PP297-301.
[65]Armstrong, M.,2002, "The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection", in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics:Volume I, ed. By M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[66]Armstrong, M.,2008, "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post" Review of Network Economics No.7, PP172-187.
[67]Barros, P. and Carmo Seabra,1999, "Universal Service Does Competition Help or Hurt", Information Economics and Policy, Vo.11, No.1, PP45-60.
[68]Bayard, K., J. Hellerstein, D. Neumark and K. Troske,2003, "New Evidence on Sex Segregation and Sex Differences in Wages from Matched Employer-Employee Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.21, No.4, PP887-922.
[69]Benito, A.,2000, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials in Great Britain", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.62, Supplement si, PP727-746.
[70]Biancini,2006, "Universal Telecommunication Service:an Empirical Analysis of the Indian Market", Working Paper.
[71]Bjorklund, A., B. Bratsberg, T. Eriksson, M. Jantti and O. Raaum,2004, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability:Siblings Evidence from Five Countries", IZA Discussion Paper Series, No.1080.
[72]Bjorklund, A., B. Bratsberg, T. Eriksson, M. Jantti and O. Raaum,2007, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability:Siblings Evidence from Five Countries", Industrial Relations, Vol.46, No.1, PP171-202.
[73]Blanchflower, David G, Andrew J. Oswald and Peter Sanfey,1996, "Wage, Profits and Rent-sharing", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, No.1, PP227-251.
[74]Blinder, A.,1973,"Wage Discrimination:Reduced Form and Structural Estimates", Journal of Human Resources, Vol.8, No.4, PP436-455.
[75]Boldron, F., D. Joram, L. Martiin, B. Roy,2006, "From the Size of the Box to the Costs of Universal Service Obligations:A Cross-country Comparison", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, Northampton, MA:Edward Elgar.
[76]Bourguignon, H. and J. A. Ferrando Yanez,2007, "Skimming the Others'Cream: Competitive Effects of an Asymmetric Universal Service Obligation", International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.25, No.4, PP.761-790.
[77]Caillaud, B. and J. Tirole,2004, "Essential Facility Financing and Market Structure", Journal of Public Economics, Vol.88, No.3, PP667-694.
[78]Carruth, A., W. Collier and A. Dickerson,2004, "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Individual Heterogeneity", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.55, No.5, PP811-846.
[79]Christofides, L.N. and Oswald A.J.,1992, "Real Wage Determination and Rent-Sharing in Collective Bargaining Agreements", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.107, No.3, PP985-1002.
[80]Chone, P., L. Flochel and A. Perrot,2000, "Universal Service Obligations and Competition", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No3, PP249-259.
[81]Chone, P., L. Flochel and A. Perrot,2002, "Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Market", International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.20, No.9, PP1247-1276.
[82]Christopoulou, R. and P. Vermeulen,2008, "Markups in the Euro Area and the US Over the Period 1981-2004-a Comparison of 50 Sectors", ECB Working Paper No.856.
[83]Cotton, J.,1988, "On the Decomposition of the Wage Differentials", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.70, No.2, PP236-243.
[84]Cremer, H., F.Gasmi, A.Grimaud and J.J. Laffont,1998, "The Economics of Universal Service:Practice", Working Paper.
[85]Cremer, H., M. De Rycke and A. Grimaud,1997, "Cost and Benefits of Universal Service in the Postal Sector", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[86]Cremer, H., P.D.Donder, F.Boldron, D.Joram and B.Roy,2007, "Social Costs and Benefits of the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal Market", Working Paper.
[87]Cremer, H., F.Gasmi, A.Grimaud and J.J. Laffont,2001, "The Cost of Universal Service in the Postal Sector", chapter3 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (eds.), PP47-68.
[88]Cremer, H., Gasmi, F., Grimaud, A. and J.-J. Laffont,2001, "Universal Service:an Economic Perspective", Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol.72, No.1,PP5-43.
[89]Cremer, H., Pestieau, P. and Rochet, J-C.,2001, "Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: the Design of the Tax Structure Revisited", International Economic Review, Vol.42, No.3,PP781-799.
[90]Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer,1998, "Efficient Entry, Monopoly and the Universal Service Obligation in Postal Service", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.14, No.2, PP103-125.
[91]De Donder, P., Cremer, H. and Rodriguez, F.,2002, "Funding the USO under Liberalisation", chapter2 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer(eds), PP31-52.
[92]Dickens, W. and L. Katz,1987, "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Industry Characteristics", in Lang K. and Leonard J. (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of Labour Market, Basil Blackwell:Oxford.
[93]DiNardo, J., N.M. Fortin, and T. Lemieux,1996, "Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages,1973-1992:A Semiparametric Approach", Econometrica, Vol.64, No.5, PP1001-1044.
[94]Druant, M., S. Fabiani, G. Kezdi, A. Lamo, F. Martins and R.Sabbatini,2009, "How Are Firms Wages and Prices Linked:Survey Evidence in Europe", ECB Working Paper No.1084.
[95]Du Caju, Ph., E. Gautier, D. Momferatou and M. Ward-Warmedinger,2008, "Institutional Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 EU Countries, the US and Japan", ECB Working Paper No.974.
[96]Du Caju Ph., F. Rycx and I. Tojerow,2011, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials: How Much Does Rent Sharing Matter?", The Manchester School, Vol.79, No.4, PP691-717.
[97]Erdil, E. and I. H. Yetkiner,2001, "A Comparative Analysis of Inter-industry Wage Differentials:Industrialised versus Developing Countries", Applied Economics, Vol.33, No.13, PP1639-1648.
[98]Fabra, Natalia and Philippe Gagnepain,2004, "Competition in Postal Markets: Quality, Coverage and Universal Service", Working Paper.
[99]Foros, O. and H. J. Kind,2003, "The Broadband Access Market:Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.23, No.3,P215-235.
[100]Freeman, R.,2007, "Labour Market Institutions around the World", NBER Working Paper No.13242.
[101]Gannon, B. and B. Nolan,2004, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials in Ireland" The Economic and Social Review, Vol.35, No.2, PP157-182.
[102]Gasmi, F., J.J. Laffont and W.W. Sharkey,2000, "Competition, Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No.3, PP221-248.
[103]Gautier, A. and M. Mitra,2008, "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility", Economica, Vol.75, No.300, PP662-682.
[104]Genre, V., Momferatou D. and Mourre Gilles,2005, "Wage Diversity in the Euro Area:An Overview of Labour Cost Differentials Across Industries", ECB Occasional Paper, No.24.
[105]Gibbons, R. and L. Katz,1992, "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59, No.3, PP515-35.
[106]Gibbons, R., L.F.Katz, T.Lemieux, D.Parent,2005, "Comparative Advantage, Learning and Sectoral Wage Determination", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.23, No.4,PP681-723.
[107]Goux, D. and E.Maurin,1999, "Persistence of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials: A Reexamination Using Matched Worker-Firm Panel Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vo.17, No.3, PP492-533.
[108]Grey, A.,1993, "Interindustry Wage Differentials in Manufacturing:Rents and Industrial Structure", Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.26, PP525-535.
[109]Gurtzgen, N.,2005, "Rent-sharing:Does the Bargaining Regime Make a Difference? Theory and Empirical Evidence", ZEW Discussion Paper, No.05-15.
[110]Haisken-denew, J.P. and C.M. Schmidt,1997, "Interindustry and Interregion Differentials:Mechanics and Interpretation", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.79, No.3, PP516-521.
[111]Helwege, J.,1992, "Sectoral Shifts and Interindustry Wage Differentials", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.10, No.1, PP55-84.
[112]Hoernig, S.,2006, "Should Uniform Pricing Constraints be Imposed on Entrants?", Journal of Regulatory Economics,30, No.2, PP199-216.
[113]Holmlund, B. and J. Zetterberg,1991, "Insider Effects in Wage Determination: Evidence from Five Countries", European Economic Review, Vol.35, No.5, 1009-1034.
[114]Ilie, L. and R. Losada,2004, "Endogenous Financing of the Universal Service" Working Paper.
[115]Independent Regulators Group,2003, "Universal Service Designation"
[116]International Telecommunication Union,2006, "Report on Innovative Solutions for the Management and Financing of Universal Service and Universal Access Policies", http://www.itu.int/pub/D-STG-SG01.07.1-2006/en.
[117]Kahn, L. M.,1998, "Collective Bargaining and Interindustry Wage Structure: International Evidence", Economica, Vol.65, No.260, PP507-534.
[118]Katz, L. and L. Summers,1989, "Industry Rents:Evidence and Implications", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:Macroeconomics, PP209-275.
[119]Klemperer, P.,2004, Auctions:Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press.
[120]Koenker, R. and G. Bassett,1978, "Regression Quantiles", Econometrica, Vol.46, No.1,PP33-50.
[121]Krause, Michael U.,2002, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials and Job Flows", CentER Working Paper No.2002-03.
[122]Krueger, A. and L. Summers,1987, "Reflection on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure", in Lang K. and Leonard J. (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of Labour Market, Basil Blackwell:Oxford.
[123]Krueger, A. and L. Summers,1988, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure", Econometrica, Vol.56, No.2, PP259-293.
[124]Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole,2000, Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
[125]Lindbeck, A. and D. J. Snower,1990, "Interindustry Wage Structure and the Power of Incument Workers", in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa (eds.), Labour Relations and Economic Performance, London:MacMillan, PP378-390.
[126]Lundgren, A.,2002, "Sustainability of the USO in a Liberalised Postal Market: some Empirical Insight", chapter 4 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (eds).
[127]Madet, C., Mirabel, F., Poudou, J. and Roland, M.,2004, "Funding Universal Service Obligations with an Essential Facility:Charges vs. Taxes and Subsidies" CREDEN.
[128]Magda, I., F. Rycx, I. Tojerow and D.Valsamis,2008, "Wage Differentials Across Sectors in Europe:an East-West Comparison", IZA Discussion Paper No.3830.
[129]Margolis, D.N. and Salvanes, K.G.,2001, "Do Firms Really Share Rents with their Workers?", CREST Working Paper, No.2001-2016.
[130]Martins, P.,2004, "Industry Wage Premia:Evidence from the Wage Distribution", Economics Letters, Vol.83, No.2, PP157-163.
[131]Melly, B.,2006, "Estimation of Counterfactual Distributions Using Quantile Regression", Working Paper.
[132]Milgrom, P.,1996, "Procuring Universal Service:Putting Auctions Theory to Work", Lecture at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
[133]Mirabel, F. and J.-C. Poudou,2004, "Mechanisms of Funding for Universal Service Obligations:the Electricity Case", Energy Economics, Vol.62, PP801-823.
[134]Mirabel, F., J.-C. Poudou and M. Roland,2009, "Universal Service Obligations: The role of Subsidization Schemes", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.21, No.1,PP1-9.
[135]Mortensen, D. T.,2003, "Wage Dispersion:Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently", Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
[136]Neeman, Z. and Orosel, G,2004, "Contestability Licensing", Contributions to Economic Analysis& Policy, Vol.3, No.1.
[137]Neumark, D.,1988, "Employers'Discriminatory Behavior and the Estimation of Wage Discrimination", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol.23, No.3, PP279-295.
[138]Nickell, S. and R. Layard,1999, "Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance", in O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.3, No.46, Amsterdam:Elsevier, PP3029-3084.
[139]Oaxaca, R.,1973, "Male and Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets" International Economic Review, Vol.14, No.3, PP693-709.
[140]OI, W. and T. Idson,1999, "Firm Size and Wages", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labour Economics,3B, Elsevier Science, North Holland, PP2165-2214.
[141]Oxera,2007, "Funding Universal Service Obligations in the Postal Sector", http://www.oxera.com.
[142]Panzar, J.,2000, "A Methodology for Measuring the Costs of Universal Service Obligations", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No.3, PP211-220.
[143]Plasman R. and S.Sissoko,2004, "Comparing Apples with Oranges:Revisiting the Gender Wage Gap in an International Perspective", IZ A Discussion Papers.
[144]Poudou, J.-C, Roland, M. and L. Thomas,2009, "Universal Service and Competition with Asymmetric Information", Working Paper.
[145]Reilly, K.T. and Zanchi,2003, "Industry Wage Differentials:How Many, Big and Significant Are They?", International Journal of Manpower, Vol.24, No.4, PP367-398.
[146]Riordan, M.,2001, "Universal Residential Telephone Service", in Cave, M, S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam Elsevier Science.
[147]Rycx, F.,2003, "Industry Wage Differentials and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporatist Country", International Journal of Manpower, Vol.24, No.4, PP347-366.
[148]Rycx, F. and I. Tojerow,2004, "Rent Sharing and the Gender. Wage Gap in Belgium", International Journal Manpower, Vol.25, No.3, PP279-299.
[149]Rycx, F. and I. Tojerow,2007, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials:What Do We Know?", Reflets et Perspectives de la vie economique, Vol. XLVI, No.2/3, PP13-22.
[150]Rycx, F., I. Tojerow and D. Valsamis,2008, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials in Europe:An East-west Comparison, Paper presented at the 2008 EALE Conference in Amsterdam.
[151]Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz,1984, "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device", The American Economic Review, Vol.74, No.3, PP433-444.
[152]Slichter, S.,1950, "Notes On the Structure of Wages", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.127, No.32, PP80-91.
[153]Sorana, V,2000, "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.18, No.1, PP33-58.
[154]Thaler, R. H.,1989, "Anomalies:Interindustry Wage Differentials", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.3, PP2,181-193.
[155]Vainiomaki, J. and S. Laaksonen,1995, "Interindustry Wage Differentials in Finland:Evidence from Longitudinal Census Data for 1975-1985", Labour Economics, Vol.2, No.2, PP161-173.
[156]Valletti, T., S. Hoernig and P. Barros,2002, "Universal Service and Entry:The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.21, No.2, PP169-190.
[157]Weller, D.,1999, "Auctions for Universal Service Obligations", Telecommunications Policy, Vol.23, No.9, PP645-674.
[158]Zanchi, L.,1995, "Cross-country Comparisons of the Inter-industry Wage Structure:Empirical Evidence with the Luxembourg Income Study Data-bank" University of York Discussion Paper in Economics 95/18.
[2]陈纯.竞争环境下我国电信普遍服务问题研究[D].暨南大学硕士学位论文,2008.
[3]陈剑、夏大慰.规制促减贫：以公用事业改革为视角[J].中国工业经济,2010,(2)：26-35.
[4]陈弋、Sylvie、Martin.中国企业的工资差异和所有制结构[J].世界经济文汇,2005,(6)
[5]陈钊、陆铭、佐藤宏.谁进入了高收入行业?关系、户籍与生产率的作用[J].经济研究,2009,(10).
[6]陈钊、万广华和陆铭.行业间不平等：日益重要的城镇收入差距成因——基于回归方程的分解[J].中国社会科学,2010,(3).
[7]程永宏.改革以来全国总体基尼系数的演变及其城乡分解[J].中国社会科学,2007,(4).
[8]迟楠楠、赵会茹、李春杰.我国实施电力普遍服务基金机制的成本与时机分析[J].技术经济,2008,(3)：78-82.
[9]杜鑫.中国垄断性行业与竞争性行业的收入差距：基于北京市微观数据的研究[J].南开经济研究,2010,(5).
[10]范瑛、平新乔.工资合约、灰色收入和职业生涯考虑[J].经济学(季刊),2004,(4)
[11]傅娟.中国垄断行业的高收入及其原因：基于整个收入分布的经验研究[J].世界经济,2008,(7).
[12]伏帅、龚志民.中国行业收入差距的成因及其经济增长效应[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,(12).
[13]顾严、冯银虎.我国行业收入分配发生两极分化了吗——来自非参数Kernel密度估计的证据[J].经济评论,2008,(4).
[14]郭继强、陆利丽.工资差异均值分解的一种改进[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(4).
[15]郭娜、祁怀锦.中国行业收入差距的度量及其对经济增长的效应分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2010,(3).
[16]胡汉辉、刘怀德.产业开放背景下的普遍服务问题之我见[J].东南大学学报,2002,(3)：70-77.
[17]姜付秀、余晖.我国行政性垄断的危害——市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2007,(10)：71-78.
[18]江劲松.国有企业工资制度研究[D].湖南农业大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[19]金玉国.行业属性对劳动报酬的边际效应及其细部特征——基于分位数回归模型的实证研究[J].财经研究,2008,(7).
[20]拉丰、张昕竹.发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析[J].当代财经,2004,(1)：5-13.
[21]廖进球、吴昌南.我国电力产业运营模式变迁下电力普遍服务的主体及补贴机制[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：126-130.
[22]罗楚亮.垄断企业内部的工资收入分配[J].中国人口科学,2006,(1).
[23]罗孜婧.我国邮政普遍服务财政补偿机制研究[D].北京邮电大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[24]吕志勇、陈宏民.定价约束、社会福利与电信普遍服务机制设计[J].上海交通大学学报,2005,(3)：492-495.
[25]彭征波.企业规模、所有制与工资[J].山西财经大学学报,2006,(12).
[26]齐良书.国有部门劳动力工资制度改革对教育收益率的影响——对1988-1999年中国城市教育收益率的实证研究[J].教育与经济,2005,(4).
[27]齐新宇.普遍服务与电力零售竞争[J].财经研究,2004,(1)：96-103.
[28]阙光辉.我国电力普遍服务问题研究[J].电力技术经济,2006,(5)：7-17.
[29]任重、周云波.垄断对我国行业收入差距的影响到底有多大[J].经济理论与经济管理,2009,(4).
[30]史先诚.行业间工资差异和垄断租金分享[J].中央财经大学学报,2007,(2).
[31]王瑾.建立中国电信普遍服务机制的经济学分析[D].清华大学硕士学位论文,2005.
[32]王珺.我国邮政普遍服务政府规制研究[D].天津大学硕士学位论文,2009.
[33]王俊、昌忠泽.社会普遍服务的建立：来自中国的经验分析[J].经济研究,2007,(12)：34-45.
[34]王俊豪.我国电信普遍服务面临的问题与对策[J].经济管理,2002,(9)：72-74.
[35]王俊豪.我国电信产业民营化改革与政府管制政策[J].财经论丛,2004,(1)：15-23.
[36]王俊豪.中国垄断性产业普遍服务政策探讨——以电信、电力产业为例[J].财贸经济,2009,(10)：120-125.
[37]王丽萍、李新武、谢维、张验科.一种激励相容的电力普遍服务实现机制[J].工业技术经济,2009,(11)：85-87.
[38]王书生.电力普遍服务问题初探[J].中国电力教育,2006,(2).
[39]王天夫、王丰.中国城市收入分配中的集团因素：1986-1995[J].社会学研究,2005,(3).
[40]王晓颖.国有企业利润分配问题研究[D].山西财经大学硕士学位论文,2010.
[41]吴洪、张晓铁.电信普遍服务研究[M].人民邮电出版社,2004.
[42]吴绪亮、于左.中国基础领域反垄断与弱势群体福利变迁[J].当代财经,2005,(5)：5-10.
[43]武鹏、周云波.行业收入差距细分与演进轨迹：1990-2008[J],改革,2011,(1).
[44]谢露露.中国工业行业的工资集聚与互动：观察和解释[D].复旦大学硕士学位论文,2011.
[45]刑春冰.不同所有制企业的工资决定机制考察[J].经济研究,2005,(6).
[46]刑春冰.中国不同所有制部门的工资决定与教育回报：分位回归的证据[J].世界经济文汇,2006,(4).
[47]叶林祥、李实、罗楚亮.效率工资、租金分享与企业工资收入差距——基于第一次全国经济普查工业企业数据的实证研究[J],财经研究,2011,(3).
[48]杨瑞龙、周业安、张玉仁.国有企业双层分配合约下的效率工资假说及其检验—对”工资侵蚀利润”命题的质疑[J].管理世界,1998,(1).
[49]姚先国、李晓华.工资不平等的上升：结构效应与价格效应[J].中国人口科学,2007,(1).
[50]岳昌君、吴淑娇.人力资本的外部性与行业收入差异[J].北京大学教育评论,2005,(10)：31-37.
[51]岳希明、李实、史泰丽.垄断行业高收入问题探讨[J],中国社会科学,2010,(3).
[52]张少华.我国国有企业收入分配制度改革研究[D].广东商学院硕士学位论文,2011.
[53]张原、陈建奇.非工资性收入分配：国有部门收入调控的新视角[J].中国工业经济,2007,(8).
[54]张原、陈建奇.人力资本还是行业特征：行业间工资回报差异成因分析[J].世界经济,2008,(5).
[55]赵会茹、迟楠楠、崔博.电力普遍服务社会效益量化研究[J].工业技术经济[J].工业技术经济,2009,(5)：102-105.
[56]赵会茹、李春杰、李泓泽.电力市场环境下的电力普遍服务[M].中国电力出版社,2009.
[57]Abowd, J. and F. Kramarz,1999, "Econometrics Analysis of Linked Employer-Employee Data", Labour Economics, Vol.6, No.1, PP53-74.
[58]Abowd, J., F. Kramarz and D.N.Margolis,1999, "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms", Econometrica, Vol.67, No.2, PP251-333.
[59]Abowd, J. and T. Lemieux,1993, "The Effect of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements:The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108, No.4, PP983-1014.
[60]Albrecht, J. and S. Vroman,1998, "Nash Equilibrium Efficiency Wage Distributions", International Economic Review, Vol.39, No.1, PP183-203.
[61]Ambrosini, X., F. Boldron and B.Roy,2006, "Universal Service Obligations in the Postal Sector:Economic Learnings from Cross-country Comparisons", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer(eds), Progress towards Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, New York:Springer.
[62]Anton, J., J. Vander Weide and N. Vettas,2002, "Entry Auctions and Strategic Behavior under Cross-Market Price Constraints", International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol.20, PP611-629.
[63]Arai, M.,2003, "Wages, Profits and Capital Intensity:Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.21, No.3, PP593-618.
[64]Armstrong, M.,2001, "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service", American Economic Review, Vol.91, No.2, PP297-301.
[65]Armstrong, M.,2002, "The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection", in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics:Volume I, ed. By M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[66]Armstrong, M.,2008, "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post" Review of Network Economics No.7, PP172-187.
[67]Barros, P. and Carmo Seabra,1999, "Universal Service Does Competition Help or Hurt", Information Economics and Policy, Vo.11, No.1, PP45-60.
[68]Bayard, K., J. Hellerstein, D. Neumark and K. Troske,2003, "New Evidence on Sex Segregation and Sex Differences in Wages from Matched Employer-Employee Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.21, No.4, PP887-922.
[69]Benito, A.,2000, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials in Great Britain", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.62, Supplement si, PP727-746.
[70]Biancini,2006, "Universal Telecommunication Service:an Empirical Analysis of the Indian Market", Working Paper.
[71]Bjorklund, A., B. Bratsberg, T. Eriksson, M. Jantti and O. Raaum,2004, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability:Siblings Evidence from Five Countries", IZA Discussion Paper Series, No.1080.
[72]Bjorklund, A., B. Bratsberg, T. Eriksson, M. Jantti and O. Raaum,2007, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability:Siblings Evidence from Five Countries", Industrial Relations, Vol.46, No.1, PP171-202.
[73]Blanchflower, David G, Andrew J. Oswald and Peter Sanfey,1996, "Wage, Profits and Rent-sharing", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, No.1, PP227-251.
[74]Blinder, A.,1973,"Wage Discrimination:Reduced Form and Structural Estimates", Journal of Human Resources, Vol.8, No.4, PP436-455.
[75]Boldron, F., D. Joram, L. Martiin, B. Roy,2006, "From the Size of the Box to the Costs of Universal Service Obligations:A Cross-country Comparison", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, Northampton, MA:Edward Elgar.
[76]Bourguignon, H. and J. A. Ferrando Yanez,2007, "Skimming the Others'Cream: Competitive Effects of an Asymmetric Universal Service Obligation", International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.25, No.4, PP.761-790.
[77]Caillaud, B. and J. Tirole,2004, "Essential Facility Financing and Market Structure", Journal of Public Economics, Vol.88, No.3, PP667-694.
[78]Carruth, A., W. Collier and A. Dickerson,2004, "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Individual Heterogeneity", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.55, No.5, PP811-846.
[79]Christofides, L.N. and Oswald A.J.,1992, "Real Wage Determination and Rent-Sharing in Collective Bargaining Agreements", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.107, No.3, PP985-1002.
[80]Chone, P., L. Flochel and A. Perrot,2000, "Universal Service Obligations and Competition", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No3, PP249-259.
[81]Chone, P., L. Flochel and A. Perrot,2002, "Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Market", International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.20, No.9, PP1247-1276.
[82]Christopoulou, R. and P. Vermeulen,2008, "Markups in the Euro Area and the US Over the Period 1981-2004-a Comparison of 50 Sectors", ECB Working Paper No.856.
[83]Cotton, J.,1988, "On the Decomposition of the Wage Differentials", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.70, No.2, PP236-243.
[84]Cremer, H., F.Gasmi, A.Grimaud and J.J. Laffont,1998, "The Economics of Universal Service:Practice", Working Paper.
[85]Cremer, H., M. De Rycke and A. Grimaud,1997, "Cost and Benefits of Universal Service in the Postal Sector", in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[86]Cremer, H., P.D.Donder, F.Boldron, D.Joram and B.Roy,2007, "Social Costs and Benefits of the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal Market", Working Paper.
[87]Cremer, H., F.Gasmi, A.Grimaud and J.J. Laffont,2001, "The Cost of Universal Service in the Postal Sector", chapter3 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (eds.), PP47-68.
[88]Cremer, H., Gasmi, F., Grimaud, A. and J.-J. Laffont,2001, "Universal Service:an Economic Perspective", Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol.72, No.1,PP5-43.
[89]Cremer, H., Pestieau, P. and Rochet, J-C.,2001, "Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: the Design of the Tax Structure Revisited", International Economic Review, Vol.42, No.3,PP781-799.
[90]Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer,1998, "Efficient Entry, Monopoly and the Universal Service Obligation in Postal Service", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.14, No.2, PP103-125.
[91]De Donder, P., Cremer, H. and Rodriguez, F.,2002, "Funding the USO under Liberalisation", chapter2 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer(eds), PP31-52.
[92]Dickens, W. and L. Katz,1987, "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Industry Characteristics", in Lang K. and Leonard J. (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of Labour Market, Basil Blackwell:Oxford.
[93]DiNardo, J., N.M. Fortin, and T. Lemieux,1996, "Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages,1973-1992:A Semiparametric Approach", Econometrica, Vol.64, No.5, PP1001-1044.
[94]Druant, M., S. Fabiani, G. Kezdi, A. Lamo, F. Martins and R.Sabbatini,2009, "How Are Firms Wages and Prices Linked:Survey Evidence in Europe", ECB Working Paper No.1084.
[95]Du Caju, Ph., E. Gautier, D. Momferatou and M. Ward-Warmedinger,2008, "Institutional Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 EU Countries, the US and Japan", ECB Working Paper No.974.
[96]Du Caju Ph., F. Rycx and I. Tojerow,2011, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials: How Much Does Rent Sharing Matter?", The Manchester School, Vol.79, No.4, PP691-717.
[97]Erdil, E. and I. H. Yetkiner,2001, "A Comparative Analysis of Inter-industry Wage Differentials:Industrialised versus Developing Countries", Applied Economics, Vol.33, No.13, PP1639-1648.
[98]Fabra, Natalia and Philippe Gagnepain,2004, "Competition in Postal Markets: Quality, Coverage and Universal Service", Working Paper.
[99]Foros, O. and H. J. Kind,2003, "The Broadband Access Market:Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.23, No.3,P215-235.
[100]Freeman, R.,2007, "Labour Market Institutions around the World", NBER Working Paper No.13242.
[101]Gannon, B. and B. Nolan,2004, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials in Ireland" The Economic and Social Review, Vol.35, No.2, PP157-182.
[102]Gasmi, F., J.J. Laffont and W.W. Sharkey,2000, "Competition, Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No.3, PP221-248.
[103]Gautier, A. and M. Mitra,2008, "Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility", Economica, Vol.75, No.300, PP662-682.
[104]Genre, V., Momferatou D. and Mourre Gilles,2005, "Wage Diversity in the Euro Area:An Overview of Labour Cost Differentials Across Industries", ECB Occasional Paper, No.24.
[105]Gibbons, R. and L. Katz,1992, "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials?", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.59, No.3, PP515-35.
[106]Gibbons, R., L.F.Katz, T.Lemieux, D.Parent,2005, "Comparative Advantage, Learning and Sectoral Wage Determination", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.23, No.4,PP681-723.
[107]Goux, D. and E.Maurin,1999, "Persistence of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials: A Reexamination Using Matched Worker-Firm Panel Data", Journal of Labor Economics, Vo.17, No.3, PP492-533.
[108]Grey, A.,1993, "Interindustry Wage Differentials in Manufacturing:Rents and Industrial Structure", Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.26, PP525-535.
[109]Gurtzgen, N.,2005, "Rent-sharing:Does the Bargaining Regime Make a Difference? Theory and Empirical Evidence", ZEW Discussion Paper, No.05-15.
[110]Haisken-denew, J.P. and C.M. Schmidt,1997, "Interindustry and Interregion Differentials:Mechanics and Interpretation", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.79, No.3, PP516-521.
[111]Helwege, J.,1992, "Sectoral Shifts and Interindustry Wage Differentials", Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.10, No.1, PP55-84.
[112]Hoernig, S.,2006, "Should Uniform Pricing Constraints be Imposed on Entrants?", Journal of Regulatory Economics,30, No.2, PP199-216.
[113]Holmlund, B. and J. Zetterberg,1991, "Insider Effects in Wage Determination: Evidence from Five Countries", European Economic Review, Vol.35, No.5, 1009-1034.
[114]Ilie, L. and R. Losada,2004, "Endogenous Financing of the Universal Service" Working Paper.
[115]Independent Regulators Group,2003, "Universal Service Designation"
[116]International Telecommunication Union,2006, "Report on Innovative Solutions for the Management and Financing of Universal Service and Universal Access Policies", http://www.itu.int/pub/D-STG-SG01.07.1-2006/en.
[117]Kahn, L. M.,1998, "Collective Bargaining and Interindustry Wage Structure: International Evidence", Economica, Vol.65, No.260, PP507-534.
[118]Katz, L. and L. Summers,1989, "Industry Rents:Evidence and Implications", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:Macroeconomics, PP209-275.
[119]Klemperer, P.,2004, Auctions:Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press.
[120]Koenker, R. and G. Bassett,1978, "Regression Quantiles", Econometrica, Vol.46, No.1,PP33-50.
[121]Krause, Michael U.,2002, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials and Job Flows", CentER Working Paper No.2002-03.
[122]Krueger, A. and L. Summers,1987, "Reflection on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure", in Lang K. and Leonard J. (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of Labour Market, Basil Blackwell:Oxford.
[123]Krueger, A. and L. Summers,1988, "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure", Econometrica, Vol.56, No.2, PP259-293.
[124]Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole,2000, Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
[125]Lindbeck, A. and D. J. Snower,1990, "Interindustry Wage Structure and the Power of Incument Workers", in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa (eds.), Labour Relations and Economic Performance, London:MacMillan, PP378-390.
[126]Lundgren, A.,2002, "Sustainability of the USO in a Liberalised Postal Market: some Empirical Insight", chapter 4 in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (eds).
[127]Madet, C., Mirabel, F., Poudou, J. and Roland, M.,2004, "Funding Universal Service Obligations with an Essential Facility:Charges vs. Taxes and Subsidies" CREDEN.
[128]Magda, I., F. Rycx, I. Tojerow and D.Valsamis,2008, "Wage Differentials Across Sectors in Europe:an East-West Comparison", IZA Discussion Paper No.3830.
[129]Margolis, D.N. and Salvanes, K.G.,2001, "Do Firms Really Share Rents with their Workers?", CREST Working Paper, No.2001-2016.
[130]Martins, P.,2004, "Industry Wage Premia:Evidence from the Wage Distribution", Economics Letters, Vol.83, No.2, PP157-163.
[131]Melly, B.,2006, "Estimation of Counterfactual Distributions Using Quantile Regression", Working Paper.
[132]Milgrom, P.,1996, "Procuring Universal Service:Putting Auctions Theory to Work", Lecture at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
[133]Mirabel, F. and J.-C. Poudou,2004, "Mechanisms of Funding for Universal Service Obligations:the Electricity Case", Energy Economics, Vol.62, PP801-823.
[134]Mirabel, F., J.-C. Poudou and M. Roland,2009, "Universal Service Obligations: The role of Subsidization Schemes", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.21, No.1,PP1-9.
[135]Mortensen, D. T.,2003, "Wage Dispersion:Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently", Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
[136]Neeman, Z. and Orosel, G,2004, "Contestability Licensing", Contributions to Economic Analysis& Policy, Vol.3, No.1.
[137]Neumark, D.,1988, "Employers'Discriminatory Behavior and the Estimation of Wage Discrimination", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol.23, No.3, PP279-295.
[138]Nickell, S. and R. Layard,1999, "Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance", in O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.3, No.46, Amsterdam:Elsevier, PP3029-3084.
[139]Oaxaca, R.,1973, "Male and Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets" International Economic Review, Vol.14, No.3, PP693-709.
[140]OI, W. and T. Idson,1999, "Firm Size and Wages", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labour Economics,3B, Elsevier Science, North Holland, PP2165-2214.
[141]Oxera,2007, "Funding Universal Service Obligations in the Postal Sector", http://www.oxera.com.
[142]Panzar, J.,2000, "A Methodology for Measuring the Costs of Universal Service Obligations", Information Economics and Policy, Vol.12, No.3, PP211-220.
[143]Plasman R. and S.Sissoko,2004, "Comparing Apples with Oranges:Revisiting the Gender Wage Gap in an International Perspective", IZ A Discussion Papers.
[144]Poudou, J.-C, Roland, M. and L. Thomas,2009, "Universal Service and Competition with Asymmetric Information", Working Paper.
[145]Reilly, K.T. and Zanchi,2003, "Industry Wage Differentials:How Many, Big and Significant Are They?", International Journal of Manpower, Vol.24, No.4, PP367-398.
[146]Riordan, M.,2001, "Universal Residential Telephone Service", in Cave, M, S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam Elsevier Science.
[147]Rycx, F.,2003, "Industry Wage Differentials and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporatist Country", International Journal of Manpower, Vol.24, No.4, PP347-366.
[148]Rycx, F. and I. Tojerow,2004, "Rent Sharing and the Gender. Wage Gap in Belgium", International Journal Manpower, Vol.25, No.3, PP279-299.
[149]Rycx, F. and I. Tojerow,2007, "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials:What Do We Know?", Reflets et Perspectives de la vie economique, Vol. XLVI, No.2/3, PP13-22.
[150]Rycx, F., I. Tojerow and D. Valsamis,2008, "Inter-industry Wage Differentials in Europe:An East-west Comparison, Paper presented at the 2008 EALE Conference in Amsterdam.
[151]Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz,1984, "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device", The American Economic Review, Vol.74, No.3, PP433-444.
[152]Slichter, S.,1950, "Notes On the Structure of Wages", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.127, No.32, PP80-91.
[153]Sorana, V,2000, "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.18, No.1, PP33-58.
[154]Thaler, R. H.,1989, "Anomalies:Interindustry Wage Differentials", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.3, PP2,181-193.
[155]Vainiomaki, J. and S. Laaksonen,1995, "Interindustry Wage Differentials in Finland:Evidence from Longitudinal Census Data for 1975-1985", Labour Economics, Vol.2, No.2, PP161-173.
[156]Valletti, T., S. Hoernig and P. Barros,2002, "Universal Service and Entry:The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol.21, No.2, PP169-190.
[157]Weller, D.,1999, "Auctions for Universal Service Obligations", Telecommunications Policy, Vol.23, No.9, PP645-674.
[158]Zanchi, L.,1995, "Cross-country Comparisons of the Inter-industry Wage Structure:Empirical Evidence with the Luxembourg Income Study Data-bank" University of York Discussion Paper in Economics 95/18.