地方政府投融资平台提供城市基础设施的效率和风险分析
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摘要
近二十年来,中国的城市基础设施水平突飞猛进,其发展速度令世人惊叹。未来二十年,中国的城镇化进程进入深化阶段,如何公平而有效地为城市基础设施建设融资仍是地方政府面临的重要议题。本研究试图从地方政府融资模式创新的角度,解释形成中国城市基础设施飞速改善这一“历史奇迹”的内在效率机制及其风险累积机制,并在此基础上探索当今乃至未来中国城镇化过程中基础设施建设融资的公平、有效之道。
目前,地方政府投融资平台(Local government financing vechiles, LGFVs)成为地方政府为城市基础设施融资的一种主要模式。虽然LGFVs这一名称的确立是近几年的事情,但在市场经济较发达的地区,这种融资模式的原型早在20世纪80年代末期已经出现。LGFVs作为一种历史自然选择的产物,必然存在显著的效率优势,这无疑已为中国过去十几年的发展经验所印证。但与此同时,随城镇化进程的深化,该融资模式背后蕴含的风险也越来越突出。越来越多的专家开始质疑投融资平台存在的必要性,国务院也出台了规范投融资平台的通知。理论界对此争论不休,政策选择上左右为难,骑虎难下。因此,很有必要首先从根源上探究LGFVs这种融资模式发挥资源配置效率优势的机制与条件,藉此机制和条件,我们才能进一步探究各种风险累积乃至触发的内在机理,最终才可能在提高效率与控制风险之间做出务实的权衡。
本研究的主要结构如下：
论文首先对城市基础设施的概念进行了界定,分析城市基础设施的特点和传统意义上主要的融资模式,并简要指出LGFVs的优势所在。然后,论文在对投融资平台运行机制系统描述的基础上,指出LGFVs不仅仅为地方政府提供了融资便利,而且创造了地方政府有效提供城市基础设施的某种经济激励。即投融资平台模式下,基础设施建设与土地开发相捆绑,地方政府实现了有激励的自我融资。与此同时,我们给出了论文得出LGFVs效率机制的三个条件：预算硬约束条件、良好内部公司治理条件与非货币经济条件。接着,我们在理解以上效率机制和效率条件的基础上,放松假设条件,重点分析了LGFVs内生的三类风险。即因预算软约束和道德风险所致的财政风险、货币经济条件下可能触发的金融风险和LGFVs恶化收入分配矛盾所致的社会风险。进而,我们通过对某市四大市级投融资平台的调研,在一定程度上为我们的理论论证提供经验证据。最后是相关政策建议。
本研究的主要发现有二：
第一,LGFVs不仅是一种融资工具,像大众媒体所报道的那样,而且是地方政府有效提供基础设施的一种激励机制。在经济学的意义上,LGFVs或者说地方政府类似于一个追求利润最大化的土地开发商,基础设施改良所产生的效益会资本化到土地价值中,这给LGFVs或地方政府的基础设施投资行为提供了自我激励。
第二,我们从LGFVs资源配置的效率机制及其实现条件出发探讨了三类潜在风险,指出财政风险主要源于地方政府的预算软约束和财政道德风险,金融风险主要来自于过度宽松的货币金融政策,而非LGFVs本身,收入分配相关的社会风险则与LGFVs的效率机制是一枚硬币的两面,基础设施融资成本在老住户与新移民之间的不合理分担可能成为下一步中国城镇化过程中亟需解决的问题。
我们的政策建议主要包括：构建合理的制度框架,硬化基础设施类LGFVs的预算约束,在充分发挥其效率机制的同时控制财政风险；根据各地区经济发展阶段的不同,逐步建立、完善LGFVs退出机制和地方公债发行制度；采取相关的财政支出政策矫正LGFVs可能产生的收入分配负效应。等等。
总之,分析投融资平台应该不仅要看到投融资平台在资源配置方面的效率优势,同时也不能忽略投融资平台带来的风险,应当理性看待投融资平台的过去、现在和未来。
最后,论文只是提出了一个简单的LGFVs分析框架,所提出的问题甚至多于已解决的问题。例如,LGFVs的效率优势如何受到基础设施服务资本化率的影响,资本化的具体机制是什么,LGFVs的收入分配效应的具体传导机制等等,这都需要未来进一步的思考和研究。
Over the last two decades, China's unban infrastructure has experienced an amazingly rapid development. And China's urbanization will be looking forward to stepping into another enhancive stage in the next twenty years. This makes the issue that to finance fairly and effectively for the construction of urban infrastructure, will still be an essential issue for the local governments. This paper will be analyzed from the prospective of financing mode innovation of local governments, trying to explain the intrinsic efficiency mechanism and risk accumulation mechanism that formed along with the above rapid improvement, and then comes up with suggestions on the financing mode of the future infrastructure construction.
Currently, the Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) is one of the most important financing modes of the urban infrastructure. Although this concept is just known recently, its embryo has been formed in the relatively developed areas ever since1980s. As has been existed and developed for decades, LGFVs is proved to be effective and useful. However, as the changes in urbanization, the risks of LGFVs do reveal gradually. More and more experts suggest that it is necessary to build a financing platform and corresponding regulations has been put forward by the State Department. There are lots of discussions on LGFVs both in academia and practice. Therefore, it's necessary to make a throughout research on LGFVs, particularly in aspects of the mechanism and conditions that help LGFVs to become an efficient financing mode. Only after this detailed study can we learn the elements of each risk, such as how it accumulates and acts, and can we make balance between efficiency and risks.
This paper first describes a clear definition and characteristics of Urban Infrastructure, and then displays other main financing modes, comparing to LGFVs. Second, after making a brief introduction of the mechanism of LGFVs, we find that LGFVs not only provides convenience to funds, but also encourages the local governments to construct infrastructures, that is, under LGFVs, the construction is bundled with land development, thus makes local governments refinancing themselves. Moreover, we discover three essential conditions of LGFVs:budget constraints, intra governance and nonmonetary economic conditions. After understanding the necessary foundations of efficiency, we emphasized on analyzing the three intrinsic risks of LGFVs:the fiscal risk due to budget constraints and moral risks, the possible financial risk due to monetary economy, and the social risk of worsening income distribution contractions led by LGFVs. Then, we undertake an investigation on four financing LGFVs in a city, in order to combine theoretical research with empirical analysis. The last part is conclusion and suggestions.
Based on the research, there are two key findings in this paper. Firstly, we find that LGFVs is not only a tool of finance as known, but also an effective incentive mode for local governments to construct more urban infrastructures. In an economic view, LGFVs or the local governments act as land developers aiming at profit maximization, and the benefits due to infrastructure improvement will be capitalized by the land value, encouraging the local government to reinvest. Secondly, after a detailed research on LGFVs potential risks, we find that the fiscal risk is mostly originated from local governments'budget constraints and moral risks, and the financial risk is basically due to overly loose monetary policies, rather than the LGFVs itself. However, the social risk is a property of LGFVs' mechanism, acting just as the other side of the coin. The allocation problems of financing costs between residents and new immigrants may need solving in the next decades.
This paper comes up with three suggestions. First, systemize reasonable political regulations, and reinforce the budget constraints for LGFVs. This aims at controlling the fiscal risk while not expropriate the efficiency. Second, establish a withdraw system for LGFVs, and improve the local government bond issuance system. Last but not least, conduct series of fiscal expenses regulations to refrain from negative effects made by income reallocation.
In a word, we should view the financing vehicles in a dialectical prospective. There is no doubt that LGFVs have its irreplaceable strengths, while there are also risks.
This paper just builds a simple analytical framework for LGFVs, while there are still numerous questions, such as how is the efficiency influenced by the capitalization rate of infrastructure, what is the specific mechanism of mechanism and the conduction mechanism of income distribution effects, etc.. All these should be solved in the further researches.
目前,地方政府投融资平台(Local government financing vechiles, LGFVs)成为地方政府为城市基础设施融资的一种主要模式。虽然LGFVs这一名称的确立是近几年的事情,但在市场经济较发达的地区,这种融资模式的原型早在20世纪80年代末期已经出现。LGFVs作为一种历史自然选择的产物,必然存在显著的效率优势,这无疑已为中国过去十几年的发展经验所印证。但与此同时,随城镇化进程的深化,该融资模式背后蕴含的风险也越来越突出。越来越多的专家开始质疑投融资平台存在的必要性,国务院也出台了规范投融资平台的通知。理论界对此争论不休,政策选择上左右为难,骑虎难下。因此,很有必要首先从根源上探究LGFVs这种融资模式发挥资源配置效率优势的机制与条件,藉此机制和条件,我们才能进一步探究各种风险累积乃至触发的内在机理,最终才可能在提高效率与控制风险之间做出务实的权衡。
本研究的主要结构如下：
论文首先对城市基础设施的概念进行了界定,分析城市基础设施的特点和传统意义上主要的融资模式,并简要指出LGFVs的优势所在。然后,论文在对投融资平台运行机制系统描述的基础上,指出LGFVs不仅仅为地方政府提供了融资便利,而且创造了地方政府有效提供城市基础设施的某种经济激励。即投融资平台模式下,基础设施建设与土地开发相捆绑,地方政府实现了有激励的自我融资。与此同时,我们给出了论文得出LGFVs效率机制的三个条件：预算硬约束条件、良好内部公司治理条件与非货币经济条件。接着,我们在理解以上效率机制和效率条件的基础上,放松假设条件,重点分析了LGFVs内生的三类风险。即因预算软约束和道德风险所致的财政风险、货币经济条件下可能触发的金融风险和LGFVs恶化收入分配矛盾所致的社会风险。进而,我们通过对某市四大市级投融资平台的调研,在一定程度上为我们的理论论证提供经验证据。最后是相关政策建议。
本研究的主要发现有二：
第一,LGFVs不仅是一种融资工具,像大众媒体所报道的那样,而且是地方政府有效提供基础设施的一种激励机制。在经济学的意义上,LGFVs或者说地方政府类似于一个追求利润最大化的土地开发商,基础设施改良所产生的效益会资本化到土地价值中,这给LGFVs或地方政府的基础设施投资行为提供了自我激励。
第二,我们从LGFVs资源配置的效率机制及其实现条件出发探讨了三类潜在风险,指出财政风险主要源于地方政府的预算软约束和财政道德风险,金融风险主要来自于过度宽松的货币金融政策,而非LGFVs本身,收入分配相关的社会风险则与LGFVs的效率机制是一枚硬币的两面,基础设施融资成本在老住户与新移民之间的不合理分担可能成为下一步中国城镇化过程中亟需解决的问题。
我们的政策建议主要包括：构建合理的制度框架,硬化基础设施类LGFVs的预算约束,在充分发挥其效率机制的同时控制财政风险；根据各地区经济发展阶段的不同,逐步建立、完善LGFVs退出机制和地方公债发行制度；采取相关的财政支出政策矫正LGFVs可能产生的收入分配负效应。等等。
总之,分析投融资平台应该不仅要看到投融资平台在资源配置方面的效率优势,同时也不能忽略投融资平台带来的风险,应当理性看待投融资平台的过去、现在和未来。
最后,论文只是提出了一个简单的LGFVs分析框架,所提出的问题甚至多于已解决的问题。例如,LGFVs的效率优势如何受到基础设施服务资本化率的影响,资本化的具体机制是什么,LGFVs的收入分配效应的具体传导机制等等,这都需要未来进一步的思考和研究。
Over the last two decades, China's unban infrastructure has experienced an amazingly rapid development. And China's urbanization will be looking forward to stepping into another enhancive stage in the next twenty years. This makes the issue that to finance fairly and effectively for the construction of urban infrastructure, will still be an essential issue for the local governments. This paper will be analyzed from the prospective of financing mode innovation of local governments, trying to explain the intrinsic efficiency mechanism and risk accumulation mechanism that formed along with the above rapid improvement, and then comes up with suggestions on the financing mode of the future infrastructure construction.
Currently, the Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) is one of the most important financing modes of the urban infrastructure. Although this concept is just known recently, its embryo has been formed in the relatively developed areas ever since1980s. As has been existed and developed for decades, LGFVs is proved to be effective and useful. However, as the changes in urbanization, the risks of LGFVs do reveal gradually. More and more experts suggest that it is necessary to build a financing platform and corresponding regulations has been put forward by the State Department. There are lots of discussions on LGFVs both in academia and practice. Therefore, it's necessary to make a throughout research on LGFVs, particularly in aspects of the mechanism and conditions that help LGFVs to become an efficient financing mode. Only after this detailed study can we learn the elements of each risk, such as how it accumulates and acts, and can we make balance between efficiency and risks.
This paper first describes a clear definition and characteristics of Urban Infrastructure, and then displays other main financing modes, comparing to LGFVs. Second, after making a brief introduction of the mechanism of LGFVs, we find that LGFVs not only provides convenience to funds, but also encourages the local governments to construct infrastructures, that is, under LGFVs, the construction is bundled with land development, thus makes local governments refinancing themselves. Moreover, we discover three essential conditions of LGFVs:budget constraints, intra governance and nonmonetary economic conditions. After understanding the necessary foundations of efficiency, we emphasized on analyzing the three intrinsic risks of LGFVs:the fiscal risk due to budget constraints and moral risks, the possible financial risk due to monetary economy, and the social risk of worsening income distribution contractions led by LGFVs. Then, we undertake an investigation on four financing LGFVs in a city, in order to combine theoretical research with empirical analysis. The last part is conclusion and suggestions.
Based on the research, there are two key findings in this paper. Firstly, we find that LGFVs is not only a tool of finance as known, but also an effective incentive mode for local governments to construct more urban infrastructures. In an economic view, LGFVs or the local governments act as land developers aiming at profit maximization, and the benefits due to infrastructure improvement will be capitalized by the land value, encouraging the local government to reinvest. Secondly, after a detailed research on LGFVs potential risks, we find that the fiscal risk is mostly originated from local governments'budget constraints and moral risks, and the financial risk is basically due to overly loose monetary policies, rather than the LGFVs itself. However, the social risk is a property of LGFVs' mechanism, acting just as the other side of the coin. The allocation problems of financing costs between residents and new immigrants may need solving in the next decades.
This paper comes up with three suggestions. First, systemize reasonable political regulations, and reinforce the budget constraints for LGFVs. This aims at controlling the fiscal risk while not expropriate the efficiency. Second, establish a withdraw system for LGFVs, and improve the local government bond issuance system. Last but not least, conduct series of fiscal expenses regulations to refrain from negative effects made by income reallocation.
In a word, we should view the financing vehicles in a dialectical prospective. There is no doubt that LGFVs have its irreplaceable strengths, while there are also risks.
This paper just builds a simple analytical framework for LGFVs, while there are still numerous questions, such as how is the efficiency influenced by the capitalization rate of infrastructure, what is the specific mechanism of mechanism and the conduction mechanism of income distribution effects, etc.. All these should be solved in the further researches.
引文
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[1]亚当·斯密：《国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上卷)》,商务印书出版社,1972版,第292页
[2]罗森斯坦一罗丹：《大推进理论笔记》,圣马丁出版社1996年版
[3]李辉,郭继秋,姚雪.基础设施融资理论文献评析[J].情报科学,2010.5
[4]赵坚,试论我国经济快速增长与基础设施的关系[J],数量经济技术经济研究,1995.2
[5]毛腾飞,中国城市基础设施建设投融资模式创新研究[M],北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007
[6]段正梁,城市基础设施投融资体制创新研究[J],求索,2006.9
[7]郑边江、王红岩,城市基础设施融资平台构建研究[J],投资论坛,2005.12
[8]熊盛文,政府投融资平台要在规范中实现可持续发展[J],金融与经济,2009.11
[9]詹向阳,辩证看待地方政府融资平台的发展[J],中国金融,2010.07
[10]袁业敏、李亚敏、林祖松,地方政府融资平台近忧远虑及相关对策建议-浙江某地区政府融资平台情况调查分析[J],浙江金融,2010.1
[11]巴曙松,地方政府融资平台的发展及其风险评估[J],西南金融,2009.9
[12]陈柳钦,规范地方政府融资平台发展的思考[J],地方财政,2010.11
[13]周飞舟,分税制十年：制度及其影响[J],中国社会科学,2006.6
[14]马骏、刘亚平,中国地方政府财政风险研究：“逆向软预算约束”理论的视角[J],学术研究,2005.11
[15]张国平、牛建锋,地方投融资平台建设中的问题与对策[J],中国财政,2009.21
[16]杨召举,地方政府投融资平台贷款风险要引起关注[J],甘肃金融,2009.9
[17]田威宇,地方投融资平台健康发展的常见问题及应对措施[JJ,致富时代(下半月刊),2009.11
[18]彭红利,构建地方融资平台“阳光融资”机制[J],浙江金融,2010.3
[19]林文顺,地方政府融资平台：风险及规范检疫[J],金融与经济,2010.2
[20]段晓梅、地方债的两难选择[J],经济导报,2010.7
[21]潘文轩,地方政府投融资平台运行风险及其化解——偿债风险为中心[J],地 方财政研究,2010.4
[22]吕冬颖,金融危机下对地方政府投融资平台财务风险控制的思考[J],中国财经信息资料,2009.35
[23]刘宇飞,《当代西方财政学》[M],北京大学出版社,2008年2月
[24]弗兰克·N·马吉尔,《经济百科全书》,中国人民大学出版社,2009
[25]曹荣湘,蒂布特及其模型：地方公共产品与辖区竞争的经济分析[M],蒂布特模型,北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004：3-4
[26]张颖,《地方政府融资平台贷款风险及互借策略》[J],中国金融,2010年第13期
[27]世界银行,毛晓威等译,《1994年世界发展报告》,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1994.8
[28]《关于建立国有土地收益基金的构想》http://wenku.baidu.com/view/9e3c6df0aef8941 ea76e0546.html
[1]R. M. Kirwan. Finance for Urban Public Infrastructre Urban Studies.1989(6):
[2]TeresaTer-Minassian,etal.Public-Private Partnerships.IMF Report,2004,(12)
[3]I. J. Bahl, Lumped Elements for RF and Microwave Circuits, Artech House Publishers,2003.6
[4]Estache, A.and S.Sinha,1995."Does Decentralization Increase Spending on Infrastru-cture " Policy Research Working Paper, No.1457, World Bank, Washington D.C.
[5]Bardhan,P.and D.Mookherjee,2006."Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries."Economic Journal.116 (January):
②罗森斯坦—罗丹：《大推进理论笔记》,圣马丁出版社1996年版。
③ R. M. Kirwan. Finance for Urban Public Infrastructre Urban Studies.1989(6):79-83
④ TeresaTer-Minassian,etal.Public-Private Partnerships.IMF Report,2004,(12):141-143
⑤I. J.Bahl,Lumped Elements for RF and Microwave Circuits, Artech House Publishers,2003.6
⑥李辉,郭继秋,姚雪.基础设施融资理论文献评析[J].情报科学,2010.5
⑦Estache,A.and S.Sinha,1995."Does Decentralization Increase Spending on Infrastructure" Policy Research Working Paper, No.1457, World Bank, Washington D.C.
⑧ Bardhan, P.and D.Mookherjee,2006."Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries." Economic Journal.116 (January):101-27.
⑨赵坚，试论我国经济快速增长与基础设施的关系[J],数量经济技术经济研究,1995.2
⑩毛腾飞,中国城市基础设施建设投融资模式创新研究[M],北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007
11段正梁,城市基础设施投融资体制创新研究[J],求索,2006.9
12郑边江、王红岩,城市基础设施融资平台构建研究[J],投资论坛,2005.12
13熊盛文,政府投融资平台要在规范中实现可持续发展[J],金融与经济,2009.11
14詹向阳,辩证看待地方政府融资平台的发展[J],中国金融,2010.07
15袁亚敏、李亚敏、林祖松,地方政府融资平台近忧远虑及相关对策建议-浙江某地区政府融资平台情况调查分析[J],浙江金融,2010.1
16封北麟,地方政府融资平台的财政风险研究[Jl,金融与经济,2010.2
17巴曙松,地方政府融资平台的发展及其风险评估[J],西南金融,2009.9
18陈柳钦,规范地方政府融资平台发展的思考[J],地方财政,2010.11
19周飞舟,分税制十年：制度及其影响[J],中国社会科学,2006.6
20马骏、刘亚平,中国地方政府财政风险研究：“逆向软预算约束”理论的视角[J],学术研究,2005.11
21张国平、牛建锋,地方投融资平台建设中的问题与对策[J],中国财政,2009.21
22杨召举,地方政府投融资平台贷款风险要引起关注[J],甘肃金融,2009.9
23田威宇,地方投融资平台健康发展的常见问题及应对措施[J],致富时代(下半月刊),2009.11
24吕冬颖,金融危机下对地方政府投融资平台财务风险控制的思考[J],中国财经信息资料,2009.35
25彭红利,构建地方融资平台“阳光融资”机制[J],浙江金融,2010.3
26林文顺,地方政府融资平台：风险及规范检疫[J],金融与经济,2010.2
27潘文轩,地方政府投融资平台运行风险及其化解——偿债风险为中心[J],地方财政研究,2010.4
28张晓梅,“地方债”的两难选择[J],经济导报[,2010.17
29弗兰克·N.马吉尔,《经济百科全书》,中国人民大学出版社,2009
30世界银行,毛晓威等译,《1994年世界发展报告》,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1994.8
31刘宇飞,《当代西方财政学》[M],北京大学出版社,2008年2月
32曹荣湘,蒂布特及其模型：地方公共产品与辖区竞争的经济分析[M]//,蒂布特模型,北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004：3-4
33张颖,《地方政府融资平台贷款风险及互借策略》[J],中国金融,2010年第13期
[1]亚当·斯密：《国民财富的性质和原因的研究(上卷)》,商务印书出版社,1972版,第292页
[2]罗森斯坦一罗丹：《大推进理论笔记》,圣马丁出版社1996年版
[3]李辉,郭继秋,姚雪.基础设施融资理论文献评析[J].情报科学,2010.5
[4]赵坚,试论我国经济快速增长与基础设施的关系[J],数量经济技术经济研究,1995.2
[5]毛腾飞,中国城市基础设施建设投融资模式创新研究[M],北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007
[6]段正梁,城市基础设施投融资体制创新研究[J],求索,2006.9
[7]郑边江、王红岩,城市基础设施融资平台构建研究[J],投资论坛,2005.12
[8]熊盛文,政府投融资平台要在规范中实现可持续发展[J],金融与经济,2009.11
[9]詹向阳,辩证看待地方政府融资平台的发展[J],中国金融,2010.07
[10]袁业敏、李亚敏、林祖松,地方政府融资平台近忧远虑及相关对策建议-浙江某地区政府融资平台情况调查分析[J],浙江金融,2010.1
[11]巴曙松,地方政府融资平台的发展及其风险评估[J],西南金融,2009.9
[12]陈柳钦,规范地方政府融资平台发展的思考[J],地方财政,2010.11
[13]周飞舟,分税制十年：制度及其影响[J],中国社会科学,2006.6
[14]马骏、刘亚平,中国地方政府财政风险研究：“逆向软预算约束”理论的视角[J],学术研究,2005.11
[15]张国平、牛建锋,地方投融资平台建设中的问题与对策[J],中国财政,2009.21
[16]杨召举,地方政府投融资平台贷款风险要引起关注[J],甘肃金融,2009.9
[17]田威宇,地方投融资平台健康发展的常见问题及应对措施[JJ,致富时代(下半月刊),2009.11
[18]彭红利,构建地方融资平台“阳光融资”机制[J],浙江金融,2010.3
[19]林文顺,地方政府融资平台：风险及规范检疫[J],金融与经济,2010.2
[20]段晓梅、地方债的两难选择[J],经济导报,2010.7
[21]潘文轩,地方政府投融资平台运行风险及其化解——偿债风险为中心[J],地 方财政研究,2010.4
[22]吕冬颖,金融危机下对地方政府投融资平台财务风险控制的思考[J],中国财经信息资料,2009.35
[23]刘宇飞,《当代西方财政学》[M],北京大学出版社,2008年2月
[24]弗兰克·N·马吉尔,《经济百科全书》,中国人民大学出版社,2009
[25]曹荣湘,蒂布特及其模型：地方公共产品与辖区竞争的经济分析[M],蒂布特模型,北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004：3-4
[26]张颖,《地方政府融资平台贷款风险及互借策略》[J],中国金融,2010年第13期
[27]世界银行,毛晓威等译,《1994年世界发展报告》,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1994.8
[28]《关于建立国有土地收益基金的构想》http://wenku.baidu.com/view/9e3c6df0aef8941 ea76e0546.html
[1]R. M. Kirwan. Finance for Urban Public Infrastructre Urban Studies.1989(6):
[2]TeresaTer-Minassian,etal.Public-Private Partnerships.IMF Report,2004,(12)
[3]I. J. Bahl, Lumped Elements for RF and Microwave Circuits, Artech House Publishers,2003.6
[4]Estache, A.and S.Sinha,1995."Does Decentralization Increase Spending on Infrastru-cture " Policy Research Working Paper, No.1457, World Bank, Washington D.C.
[5]Bardhan,P.and D.Mookherjee,2006."Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries."Economic Journal.116 (January):