风险资本融资的制度分析
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摘要
中国风险资本要成为高新技术产业的“孵化器”，首先要解决的就是制约其发展的“瓶颈”——风险资本融资问题。笔者认为：我国风险资本融资渠道不畅，规模不大，根源在于缺乏一整套适合风险资本融资的制度。制度是一个社会的游戏规则，是人类给自己施加的约束。在经济分析中，无论是把制度抽象掉，还是把制度作为既定前提，都无法解释人类的经济发展过程和经济实际。新制度经济学尽管产生于西方发达国家，但其方法和原理更适合于分析发展中国家，尤其适合于新旧制度转轨的国家。因此，本文以制度经济学、博弈论、信息经济学等理论为依据，力图从制度层面寻求风险资本融资发展的经济学解释。并对制度安排中影响风险资本融资的主要因素进行了细致的阐述，进而提出宏、微观制度安排思路，以期对完善我国风险资本融资制度，推动风险投资发展有所助益。
本文共分五个部分。引言概括地介绍了风险投资在中国的发展中所遇到的困难，解释了现阶段风险资本缺乏的原因。
第一部分从实证的角度对风险资本融资与风险资本融资制度的关联关系进行了定性分析，指出风险资本融资制度是影响风险资本融资来源、规模的核心要素，是规范投资者与风险投资机构之间合作与竞争方式的关键环节。
风险资本融资属于制度内容，但这种制度的规划也需要符合一定的经济逻辑，因为制度的宏观可行必须满足微观合理。所以分析风险资本融资制度背后的经济逻辑并据此进行最优融资制度的规划非常必要。本文第二部分即是对这种经济逻辑的探索。指出传统的微观经济学由于建立在完全市场假定基础上以及忽略了制度问题，因而在分析风险资本融资制度方面具有很大的局限性；而基于新古典经济学内核的新制度经济学与信息经济学则恰当的为此问题提供了理论基础和分析工具。因此本文拟用新制度经济学和信息经济学来对风险资本融资进行制度分析。
第三部分首先从新制度经济学交易费用的角度对风险投资者选择风险投资机构进行风险投资给出了模型解释，即对投资者与风险投资机构之间委托代理
内容提要
旦旦旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼里旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼旦鱼鱼旦旦里鱼旦旦鱼鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦旦鱼里旦鱼旦旦鱼鱼旦旦鱼夕.鱼鱼.国鱼国.鱼鱼口.鱼国.旦鱼贝.鱼鱼口旦鱼鱼里旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼里鱼鱼鱼旦旦鱼皿旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼旦旦鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦】旦鱼旦里旦鱼旦里鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼里鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦
关系的产生进行了制度经济学分析。其次从信息经济学的角度分析了逆向选择
问题的产生，并从理论上给出了解决逆向选择问题的思路。同时借鉴了新制度
经济学关于制度分析的概念和分析方法，将“制度”定义为市场的一套行为规
则，而“制度安排”则是市场制度的具体化。指出风险资本融资制度应该是多
层次规则的综合体，即以融资方式为核心、以多层次的资本市场、法律规范和
中介机构为支撑、各部分相互配合而形成的一个多层次体系。
风险资本融资需要创新的制度和支持体系，而这个制度或支持体系必须依
靠政府来提供。我国的风险资本市场还处在初期阶段，为培育风险投资主体，
规范其运行，鼓励其发展，政府必须制定相应的政策法规，做出合理的制度安
排，全面促进风险资本发展的制度供给。因此，第四部分提出了风险资本融资
制度安排的宏观设计思路，从多层次资本市场、多元化风险融资体系和风险资
本融资法律体系三个方面系统阐述风险资本融资制度。
第五部分提出风险资本融资的微观制度安排，即对风险资本融资主体—
风险投资机构(基金)内部权利和责任结构的设计。提出在公司制、信托基金
制、有限合伙制三种组织形式下，风险投资人与风险投资机构之间委托—代
理问题的解决方案，即通过签订合伙契约或制订公司章程、契约章程等制度安
排解决二者间有关激励与约束、所有权与经营权、控制权与监管权、收益与风
险等问题。
In order to make China's venture capital become the "incubator" of the
high-tech industry, the first thing is to solve the bottleneck problem--the problem
of venture capital financing. China's venture capital has great difficulty in financing aspect and its scale is somewhat small, the cause of which is mostly lack of a series of venture capital institutions. Institutions are the game rules of a society. During economic analysis we have to use them properly to explain the economic evolution and economic realities of human beings. Although the Neoinstitutional Economics is established in developed counties, its instruments and theories are more applicable to developing countries, especially the countries that are under reform. So the thesis tries to explore the economic explanation of the development of venture capital financing, based on Neoinstitutional Economics, Game Theory and information economics. It also puts forward macroscopic and microcosmic thoughts to improve Chinese venture capital financing system and consequently promote the development of China's venture capital.
The thesis consists of five parts. Foreword introduces the difficulties that venture capital faced in China and explains the reason why there's lack of venture capital in China at present.
The first part analyzes the relationship between venture capital financing and venture capital financing system in a demonstrative way and points out that venture capital financing system is the core that affects venture capital financing issue.
Venture capital financing is a system that must accord with certain economic logic, for macroscopic feasibility is based on microcosmic rationality. Thus it's necessary to analyze the economic logic and layout a satisfactory financing system. The second part is just the exploration of such economic logic and concludes that new institutional economics and information economics performs better than traditional microeconomics when discussing venture capital financing problems.
The third part firstly gives a model to explain why venture investors choose to invest in venture capital institutions against investing directly by themselves. Secondly, the part analyzes the problem of adverse selection and gives a thought to solve it. Meanwhile some concepts and analysis methods of Neoinstitutional Economics are used here to explain what are institutions and the arrangement of institution. It points out that the venture capital financing institution ought to be a multi-level issue, that is to say, it should be a multi-level functionality framework within which is Under the core of financial resources, the support of multi-layer market, the constitutional structure, and middle-party organizations.
The forth part puts forward the macroscopic suggestions for venture capital financing system and expatiate on venture capital system from the following three
aspects--the multi-level capital market, the pluralism of the venture capital
financing system and the legal system of venture capital financing.
The fifth part brings forward the microcosmic system of venture capital financing, which is the arrangement of rights and obligations inside the venture capital organizations. The part also gives a solution to solve the principle-agent problem between the venture capital investors and the venture capital organizations.
本文共分五个部分。引言概括地介绍了风险投资在中国的发展中所遇到的困难，解释了现阶段风险资本缺乏的原因。
第一部分从实证的角度对风险资本融资与风险资本融资制度的关联关系进行了定性分析，指出风险资本融资制度是影响风险资本融资来源、规模的核心要素，是规范投资者与风险投资机构之间合作与竞争方式的关键环节。
风险资本融资属于制度内容，但这种制度的规划也需要符合一定的经济逻辑，因为制度的宏观可行必须满足微观合理。所以分析风险资本融资制度背后的经济逻辑并据此进行最优融资制度的规划非常必要。本文第二部分即是对这种经济逻辑的探索。指出传统的微观经济学由于建立在完全市场假定基础上以及忽略了制度问题，因而在分析风险资本融资制度方面具有很大的局限性；而基于新古典经济学内核的新制度经济学与信息经济学则恰当的为此问题提供了理论基础和分析工具。因此本文拟用新制度经济学和信息经济学来对风险资本融资进行制度分析。
第三部分首先从新制度经济学交易费用的角度对风险投资者选择风险投资机构进行风险投资给出了模型解释，即对投资者与风险投资机构之间委托代理
内容提要
旦旦旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼里旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼旦鱼鱼旦旦里鱼旦旦鱼鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦旦鱼里旦鱼旦旦鱼鱼旦旦鱼夕.鱼鱼.国鱼国.鱼鱼口.鱼国.旦鱼贝.鱼鱼口旦鱼鱼里旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼里鱼鱼鱼旦旦鱼皿旦鱼鱼旦鱼鱼鱼旦旦鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦】旦鱼旦里旦鱼旦里鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼里鱼鱼旦旦旦鱼旦
关系的产生进行了制度经济学分析。其次从信息经济学的角度分析了逆向选择
问题的产生，并从理论上给出了解决逆向选择问题的思路。同时借鉴了新制度
经济学关于制度分析的概念和分析方法，将“制度”定义为市场的一套行为规
则，而“制度安排”则是市场制度的具体化。指出风险资本融资制度应该是多
层次规则的综合体，即以融资方式为核心、以多层次的资本市场、法律规范和
中介机构为支撑、各部分相互配合而形成的一个多层次体系。
风险资本融资需要创新的制度和支持体系，而这个制度或支持体系必须依
靠政府来提供。我国的风险资本市场还处在初期阶段，为培育风险投资主体，
规范其运行，鼓励其发展，政府必须制定相应的政策法规，做出合理的制度安
排，全面促进风险资本发展的制度供给。因此，第四部分提出了风险资本融资
制度安排的宏观设计思路，从多层次资本市场、多元化风险融资体系和风险资
本融资法律体系三个方面系统阐述风险资本融资制度。
第五部分提出风险资本融资的微观制度安排，即对风险资本融资主体—
风险投资机构(基金)内部权利和责任结构的设计。提出在公司制、信托基金
制、有限合伙制三种组织形式下，风险投资人与风险投资机构之间委托—代
理问题的解决方案，即通过签订合伙契约或制订公司章程、契约章程等制度安
排解决二者间有关激励与约束、所有权与经营权、控制权与监管权、收益与风
险等问题。
In order to make China's venture capital become the "incubator" of the
high-tech industry, the first thing is to solve the bottleneck problem--the problem
of venture capital financing. China's venture capital has great difficulty in financing aspect and its scale is somewhat small, the cause of which is mostly lack of a series of venture capital institutions. Institutions are the game rules of a society. During economic analysis we have to use them properly to explain the economic evolution and economic realities of human beings. Although the Neoinstitutional Economics is established in developed counties, its instruments and theories are more applicable to developing countries, especially the countries that are under reform. So the thesis tries to explore the economic explanation of the development of venture capital financing, based on Neoinstitutional Economics, Game Theory and information economics. It also puts forward macroscopic and microcosmic thoughts to improve Chinese venture capital financing system and consequently promote the development of China's venture capital.
The thesis consists of five parts. Foreword introduces the difficulties that venture capital faced in China and explains the reason why there's lack of venture capital in China at present.
The first part analyzes the relationship between venture capital financing and venture capital financing system in a demonstrative way and points out that venture capital financing system is the core that affects venture capital financing issue.
Venture capital financing is a system that must accord with certain economic logic, for macroscopic feasibility is based on microcosmic rationality. Thus it's necessary to analyze the economic logic and layout a satisfactory financing system. The second part is just the exploration of such economic logic and concludes that new institutional economics and information economics performs better than traditional microeconomics when discussing venture capital financing problems.
The third part firstly gives a model to explain why venture investors choose to invest in venture capital institutions against investing directly by themselves. Secondly, the part analyzes the problem of adverse selection and gives a thought to solve it. Meanwhile some concepts and analysis methods of Neoinstitutional Economics are used here to explain what are institutions and the arrangement of institution. It points out that the venture capital financing institution ought to be a multi-level issue, that is to say, it should be a multi-level functionality framework within which is Under the core of financial resources, the support of multi-layer market, the constitutional structure, and middle-party organizations.
The forth part puts forward the macroscopic suggestions for venture capital financing system and expatiate on venture capital system from the following three
aspects--the multi-level capital market, the pluralism of the venture capital
financing system and the legal system of venture capital financing.
The fifth part brings forward the microcosmic system of venture capital financing, which is the arrangement of rights and obligations inside the venture capital organizations. The part also gives a solution to solve the principle-agent problem between the venture capital investors and the venture capital organizations.
引文
1．思拉恩·埃格特森：《新制度经济学》，商务印书馆1996年版。
2．科斯：《生产的制度结构》，上海三联书店1994年版。
3．胡乐明：《真实世界的经济学——新制度经济学纵览》，当代中国出版社2002年版。
4．阿罗：《信息经济学》，北京经济学院出版社1989年版。
5．张维迎：《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版。
6．李绍光：《养老金制度与资本市场》，中国发展出版社1998年版。
7．张树中：《美国创业资本市场的制度分析》，中国社会科学出版社2001年版。
8．陈郁：《企业制度与市场组织》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版。
9．李伯亭：《风险投资》，企业管理出版社1999年版。
10．辜胜阻等：《政府与风险投资》，民主与建设出版社2001年出版。
11．吕炜：《风险投资的经济学考察—制度、原理及中国化应用的研究》，经济科学出版社2001年版。
12．张永衡：《风险投资与产权制度》，经济科学出版社2002年版。
13．萨缪尔森：《制度经济学的现状》，《当代经济科学》1999年第二期。
14．尹淑娅：《风险投资中的创业企业价值评估模型及其运用》，《中国软科学》，1999年第六期。
15．唐翰岫，李湛：《中国风险基金融资问题初探》，《当代经济科学》2000年第一期。
16. Grossman, S.J., and Hart, O.D., An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica , 1983.
17. PaulA.Gompers and Josh Lerner, "The Venture Capital Cycle", The MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Press,1999.
18. Ateward , J., Adverse Selection and Pay Compression.Southern Economic Journal, 1999.
19. Tang Hanxiu, Li Zhan, Study of Venture Capitalist Compensation Structure Based on Reputation Model. J. China Textile Uni., 2000.
2．科斯：《生产的制度结构》，上海三联书店1994年版。
3．胡乐明：《真实世界的经济学——新制度经济学纵览》，当代中国出版社2002年版。
4．阿罗：《信息经济学》，北京经济学院出版社1989年版。
5．张维迎：《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版。
6．李绍光：《养老金制度与资本市场》，中国发展出版社1998年版。
7．张树中：《美国创业资本市场的制度分析》，中国社会科学出版社2001年版。
8．陈郁：《企业制度与市场组织》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店1996年版。
9．李伯亭：《风险投资》，企业管理出版社1999年版。
10．辜胜阻等：《政府与风险投资》，民主与建设出版社2001年出版。
11．吕炜：《风险投资的经济学考察—制度、原理及中国化应用的研究》，经济科学出版社2001年版。
12．张永衡：《风险投资与产权制度》，经济科学出版社2002年版。
13．萨缪尔森：《制度经济学的现状》，《当代经济科学》1999年第二期。
14．尹淑娅：《风险投资中的创业企业价值评估模型及其运用》，《中国软科学》，1999年第六期。
15．唐翰岫，李湛：《中国风险基金融资问题初探》，《当代经济科学》2000年第一期。
16. Grossman, S.J., and Hart, O.D., An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica , 1983.
17. PaulA.Gompers and Josh Lerner, "The Venture Capital Cycle", The MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Press,1999.
18. Ateward , J., Adverse Selection and Pay Compression.Southern Economic Journal, 1999.
19. Tang Hanxiu, Li Zhan, Study of Venture Capitalist Compensation Structure Based on Reputation Model. J. China Textile Uni., 2000.