“TBTF”问题及规制研究
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摘要
20世纪70年代以来,伴随着经济全球化和金融自由化的发展,跨国金融机构不断涌现,金融机构的竞争逐渐加剧。为了应对国内和国际多方面的竞争,提高自身竞争力,各金融机构不断进行业务创新,扩大公司规模。但金融系统在一国经济体系中处于核心地位,一家大型金融机构的倒闭所引起的挤兑现象可能导致整个金融系统的危机,甚至威胁到整个国家的经济体系。因此,当大银行濒临破产时,政府为了避免其倒闭可能产生的系统性风险往往会对其实施救助,“大而不倒”随之产生。
尽管“大而不倒”可以在一定程度上防范系统性风险,但其作用只是暂时的。“大而不倒”政策的实践也存在很多不合理性,如道德风险,逆向选择,降低金融业资源的使用效率等。
因此,政府在防范系统性风险与降低“大而不倒”所产生的负面影响之间面临两难选择。如果坚持“大而不倒”,尽管短期内会降低系统性风险,但却不利于金融系统的长远发展,而若放任大银行的倒闭,其失败所引发的系统性风险可能会危及整个金融系统甚至国家或全球的经济,这便产生了“大而不倒”问题。
2008年,由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机爆发。在金融危机中,包括美国、英国在内的多国政府为了防止单个金融机构破产所产生的多米诺骨牌效应使整个金融系统陷入崩溃的边缘,对多家濒临破产的大型金融机构实施救助,使得“大而不倒”问题再一次成为了金融界的焦点。“大而不倒”问题在我国同样存在,我国政府多次为四大国有商业银行剥离不良资产、补充资本金,为金融机构埋单。危机过后,国际金融组织和各国政府均加强各国的金融监管,同时对“大而不倒”问题提出了防范措施,为我国金融体系“大而不倒”问题的解决提供了参考依据。
本论文主要分为五个部分。第一部分为导论,介绍了本论文的研究背景及意义、国内外研究的文献综述以及研究方法及创新之处。第二部分为"TBTF"救助政策的理论研究。首先论文详细介绍了"TBTF"政策被正式化的标志性事件,并从绝对大小、相对大小和金融机构在一国金融体系中的重要性三个方面对“大而不倒”中的“大”进行度量,同时评价了“大而不倒”政策的合理性与非合理性,然后论文对金融危机后“大而不倒”的新发展进行阐述,最后论文运用经济学模型对该政策的合理性与不合理性进行了分析。第三部分为金融危机中的‘'TBTF"。本部分以美国政府在危机中救助美国国际集团为例,阐述美国政府在危机中的救助政策,并详细阐述了危机后国际金融组织和美国政府为防范“大而不倒”所做出的贡献。第四部分为我国金融体系中的‘'TBTF"问题。该部分首先通过对我国的金融系统结构的分析说明了我国的“大”银行,然后从四个方面阐述了‘TBTF"对我国金融系统的影响。第五部分针对我国“TBTF"问题提出相应的政策建议,包括完善相关法律法规、加强市场约束、提高我国大型金融机构的监管标准、降低中小型银行的准入限制。
Since 1970s, with the development of economic globalization and financial liberalization, multinational financial institutions sprung up and the competition between the financial institutions had gradually intensified. In order to cope with the domestic and international various competition and to improve their own competitiveness, the financial institutions continuously insist on innovating the business and expanding the scale of the company. But because the financial system is in the core position of a country, a run on a bank caused by the failure of a big financial institution may lead to the crisis of the whole financial system, even threaten the economic system of the country. Therefore, when the big banks are on the verge of bankruptcy, the governments tend to rescue them in order to avoid the systemic risk may produce. Then "Too Big To Fail" produced.
Although "TBTF" can prevent systemic risk to a certain extent, the effect is just temporary. "TBTF" policy is not quite reasonable in practice, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, reducing the efficiency of financial resource and so on.
Therefore, the governments are in a dilemma whether to prevent the systemic risk or reduce the negative effect produced by "TBTF". If they insist on "TBTF", although it can reduce systemic risk within a short time, it has detrimental effects on the development of financial system. And if they let the big bank fails, the systemic risk caused by its failure may threaten the whole financial system, and even the national or global economy. This is the problem of "Too Big To Fail".
The global financial crisis which triggered by the United States sub-loan crisis broke up in 2008. In the global financial crisis, many countries, such as the United States, England and so on, afforded assistance to many big financial institutes which had been on the verge of bankruptcy, in order to avoid the Domino effect which caused by a single financial institution bankruptcy and may leave the whole financial system on the brink of collapse. As a result, the problem of "Too Big To Fail" became the focus in financial industry. The problem of "Too Big To Fail" is also existence in our country. In our country, the government has repeatedly divested non-performing assets and recapitalized to four major stated-owned commercial banks. After the crisis, the international financial organizations and the governments had strengthened the financial supervision, and at the same time on the problem of "Too Big To Fail" they had put forward the precautionary measures, which had provided reference for our country on the problem of "Too Big To Fail" solution.
The article has five parts separately. The first part is introduction, which includes the background and the signification of the content, the research literatures review of this topic at home and abroad, and the research method and the innovation of the article. The second part is the theoretical research of the "TBTF". At first, it introduces in detail the landmark event of the "TBTF" policy's formalization, and measures the "big" in the "Too Big To Fail" policy from three aspects, include the absolute size, relative size and the importance of the financial institution in the financial system in one country. At the same time, this part evaluated the rationality and irrationality of "Too Big To Fail". And then, it introduces the new development of the "Too Big To Fail" after the financial crisis. Finally, the article analyzes the rationality and irrationality of the policy based on the economics model. The fourth part is the "TBTF" in the financial crisis. This part takes rescuing the American International Group of the United States in the financial crisis for example, elaborates the assistance policy of the United States government in the financial crisis, and expounds the contribution what the international financial organization and the United States government to prevent "Too Big To Fail" for after the financial crisis. The forth part is the "TBTF" problem in our country's financial system. This part shows our country's "big" bank through analyzing our country's financial system structure, and then elaborates the effects of "TBTF" policy on the financial system. The fifth part puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions to the "Too Big To Fail" problem in our country, which contains perfecting relevant laws and regulations, strengthening market discipline, improving the regulatory standards of big financial institutions in our country and reducing the access restrictions of the small and medium banks.
尽管“大而不倒”可以在一定程度上防范系统性风险,但其作用只是暂时的。“大而不倒”政策的实践也存在很多不合理性,如道德风险,逆向选择,降低金融业资源的使用效率等。
因此,政府在防范系统性风险与降低“大而不倒”所产生的负面影响之间面临两难选择。如果坚持“大而不倒”,尽管短期内会降低系统性风险,但却不利于金融系统的长远发展,而若放任大银行的倒闭,其失败所引发的系统性风险可能会危及整个金融系统甚至国家或全球的经济,这便产生了“大而不倒”问题。
2008年,由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机爆发。在金融危机中,包括美国、英国在内的多国政府为了防止单个金融机构破产所产生的多米诺骨牌效应使整个金融系统陷入崩溃的边缘,对多家濒临破产的大型金融机构实施救助,使得“大而不倒”问题再一次成为了金融界的焦点。“大而不倒”问题在我国同样存在,我国政府多次为四大国有商业银行剥离不良资产、补充资本金,为金融机构埋单。危机过后,国际金融组织和各国政府均加强各国的金融监管,同时对“大而不倒”问题提出了防范措施,为我国金融体系“大而不倒”问题的解决提供了参考依据。
本论文主要分为五个部分。第一部分为导论,介绍了本论文的研究背景及意义、国内外研究的文献综述以及研究方法及创新之处。第二部分为"TBTF"救助政策的理论研究。首先论文详细介绍了"TBTF"政策被正式化的标志性事件,并从绝对大小、相对大小和金融机构在一国金融体系中的重要性三个方面对“大而不倒”中的“大”进行度量,同时评价了“大而不倒”政策的合理性与非合理性,然后论文对金融危机后“大而不倒”的新发展进行阐述,最后论文运用经济学模型对该政策的合理性与不合理性进行了分析。第三部分为金融危机中的‘'TBTF"。本部分以美国政府在危机中救助美国国际集团为例,阐述美国政府在危机中的救助政策,并详细阐述了危机后国际金融组织和美国政府为防范“大而不倒”所做出的贡献。第四部分为我国金融体系中的‘'TBTF"问题。该部分首先通过对我国的金融系统结构的分析说明了我国的“大”银行,然后从四个方面阐述了‘TBTF"对我国金融系统的影响。第五部分针对我国“TBTF"问题提出相应的政策建议,包括完善相关法律法规、加强市场约束、提高我国大型金融机构的监管标准、降低中小型银行的准入限制。
Since 1970s, with the development of economic globalization and financial liberalization, multinational financial institutions sprung up and the competition between the financial institutions had gradually intensified. In order to cope with the domestic and international various competition and to improve their own competitiveness, the financial institutions continuously insist on innovating the business and expanding the scale of the company. But because the financial system is in the core position of a country, a run on a bank caused by the failure of a big financial institution may lead to the crisis of the whole financial system, even threaten the economic system of the country. Therefore, when the big banks are on the verge of bankruptcy, the governments tend to rescue them in order to avoid the systemic risk may produce. Then "Too Big To Fail" produced.
Although "TBTF" can prevent systemic risk to a certain extent, the effect is just temporary. "TBTF" policy is not quite reasonable in practice, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, reducing the efficiency of financial resource and so on.
Therefore, the governments are in a dilemma whether to prevent the systemic risk or reduce the negative effect produced by "TBTF". If they insist on "TBTF", although it can reduce systemic risk within a short time, it has detrimental effects on the development of financial system. And if they let the big bank fails, the systemic risk caused by its failure may threaten the whole financial system, and even the national or global economy. This is the problem of "Too Big To Fail".
The global financial crisis which triggered by the United States sub-loan crisis broke up in 2008. In the global financial crisis, many countries, such as the United States, England and so on, afforded assistance to many big financial institutes which had been on the verge of bankruptcy, in order to avoid the Domino effect which caused by a single financial institution bankruptcy and may leave the whole financial system on the brink of collapse. As a result, the problem of "Too Big To Fail" became the focus in financial industry. The problem of "Too Big To Fail" is also existence in our country. In our country, the government has repeatedly divested non-performing assets and recapitalized to four major stated-owned commercial banks. After the crisis, the international financial organizations and the governments had strengthened the financial supervision, and at the same time on the problem of "Too Big To Fail" they had put forward the precautionary measures, which had provided reference for our country on the problem of "Too Big To Fail" solution.
The article has five parts separately. The first part is introduction, which includes the background and the signification of the content, the research literatures review of this topic at home and abroad, and the research method and the innovation of the article. The second part is the theoretical research of the "TBTF". At first, it introduces in detail the landmark event of the "TBTF" policy's formalization, and measures the "big" in the "Too Big To Fail" policy from three aspects, include the absolute size, relative size and the importance of the financial institution in the financial system in one country. At the same time, this part evaluated the rationality and irrationality of "Too Big To Fail". And then, it introduces the new development of the "Too Big To Fail" after the financial crisis. Finally, the article analyzes the rationality and irrationality of the policy based on the economics model. The fourth part is the "TBTF" in the financial crisis. This part takes rescuing the American International Group of the United States in the financial crisis for example, elaborates the assistance policy of the United States government in the financial crisis, and expounds the contribution what the international financial organization and the United States government to prevent "Too Big To Fail" for after the financial crisis. The forth part is the "TBTF" problem in our country's financial system. This part shows our country's "big" bank through analyzing our country's financial system structure, and then elaborates the effects of "TBTF" policy on the financial system. The fifth part puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions to the "Too Big To Fail" problem in our country, which contains perfecting relevant laws and regulations, strengthening market discipline, improving the regulatory standards of big financial institutions in our country and reducing the access restrictions of the small and medium banks.
引文
[1]安启雷,陈超.金融机构市场退出机制的国际比较与我国的制度选择[J].金融研究,2003,(10)
[2]巴曙松,陈华良.金融机构的政府救助与监管声誉：一个理论框架和现实解释[J].海南金融,2005,(4)
[3]陈宇阳.评析美国存款保险改革的新法案[J].当代财经,2003,(8)
[4]陈志英.银行危机过程中的道德风险及其对银行危机成本的影响[J].当代经济科学,2002,(5)
[5]高杰英.“大而不倒”的终结?,金融博览,2010,(8)
[6]葛晓鳞,罗朝晖.金融并购浪潮中的金融风险与金融监管[N],北京工商大学学报,2002-3(17)
[7]郭敏,岳霖.美国金融监管新政中的系统性风险防范[J].国际贸易,2010,(11).
[8]贾玉革.金融机构“大而不倒”中的道德风险及其防范[N].中央财经大学学报,2009(8)
[9]刘平.拯救AIG[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009：1-14.
[10]陆晓明.银行风险管理的警钟[J].国际金融研究,2002, (9)
[11](美)安德鲁.罗斯.索尔金著,潘山卓译.大到不能倒[M].台湾：经济新潮社,2010.
[12](美)查理斯.P.金德尔伯格著,朱隽,叶翔译.经济过热,经济恐慌及经济崩溃：金融危机史[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2000.
[13]美国联邦保险公司编,刘士余、王科进等翻译.《危机管理——1981-1984年联邦存款保险公司和处置信托公司的经验》[M].中国金融出版社,2004.
[14]钱小安.存款保险的道德风险、约束条件与制度设计[J].金融研究,2004,(8)
[15]涂永红.金融集团挑战现行监管模式[J].西部论丛,2008,(3)
[16]王信,周晴.“大而不倒”问题的解决方案——以次贷危机中的美国金融机构为例[J].经济社会体制比较,2010,(6)
[17]危勇.基于道德风险视角的最后贷款人救助政策研究,[C],2008.
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[20]伍巧芳.《2010年华尔街改革和消费者保护法》述评[J].法学,2010,(8)
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[2]巴曙松,陈华良.金融机构的政府救助与监管声誉：一个理论框架和现实解释[J].海南金融,2005,(4)
[3]陈宇阳.评析美国存款保险改革的新法案[J].当代财经,2003,(8)
[4]陈志英.银行危机过程中的道德风险及其对银行危机成本的影响[J].当代经济科学,2002,(5)
[5]高杰英.“大而不倒”的终结?,金融博览,2010,(8)
[6]葛晓鳞,罗朝晖.金融并购浪潮中的金融风险与金融监管[N],北京工商大学学报,2002-3(17)
[7]郭敏,岳霖.美国金融监管新政中的系统性风险防范[J].国际贸易,2010,(11).
[8]贾玉革.金融机构“大而不倒”中的道德风险及其防范[N].中央财经大学学报,2009(8)
[9]刘平.拯救AIG[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009：1-14.
[10]陆晓明.银行风险管理的警钟[J].国际金融研究,2002, (9)
[11](美)安德鲁.罗斯.索尔金著,潘山卓译.大到不能倒[M].台湾：经济新潮社,2010.
[12](美)查理斯.P.金德尔伯格著,朱隽,叶翔译.经济过热,经济恐慌及经济崩溃：金融危机史[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2000.
[13]美国联邦保险公司编,刘士余、王科进等翻译.《危机管理——1981-1984年联邦存款保险公司和处置信托公司的经验》[M].中国金融出版社,2004.
[14]钱小安.存款保险的道德风险、约束条件与制度设计[J].金融研究,2004,(8)
[15]涂永红.金融集团挑战现行监管模式[J].西部论丛,2008,(3)
[16]王信,周晴.“大而不倒”问题的解决方案——以次贷危机中的美国金融机构为例[J].经济社会体制比较,2010,(6)
[17]危勇.基于道德风险视角的最后贷款人救助政策研究,[C],2008.
[18]危勇.“大而不倒”救助政策的理论和实证研究[J].南方金融,2008, (3)
[19]吴晓灵.从美国金融监管改革看“大而不倒”问题的处置[J].中国金融,2010,(16)
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