基于联盟结构和分配方式的行业内合作研发激励机制研究
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摘要
在当今企业激烈竞争的环境下,科学技术的迅速发展使得产品更新换代速度加快,消费者需求的不断变化和市场竞争的加剧需要企业持续进行新产品研发。但是复杂产品的研发存在着大量的不确定因素,具有很高的研发风险。仅仅依靠企业内部有限的技术和资源进行研发变得日益困难。为了降低研发风险,提高成功率,企业进行新产品的研发越来越倾向于结成研发联盟的方式。
合作研发能给企业带来诸多好处,如:共享信息和研究成果,提高研发效率,降低和分担研发中的风险和成本,保证创新中组织的灵活性,还可以形成协同优势等。但是合作研发也存在一些问题,由于创新的外部性,研发活动的高技术风险、高成本等因素,多数研发以失败告终。产品开发和管理协会研究指出,目前新产品研发成功率仅为59%。联盟中存在成员少投入甚至不投入的道德风险,收益分配方式的不合理也是导致研发联盟不稳定的主要因素。因此如何降低成员道德风险、增大成员研发投入量是联盟进行研发及参与市场竞争成功的关键。
论文针对联盟中道德风险和收益分配不合理的现状,建立了研发联盟成员在不同分配方式和不同联盟结构下的合作研发博弈模型。通过研究不同收益分配方式和联盟结构下,技术风险和投资溢出效应等条件对联盟成员投资策略的影响,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制,使得联盟成员在自利行为的驱使下自愿减少投机行为,从而规避道德风险,激励其投入更多研发资源,促进合作研发的成功。为企业、高校、科研机构以及政府科研管理部门制定策略或政策提供理论指导。
在现实经济生活或研究文献中,以合作研发为主要生产活动的组织形式有多种。常见的分类方法是根据合作各方是否以采用股份制分为股权合作研发组织和非股权合作研发组织。论文研究的研发联盟结构包括并行研发联盟和集中研发联盟两种形式,收益分配方式为平均分配和按投入比例分配。并行研发联盟是指以交叉许可协议为基础的非股权合作研发组织,联盟成员基于各自的技术和资源独立进行研发,最终双方根据交叉协议共享研发成果。集中研发联盟是一种股权合作研发组织,联盟成员以资源投入量为限享有一定比例的股权。在平均分配方式下,联盟成员无论各自投入了多少研发资源,均将市场收益平分给每个成员。在按投入比例分配方式下,研发联盟按照成员的研发资源投入量占联盟研发资源总投入量的比例将市场收益分配给每位成员。
本文的主要内容是第三、四、五章,具体内容如下:
第三章研究的是基于相持收益的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。分别构建集中和并行研发联盟在平均分配和按投入比例分配下的合作研发博弈模型,通过研究不同联盟结构和收益分配方式下联盟成员的研发投资策略,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制,防范研发联盟道德风险。
第四章研究的是基于溢出效应的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。主要是考虑在研发过程中存在着由于企业间研发信息的交流,研发人员的流动所引起的投资溢出效应。研究并行研发联盟和集中研发联盟中联盟成员在平均分配和按投入比例分配收益方式下的投资策略,分析研发投资溢出、联盟结构和收益分配方式对联盟成员投资策略的影响,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式。
第五章研究的是基于技术风险的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。主要是考虑研发存在技术风险,分别建立集中和并行研发联盟成员在平均分配和按投入比例分配方式下的合作研发博弈模型,通过研究不同联盟结构和收益分配方式下,联盟成员在不同的技术风险和市场收益等条件下的投资策略,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制。
论文理论和方法上的创新之处有以下几点:
①考虑研发联盟之间竞争相持时仍存在一定的收益,建立了基于相持收益的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式和相持收益下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
②考虑研发联盟间竞争存在相持收益,联盟成员间存在投资溢出效应,建立了基于溢出效应的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式、相持收益以及溢出效应环境下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
③考虑研发联盟间竞争存在相持收益,研发存在技术风险,建立了基于技术风险的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式、相持收益以及技术风险环境下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
Under the highly competitive business environment, the rapid development of science and technology makes the production changing faster, consumer demand changing and market competition intensifying need the corporation’s continuity new product development. However, there are so many uncertainty factors in the development of complex products, so it has high R&D risk. Only relying on limited internal skills and resources to carry on R&D activities, it becomes increasingly difficult. In order to reduce risk and increase the success rate of new production, the companies inclined to form R&D alliances to carry on R&D.
Cooperative R&D can bring on many benefits, such as: sharing information and research results, improving development efficiency, reducing and sharing risks and costs of R&D, ensuring innovation organizational flexibility, and forming synergies and so on. But there are also some problems, due to the externalities of innovation, high-tech risks and costs and some other factors, most R&D activities ended with failure. Product Development and Management Association study found that the current new product development success rate was only 59%. There are little or no input moral risks of the union members; the unreasonable allocation of the benefits also is the main factors of R&D alliance instability. So how to reduce the moral hazard of the members, increase the amount of R&D investment is the key to success of cooperative R&D and market competition.
Considering the status of the Union moral hazard and unreasonable allocation of the benefits, the paper establishes a cooperative R&D game model under the different distribution patterns and different coalition structure .By studying the effect of the conditions such as technology risk and investment spillover on the investment strategy of alliance members, under the different distribution and alliance structure, exploring the optimal collaborative R&D model under the different market environment, designing investment incentives mechanisms of alliance members, in order to make alliance member voluntarily reduce the speculation driven by self-interest behavior, in order to avoid moral hazard, incentive to invest more R&D resources, promote the success of cooperative R&D, and provide theoretical guidance in developing strategies or policies for enterprises, universities, research institutions and government research and administrative departments.
In real economic life, or research in the literature, there are many organizations forms of production activities mainly based on collaborative R&D. Common classification is based on whether all parties of the cooperation adopt the shareholding system. So usually the form is divided into equity cooperative R&D organizations and non-equity cooperative R&D organization. R&D alliance structure of this paper consists of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance, as well as earning distribution consists of average distribution and distribution according to the proportion of input. Parallel R&D alliance refers to the non-equity cooperative R&D organization based on cross-license agreement, alliance members rely on their own independent research and resource, and finally the two sides share their research results under the cross-license Concentration R&D alliance is an equity cooperative R&D organization, in which alliance members shares a certain percentage of the shares according to the resource input .While in the average distribution, all market earning will be divided equally to each alliance members regardless of how much each has invested in to R&D, while in the other station , each member according to the proportion of the member input accounting for the league total input distributes their market earning.
The main chapters of this article are the third, the forth, the fifth, the contents are as follows:
Chapter III studies the cooperation alliance structure and distribution within stalemate industry revenue. the game model of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance are built in the average allocation and proportional allocation, according to study the R&D investment strategies of the alliance members under the different alliance structure and interest distribution, the optimal model of cooperative R&D was explored in the different market environment, besides, R&D investment incentives mechanism was designed for alliance members to guard against moral hazard R&D alliance.
Chapter IV studies on R&D alliances structure and distribution based on the spillover effects within the industry cooperation. The chapter mainly on account of the existence of the exchange of information between enterprises in the R&D process, and spillover effects of investment caused by research staff turnover. Investment strategy is also focused on in the average allocation and proportion distribution of the alliance members each in the Parallel R&D alliances and Concentration R&D alliance, in order to analysis the impact of R&D investment spillover, the alliance structure and distribution form on the investment strategy of the alliance members, and explore the optimal cooperative R&D model in different market environment.
Chapter V is the study on the alliance structure and distribution based on the technology risk within the industry cooperation. The paper main considers the existence of technical risk in the R&D process, based on which, cooperation game model of the parallel alliances and Concentration R&D alliance are respectively established in the average distribution and proportion distribution. By studying the different structures and different benefits allocations, as well as investment strategy of the alliance members in the different technical risk and market conditions, alliance member investment incentives mechanisms are designed.
The innovations of the papers on the theoretical and methodological are as follows:
①Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, this paper establishs a game model based on rally gains of the industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
②Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, the existense of investment spillover effect among members. The paper establishs a game model based on spillover effects of industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
③Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, and a technical risk when R & D. The paper establishs a game model based on technical risk of cooperative R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
合作研发能给企业带来诸多好处,如:共享信息和研究成果,提高研发效率,降低和分担研发中的风险和成本,保证创新中组织的灵活性,还可以形成协同优势等。但是合作研发也存在一些问题,由于创新的外部性,研发活动的高技术风险、高成本等因素,多数研发以失败告终。产品开发和管理协会研究指出,目前新产品研发成功率仅为59%。联盟中存在成员少投入甚至不投入的道德风险,收益分配方式的不合理也是导致研发联盟不稳定的主要因素。因此如何降低成员道德风险、增大成员研发投入量是联盟进行研发及参与市场竞争成功的关键。
论文针对联盟中道德风险和收益分配不合理的现状,建立了研发联盟成员在不同分配方式和不同联盟结构下的合作研发博弈模型。通过研究不同收益分配方式和联盟结构下,技术风险和投资溢出效应等条件对联盟成员投资策略的影响,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制,使得联盟成员在自利行为的驱使下自愿减少投机行为,从而规避道德风险,激励其投入更多研发资源,促进合作研发的成功。为企业、高校、科研机构以及政府科研管理部门制定策略或政策提供理论指导。
在现实经济生活或研究文献中,以合作研发为主要生产活动的组织形式有多种。常见的分类方法是根据合作各方是否以采用股份制分为股权合作研发组织和非股权合作研发组织。论文研究的研发联盟结构包括并行研发联盟和集中研发联盟两种形式,收益分配方式为平均分配和按投入比例分配。并行研发联盟是指以交叉许可协议为基础的非股权合作研发组织,联盟成员基于各自的技术和资源独立进行研发,最终双方根据交叉协议共享研发成果。集中研发联盟是一种股权合作研发组织,联盟成员以资源投入量为限享有一定比例的股权。在平均分配方式下,联盟成员无论各自投入了多少研发资源,均将市场收益平分给每个成员。在按投入比例分配方式下,研发联盟按照成员的研发资源投入量占联盟研发资源总投入量的比例将市场收益分配给每位成员。
本文的主要内容是第三、四、五章,具体内容如下:
第三章研究的是基于相持收益的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。分别构建集中和并行研发联盟在平均分配和按投入比例分配下的合作研发博弈模型,通过研究不同联盟结构和收益分配方式下联盟成员的研发投资策略,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制,防范研发联盟道德风险。
第四章研究的是基于溢出效应的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。主要是考虑在研发过程中存在着由于企业间研发信息的交流,研发人员的流动所引起的投资溢出效应。研究并行研发联盟和集中研发联盟中联盟成员在平均分配和按投入比例分配收益方式下的投资策略,分析研发投资溢出、联盟结构和收益分配方式对联盟成员投资策略的影响,探索不同市场环境下的最优合作研发模式。
第五章研究的是基于技术风险的行业内合作研发联盟结构及分配方式。主要是考虑研发存在技术风险,分别建立集中和并行研发联盟成员在平均分配和按投入比例分配方式下的合作研发博弈模型,通过研究不同联盟结构和收益分配方式下,联盟成员在不同的技术风险和市场收益等条件下的投资策略,设计研发联盟成员的投资激励机制。
论文理论和方法上的创新之处有以下几点:
①考虑研发联盟之间竞争相持时仍存在一定的收益,建立了基于相持收益的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式和相持收益下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
②考虑研发联盟间竞争存在相持收益,联盟成员间存在投资溢出效应,建立了基于溢出效应的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式、相持收益以及溢出效应环境下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
③考虑研发联盟间竞争存在相持收益,研发存在技术风险,建立了基于技术风险的行业内合作研发博弈模型,研究了不同联盟结构、收益分配方式、相持收益以及技术风险环境下的联盟成员投资策略,提出了不同外部环境下的最优联盟结构和收益分配方式。
Under the highly competitive business environment, the rapid development of science and technology makes the production changing faster, consumer demand changing and market competition intensifying need the corporation’s continuity new product development. However, there are so many uncertainty factors in the development of complex products, so it has high R&D risk. Only relying on limited internal skills and resources to carry on R&D activities, it becomes increasingly difficult. In order to reduce risk and increase the success rate of new production, the companies inclined to form R&D alliances to carry on R&D.
Cooperative R&D can bring on many benefits, such as: sharing information and research results, improving development efficiency, reducing and sharing risks and costs of R&D, ensuring innovation organizational flexibility, and forming synergies and so on. But there are also some problems, due to the externalities of innovation, high-tech risks and costs and some other factors, most R&D activities ended with failure. Product Development and Management Association study found that the current new product development success rate was only 59%. There are little or no input moral risks of the union members; the unreasonable allocation of the benefits also is the main factors of R&D alliance instability. So how to reduce the moral hazard of the members, increase the amount of R&D investment is the key to success of cooperative R&D and market competition.
Considering the status of the Union moral hazard and unreasonable allocation of the benefits, the paper establishes a cooperative R&D game model under the different distribution patterns and different coalition structure .By studying the effect of the conditions such as technology risk and investment spillover on the investment strategy of alliance members, under the different distribution and alliance structure, exploring the optimal collaborative R&D model under the different market environment, designing investment incentives mechanisms of alliance members, in order to make alliance member voluntarily reduce the speculation driven by self-interest behavior, in order to avoid moral hazard, incentive to invest more R&D resources, promote the success of cooperative R&D, and provide theoretical guidance in developing strategies or policies for enterprises, universities, research institutions and government research and administrative departments.
In real economic life, or research in the literature, there are many organizations forms of production activities mainly based on collaborative R&D. Common classification is based on whether all parties of the cooperation adopt the shareholding system. So usually the form is divided into equity cooperative R&D organizations and non-equity cooperative R&D organization. R&D alliance structure of this paper consists of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance, as well as earning distribution consists of average distribution and distribution according to the proportion of input. Parallel R&D alliance refers to the non-equity cooperative R&D organization based on cross-license agreement, alliance members rely on their own independent research and resource, and finally the two sides share their research results under the cross-license Concentration R&D alliance is an equity cooperative R&D organization, in which alliance members shares a certain percentage of the shares according to the resource input .While in the average distribution, all market earning will be divided equally to each alliance members regardless of how much each has invested in to R&D, while in the other station , each member according to the proportion of the member input accounting for the league total input distributes their market earning.
The main chapters of this article are the third, the forth, the fifth, the contents are as follows:
Chapter III studies the cooperation alliance structure and distribution within stalemate industry revenue. the game model of parallel R&D alliances and concentration R&D alliance are built in the average allocation and proportional allocation, according to study the R&D investment strategies of the alliance members under the different alliance structure and interest distribution, the optimal model of cooperative R&D was explored in the different market environment, besides, R&D investment incentives mechanism was designed for alliance members to guard against moral hazard R&D alliance.
Chapter IV studies on R&D alliances structure and distribution based on the spillover effects within the industry cooperation. The chapter mainly on account of the existence of the exchange of information between enterprises in the R&D process, and spillover effects of investment caused by research staff turnover. Investment strategy is also focused on in the average allocation and proportion distribution of the alliance members each in the Parallel R&D alliances and Concentration R&D alliance, in order to analysis the impact of R&D investment spillover, the alliance structure and distribution form on the investment strategy of the alliance members, and explore the optimal cooperative R&D model in different market environment.
Chapter V is the study on the alliance structure and distribution based on the technology risk within the industry cooperation. The paper main considers the existence of technical risk in the R&D process, based on which, cooperation game model of the parallel alliances and Concentration R&D alliance are respectively established in the average distribution and proportion distribution. By studying the different structures and different benefits allocations, as well as investment strategy of the alliance members in the different technical risk and market conditions, alliance member investment incentives mechanisms are designed.
The innovations of the papers on the theoretical and methodological are as follows:
①Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, this paper establishs a game model based on rally gains of the industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
②Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, the existense of investment spillover effect among members. The paper establishs a game model based on spillover effects of industry cooperation in R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
③Considering there is also a profit when competitive stalemate exists, and a technical risk when R & D. The paper establishs a game model based on technical risk of cooperative R & D.It studies the different coalition structure, the manner of income distribution, rally gains and the investment strategy of union members under the spillover effects environment, proposes the optimal coalition structure and the manner of income distribution under different external environment
引文
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